JUDGMENT : P.K. LOHRA, J. Appellants, the legal heirs of original-defendant Jay Ram, have preferred this first appeal to assail ex-parte judgment and decree dated 29th of May 2015, passed by District Judge, Jodhpur (for short, ‘learned trial Court’)- By the impugned judgment and decree, learned trial Court has decreed the suit of respondent-plaintiffs for specific performance of contract and perpetual injunction. 2. The appeal is filed after delay of 1236 days, and therefore, on behalf of appellants, an endeavour is made for seeking condonation of delay. In order to wriggle out from delay, an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is filed, duly supported by affidavit of Dharmaram as well as death certificate of original-defendant Jayram Spelling out reasons of delayed presentation of appeal, it is, inter alia, averred in the application that at the threshold learned trial Court passed ex-parte order on 29th of March, 2013 due to the absence of lawyer representing the cause of original-defendant Jayram. It is further averred that the counsel before withdrawing the case did not inform Jayram. Absence of lawyer, as per the version of appellants, led to continuance of trial in the suit without any defence of original-defendant and finally the suit was decreed on 29th of May, 2019. It is also incorporated in the application that during pendency of the suit, original-defendant Jayram remained bedridden for almost two years and finally took his last breath on 21st of October, 2015 after prolonged illness. For substantiating factum of death of original-defendant Jayram, his death certificate is also placed on record. 3. The appellants have also pleaded that they came to know about ex-parte judgment and decree when notices under Order XXI Rule 2 CPC were served on them indicating next date of hearing as 21st of January, 2017. In response to the notice, as per appellants, a counsel was engaged who submitted Vakalatnama before the learned executing Court and it revealed that the decree sought to be executed against them was passed ex-parte on 29th of May, 2015, and therefore, at their behest, endeavour was made for obtaining certified copy of the judgment and decree and finally same was delivered to them on 1st of February, 2017. 4. 4. The application also envisaged that taking note of the fact that ex-parte decree was sought to be executed against them, at their behest an application was submitted before learned trial Court on 17th of February, 2017 for setting aside the judgment and decree by taking shelter of Order IX Rule 13 CPC. Along with application for setting aside ex-parte judgment and decree, on their behalf, application under Sec. 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay was also filed. The application was registered by the learned trial Court and notices were issued to respondent. Pursuant to the notice issued to respondent, reply was filed and after considering the rival submissions, learned trial Court rejected the application on 3rd of December, 2018. 5. Being aggrieved by the said order, on behalf of the appellants, civil misc. appeal was preferred before this Court, which was registered as Civil Misc. Appeal No. 3508/2018 and came up for consideration before the Court on 11th of January, 2019 but same was got dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with law. It is only after withdrawal of the civil misc. appeal that they have preferred this regular first appeal to assail impugned judgment and decree. Some facts are also incorporated in the application to highlight the cause for delay besides pleading that the delay was unintentional and for bonafide reasons. An endeavour is also made by the appellants to impress upon the Court that this appeal is founded on substantial grounds, which require decision on merit. 6. Per contra, on behalf of respondent, reply to the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is submitted refuting all the averments made in the application. It is also pleaded in the reply that the case as has been set up by the appellants is not that of non-service of summons on the original-defendant, inasmuch as, on his behalf counsel had appeared before the learned trial Court. It is also averred that the counsel representing cause of original-defendant made sincere endeavour to contest the suit, but, for not getting requisite assistance and instructions of his client, could not file written statement. It is also averred that the counsel representing cause of original-defendant made sincere endeavour to contest the suit, but, for not getting requisite assistance and instructions of his client, could not file written statement. It is also pleaded that the ex-parte order was passed on 29th of March, 2013, and thereafter proceedings of the suit continued for more than two years when finally the suit was decreed on 29th of may, 2015 and during this interregnum period no endeavour was made by the original-defendant for setting aside ex-parte order. 7. Joining issue with the appellants on prolonged illness of the original-defendant, it is submitted not furnishing any proof to this effect is sufficient to show that the story about factum of illness of original-defendant is concocted and false one. The application is also contested on the anvil of not satisfying the contingencies envisaged under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is also averred in the reply that after obtaining certified copy of impugned judgment and decree, the instant appeal is filed two years later without explaining delay. 8. In substance, the respondent has pleaded with emphasis that the inordinate delay of more than three years is not liable to be condoned on wholly vague, cryptic and jejune ground. For seeking rejection of the application for condonation of delay, on behalf of respondent, it is also averred in the reply that on behalf of the appellants, objection under Section 47 CPC was filed before the learned executing Court but the same was rejected on 19th of January, 2019 and against that order a writ petition is preferred, which is pending consideration. Apart from joining issue with the appellants on ground of delay, in its reply, respondent has also pleaded some other facts touching merits of the case. At the cost of repetition, it is further averred on behalf of respondent that the application for condonation of delay is bereft of any reason much less substantial reason and its only object is to prolong the matter so that respondent may not be able to reap the fruits flowing from the decree. 9. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Thanvi, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has strenuously urged that the appellants are legal heirs of original-defendant who came to know about the ex-parte judgment and decree. 9. Learned Senior Counsel, Mr. Thanvi, appearing on behalf of the appellants, has strenuously urged that the appellants are legal heirs of original-defendant who came to know about the ex-parte judgment and decree. Upon receipt of notices of the executing Court and subsequently at their behest efforts were made without delay, therefore, in the matter of condonation of delay a benevolent and pragmatic approach of the Court is desirable. Learned Senior Counsel has also argued that earlier the appellants preferred civil misc. appeal to challenge order rejecting their application for setting aside ex-parte decree but the same was withdrawn with liberty to avail appropriate remedy in accordance with law, therefore, the time spent in pursuing that remedy deserves due credence for exercising discretion in the matter of condonation of delay. Learned counsel Mr. Thanvi has further submitted that first appeal is statutory appeal, which is right of a litigant, and therefore, in the interest of justice, the words “sufficient cause” should be liberally construed for advancement of justice. 10. Mr. Thanvi has further urged that the criterion for adjudicating application under Order IX Rule 13 CPC are not akin to Section 96(2) CPC and so also scope of both these provisions are also entirely different. He, therefore, contends that considering appellate Court's wide jurisdiction under Section 96 CPC, a pragmatic approach in construing the term “sufficient cause is warranted in the matter for doing substantial justice. Learned counsel has vehemently argued that appellant cannot be deprived of statutory right of appeal under Section 96(2) CPC solely on account of rejection of his application under Order X Rule 13 CPC is yet another significant ground for adopting liberal approach in construing words “sufficient cause” to father interest of justice. In support of his arguments, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on a decision of Supreme Court in Bhivchandra Shankar More v. Balu Gangaram More, [ 2019 (7) Scale 551 ]. 11. E. converso, learned counsel for respondent, Mr. S.S. Rajpurohit, has strenuously urged that no cause much less sufficient cause is forthcoming from the averments made in the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Learned counsel contends that liberal construction of the words “sufficient cause” always depend on facts of an individual case and by no means negligence of a litigant can be overshadowed by the Courts. Learned counsel contends that liberal construction of the words “sufficient cause” always depend on facts of an individual case and by no means negligence of a litigant can be overshadowed by the Courts. Highlighting the precise object of Limitation Act, learned counsel submits that giving expansive meaning to these words may prove counter-productive. 12. Learned counsel further submits that the reasons furnished by the appellants for absence of original-defendant before learned trial Court from the date of passing of ex-parte decree are absolutely vague, cryptic and unspecific and the learned trial Court has also found those reasons unsatisfactory while declining their prayer for setting ex-parte decree. Mr. Rajpurohit has also argued that plea of the appellants about failing health of original-defendant is not supported by any proof much less cogent proof, and therefore, the entire grounds set out for condonation of delay are wholly concocted and inspiring no confidence. Mr. Rajpurohit has also urged that before the executing Court, objections submitted by the appellants under Section 47 CPC are rejected by by the learned executing Court on 19th of January, 2019 vide Annex. R/2 and while authenticating those objections appellants have also preferred this appeal is sufficient to show their conduct of pursuing two remedies simultaneously. He, therefore, submits that on equitable considerations also they are not entitled for grant of any indulgence on their application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on following judgments: (i). Jai Lal v. Chandro Devi, [2015 (2) RLW 1493 (Raj.)] (ii). Jagdeesh Nayak v. Laxmi Narayana Dhobi, (since deceased) through LR's [2017 (3) DNJ (Raj.) 1037] (iii). Smt. Mangi Bai v. Smt. Kanku, [S.B. Civil Regular First Appeal No. 805/2011, decided on 06.05.2011 by this Court]. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the materials available on record and also gone through some relevant papers and certified copies of the order sheets of Original Suit No. 41/2012 submitted for perusal by learned counsel for the respondent. 14. Indisputably, in the present matter, summons were duly served on the original-defendant Jayram, and counsel appeared on his behalf before the learned trial Court. The counsel representing his cause, appeared on three successive dates and sought adjournment, and thereafter filed application under Section 151 CPC seeking further time to file written statement on 19th of January, 2013. 14. Indisputably, in the present matter, summons were duly served on the original-defendant Jayram, and counsel appeared on his behalf before the learned trial Court. The counsel representing his cause, appeared on three successive dates and sought adjournment, and thereafter filed application under Section 151 CPC seeking further time to file written statement on 19th of January, 2013. Later on, due to absence of lawyer, Court passed ex-parte order on 29th of March, 2013 forfeiting the defendant's right to file written statement. Even subsequent to order dated 29th of March, 2013, trial of the suit continued for more than two years upto 29th of May, 2015, when proceedings finally culminated in decreeing the suit ex-parte. Therefore, non-participation of the original-defendant in the suit proceedings is per se without any excuse much less plausible excuse. A litigant, defending a suit, is not expected be keep himself aloof from the proceedings, which are periodically fixed before subordinate courts. 15. Although appellants have pleaded in the application that original-defendant remained bedridden and was seriously ill preceding two years of his death on 21st of October, 2015, but there is nothing on record to substantiate this positive assertion. When admittedly original-defendant was alive uptil 21st of October, 2015, i.e. five months posterior to the ex-parte judgment, then why he remained dormant is really a cause of concern. Moreover, not initiating any action against lawyer, by original-defendant during his lifetime and later by appellants, is sufficient to show that the aspersion casted on the lawyer is nothing but an attempt to create a ground for condonation of delay. These averments are ex-facie projecting afterthoughts of the appellants to wriggle out from unexplained inordinate delay. Blaming a lawyer with bald and mallow allegations of not apprising client about stage of trial in a matter is per se not tenable. 16. The judgment of Apex Court in Bhivchandra Shanlar More, (supra), on which heavy reliance is placed by learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, lays down the law concerning approach of the Courts while construing the words “sufficient cause”. Emphasis of the Court is to give liberal construction to the term. There remains no quarrel on the trite law that words “sufficient cause” require liberal construction with pragmatic approach to farther the interests of justice. However, I am afraid, liberal construction cannot be overstretched so as to condone inordinate delay for mere askance. Emphasis of the Court is to give liberal construction to the term. There remains no quarrel on the trite law that words “sufficient cause” require liberal construction with pragmatic approach to farther the interests of justice. However, I am afraid, liberal construction cannot be overstretched so as to condone inordinate delay for mere askance. In the guise of liberal construction of the words, “sufficient cause”, a total callousness, indolence and apathy of a litigant cannot be excused or camouflaged so as to render law of limitation nugatory or otiose. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex”, which means “the law is harsh, but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. 17. In the aforesaid case, defendant laid requisite application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for setting aside ex-parte decree with a specific plea of improper service of summons being served on his son residing in neighboring village in search of work. Further, it was alleged that the son did not inform his father about service of the summons. Therefore, in that background and peculiar circumstances, Apex Court emphasized for liberal construction of the words “sufficient cause”. Here, in the instant matter, no such plea is raised by the appellants, nor is available to them, as observed hereinabove. Moreover, in the matter before Apex Court, the ex-parte preliminary decree against defendant was for partition and, therefore, considering his afflictions in larger perspective that non-challenge to preliminary decree of partition may preclude him for challenging final decree Court, took a benevolent view. The nature of the suit here is different. Therefore, on facts, judgment in Bhivchandra Shanlar More, (supra) is clearly distinguishable. 18. Supreme Court in Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd; [AIR 1962 SC 3611, while underlying principles relevant for consideration of application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, held: “In construing S.5 it is relevant to bear in mind two important considerations. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. The first consideration is that the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the decree-holder to treat the decree as binding between the parties. In other words, when the period of limitation prescribed has expired the decree-holder has obtained a benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued to the decree-holder by lapse of time should not be light-heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan I.L.R, (1890) 13 Mad. 269. “Sec. 5 gives the Court a discretion which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be exercised upon principles which are well understood; the words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the appellant.” It is, however, necessary to emphasize that even after sufficient cause has been shown a party is not entitled to the condonation of delay in question as a matter of right. The proof of a sufficient cause is a condition precedent for the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in the Court by S. 5. If sufficient cause is not proved nothing further has to be done; the application for condoning delay has to be dismissed on that ground alone. If sufficient cause is shown then the Court has to enquire whether in its discretion it should condone the delay. This aspect of the matter naturally introduces the consideration of all relevant facts and it is at this stage that diligence of the party or its bona fides may fall for consideration; but the scope of the enquiry’ while exercising the discretionary power after sufficient cause is shown would naturally be limited only to such facts as the Court may regard as relevant. It cannot justify an enquiry as to why the party was sitting idle during all the time available to it.” 19. In a later judgment in Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, [ (2010) 8 SCC 685 ], yet again, Supreme Court, examined ambit and scope of Court's discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the context of application under Order XXII Rule 3 & 9 CPC for setting aside abatement of appeal and reiterating liberal approach in construing the term “sufficient cause”. The Court held: “The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right, as accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 20. In the matter of Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, [ (2013) 12 SCC 649 ], Supreme Court laid emphasis on the obligation of Court, while dealing with application for condonation of delay and approach to be adopted upon consideration of grounds for condonation. After considering many earlier legal precedents, the Court broadly culled out following principles: “21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non-pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3.(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivoted the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4.(iv) No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6.(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9.(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11.(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1. (a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harboring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. (c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challan manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 21. In the backdrop of available material, reasons furnished in the application for condonation of delay and the principles broadly enunciated in the judgments of Supreme Court, referred to supra, no sufficient cause is forthcoming for exercising discretion to condone the delay. In over all fact scenario, even by applying normal rule of prudency, it is not possible to record an affirmation that absence of original-defendant before the learned trial Court was due to sufficient cause and his such conduct was not blameworthy. The word “sufficient” means, “adequate” or “enough” so as to necessarily answer the intent of the Legislature. Thus, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of cautious and vigilant man. Thus, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the backdrop of facts and circumstances of the case duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of cautious and vigilant man. Last but not the least, the Court, while exercising its discretion is required to see sufficient ground, which may enable it to exercise discretion judiciously. In above view of the matter, I am afraid, no case for exercising discretion to condone inordinate delay in the matter is made out. Resultantly, application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is hereby rejected, which also entails rejection of main appeal itself. The stay petition is also rejected.