JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. Delay of 7 days in filing Special Appeal Nos. 684 and 685 of 2018, and the delay of 8 days in filing Special Appeal No. 686 of 2018, is not opposed and the delay is, therefore, condoned. Delay condonation applications (CLMA 12976/2018, CLMA 12977/2018 and CLMA 12984/2018) stand disposed of. 2. Heard Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Yogesh Pacholia, learned Counsel for the appellant, and Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner. 3. These appeals are preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No. 1100 of 2015 and batch dated 6.7.2018. The respondent-writ petitioner, a housing society, had passed a resolution on 25.9.2002 seizing the plots, granted on lease to its members, on the ground that they had transferred the plots without prior consent of the Committee of Management of the society. On a resolution being passed in this regard on 25.09.2002, directing seizure of the plots, the appellants herein questioned the said resolution before the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Uttarakhand who, after hearing the parties, annulled the resolution passed by the Committee of Management on 25.9.2002. Aggrieved thereby the respondent-writ petitioner preferred an appeal, before the Secretary, Co-operative Societies, which was also dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the Committee of Management invoked the writ jurisdiction of this Court. 4. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge, after extracting Section 126 of the Uttaranchal Co-operative Societies Act, 2003, observed that, in terms of the proviso to Section 126, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies was required, before annulling the resolution dated 25.9.2002, to permit the Co-operative society to reconsider the resolution within a period fixed by him; and on a reading of the entire scheme of the Act, and more particularly Section 126, the requirements of the proviso was mandatory and imperative, and not directory. The order impugned in the writ petition dated 28.11.2002 (the order of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies), and the order dated 18.4.2015 (the order of the Secretary), were quashed, and the matter was remanded back to the Registrar, Co-operative Societies directing him to refer the matter back for reconsideration of the resolution within a period of three weeks from the date of production of the certified copy of the judgment before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies. The learned Single Judge recorded the submission of the learned Counsel for the petitioner that, till the disposal of the matter finally, status quo shall be maintained. Aggrieved thereby the respondents in the writ petition, (members who had earlier invoked the jurisdiction of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies questioning the resolution dated 25.9.2002) have preferred these appeals. 5. Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants, would submit that the contention, regarding non-compliance of the proviso to Section 126 of the Act, was not even raised by the respondent-writ petitioner either before the Registrar of Co-operative Societies or before the Appellate Authority (Secretary, Co-operative Societies); this contention was raised for the first time during the hearing of these writ petitions; the question whether the Committee of Management was called upon, by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, to reconsider the resolution is a question of fact; the contention regarding non-compliance of the proviso is, at best, a mixed question of fact and law; and, in the absence of such a contention having been urged either before the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies or the Appellate Authority under the Act, such a contention cannot be raised for the first time, that too during the hearing of the writ petitions, even in the absence of such a contention having been raised in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petitions. 6. On the other hand Sri Siddhartha Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioners, would submit that a statutory obligation was cast on the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies, to comply with the proviso to Section 126; it is not even the case of the appellants that the Registrar had adhered to the conditions stipulated in the proviso, and had directed the Committee of Management to reconsider the resolution; the respondent-writ petitioner cannot be said to have waived this statutory requirement, as it is not in the larger public interest of ensuring independence of such societies; and since the learned Single Judge had, rightly, held that the proviso is mandatory in character, failure on the part of the Registrar to comply with the said requirement is fatal, and does not necessitate interference in an intra-Court appeal. 7. 7. As noted hereinabove, the learned Single Judge has not examined the rival contentions on its merits, nor has he examined the validity of the order passed by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies on 28.11.2002, and the order of the Appellate Authority dated 18.4.2015. The contention that the question, whether non-compliance with the proviso to Section 126 was fatal, was a pure question of law, and could be raised at any stage, found acceptance; and the learned Single Judge has held that the proviso to Section 126 is mandatory necessitating strict compliance. 8. Except to state that, on a reading of the entire scheme of the Act and more particularly Section 126 thereof, the Court was of the opinion that the word ‘shall’ in Section 126 should be treated as mandatory and not directory, the learned Single Judge has not applied any of the relevant tests to determine whether the proviso to Section 126 is mandatory or directory. It is only if reasons had been assigned, in the order under appeal by the learned Single Judge in support of his conclusion that the proviso to Section 126 was mandatory, would the appellate Court be able to examine whether the learned Single Judge was justified in coming to such a conclusion. While it is debatable whether this contention, urged for the first time during the hearing of the writ petitions, is a pure question of law, even otherwise the order of the learned Single Judge necessitates being set aside, since no reasons have been assigned by him for coming to the conclusion that the said proviso is mandatory. 9. In this context it is relevant to note that, in the case of directory provisions, substantial compliance is sufficient, unless it is established that violation of a directory provision had resulted in loss or had caused prejudice to a party. Even in the case of a mandatory provision, interference does not follow as a matter of course. A mandatory provision, conceived in the interest of the party, may be waived by that party, while a mandatory provision conceived in the public interest cannot be waived by a party. The construction of the expression “shall” depends on the provisions of the particular Act/Rules, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction, and such other considerations. The construction of the expression “shall” depends on the provisions of the particular Act/Rules, the setting in which the expression appears, the object for which the direction is given, the consequences that would flow from the infringement of the direction, and such other considerations. [Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel vs. Agricultural Produce Market Committee [ AIR 1976 SC 263 ] ; Khub Chand & others vs. State of Rajasthan & others [ AIR 1967 SC 1074 ]; State of U.P. & others vs. Babu Ram Upadhya [ AIR 1961 SC 751 ]]. 10. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language, implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions; and Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold it to be directory though worded in a negative form. [Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab vs. Kumar & others [ AIR 2006 SC 396 ]]. The question whether a particular provision of a statute which, on the face of it, appears mandatory, in as much as it uses the word “shall”, is merely directory cannot be resolved by laying down any general rule. [Raza Buland Sugar Co. Ltd. vs. Municipal Board, Rampur [ AIR 1965 SC 895 ]]. 11. Where the statute provides that failure to observe a particular rule would lead to a specific consequence, the provision should be construed as mandatory. [Sharif-ud-Din vs. Abdul Gani Lone [ AIR 1980 SC 303 ]; Balwant Singh & others vs. Anand Kumar Sharma & others [ AIR 2003 SC 1637 ]; Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. & others [ AIR 2003 SC 511 ]; Chandrika Prasad Yadav vs. State of Bihar & others [ AIR 2004 SC 2036 ]; May George vs. Special Tahsildar & others [ (2010) 13 SCC 98 ]]. Often the question whether a mandatory or directory construction should be given to a statutory provision may be determined by the expression in the statute itself or the result that would follow on non-compliance with the said provision. As a corollary to this rule, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive. As a corollary to this rule, the fact that no consequences of non-compliance are stated in the statute, has been considered as a factor tending towards a directory construction. But this is only an element to be considered, and is by no means conclusive. [Balwant Singh [ AIR 2003 SC 1637 ]; Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, 3rd Edn., Vol. 3]. 12. While it would not be proper for us to record a conclusive opinion on whether the proviso to Section 126 is mandatory or directory, we have taken note of the principles laid down by Courts only to note that mere use of the word “shall” would not, by itself, make the said proviso mandatory, nor would failure to mention the consequence, by itself and without anything more, make it directory. 13. As has been urged both by Sri A.S. Rawat, learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, and Sri Siddharth Singh, learned Counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner, the learned Single Judge has not examined the rival contentions on merits. We consider it appropriate, therefore, to set aside the order under appeal and restore the Writ Petitions to file. Suffice it to protect the interest of both the parties to direct status quo, as on today, to be maintained until further orders. This order shall be the interim order in the writ petition. 14. Since pleadings are complete, it is open to the appellants herein either to request the learned Single Judge to take up the writ petitions for an out of turn hearing or seek vacation of the interim order. 15. Special appeals stand disposed of accordingly. However, in the circumstances, without costs.