Research › Search › Judgment

Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1652 (HP)

Pratibha Sharma v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2019-11-06

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. 1. By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of FIR No. 0122 dated 15.12.2016 under Sections 309 of Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) registered with Police Station, East Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. as well as consequent challan No. 93/2018, titled as State vs. Pratibha pending adjudication in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. primarily on two grounds; (i) no criminal proceedings under Section 309 of IPC could have been initiated against her on the basis of FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings as the same is based upon her own statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. (ii) Section 115 of Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, provides that any person, who attempts to commit suicide shall be presumed to have severe stress unless proved otherwise, and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code. 2. Necessary facts, which may be relevant for adjudication of the case are that marriage of the petitioner was solemnized on 3.6.2010 with a divorcee namely, Anurag Sharma. Since the petitioner and her above named husband were unable to live together on account of certain differences, husband of the petitioner filed Divorce Petition in January, 2012 in the Court of learned District Judge, Kullu, H.P. on the ground of cruelty and adultery. In the aforesaid proceedings of divorce initiated at the behest of the husband of the petitioner, an application having been filed by the petitioner for maintenance pen-dentelite at the rate of Rs. 15,000/- per month and litigation charges to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- came to be allowed (Annexure P-1). 3. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated 7.7.2012, husband of the petitioner firstly preferred Civil Revision No. 98 of 2012 before this Court, which came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 31.5.2013 (Annexure P-2) and thereafter filed Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 26774 of 2013 before the Hon'ble Apex Court, but same was also dismissed vide order dated 31.5.2013 (Annexure P-3). Record further reveals that divorce petition filed by the husband of the petitioner also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 11.3.2014, passed by learned District Judge, Kullu, H.P. in HMP No. 19 of 2011(23 of 2012)499 of 2013 (Annexure P-4). Record further reveals that divorce petition filed by the husband of the petitioner also came to be dismissed vide judgment dated 11.3.2014, passed by learned District Judge, Kullu, H.P. in HMP No. 19 of 2011(23 of 2012)499 of 2013 (Annexure P-4). Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the aforesaid judgment rendered by learned District Judge, Kullu, H.P. husband of the petitioner firstly approached this Court by way of appeal bearing FAO No. 208 of 2014, but same was dismissed vide judgment dated 26.11.2014 (Annexure P-5) and thereafter before Hon'ble Apex Court, which was also dismissed on 27.7.2015 (Annexure P-6). 4. Material available on record further reveals that husband of the petitioner also filed FIR bearing No. 29, dated 7.1.2012 against the father of the petitioner and her brother-in-law as counter measure to the petition filed by the petitioner herein under the Domestic Violence Act, but same was cancelled since allegations contained in the same were not found to be genuine. 5. Though, during the pendency of aforesaid proceedings before the various Courts of law, petitioner had been residing separately at Mandi, but on 14.12.2016 with a view to appear in an interview with outsourcing agency NIELIT, Shimla, she visited Shimla. Allegedly, after appearing in the interview, the petitioner went to the house of her father-in-law, where he resides with his wife, but since they refused to entertain her, she was compelled to sleep in the gallery of the house. Allegedly, being hurt with the indifferent behaviour of her in-laws and maltreatment meted by her husband, petitioner consumed phenyl. Petitioner was taken to IGMC, Shimla, whereafter FIR (Annexure P-7) sought to be quashed and set-aside in the instant proceedings, came to be lodged against her on the basis of her statement recorded in the hospital under Section 154 Cr.P.C. In the aforesaid background, petitioner has approached this Court in the instant proceedings for quashment of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law on the grounds taken note hereinabove. 6. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel representing the parties and gone through the record. 7. Before ascertaining the correctness of the submissions/grounds having been made/raised by learned counsel representing the parties vis-a-vis prayer made in the instant petition for quashment of FIR, this Court at the first instance deems it necessary to elaborate upon the scope and competence of this Court to quash the criminal proceedings while exercising power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Hon'ble Apex Court in judgment titled State of Haryana and Others vs. Bhajan Lal and Others, (1992) Supp 1 SCC 335 has laid down several principles, which govern the exercise of jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Before pronouncement of aforesaid judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, a three-Judge Bench of Hon'ble Court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 , held that the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. Relevant para is being reproduced herein-below:- "7....In the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceeding ought to be quashed. The saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose which is that a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High Court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice has got to be administered according to laws made by the legislature. The compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realisation of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High Court to do justice, between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction." 8. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Bhajan Lal (supra), has elaborately considered the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in Vineet Kumar and Others vs. State of U.P. and Another, while considering the scope of interference under Sections 397 Cr.P.C. and 482 Cr.P.C. by the High Courts, has held that High Court is entitled to quash a proceeding, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceeding to continue would be an abuse of the process of the Court or that the ends of justice require that the proceedings ought to quashed. The Hon'ble Apex Court further held that the saving of the High Court's inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, is designed to achieve a salutary public purpose i.e. a court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In the aforesaid case, the Hon'ble Apex Court taking note of seven categories, where power can be exercised under Section 482 Cr.P.C. as enumerated in Bhajan Lal (supra), i.e. where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fides and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge, quashed the proceedings. 9. Hon'ble Apex Court in Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , while drawing strength from its earlier judgment titled as Rajiv Thapar and Others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , reiterated that High Court has inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charge, but such power must always be used with caution, care and circumspection. While invoking its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts and the material adduced on record itself overrules the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. In the aforesaid judgment titled Prashant Bharti vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2013) 9 SCC 293 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under:- "22. The proposition of law, pertaining to quashing of criminal proceedings, initiated against an accused by a High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter referred to as "the Cr.P.C.") has been dealt with by this Court in Rajiv Thapar and Others vs. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330 , paras 29-30 wherein this Court inter alia held as under: 29. The issue being examined in the instant case is the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. if it chooses to quash the initiation of the prosecution against an accused, at the stage of issuing process, or at the stage of committal, or even at the stage of framing of charges. These are all stages before the commencement of the actual trial. The same parameters would naturally be available for later stages as well. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/ complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. The power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. at the stages referred to hereinabove, would have far reaching consequences, inasmuch as, it would negate the prosecution's/ complainant's case without allowing the prosecution/complainant to lead evidence. Such a determination must always be rendered with caution, care and circumspection. To invoke its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied, that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts; the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused; and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations contained in the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. It should be sufficient to rule out, reject and discard the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without the necessity of recording any evidence. For this the material relied upon by the defence should not have been refuted, or alternatively, cannot be justifiably refuted, being material of sterling and impeccable quality. The material relied upon by the accused should be such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the actual basis of the accusations as false. In such a situation, the judicial conscience of the High Court would persuade it to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash such criminal proceedings, for that would prevent abuse of process of the court, and secure the ends of justice. 30. Based on the factors canvassed in the foregoing paragraphs, we would delineate the following steps to determine the veracity of a prayer for quashing, raised by an accused by invoking the power vested in the High Court under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. 30.1 Step one, whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable, and indubitable, i.e. the material is of sterling and impeccable quality? 30.2 Step two, whether the material relied upon by the accused, would rule out the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused, i.e. the material is sufficient to reject and overrule the factual assertions contained in the complaint, i.e. the material is such, as would persuade a reasonable person to dismiss and condemn the factual basis of the accusations as false. 30.3 Step three, whether the material relied upon by the accused, has not been refuted by the prosecution/complainant; and/or the material is such, that it cannot be justifiably refuted by the prosecution/complainant? 30.4 Step four, whether proceeding with the trial would result in an abuse of process of the court, and would not serve the ends of justice? 30.5 If the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative, judicial conscience of the High Court should persuade it to quash such criminal - proceedings, in exercise of power vested in it under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. Such exercise of power, besides doing justice to the accused, would save precious court time, which would otherwise be wasted in holding such a trial (as well as, proceedings arising therefrom) specially when, it is clear that the same would not conclude in the conviction of the accused." 10. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa vs. State of Andhra Pradesh, (2011) 11 SCC 259 , has held as under: "12. This Court, in a number of cases, has laid down the scope and ambit of the High Court's power under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Inherent power under section 482 Cr.P.C. though wide have to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with great caution and only when such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid down in this section itself. Authority of the court exists for the advancement of justice. If any abuse of the process leading to injustice is brought to the notice of the court, then the Court would be justified in preventing injustice by invoking inherent powers in absence of specific provisions in the Statute. 13. The law has been crystallized more than half a century ago in the case of R.P. Kapur vs. State of Punjab, (1960) AIR SC 866 wherein this Court has summarized some categories of cases where inherent power can and should be exercised to quash the proceedings. This Court summarized the following three broad categories where the High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under section 482: (i) where it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the institution or continuance of the proceedings. (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (ii) where the allegations in the first information report or complaint taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not constitute the offence alleged. (iii) where the allegations constitute an offence but there is no legal evidence adduced or the evidence adduced clearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge." 14. In Smt. Nagawwa vs. Veeranna Shivalingappa Konjalgi and Others, (1976) 3 SCC 736 , according to the court, the process against the accused can be quashed or set aside: "(1) where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value make out absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused. (2) where the allegations made in the complaint are patently absurd and inherently improbable so that no prudent person can ever reach a conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (3) where the discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible. (4) where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like." 15. This court in State of Karnataka vs. L. Muniswamy and Others, (1977) 2 SCC 699 , observed that the wholesome power under section 482 Cr.P.C. entitles the High Court to quash a proceeding when it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of the process of the court or that the ends of justice requires that the proceedings ought to be quashed. The High Courts have been invested with inherent powers, both in civil and criminal matters, to achieve a salutary public purpose. A Court proceeding ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment or persecution. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts." 11. In this case, the court observed that ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice must be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This case has been followed in a large number of subsequent cases of this court and other courts." 11. Hon'ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 Cr.P.C. 12. Careful perusal of FIR dated 15.12.2016 (Annexure P-7) clearly reveals that petitioner herself is a complainant because FIR sought to be quashed in the instant proceedings admittedly came to be lodged on the basis of the statement given by the petitioner under Section 154 Cr.P.C. Learned Additional Advocate General was unable to dispute that in the case at hand petitioner herself is a complainant and as such, there appears to be considerable force in the argument of learned counsel representing the petitioner that case registered under Section 309 of IPC against the petitioner, is not sustainable being violative of fundamental rights as enshrined under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. 13. At this stage, it would be apt to reproduce Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India herein:- 20. Protection in respect of conviction for offences:- (1) No person shall be convicted of any offence except for violation of a law in force at the time of the commission of the act charged as an offence, nor be subjected to a penalty greater than that which might have been inflicted under the law in force at the time of the commission of the offence. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 14. Bare reading of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, clearly reveals that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself/herself. (2) No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. (3) No person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. 14. Bare reading of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, clearly reveals that no person accused of any offence shall be compelled to be a witness against himself/herself. Interestingly, in the case at hand petitioner in her statement recorded under Section 154 Cr.P.C. herself gave narration of facts leading her to make an attempt to commit suicide. Presumably, after alleged attempt to commit suicide by the petitioner, other family members, especially father-in-law and mother-in-law must have taken petitioner to the hospital. Similarly, this Court can presume that information with regard to alleged attempt to commit suicide must have been given to the Police Authorities by the Doctor attending upon the petitioner, but there is no material, worth the name, available on record suggestive of the fact that FIR against the petitioner for the alleged commission of offence under Section 309 of IPC came to be registered either at the behest of Medical Officer treating her or family members, who took her to hospital after the alleged incident, rather close scrutiny of FIR (Annexure P-7), itself suggests that police recorded the statement of the petitioner, wherein she while narrating sequence of events compelling her to commit suicide made a prayer to take action against culprits. 15. Having carefully perused the provisions of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, this Court is in total agreement with Mr. Chandel, learned counsel representing the petitioner that FIR lodged against the petitioner for the commission of offence under Section 309 of IPC, is not sustainable because admittedly prosecution with a view to prove its case or contents of the FIR would be necessarily required to examine the person, who has lodged the complaint, meaning thereby petitioner, who is the complainant would be compelled to depose against herself, enabling prosecution to establish case against her under Section 309 of IPC, which action, if allowed/permitted would be definitely in complete violation of Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. Argument advanced by learned Additional Advocate General that since petitioner made statement under Section 154 Cr.P.C of her free will and volition, she is not entitled to invoke her right against self incrimination under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India, deserves out right rejection being wholly untenable. Needless to say, protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not extend to any kind of evidence but for self incriminating statements relating to the charges brought against an accused. Similarly, in order to bring testimony of the accused within the prohibition of constitutional protection, it must be of such character that by itself it tends to incriminate the accused. Similarly, for invoking the constitutional right under Article 20(3) a formal accusation against the person claiming the protection must exist. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Balasaheb alias Ramesh Deshmukh vs. State of Maharashtra, (2011) AIR SC 304, wherein it has been held as under:- 5. At the first blush we were inclined to accept this submission but on a deeper scrutiny we find no substance in it and the decision relied on instead of supporting his case, goes against him. Protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution does not extend to any kind of evidence but only to self-incriminating statements relating to the charges brought against an accused. In order to bring the testimony of an accused within the prohibition of constitutional protection, it must be of such character that by itself it tend to incriminate the accused. Appellant is not an accused in the Police case and in fact a witness, whose statement was recorded under Article 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code, and, therefore, not entitled to a blanket protection. However, in case of trial in the Police case answer to certain question if tends to incriminate the appellant he can seek protection at that stage. Whether answer to a question is incriminating or otherwise has to be considered at the time it is put. However, in case of trial in the Police case answer to certain question if tends to incriminate the appellant he can seek protection at that stage. Whether answer to a question is incriminating or otherwise has to be considered at the time it is put. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this Court in the case of State of Bombay vs. Kathi Kalu Oghad, (1961) AIR SC 1808, wherein it has been held as follows: "In order that a testimony by an accused person may be said to have been self-incriminatory the compulsion of which comes within the prohibition of the constitutional provision, it must be of such a character that by itself it should have the tendency of incriminating the accused, if not also of actually doing so. In other words, it should be a statement which makes the case against the accused person at least probable, considered by itself." 6. We are of the opinion that for invoking the constitutional right under Article 20(3) a formal accusation against the person claiming the protection must exist. Simply because the appellant figures as the accused in the complaint case, a blanket protection as claimed by him cannot be granted. Reference in this connection can be made to a decision of this Court in the case of Raja Narayanlal Bansilal vs. Maneck Phiroz Mistry and Another, (1961) AIR SC 29, wherein it has been held as follows: "The effect of this decision thus appears to be that one of the essential conditions for invoking the constitutional guarantee enshrined in Article 20(3) is that a formal accusation relating to the commission of an offence, which would normally lead to his prosecution, must have been levelled against the party who is being compelled to give evidence against himself; and this conclusion, in our opinion, is fully consistent with the two other decisions of this Court to which we have already referred. 7. Referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah (supra), relied on by the appellant, the same in spite of supporting his case goes against him which would be evident from the following paragraph of the said judgment: "24. 7. Referring to the decision of this Court in the case of Ramanlal Bhogilal Shah (supra), relied on by the appellant, the same in spite of supporting his case goes against him which would be evident from the following paragraph of the said judgment: "24. Although we hold that the petitioner is a person accused of an offence within the meaning of Article 20(3), the only protection that Article 20(3) gives to him is that he cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself. But this does not mean that he need not give information regarding matters which do not tend to incriminate him. 8. Mr. Deshmukh, then contends that the protection under Article 20(3) goes beyond the complaint case but shall cover the Police case also because appellant is an accused in relation to the same incident and the trial is pending in the said case. Reliance has been placed on a decision of this Court in the case of Nandini Satpathy vs. P.L. Dani and Another, (1978) 2 SCC 424 and our attention has been drawn to paragraph 57 of the judgment which reads as follows: "57. We hold that Section 161 enables the police to examine the accused during investigation. The prohibitive sweep of Article 20(3) goes back to the stage of police interrogation - not, as contended, commencing in court only. In our judgment, the provisions of Article 20(3) and Section 161(1) substantially cover the same area, so far as police investigations are concerned. The ban on self-accusation and the right to silence, while one investigation or trial is under way, goes beyond that case and protects the accused in regard to other offences pending or imminent, which may deter him from voluntary disclosure of criminatory matter. We are disposed to read "compelled testimony" as evidence procured not merely by physical threats or violence but by psychic torture, atmospheric pressure, environmental coercion, tiring interrogative prolixity, overbearing and intimidatory methods and the like - not legal penalty for violation. So, the legal perils following upon refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a calculated risk. So, the legal perils following upon refusal to answer, or answer truthfully, cannot be regarded as compulsion within the meaning of Article 20(3). The prospect of prosecution may lead to legal tension in the exercise of a constitutional right, but then, a stance of silence is running a calculated risk. On the other hand, if there is any mode of pressure, subtle or crude, mental or physical, direct or indirect, but sufficiently substantial, applied by the policeman for obtaining information from an accused strongly suggestive of guilt, it becomes "compelled testimony" violative of Article 20(3)." We do not find any substance in this submission of the learned Counsel and the decision relied on is clearly distinguishable. 9. As observed earlier the appellant is not an accused in the Police case and in fact a witness whose statement was recorded during the course of investigation under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In the Police case he utmost can be asked to support the case of the prosecution but no question indented to incriminate him can be asked and in case it is done the protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution shall spring into action. What question shall be put to this appellant when he appears as a witness is a matter of guess and on that basis he does not deserve the blanket protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Even at the cost of the repetition we may observe that in the Police case when he appears and asked to answer question, the answer whereof tends to incriminate him, he can refuse to answer the same pleading protection under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. In such eventuality the Court would decide the same. Therefore, at this stage the blanket protection sought by the appellant is not fit to be granted." 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in Mohammed Ajmal Mohammad Amir Kasab alias ABU Mujahid vs. State of Maharashtra, (2012) AIR SC 3565, has categorically held that right against self incrimination under Article 20(3) does not exclude any voluntary statements made in exercise of free will and volition. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment herein-below:- "454. Moreover, a bare reference to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would show that those provisions are designed to afford complete protection to the accused against self-incrimination. Section 161(2) of the Cr.P.C. disallows incriminating answers to police interrogations. It would be profitable to reproduce following paras of the judgment herein-below:- "454. Moreover, a bare reference to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. would show that those provisions are designed to afford complete protection to the accused against self-incrimination. Section 161(2) of the Cr.P.C. disallows incriminating answers to police interrogations. Section 162(1) makes any statements, in any form, made to police officers inadmissible excepting those that may lead to discovery of any fact (vide Section 27 of the Evidence Act) and that may constitute a dying declaration (vide Section 32of the Evidence Act). Coupled with these provisions of the Cr.P.C. is Section 25 of the Evidence Act that makes any confession by an accused made to a police officer completely inadmissible. Section 163 of the Cr.P.C. prohibits the use of any inducement, threat or promise by a police officer. And then comes Section 164 Cr.P.C. dealing with the recording of confessions and statements made before a magistrate. Subsection (1) of Section 164 provides for recording any confession or statement in the course of an investigation, or at any time before the commencement of the inquiry or trial; sub-section (2) mandates the magistrate to administer the pre- confession caution to the accused and also requires him to be satisfied, as a judicial authority, about the confession being made voluntarily; sub- section (3) provides one of the most important protections to the accused by stipulating that in case the accused produced before the magistrate declines to make the confession, the magistrate shall not authorize his detention in police custody; sub-section (4) incorporates the post- confession safeguard and requires the magistrate to make a memorandum at the foot of the confession regarding the caution administered to the accused and a certificate to the effect that the confession as recorded is a full and true account of the statement made. Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is to be read along with Section 26 of the Evidence Act, which provides that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. 455. Section 164 of the Cr.P.C. is to be read along with Section 26 of the Evidence Act, which provides that no confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be made in the immediate presence of a magistrate, shall be proved as against such person. 455. It is thus clear to us that the protection to the accused against any self-incrimination guaranteed by the Constitution is very strongly built into the Indian statutory framework and we see absolutely no reason to draw any help from the Miranda principles for providing protection against self-incrimination to the accused." 17. If contents of FIR sought to be quashed are read in its entirety, it certainly compels this Court to point out callous and irresponsible approach of police officials, who lodged the FIR on the basis of the statement made by the petitioner. In the first part of FIR sequence of events which allegedly led petitioner to make an attempt to commit suicide stands recorded/ taken note of, but interestingly in second part of the FIR police despite having noticed prayer made on behalf of the petitioner to act against her in laws and husband, proceeded to lodge case under Section 309 of IPC against the petitioner and not against her in laws and husband under Section 306 of IPC. As has been observed hereinabove, prosecution with a view to prove its case is necessarily required to examine petitioner being complainant and if permitted, she would be virtually called upon to depose against herself, which is otherwise not permissible in view of the provisions contained under Article 20(3) of the Constitution of India. 18. Moreover, section 25 of IPC, provides that confession, if any, made to the police official cannot be proved against a person accused of any offence. Section 25 of IPC makes confessional statement of accused before the police official inadmissible in evidence and same cannot be brought on record by the prosecution to obtain conviction. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Singh vs. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2011) AIR SC 2490, wherein it has been held as under:- "7. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Ram Singh vs. Central Bureau of Narcotics, (2011) AIR SC 2490, wherein it has been held as under:- "7. In view of the rival submissions questions which fall for determination in this appeal are as follows: (i) Whether the confessions made before the officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics are admissible in evidence. (ii) Whether the confessions made were voluntary in nature and if so without corroboration, can it form the basis for conviction. (iii) Whether the appellant can be said to be in possession of the opium or selling the same. 8. In order to answer these questions it is expedient to examine the scheme of the Act. Section 42 of the Act confers on specified categories of officers power of entry, search, seizure and arrest without warrant or authorization. Section 43 thereof confers the power of seizure and arrest. Section 51 of the Act, inter alia, provides application of the provisions of Code of Criminal Procedure to all warrants issued and arrests, searches and seizures made under the Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with its provisions. Power to call for information to the officers specified is conferred by Section 67 of the Act and the confessions in the present case have been recorded in exercise of the said power. Section 25 of the Evidence Act makes confessional statement given by an accused before police officers inadmissible in evidence which cannot be brought on record by the prosecution to obtain conviction. Further Section 26 of the Evidence Act in no uncertain terms provides that the confession made while in custody of police officer cannot be proved against accused to support the criminal charge. Therefore, what needs to be considered is as to whether the officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics, who had recorded the confessions, are police officers within the meaning of Section 25 and26 of the Evidence Act. True it is that Section 53 of the Act confers powers to the Central Government to invest officers of the specified categories, the powers of an officer-in-charge of police station but that itself, in our opinion, shall not make them the police officers within the meaning of Section 25and 26 of the Evidence Act. True it is that Section 53 of the Act confers powers to the Central Government to invest officers of the specified categories, the powers of an officer-in-charge of police station but that itself, in our opinion, shall not make them the police officers within the meaning of Section 25and 26 of the Evidence Act. The officers with whom lie the powers of search, seizure and investigation under the Act have not been conferred with the power to submit report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Such officer is required to lay complaint in the Court of Special Judge for prosecuting an accused. In our opinion the power to submit report under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is necessary to make the officers of the Central Bureau of Narcotics police officers within the meaning of Section 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. The important attribute of Police Officer is not only to investigate but also to launch prosecution by filing a report or charge-sheet. In view of the pronouncement of this Court in the case of Raj Kumar Karwal vs. Union of India and Others, (1990) 2 SCC 409 , this question does not need much discussion. This was a case under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act itself and on review of large number of authorities, this Court came to the following conclusion in paragraph 22 of the judgment which reads as follows: ".........The important attribute of police power is not only the power to investigate into the commission of cognizable offence but also the power to prosecute the offender by filing a report or a charge-sheet under Section 173 of the Code. That is why this Court has since the decision in Badku Joti Savant vs. State of Mysore, (1966) AIR SC 1746, accepted the ratio that unless an officer is invested under any special law with the powers of investigation under the Code, including the power to submit a report under Section 173, he cannot be described to be a 'police officer' under Section 25, Evidence Act........." 19. First Information Report given by the accused to the police Officer amounts to confessional statement. Reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Aghnoo Nagesia vs. State of Bihar, (1966) AIR SC 119, wherein it has been held as under:- "9. First Information Report given by the accused to the police Officer amounts to confessional statement. Reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Aghnoo Nagesia vs. State of Bihar, (1966) AIR SC 119, wherein it has been held as under:- "9. Section 25 of the Evidence Act is one of the provisions of law dealing with confessions made by an accused. The law relating to confessions is to be found generally in ss. 24 to30 of the Evidence Act and ss. 162 and 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898. Sections 17 to 31 of the Evidence Act are to he found under the heading "Admissions." Confession is a species of admission, and is dealt with in ss. 24 to 30. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it, unless its admissibility is excluded by some provision of law. Section 24 excludes confessions caused by certain inducements, threats and promises. Section 25 provides. "No confession made to a police officer, shall be proved as against a person accused of an offence." The terms of s. 25 are imperative. A confession made to a police officer under any circumstances is not admissible in evidence against the accused. It covers a confession made when he was free and not in police custody, as also a confession made before any investigation has begun. The expression "accused of any offence" covers a person accused of an offence at the trial whether or not he was accused of the offence when he made the confession. Section 26 prohibits proof against any person of a confession made by him in the custody of a police officer, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. The partial ban imposed by S. 26 relates to a confession made to a person other than a police officer. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by s. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by ss. 24, 25 and 26. Section 26 does not qualify the absolute ban imposed by s. 25 on a confession made to a police officer. Section 27 is in the form of a proviso, and partially lifts the ban imposed by ss. 24, 25 and 26. It provides that when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure forbids the use of any statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of the offence Order investigation, save as mentioned in the proviso and in cases falling under sub-s (2), and it specifically provides that nothing in it shall be deemed to affect the provisions of S. 27 of the Evidence Act. The words of s. 162 are wide enough to include a confession made to a police officer in the course of an investigation. A statement or confession made in the course of an investigation may be recorded by a Magistrate under s. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure subject to the safeguards imposed by the section. Thus, except as provided by s. 27 of the Evidence Act, a confession by an accused to a police office- is absolutely protected under s. 25 of the Evidence Act, and if it is made in the course of an investigation, it is also protected by s. 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and a confession to any other person made by him while in the custody of a police officer is protected by S. 26, unless it is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. These provisions seem to proceed upon the view that confessions made by an accused to a police officer or made by him while he is in the custody of a police officer are not to be trusted, and should not be used in evidence against him. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them. 10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the first information. They are based upon grounds of public policy, and the fullest effect should be given to them. 10. Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for the recording of the first information. The information report as such is not substantive evidence. It may be used to corroborate the informant under s. 157 of the Evidence Act or to contradict him under s. 145 of the Act, if the informant is called a witness. If the first information is given by the accused himself, the fact of his giving the information is admissible against him as evidence of his conduct under s. 8 of the Evidence Art. If the information is a non-confessional statement, it is admissible against the accused as an admission under s. 21 of the Evidence Act and is relevant. Faddi vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, explaining Nisar Ali vs. State of U.P. and Dal Singh vs. King Emperor. But a confessional first information report to a police officer cannot be used against the accused in view of S. 25 of the Evidence Act." 20. Having carefully perused section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, this Court is in complete agreement with Mr. Hamender Singh Chandel, learned counsel representing the petitioner that there is presumption in favour of person making an attempt to commit suicide that he/she was under severe stress and onus, if any, to prove otherwise is always upon the police authorities. If aforesaid provisions of law is read in its entirety, it certainly suggests that before registering case, if any, under Section 309 of IPC, police is required to establish on record that person against whom it intends to register case under Section 309 of IPC is/was not under any kind of stress disentitling him/her from invoking Section 115 of the Act. In the case at hand, case under Section 309 of IPC came to be registered on the basis of the statement made by the petitioner herself that she on account of mental harassment and torture being meted to her by her husband and in laws was under severe stress but interestingly, that sole statement of the petitioner has been made basis to register case against her under Section 309 of IPC. In view of the specific expression used i.e. "unless proved otherwise" it is/was incumbent upon the police to bring on record material suggestive of the fact that petitioner while making an attempt to commit suicide was not suffering from any kind of mental disorder. There is no material available on record suggestive of the fact that the petitioner made an attempt to commit suicide to blackmail, intimidate and to create public disorder and as such, there is no force in the submissions of learned Additional Advocate General that petitioner is not entitled to draw benefit of presumption available in her favour under Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act. In this regard, reliance is placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in Common Cause (A Registered Society) vs. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 203, wherein it has been categorically held that onus is upon the prosecution to rebut presumption available in favour of a person committing suicide under Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act. Relevant para No. 366 of the judgment is reproduced herein-below:- "366. This Court's holding in Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 that the right to life does not include the right to die in the context of suicide may require to be revisited in future in view of domestic and international developments "Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt to Suicide" Law Commission of India (Report No. 210, 2008); Rajeev Ranjan, et al, "(De-) Criminalization of Attempted Suicide in India: A Review" Industrial Psychiatry Journal (2014), Vol. 23, issue 1, at page 4-9, pointing towards decriminalization of suicide. In India, the Mental Healthcare Act 2017 has created a "presumption of severe stress in cases of attempt to commit suicide." Section 115(1) provides thus: "Notwithstanding anything contained in section 309 of the Indian Penal Code any person who attempts to commit suicide shall be presumed, unless proved otherwise, to have severe stress and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code." Under Section 115(2), the Act also mandates the Government to provide care, treatment and rehabilitation to a person, having severe stress and who attempted to commit suicide, to reduce the risk of recurrence. Section 115 begins with a non-obstante provision, specifically with reference to Section 309 of the Penal Code. Section 115 begins with a non-obstante provision, specifically with reference to Section 309 of the Penal Code. It mandates (unless the contrary is proved by the prosecution) that a person who attempts to commit suicide is suffering from severe stress. Such a person shall not be tried and punished under the Penal Code. Section 115 removes the element of culpability which attaches to an attempt to commit suicide under Section 309. It regards a person who attempts suicide as a victim of circumstances and not an offender, at least in the absence of proof to the contrary, the burden of which must lie on the prosecution. Section 115 marks a pronounced change in our law about how society must treat and attempt to commit suicide. It seeks to align Indian law with emerging knowledge on suicide, by treating a person who attempts suicide being need of care, treatment and rehabilitation rather than penal sanctions." 21. Hon'ble Apex Court in P. Rathinam vs. Union of India and Others, (1994) 3 SCC 394 (overruled) held that Section 309 is violative of Article 21 of Constitution of India. In the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Apex Court held that right to life includes right to die also. Relevant para of the judgment is reproduced herein-below:- "109. On the basis of what has been held and noted above, we state that Section 309 of the Penal Code deserves to be effaced from the statute book to humanise our penal laws. It is a cruel and irrational provision, and it may result in punishing a person again (doubly) who has suffered agony and would be undergoing ignominy because of his failure to commit suicide. Then an act of suicide cannot be said to be against religion, morality or public policy, and an act of attempted suicide has no baneful effect on society. Further, suicide or attempt to commit it causes no harm to others, because of which State's interference with the personal liberty of the persons concerned is not called for." 22. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Smt. Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 , over ruled its earlier judgment rendered in P. Rathinam's case supra and held that right to life does not include right to die. The relevant para nos. 18 to 23 and 35 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- "18. Subsequently, Hon'ble Apex Court in case titled Smt. Gian Kaur vs. State of Punjab, (1996) 2 SCC 648 , over ruled its earlier judgment rendered in P. Rathinam's case supra and held that right to life does not include right to die. The relevant para nos. 18 to 23 and 35 of the judgment are reproduced as under:- "18. In P. Rathinam, (1994) 3 SCC 394 , it was held that the scope of Article 21 includes the right to die. P. Rathinam held that Article 21 has also a positive content and is not merely negative in its reach. Reliance was placed on certain decisions to indicate the wide ambit of Article 21 wherein the term life' does not mean mere animal existence but right to live with human dignity' embracing quality of life. Drawing analogy from the interpretation of freedom of speech and expression' to include freedom not to speak, freedom of association and movement' to include the freedom not to join any association or to move anywhere, freedom of business' to include freedom not to do business, it was held in P. Rathinam that logically it must follow that right to live would include right not to live, i.e. right to die or to terminate one's life. Having concluded that Article 21 includes also the right to die, it was held that Section 309 IPC was violative of Article 21. This is the only basis in P. Rathinam to hold that Section 309, IP is unconstitutional. "Right to die" - Is it included in Article 21? "19. The first question is - Whether, the scope of Article 21 also includes the right to die? Article 21 is as under: "21. Protection of life and personal liberty No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law." 20. A significant part of the judgment in P. Rathinam, (1994) 3 SCC 394 on this aspect, is as under: (SCC pp.409-10, paras 31-36) "If a person has a right to live, question is whether he has right not to live. The Bombay High Court stated in paragraph 10 of its judgment that as all the fundamental rights are to be read together, as held in R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India what is true of one fundamental right is also true Of another fundamental right. The Bombay High Court stated in paragraph 10 of its judgment that as all the fundamental rights are to be read together, as held in R.C. Cooper vs. Union of India what is true of one fundamental right is also true Of another fundamental right. It was then stated that is not, and cannot be, seriously disputed that fundamental rights have their positive as well as negative aspects. For example, freedom of speech and expression includes freedom not to speak. Similarly, the freedom of association and movement includes freedom not to join any association or move anywhere. So too, freedom Of business includes freedom not to do business. It was, therefore, stated that logically it must follow that the right to live will include right not to live, i.e. right to die or to terminate one's life. Two of the above-named and critics of the Bombay judgment have stated that the aforesaid analogy is "misplaced" which could have arisen on account of superficial comparison between the freedoms, ignoring the inherent difference between one fundamental right and the other. It has been argued that the negative aspect of the right to live would mean the end or extinction of the positive aspect, and so, it is not the suspension as such of the right as is in the case of silence or non- association and no movement. It has also been stated that the right to life stands on different footing from other rights as all other rights are derivable from the right to live. The aforesaid criticism is only partially correct inasmuch as though the negative aspect may not be inferable on the analogy of the rights conferred by different clauses of Article 19, one may refuse to live, if his life be not according to the person concerned worth living or if the richness and fullness of life were not to demand living further. One may rightly think that having achieved all worldly pleasures or happiness, he has; some-thing to achieve beyond this life. This desire for communion with God may very rightly lead even a very healthy mind to think that he would forego his right to live and would rather choose not to live. In any case, a person cannot be forced to enjoy right to life to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. This desire for communion with God may very rightly lead even a very healthy mind to think that he would forego his right to live and would rather choose not to live. In any case, a person cannot be forced to enjoy right to life to his detriment, disadvantage or disliking. xxx xxx xxx Keeping in view all the above, we state that right to live of which Article 21 speaks of can be said to bring in its trail the right not to live a forced life. In this context, reference may be made to what Alan A. Stone, while serving as Professor of Law and Psychiatry in Harvard University stated in his 1987 Jonas Robitscher Memorial Lecture in Law and Psychiatry, under the caption "The Right to Die: New Problems for Lawa and Medicine and Psychiatry. (This lecture has been printed at pp.627 to 643 of Emory Law Journal, Vol.37, 1988). One of the basic theories of the lecture of Professor Stone was that right to die inevitably leads to the right to commit suicide." (Emphasis supplied) 21. From the above extract, it is clear that in substance the reason for that view is, that if a person has a right to live, he also has a right not to live. The decisions relied on for taking that view relate to other fundamental rights which deal with different situations and different kind of rights. In those cases the fundamental right is of a positive kind, for example, freedom of speech, freedom of association, freedom of movement, freedom of business etc. which were held to include the negative aspect of there being no compulsion to exercise that right by doing the guaranteed positive act. Those decisions merely held that the right to do an act includes also the right not to do an act in that manner. It does not flow from those decisions that if the right is for protection from any intrusion thereof by others or in other words the right has the negative aspect of not being deprived by others of its continued exercise e.g. the right to life or personal liberty, then the converse positive act also flows therefrom to permit expressly its discontinuance or extinction by the holder of such right. In those decisions it is the negative aspect of the right that was invoked for which no positive or overt act was required to be done by implication. This difference in the nature of rights has to be borne in mind when making the comparison for the application of this principle. 22. When a man commits suicide he has to undertake certain positive overt acts and the genesis of those acts cannot be traced to, or be included within the protection of the 'right to life' under Article 21. The significant aspect of 'sanctity of life' is also not to be overlooked. Article 21 is a provision guaranteeing protection of life and personal liberty and by no stretch of imagination can extinction of life' be read to be included in protection of life'. Whatever may be the philosophy of permitting a person to extinguish his life by committing suicide, we find it difficult to construe Article 21 to include within it the right to die' as a part of the fundamental right guaranteed therein. 'Right to life' is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore, incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of right to life'. With respect and in all humility, we find no similarity in the nature of the other rights, such as the right to freedom of speech' etc. to provide a comparable basis to hold that the 'right to life' also includes the 'right to die'. With respect, the comparison is inapposite, for the reason indicated in the context of Article 21. The decisions relating to other fundamental rights wherein the absence of compulsion to exercise a right was held to be included within the exercise of that right, are not available to support view taken in P. Rathinam qua Article 21. 23. To give meaning and content to the word "life" in Article 21, it has been construed as life with human dignity. Any aspect of life which makes it dignified may be read into it but not that which extinguishes it and is, therefore, inconsistent with the continued existence of life resulting in effacing the right itself. The right to die, if any, is inherently inconsistent with the right to life as is death with life. 35. The question now is whether Section 306, IPC is unconstitutional for any other reason. The right to die, if any, is inherently inconsistent with the right to life as is death with life. 35. The question now is whether Section 306, IPC is unconstitutional for any other reason. In our opinion, the challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 309, IPC having been rejected, no serious challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 306 survives. We have already rejected the main challenge based on P. Rathinam on the ground that 'right to die' is included in Article 21." 23. Though, in the aforesaid judgment Hon'ble Apex Court reversed its earlier findings rendered in P. Rathinam case supra that right to life includes right to die, but has categorically observed that desirability of retaining Section 309 in the statute is a different matter and non-sequitur in the context of constitutional validity of that provision which has to be tested with reference to some provision in the Constitution of India. Para-17 of the aforesaid judgment is reproduced as under:- "17. The desirability of retaining Section 309 in the Statute is a different matter and non-sequitur in the context of constitutional validity of that provision which has to be tested with reference to some provision in the Constitution of India. Assuming for this purpose that it may be desirable to delete Section 309 from the Indian Penal Code for the reasons which led to the recommendation of the Law Commission and the formation of that opinion by persons opposed to the continuance of such a provision, that cannot be a reason by itself to declare Section 309 unconstitutional unless it is held to be violative of any specific provision in the Constitution. For this reason, challenge to the constitutional validity of Section 309 has been made and is also required to be considered only with reference to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. We, therefore, proceed now to consider the question of constitutional validity with reference to Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. Any further reference to the global debate on the desirability of retaining a penal provision to punish attempted suicide is unnecessary for the purpose of this decision. Undue emphasis on that aspect and particularly the reference to euthanasia cases tends to befog the real issue of the constitutionality of the provision and the crux of the matter which is determinative of the issue." 24. Undue emphasis on that aspect and particularly the reference to euthanasia cases tends to befog the real issue of the constitutionality of the provision and the crux of the matter which is determinative of the issue." 24. Report of Law Commission, which has been otherwise taken note of by Hon'ble Apex Court in cases (supra), clearly reveals that Law Commission having taken note of various aspect of the matter recommended for abrogation of Section 309 of IPC. Report of Law commission is reproduced as under: 8. Law Commission of India Reports Law Commission 42th Report. The Law Commission of India in its 42nd Report (1971) recommended repeal of Section 309 being of the view that this penal provision is "harsh and unjustifiable." The apprehension that the repeal of the law criminalizing attempted suicide would result in increase in suicide is betrayed by the fact that Sri Lanka repealed the law four years ago and the suicide rate is showing a trend in reduction. On the contrary, in Singapore suicide rates have been increasing in recent years despite their having suicide as a punishable offence. Law Commission 210th Report The 18th Law Commission in its 210th Report titled "Humanization and Decriminalization of Attempt to Suicide" submitted on October 17, 2008 gave the following recommendations:- 1. Suicide occurs in all ages. Life is a gift given by God and He alone can take it. Its premature termination cannot be approved by any society. But when a troubled individual tries to end his life, it would be cruel and irrational to visit him with punishment on his failure to die. It is his deep unhappiness which causes him to try to end his life. Attempt to suicide is more a manifestation of a diseased condition of mind deserving of treatment and care rather than punishment. It would not be just and fair to inflict additional legal punishment on a person who has already suffered agony and ignominy in his failure to commit suicide. 2. The criminal law must not act with misplaced over-zeal and it is only where it can prove to be apt and effective machinery to cure the intended evil that it should come into the picture. 3. Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code provides double punishment for a person who has already got fed up with his own life and desires to end it. 3. Section 309 of the Indian Penal Code provides double punishment for a person who has already got fed up with his own life and desires to end it. Section 309 is also a stumbling block in prevention of suicides and improving the access of medical care to those who have attempted suicide. It is unreasonable to inflict punishment upon a person who on account of family discord, destitution, loss of a dear relation or other cause of a like nature overcomes the instinct of self-preservation and decides to take his own life. In such a case, the unfortunate person deserves sympathy, counselling and appropriate treatment and certainly not the prison. 4. Section 309 needs to be effaced from the statute book because the provision is inhuman, irrespective of whether it is constitutional or unconstitutional. The repeal of the anachronistic law contained in section 309 of the Indian Penal Code would save many lives and relieve the distressed of his suffering. 5. The Commission is of the view that while assisting or encouraging another person to (attempt to) commit suicide must not go unpunished, the offence of attempt to commit suicide under section 309 needs to be omitted from the Indian Penal Code. 9. Conclusion It is most intriguing and frustrating to observe that our penal laws which are nothing but the handiwork of Britishers have by and large remained untouched even after more than 60 years of independence. What a pity that Britishers have themselves amended their penal laws and decriminalised attempt to suicide way back in 1961 but we are yet to even deliberate on taking any action on this decisive issue which subjects an already tormented person to further punishment and ignominy! Certainly, we should not be the copycat of Britishers but can we deny that increasingly more and more countries like Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Oregon and Washington in USA and Thailand are even legalising euthanasia or mercy killing for terminally ill persons? Can we deny the decriminalization of attempted suicide by all countries in Europe, North America and Canada? Can we deny that it is only a handful of countries in the world like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and India who still punish attempt to suicide under their penal laws? Are we still waiting only to be the last country in the world to decriminalise attempt to suicide? Can we deny that it is only a handful of countries in the world like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Singapore and India who still punish attempt to suicide under their penal laws? Are we still waiting only to be the last country in the world to decriminalise attempt to suicide? Let us not forget that Section 309 of I.P.C. tantamount to brazenly punishing a person who is already suffering endlessly by not only sending him/her to prison for one year but also imposing fine which only serves to make their life more miserable by further compounding their endless problems. How can this grave injustice be ever justified? Can an ordinary person even dream to commit suicide? It is under very compelling adverse circumstances that a person resorts to taking the extreme step of attempting to commit suicide which must be fully taken into account. Such people suffering from severe depression need the company of good doctors and not jailors which we all must also now realise and appreciate Ours is a democracy which means that it is by the people, of the people and for the people. Constitution locates power that resides in the people. It is the people's power for people's benefit. Constitution creates rights and duties. All most all our demands get converted into rights-even our feelings, emotions is governed by the rights and duties we have. As we have got the right to live life with all dignity so we should also have right to die as when it is necessary by law in certain situation. Constitution is a social document. It is the society in its political aspect. We can't understand its nature without understanding the chief characteristics of the society. If the constitution is such that it has taken into its consideration, the social set up, then only will it stand the test of time. Constitution and society grows, develops together and gets intertwined in each other. The constitution takes into account change and developments in the society. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Indian penal code is a modern code in every possible sense. Laws are made for the people and it should be change to meet the aims and aspiration of the changing society. Ultimately, the aim should be to evolve a consensual and conceptual model effectively handling the evils without sacrificing human rights. Therefore, it is wrong to say that the Indian penal code is a modern code in every possible sense. Laws are made for the people and it should be change to meet the aims and aspiration of the changing society. Ultimately, the aim should be to evolve a consensual and conceptual model effectively handling the evils without sacrificing human rights. Therefore section 309 should be deleted from the Indian penal Code because as mentioned in Maruti Shripati Dubal that no deterrence is going to hold back those who want to die for a special or political cause or to leave the world either because of the loss of interest in life or for self- deliverance. Thus in no case does the punishment serve the purpose and in some cases it is bound to prove self defeating and counter - productive. In any case a person should not be forced to enjoy the right to live to his detriment, disadvantage, and disliking. Further, the "Right to life" under Article 21 should not include "right to die" because this provision might increase the rates of suicides in the country and moreover the "Right to life" is a natural right embodied in Article 21 but suicide is an unnatural termination or extinction of life and, therefore incompatible and inconsistent with the concept of right to life. Although the judgment given by Supreme Court in Gyan Kaur is followed but according to me this should be scrapped from the I.P.C. but the 'right to die' should not be expressively included in the "right to life" because "Life is a gift given by God and He alone can take it." Its premature termination cannot be approved by any society. Neither it should be penalised. Attempt to commit suicide is a manifestation of diseased mind. So what is to be done is rightly stated by the decision given in P. Rathinam's case - What is needed to take care of suicide prone persons are soft words and wise counselling (of a psychiatrist), and not stony dealing by a jailor following harsh treatment meted out by a heartless prosecutor. Section 309 of the Penal Code deserves to be effaced from the statute book to humanise our penal laws. Section 309 of the Penal Code deserves to be effaced from the statute book to humanise our penal laws. It is a cruel and irrational provision, and it may result in punishing a person again (doubly) who has suffered agony and would be undergoing ignominy because of his failure to commit suicide." The desirability for deletion of Section 309 of I.P.C. is also the view supported by the majority of states in India. Twenty five Indian states except Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Sikkim have favoured striking down I.P.C. Section 309 that criminalises attempt to commit suicide by making it punishable with imprisonment. In conclusion, it can be said that to resolve this debate, the conflict between the principle of sanctity of life and the rights of self determination and dignity of an individual is to be resolved first and right to die should not be generalized but should be exercised as an exception in the "RAREST OF RARE CASES" like Death Penalty in India." 25. Though, consequential steps, if any, towards decriminalization of attempt to suicide in the light of aforesaid recommendations of Law Commission are yet to be taken by the quarter concerned, but it certainly appears that Legislature having noticed certain observations made by the Hon'ble Apex Court in its various pronouncements as well as recommendations made by the Law Commission, proceeded to enact the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017. Very objection to enact aforesaid Act, 2017 is to ensure health care, treatment and rehabilitation of persons with mental illness as well as to protect and promote the rights of persons with mental illness during the delivery of mental health care. Section 115 of the Act has been very carefully designed or provided under the Act to safeguard the interest of person suffering from mental disorder. 26. Another argument advanced by learned Additional Advocate General that since the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017 came into operation after lodging of the FIR sought to be quashed, benefit of presumption under section 115 cannot be invoked in the case of the petitioner, deserves out right rejection being wholly untenable because careful perusal of Section 115 of the Act provides that person, who attempts to commit suicide would be presumed to have stress and shall not be tried and punished under the said Code. No doubt, FIR in the case at hand came to be lodged prior to the enactment of Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, but it is not in dispute that trial, if any, in aforesaid FIR is yet to commence. Even otherwise, trial on the basis of FIR lodged prior to the enactment of Act, 2017, if allowed/ permitted to continue, petitioner herein would be entitled to take benefit of Section 115, which definitely raises presumption in her favour. 27. In totality of facts and circumstances of the case, this Court finds it to be a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashment of FIR as well as consequent proceedings pending in the competent Court of law. High Court while exercising power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is well within its jurisdiction to quash the FIR or pending proceedings, which if allowed to continue would amount to sheer abuse of process of law. Case against petitioner under Section 309 of IPC, which is based upon her own statement, if permitted to continue would not only result in the abuse of the process of law, but would also not serve the ends of justice. To invoke inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court has to be fully satisfied that the material produced by the accused is such, that would lead to the conclusion, that his/their defence is based on sound, reasonable, and indubitable facts the material produced is such, as would rule out and displace the assertions contained in the charges levelled against the accused and the material produced is such, as would clearly reject and overrule the veracity of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant. 28. Accordingly, in view of the aforesaid discussion made hereinabove as well as law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, FIR No. 0122 dated 15.12.2016 under Sections 309 of Indian Penal Code, registered with Police Station, East Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. as well as consequent challan No. 93/2018, titled as State vs. Pratibha pending in the Court of learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Court No. 3, Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. are quashed and set-aside. 29. 29. Before parting, having taken note of the fact that various countries in the world have already initiated steps towards decriminalization of attempt to commit suicide coupled with the fact that Government of India has already enacted the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, this Court deems it fit to recommend Government of India through Secretary (Home) to take up the matter at appropriate level, so that appropriate steps, if so advised, towards decriminalization of the attempt to commit suicide, are taken. 30. The Chief Secretary to the Government of Himachal Pradesh, is also directed to issue necessary guidelines, enabling police authorities to strictly comply with the provisions contained in Section 115 of the Mental Healthcare Act, 2017, which envisages that person making an attempt to commit suicide shall be deemed to have severe stress and shall not be tried and punished, so that person alleged to have committed the offence, if any, under Section 309 of IPC, is not put to ordeal of the protracted trial unnecessarily. Pending applications, if any, also stands disposed of.