JUDGMENT : A.K. JAYASANKARAN NAMBIAR, J. As the aforementioned Writ Petition and O.P.(DRT) involve a common issue, they are taken up together for consideration and disposed by this common judgment. For the sake of convenience, the reference to facts and exhibits is from W.P.(C).No.30651/2017, which is filed by Sri. Ratheesh M.N., who is stated to be the auction purchaser of property comprising of 18.200 cents in Sy.No.648/7/3 of Thrikkakkara North Village, pursuant to a public-e-auction conducted in accordance with the Recovery certificate dated 9.9.2005 issued consequent to the final order of the Debts Recovery Tribunal in O.A.No.6/2005. 2. The brief facts necessary for a disposal of these cases is that, one A.R. Sajan (borrower) and Sri. M.V. Shaji (guarantor), who are arrayed as respondents 6 and 7 in W.P.(C).No.30651/2017, had availed a loan from the Lord Krishna Bank (subsequently taken over by the HDFC Bank, the 5th respondent) by depositing the title deeds in respect of the property aforementioned. Consequent to a default committed by the said persons, in repaying the amounts due to the bank, the bank filed O.S.No.39/1999 against the said defaulters, for recovering the loan amounts. The original of the title deeds, pertaining to the property that was mortgaged with the bank, was produced before the IInd Additional Sub Court, Ernakulam, in connection with the aforesaid suit. It would appear that, in the suit, a consent decree was passed on 3.3.2000, where under, the 6th and 7th respondents were directed to pay an amount of Rs. 6,04,273/- together with future interest @ 20.75% per annum with quarterly rests from the date of the suit till realisation thereof. An amount of Rs. 27,736.50 was also directed to be paid to the plaintiff by way of costs. 3. For executing the decree, O.A.No.6/2005 was filed by the bank before the Debts Recovery Tribunal under S.19 read with S.31A of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the RDDBFI Act”), for the issuance of a Recovery Certificate in terms of the decree. It would appear that by 23.11.2004, the date of filing the said O.A., the decree amount had already swelled to Rs. 18,03,552/-. It would appear that by 23.11.2004, the date of filing the said O.A., the decree amount had already swelled to Rs. 18,03,552/-. The Debts Recovery Tribunal passed the final order in O.A.No.6/2005 on 10.6.2005, directing the issuance of a Recovery Certificate in terms of the decree in O.S.No.39/1999 of the Sub Court, Ernakulam for recovery of the sum of Rs. 18,03,552/- with interest on the sum of Rs. 17,75,815.50 @ 20.75% per annum with quarterly rests from 23.11.2004 till realisation from the defendants personally and by the sale of decree ‘A’ schedule property. The applicant bank was also allowed to recover its costs from the defendants and by sale of decree ‘A’ schedule property. The Recovery Certificate subsequently issued on 9.9.2005 quantifies the total amount due from the 6th and 7th respondents as Rs. 20,14,044.52. 4. It is for recovery of the said amount, and the interest accrued thereon, that a sale proclamation was issued by the Recovery Officer of the DRT on 28.10.2013. Immediately thereafter, the 6th and 7th respondents filed O.P.(DRT).No.4444/2013 challenging the sale proclamation. By a judgment dated 16.12.2013, this Court dismissed the said O.P.(DRT), and relegated the parties to the alternate remedy of filing an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal (DRAT). For reasons best known to the said respondents, they chose not to prefer the Appeal. 5. The property was thereafter sold on 24.2.2014 to Sri. Ratheesh M.N., the petitioner in W.P.(C).No.30651/2017. When faced with the situation where steps were being taken for delivery of possession to the auction purchaser, the defaulting respondents approached this Court through W.P.(C).No.15366/2015, which was dismissed by a learned Single Judge referring to the earlier judgment of this Court in O.P.(DRT).No.4444/2013, and observing that their remedy lay in pursuing a statutory appeal before the DRAT. With a view to protecting their interests, in the interregnum, the learned Judge directed that further steps for delivery of possession of the property to the auction purchaser be kept in abeyance for a period of two weeks. The 6th and 7th respondents thereafter preferred an intra court appeal before a Division Bench, impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The said appeal was however dismissed by the judgment dated 5.3.2015 in W.A.No.523/2015. The 6th and 7th respondents thereafter preferred an intra court appeal before a Division Bench, impugning the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The said appeal was however dismissed by the judgment dated 5.3.2015 in W.A.No.523/2015. The Appellate court also, while relegating the defaulting respondents to their remedy before the DRAT, directed that the delivery of the property to the auction purchaser be kept in abeyance for a further period of two weeks, so as to enable them to pursue the appeal before the DRAT. The Appeal before the DRAT was, however, never filed by the defaulting respondents. 6. On the expiry of the period of stay granted by this Court, the Recovery Officer of the DRT, Ernakulam, directed the 6th and 7th respondents to handover vacant possession of the property in question to the auction purchaser through an Advocate Commissioner appointed by it. When the Advocate Commissioner faced resistance from persons in the locality, while attempting to execute the order, a request was made by the Recovery Officer of the DRT to the Commissioner of Police, Kochi, for police assistance. It was when there was no assistance received from the police authorities that the auction purchaser moved this Court through W.P.(C).No.30651/2017, for an order of police protection. In the said Writ Petition, this Court, by its interim order dated 26.10.2017, directed that in the event of any request being made by the Advocate Commissioner appointed by the DRT, for police protection, the same should be provided by the 3rd and 4th respondents, namely, the City Police Commissioner, Kochi, and the Station House Officer, Kalamassery Police Station respectively, so as to enable the Advocate Commissioner to execute the commission warrant issued by the DRT. 7. It is distressing to note that, notwithstanding the specific direction given for police protection, for the purposes of executing the warrant of the DRT, the warrant could not be executed on account of stubborn obstruction by persons in the locality, who went to the extent of agitating against the steps taken for implementation of the orders passed by this Court. In this connection, Cont. Case (C).No.681/2018 has been filed by the auction purchaser, who is the petitioner in W.P.(C).No.30651/2017, and the same is pending before this Court. 8. In this connection, Cont. Case (C).No.681/2018 has been filed by the auction purchaser, who is the petitioner in W.P.(C).No.30651/2017, and the same is pending before this Court. 8. In the said contempt proceedings, taking note of the stand taken by the State Government whereby they attempted to justify their inaction in effectively dealing with the agitating persons in the locality, this Court, in its order dated 11.7.2018, observed as follows at paragraphs 6, 7 and 8: “6. We have chosen to narrate the factual circumstances of this case in some detail in this order solely to highlight that, while this Court would have been sympathetic to the pleas of persons who have been deprived of their property through fraudulent or deceitful means, the present is a case where the principal borrower and the guarantors, who were active parties to a litigation, have only themselves to blame for the situation that they find themselves in today. Orders passed by a court in adjudication proceedings are binding on the parties to the said proceedings, and they cannot obstruct the implementation of lawful orders by resorting to illegal acts. On its part, the State Government, through its police machinery, is expected to aid the Judiciary in the effective implementation of its orders. If, in the said process, they meet with resistance, then suitable steps have to be taken to remove such resistance, if need be by resorting to force. In a Republic, where the rule of law must prevail, the State Government cannot, and ought not, save through a judicial process, question the orders passed by a court of competent jurisdiction. The State Government cannot, when called upon to assist in the implementation of orders of this Court, refrain from doing so on account of any notions of empathy or misplaced sympathy harboured by it. 7. The learned State Attorney would submit that the orders of this court, if implemented, would cause great suffering to the principal debtor and guarantors referred above. In our view, if the State Government feels that the said persons ought to be relieved of their unfortunate predicament, it is open to them to take appropriate measures to rehabilitate the said persons or ameliorate their hardship. Such measures cannot, however, deprive the auction purchaser of his rights over the property in question, more so when those rights have accrued to him pursuant to long drawn legal proceedings. Such measures cannot, however, deprive the auction purchaser of his rights over the property in question, more so when those rights have accrued to him pursuant to long drawn legal proceedings. At any rate, since we are told that the State Government requires some time to explore the possibility of an amicable resolution of the situation, we grant the respondents herein three weeks time to file an affidavit stating the measures that they propose to take in respect of the said persons, while simultaneously ensuring the implementation of the orders of this Court, and the warrant of the DRT. 8. We might also add that, taking note of the gravity of the situation, we deem it necessary to suo moto implead the following persons as additional respondents in W.P (C) No.30651 of 2017, so that the further discussions of the State Government, in this matter, are held at the highest level. (i) The Secretary, Home Department, Government of Kerala, Secretariat, Thiruvananthapuram; (ii) The State Police Chief, Thiruvananthapuram (iii) The District Collector, Ernakulam The Registry shall communicate a copy of this order to aforesaid three functionaries, as also the Chief Secretary of the State. 9. It was while the proceedings were at this stage that O.P.(DRT).No.136/2018 was filed by Sri. M.V. Shaji, the 7th respondent in W.P.(C).No.30651/2017. In the said O.P.(DRT), the order dated 22.5.2015 of the Recovery Officer, DRT (Ext.P5), by which, an Advocate Commissioner was appointed for the purposes of executing the final order dated 10.6.2005 of the DRT as per which the Recovery Certificate was issued in terms of the decree in O.S.No.39/1999 of Sub Court, Ernakulam is impugned. The main contention urged in the O.P.(DRT) is with regard to the legality of the auction sale that was conducted on 24.2.2014. It is urged that the auction sale was held after a lapse of more than 8 years from the final order dated 10.6.2005 of the DRT in O.A.No.6/2005. It is stated, therefore, that the said sale was vitiated inasmuch as it was in violation of S.29 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, read with Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 10. The O.P.(DRT) was posted for admission before a learned Single Judge on a day when the Contempt Case was also posted before us. It is stated, therefore, that the said sale was vitiated inasmuch as it was in violation of S.29 of the RDDBFI Act, 1993, read with Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act. 10. The O.P.(DRT) was posted for admission before a learned Single Judge on a day when the Contempt Case was also posted before us. When the fact of having filed the O.P.(DRT) before a learned Single Judge was brought to our notice by the learned counsel appearing for the guarantor/mortgagor Sri. M.V. Shaji, who is the petitioner in the O.P.(DRT), as also a contemnor before us in the Contempt Case, we deemed it appropriate to call for the files of the O.P.(DRT) before this Court, so as to consider it together with the Contempt Case. Thereafter, in the post lunch session on 21.11.2018, when the O.P.(DRT) was brought before us, we took note of the contentions in the O.P.(DRT), but felt that the petitioner therein needed to establish his bona fides in the matter of pursuing his remedy through the belated challenge against the order of the Recovery Officer of the DRT, Ernakulam in the said proceedings under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. We took note of the fact that the petitioner in the O.P.(DRT) was one, who was arrayed as the respondent in the Contempt Case and had been prima facie found guilty of contumacious conduct in resisting the authorities who were attempting to implement the directions issued from this Court. We also felt that if, as a matter of fact, there was a grave illegality occasioned against the petitioner in the O.P.(DRT), on account of the auction sale of his property, then, we would be failing in our duty if we did not consider the contentions of the petitioner, on merits. We therefore informed the learned counsel for the petitioner in the O.P.(DRT) that we would exercise our discretion in the matter of entertaining the O.P.(DRT) on merits, only after the petitioner purged himself of the contempt that was prima facie found in Cont. Case (C).No.681/2018. After a brief interaction with his client, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client was agreeable to handover vacant possession of the secured asset, that was purchased by the auction purchaser, to the Village Officer concerned (Village Officer, Thrikkakkara) within 48 hours. Case (C).No.681/2018. After a brief interaction with his client, the learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that his client was agreeable to handover vacant possession of the secured asset, that was purchased by the auction purchaser, to the Village Officer concerned (Village Officer, Thrikkakkara) within 48 hours. Pursuant to the said undertaking, the petitioner in the O.P.(DRT).No.136/2018 handed over vacant possession of the property to the Village Officer, and the report of the Village Officer indicates that vacant possession of the secured asset, including the locking and sealing of the building forming part of the secured asset, has been duly secured by the Village Officer. 11. Before dealing with the contentions urged by counsel on either side, we might observe that in these cases, we are called upon to balance two conflicting claims viz. that of a mortgagor to redeem his mortgaged property and that of an auction purchaser who obtained the title to the property based on a sale conducted by the bank in execution of a decree obtained against the mortgagor. It is settled law that under the RDDBFI Act, 1993, the mortgagor loses his right of redemption in respect of the mortgaged property on the sale being confirmed in favour of an auction purchaser. While the law zealously guards against the deprivation of the right of redemption available to a mortgagor, the sale to an auction purchaser is the point at which the rubicon is crossed and the mortgagor loses his right to redeem the mortgaged property. Under normal circumstances, therefore, acting on the plethora of precedents from the Supreme Court on this issue, this court would not interfere with the rights that have accrued to an auction purchaser pursuant to a sale validly held. That being said, one cannot forget that when a mortgagor is deprived of his right to redeem the mortgaged property, he effectively loses all his rights over the property in question, including the valuable right that he has in terms of Article 300-A of our Constitution which, in unambiguous terms, states that no person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law. It follows, therefore, that if we were to find that the sale of the mortgagors property was held in a manner not authorised by the statutory provisions, or in gross disregard to those statutory provisions as are designed to prevent an unjust deprivation of the mortgagors right to redeem his property, then we would be constrained to recognise the larger Constitutional right of the mortgagor and hold the deprivation of property from the mortgagor, as without the authority of law. In that event, we would also have to ignore technical arguments with regard to the delay in mounting a challenge to the sale proceedings, or of the mortgagor not having taken timely action against adverse orders passed against him in the past, so as to recognise and effectuate the Constitutional right guaranteed to the mortgagor. We would do so because, as observed by Justice Krishna Iyer in Shivshankar Dal Mills v. State of Haryana (1980) 2 SCC 437 ), “the dharma of the situation admits of no equivocation” and recognising that “in our jurisprudence it is not palatable to turn down the prayer for high prerogative writs on the negative plea of alternate remedy”. 12. While not condoning the acts of indiscretion and obstruction of the course of justice, resorted to by the mortgagor, or others at his instance, we cannot but take note of the reality that the consent decree passed on 03.03.2000 quantified the dues to the bank @ Rs. 6,04,273/- plus future interest. This sum swelled to Rs. 18,03,552/- as on 23.11.2004 and to Rs. 20,14,044.52 as on 10.06.2005, for which the recovery certificate was issued. It is probably on account of his ignorance of the legal provisions or on account of wrong advise received by him that he chose not to pay the decree amount earlier and redeem his property. At any rate, if we were to find that the sale conducted by the bank in 24.02.2014 was illegal, then it would be a travesty of justice if we were to non-suit the mortgagor in his quest for a redemption of the mortgaged property, on purely technical grounds. 13. At any rate, if we were to find that the sale conducted by the bank in 24.02.2014 was illegal, then it would be a travesty of justice if we were to non-suit the mortgagor in his quest for a redemption of the mortgaged property, on purely technical grounds. 13. In the instant case, the creditor bank had already obtained a consent decree from the Sub Court, Ernakulam that entitled it to certain sums of money from the mortgagor, as also a right to sell the mortgaged property for the purposes of realisation of the dues from the mortgagor. It was this decree that was sought to be executed by the bank when it preferred the O.A. before the DRT in terms of S.19 read with S.31A of the RDDBFI Act. On the final order being passed by the DRT in the said O.A., and a Recovery Certificate having been issued based thereon, the bank was to proceed to recover the money in one of the modes prescribed in S.25 of the RDDBFI Act. It would appear that the bank chose to move for attachment and sale of the immovable property for recovering its dues. In terms of S.29 of the RDDBFI act, the bank was obliged to follow the procedure for recovery of tax, as prescribed under the Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act, read with the Income Tax (Certificate Proceedings) Rules, 1962, to the extent applicable to the proceedings under the RDDBFI Act. The Part III of the 799 Second Schedule to the Income Tax Act deals with the procedure for attachment and sale of immovable property. In the instant case, since the mortgage was one created by deposit of title deeds, there was no necessity for the bank to resort to a procedure for attachment of the property as a pre-condition for, or prior to, the sale thereof. Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the IT Act clearly mandates that no sale of immovable property shall be made after the expiry of three years from the end of the financial year in which the order giving rise to a demand of dues became conclusive. In the context of the recovery steps initiated under the RDDBFI Act, this would translate as three years from the end of the financial year in which the recovery certificate was issued. In the context of the recovery steps initiated under the RDDBFI Act, this would translate as three years from the end of the financial year in which the recovery certificate was issued. While, the learned counsel for the auction purchaser would vehemently contend that Rule 68B would apply only in a situation where there was an attachment of the immovable property prior to its sale, we are of the view that the phrase “shall, as far as possible, apply with necessary modifications as if the said provisions and the rules referred to the amount of debt due under this Act instead of to the Income Tax Act” appearing in S.29 of the RDDBFI clearly indicates that the words “for the recovery of which the immovable property has been attached” appearing in Rule 68B are wholly irrelevant, when an attachment of the immovable property is not required prior to its sale, on account of the title deeds of the property already being in the hands of the creditor consequent to the creation of the mortgage by deposit of title deeds. The recovery certificate in the instant case was issued on 09.09.2005 and, as per the provisions of Rule 68B, the sale should have taken place on or before 31.03.2009. The sale proclamation in the instant case, however, was only on 28.10.2013, and the sale itself on 24.02.2014, more than eight years after the issuance of the recovery certificate. As none of the exceptional circumstances mentioned in Rule 68B for extending the time limit, are made out in the instant case, the sale conducted by the bank was clearly illegal and void. 14. Having found that the sale conducted was contrary to the statutory provisions, and therefore a nullity in law, we have to now consider how best we can restore the parties to the position that existed immediately prior to the sale. Based on our directions, the learned counsel for the bank has furnished a statement showing the dues that were outstanding from the mortgagor to the bank, as on 31.03.2009 on or before which date the sale had to be conducted by the bank as per the statutory provisions. The figure arrived at, by adopting the interest rate mentioned in the decree of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam is Rs. 43,51,362.85. The figure arrived at, by adopting the interest rate mentioned in the decree of the Sub-Court, Ernakulam is Rs. 43,51,362.85. As per the provisions of the RDDBFI Act, if the mortgagor had paid the said amount to the Bank on 31.03.2009, he would have been entitled to redeem the mortgaged property. As we are dealing with a situation where a sale, albeit illegal, had taken place and the property is purchased by the auction purchaser, we have to take cue from the provisions of the Second Schedule to the I.T. Act, to determine the extent to which the auction purchaser would have to be compensated for the sale that has been set aside. Rule 60 of the Recovery Rules, while dealing with the procedure to set aside a sale of immovable property on deposit by the defaulter of the amounts due to the creditor, indicates that the purchaser has to be paid, by way of penalty, a sum equal to five per cent of the purchase money, but not less than one rupee. The auction purchaser had paid an amount of Rs. 37,80,000/- for purchasing the property, and five per cent of the said amount i.e., Rs. 1,89,000/- would have to be paid to him by the mortgagor, at whose instance the sale was set aside. 15. The upshot of the above discussion is that while the Cont. Case (C).No. 681/2018 will be dealt separately, in view of our prima facie finding on the contumacious obstruction by the guarantor/mortgagor, W.P.(C).No.30651 of 2017, preferred by the auction purchaser, seeking police protection for execution of the warrant of the Recovery Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal is dismissed, and O.P. (DRT).No.136 of 2018 preferred by the mortgagor is allowed on the following terms: i. The sale that took place on 24.02.2014, having breached the condition in Rule 68B of the Second Schedule to the I.T. Act requiring it to take place within three years from the date of the recovery certificate, is set aside as illegal and void. ii. As a consequence to the said declaration, the Recovery certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal on 09.09.2005, the Sale proclamation dated 28.10.2013 as also the order dated 22.5.2015 of the Recovery Officer, DRT (Ext.P5), by which an Advocate Commissioner was appointed for the purposes of executing the final order dated 10.6.2005 of the DRT, are also set aside. iii. As a consequence to the said declaration, the Recovery certificate issued by the Debt Recovery Tribunal on 09.09.2005, the Sale proclamation dated 28.10.2013 as also the order dated 22.5.2015 of the Recovery Officer, DRT (Ext.P5), by which an Advocate Commissioner was appointed for the purposes of executing the final order dated 10.6.2005 of the DRT, are also set aside. iii. The mortgagor petitioner in O.P.(DRT).No.136 of 2018 shall pay an amount of Rs. 43,51,362.85 to the bank in order to redeem the mortgaged property. He shall, in addition to the said amount, pay an amount of Rs. 1,89,000/- to the auction purchaser, petitioner in W.P.(C) No.30651 of 2017. The said payments shall be effected on or before 15.3.2019. On the said payments being made, the mortgagor shall be entitled to return of the title deeds in respect of the mortgaged property from the bank and on receipt of the same, he shall approach the village officer, with whom we had entrusted the task of securing vacant possession of the mortgaged property, for obtaining restoration of possession of the property. iv. If the petitioner in O.P.(DRT).No.136 of 2018 defaults in payment of the aforesaid amounts, within the time granted, the bank will be free to proceed with the recovery steps based on the Final Order dated 10.06.2005 of the Debt Recovery Tribunal in O.A.No.6 of 2005. In that event, the bank will be at liberty to seek a fresh recovery certificate from the Recovery Officer of the Debt Recovery Tribunal. The bank will also, in that event, be entitled to have vacant possession of the mortgaged property and the village officer shall do the needful to ensure that. v. As for the auction purchaser, he shall be entitled to a return of the purchase money paid by him for the property at the sale held on 24.04.2014. He shall also be entitled to the bank rate of interest, as applicable to savings accounts, for the said amount for the period from the date of payment of the purchase price to the date of refund to him of the said sum by the bank. Further, in the event of the petitioner in O.P.(DRT).No.136 of 2018 not paying him the amount of Rs. Further, in the event of the petitioner in O.P.(DRT).No.136 of 2018 not paying him the amount of Rs. 1,89,000/- within the time granted in this judgment, he is permitted to recover the said amount from the bank which, in turn, shall add the said sum to the amounts outstanding from the mortgagor and treat it as forming part of the decree amount recoverable from the mortgagor.