JUDGMENT : 1. With the consent of both the parties, the matter is finally heard and decided at this stage. 2. Petitioner has preferred the present writ petition claiming the following reliefs:- "The impugned order Annex. P/3 dated 20.05.2019 may kindly be quashed and set aside and the respondents may kindly be directed to allow the petitioner to work as Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat Manakkhedi, Panchayat Samiti Pilibanga, District Hanumangarh." 3. The core fact of the matter is that the petitioner is an elected Sarpanch of Gram Panchayat of Manakkhedi, Panchayat Samiti Pilibanga, District Hanumangarh for the period of 2015 to 2020. The petitioner has challenged the suspension order dated 20.05.2019 which reads as follows:- **vkns'k Jh d`.kyky] ljiap] xzke iapk;r ekudFksMh] iapk;r lfefr ihyhcaxk] ftyk guqekux<+ ds fo:) iqfyl Fkkuk] lwjrx<+] ftyk Jhxaxkuxj esa vfHk;ksx la[;k 407 fnukad 22-08-18 vUrxZr /kkjk 308] 325] 323] 341] 147 ,oa 149 Hkknl ntZ gSA ftlds rgr mDr ljiap fnukad 04-03-19 ls yxkrkj 48 ?kaVs ls vf/kd U;kf;d vfHkj{kk esa jgk gSA Jh d`.kyky] ljiap] xzke iapk;r ekudFksM+h] iapk;r lfefr ihyhcaxk] ftyk guqekux<+ dk 48 ?kaVs ls vf/kd U;kf;d vfHkj{kk esa jgus ds dkj.k vkjksih ljiap dk mDr d`R; iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 38 ds rgr drZO;ksa ds fuoZgu esa vopkj o vidhfrZdj vkpj.k dh Js.kh esa vkrk gSA vr% jkT; ljdkj jktLFkku iapk;rh jkt vf/kfu;e 1994 dh /kkjk 384 ds rgr iznRr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx djrs gq, ,rn~}kjk Jh d`.kyky] ljiap] xzke iapk;r ekudFksMh] iapk;r lfefr ihyhcaxk] ftyk guqekux<+ dks ljiap xzke iapk;r ekudFksMh ds in ls fuyfEcr djrh gS] rFkk vkns'k iznku djrh gS fd os fuyEcu dky esa iapk;r ds fdlh dk;Z ,oa dk;Zokgh esa Hkkx ugha ysaxsA ;g vkns'k l{ke Lrj ls vuqeksfnr gSA -sd- mi lfpo ,oa mik;qDr tkap** 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the mandate of Section 38 Sub-section (iv) of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 requires two conditions i.e. one an inquiry must have been initiated against the present petitioner or any criminal proceeding in regard to an offence involving moral turpitude was pending trial in the court of law against such elected person. 5. Learned counsel Shri Manish Tak was directed to furnish details as to the stage of FIR / trial and fact of any inquiry having been initiated. 6. Learned counsel for the complainant, who has filed an application for impleading as party, has also been heard. 5. Learned counsel Shri Manish Tak was directed to furnish details as to the stage of FIR / trial and fact of any inquiry having been initiated. 6. Learned counsel for the complainant, who has filed an application for impleading as party, has also been heard. Though the application has not been allowed but he also reiterated stand taken by the respondent. 7. Learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the complainant, however, jointly admit that though the FIR has been filed but the matter still under investigation. It is also admitted by both the respondent counsels that no inquiry as yet has been initiated against the petitioner. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner in his rejoinder arguments has referred to the judgment rendered by this Honble Court (Jaipur Bench) in the matter of Vikas Chouhan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. Reported in (2016) 1 DNJ 66 , decided on 22.07.2015. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as under:- "5. Having regard to the submissions made by the learned counsels for the parties, and to the documents on record, it appears that the petitioner was placed under suspension in view of the provisions contained in Section 38(4) of the said Act on the ground that the criminal proceedings in regard to the offence involving moral turpitude was pending, and that he was in the police custody from 19/2/2015 to 25/2/2015. Now, as per the provisions contained in Section 38(4) of the said Act, the State Government could suspend any member including Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of the Panchayat Raj Institution, against whom an enquiry has been initiated or against whom any criminal proceedings in regard to the offence involved in moral turpitude are pending trial in a Court of law. Hence, the two conditions requisite would be that either the enquiry should have been initiated prior to passing of the suspension order, or the criminal proceedings with regard to the offence involving mortal turpitude should be pending for trial in the Court of law at the time of passing the suspension order. In the instant case, it appears that the respondents had not initiated any enquiry prior to passing of the impugned order, however the petitioner has been placed under suspension on the ground that criminal proceedings with regard to the offence involving mortal turpitude were pending. In the instant case, it appears that the respondents had not initiated any enquiry prior to passing of the impugned order, however the petitioner has been placed under suspension on the ground that criminal proceedings with regard to the offence involving mortal turpitude were pending. Admittedly, at the time of passing the impugned order, even the charge sheet was not filed in respect of the said FIR registered against the petitioner, and therefore it could not be said that the criminal proceedings were pending trial in the court of law. The learned Government Counsel appearing for the respondents has ailed to substantiate as to how the petitioner could have been placed under suspension when no trial was pending in respect of the FIR registered against the petitioner. 6. In that view of the matter, the impugned order passed by the respondent No. 2 being not in consonance with the provisions contained in Section 38(4) of the said Act, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. However, now since the learned Govt. Counsel has stated that the enquiry has already been initiated against the petitioner, it is clarified that the respondent shall be at liberty to take action against the petitioner including placing him under suspension in accordance with law. 7. In view of the above, the impugned order dated 16/6/2015 is quashed and set aside. The petition stands allowed accordingly. By this order, the stay application also stands disposed of." 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the record of the case, this Court is of the opinion that Section 38 Sub-section (iv) of Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 carries two essential conditions for suspending an elected Sarpanch. The two requisite conditions are that the person would be facing criminal trial with regard to offence involving moral turpitude or an inquiry against home has been initiated under Section 38 of Subsection 1 by the State Government. Admittedly, in the present case, there is no order of State Government initiating any inquiry against the present petitioner and nor the FIR has culminated into a trial, as the investigation is still going on. 10. In light of the aforesaid observations, the present writ petition is allowed and the impugned order of suspension passed invoking Section 38 of sub-section (iv) of the Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 is quashed and set aside. Stay petition also stands disposed of accordingly.