JUDGMENT : Aravind Kumar, J. 1. Wife has filed this appeal being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed in MC No.59/2017, whereunder petition filed under Sections 13(1)(ia)(ib) of Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (for short "the Act") came to be allowed. 2. The marriage between respondent and appellant came to be solemnized on 11.05.2015 at Gadag as per custom prevailing in their community. Out of said wedlock, a female child was born on 19.03.2016. It was the grievance of the respondent-husband that when his parents had visited his in-laws are said to have not extended proper respect and has abused them. Hence, contending that he had physically and mentally suffered, he returned back to Bijapur to look after the welfare of child and the appellant and at that point of time also wife had abused him. He further states that panchayat was held by the elders of the family as wife had without any reasonable cause had deserted him. Hence, contending that he had issued a legal notice on 20.04.2017, had filed petition in question for dissolution of his marriage solemnized on 11.05.2015. 3. Notice came to be issued by the learned trial Judge by order dated 31.05.2015 and on 21.06.2017, respondent wife was placed exparte and on the next date i.e., on 03.07.2017, evidence of petitioner came to be recorded and by judgment and decree dated 07.08.2017 allowed the petition by decreeing the same. Hence, this appeal. 4. We have heard Shri Mrutyunjaya S.Hallikeri, learned counsel appearing for appellant and Shri K.L.Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent. 5. It is the contention of Shri Mrutyunjaya S.Hallikeri, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that trial Court erred in placing appellant ex-parte, since there is no effective service of notice and respondent being fully aware that appellant was working as a Teacher and spending her entire day at the school and would be unavailable during service of notice had intentionally not furnished the address of the school, where she was working and the registered post purported to have been sent to her residential address through Court was not served on her and only when copy of decree sent by the respondent through Whats App, she came to know about the decree and immediately she has filed the present appeal for setting aside the same. He would also contend that learned trial Judge has not passed any order with regard to permanent alimony in favour of appellant as well as maintenance to the child as required under Section 25 of the Act. 6. It is the contention of Shri Mrutyunjaya S.Hallikeri, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that very petition filed before the trial Court for dissolution of marriage itself was not maintainable and that too under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Act, since the date of marriage was 11.05.2015 and purported desertion was during the year 2017 particularly is not possible when child was born on 19.03.2016. He would also submit that necessary ingredients to prove cruelty for dissolving the marriage under section 13(1) (1a) is also conspicuously absent in the pleadings. Hence, he prays for allowing the appeal. 7. Per contra Sri K.L.Patil, learned counsel appearing for respondent husband would support the judgment passed by the trial Court and contends that notice which was sent through Court by RPAD has been returned with a postal share "unclaimed" which is deemed service and for this proposition, he relies upon section 27 of General Clauses Act and the judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court (Madan and Company Vs. Wazir Jaivir Chand, (1989) AIR SC 630). He would also submit, though petition may not be maintainable under section 13(1) (ib) of the Act, it is definitely maintainable under Section 13(1) (ia) of the Act and necessary ingredients are found in the petition. Hence, he prays for dismissing the appeal. 8. He would also submit that respondent husband after waiting for considerable length of time had got re-married on 21.06.2018 and third party rights have stepped in and as such this Court should refrain itself from allowing the appeal. Hence he prays for rejecting the appeal. 9. Having heard learned Advocates appearing for parties and on perusal of the records secured from the trial Court, we find from perusal of lower court records that learned family judge had directed issuance of notice to respondent wife through process of Court as well as RPAD. However, no steps had been taken by the respondent herein to pay process fee and only postal cover had been furnished for issuance of notice through RPAD. The said notice which has been issued by the registry of the Trial Court has been returned with postal shara "unclaimed". 10. However, no steps had been taken by the respondent herein to pay process fee and only postal cover had been furnished for issuance of notice through RPAD. The said notice which has been issued by the registry of the Trial Court has been returned with postal shara "unclaimed". 10. A reading of Order V Rule 9(5) would indicate that service of notice can be held complete or duly served only in the event of addressee or his authorized agent having refused to take delivery of the postal article containing the summons or had refused to accept the summons or any other means specified in Sub-Rule (3) of Rule 9 of Order V. As otherwise the provisions of Civil Procedure Code does not enable the Court to hold deemed service even succor provided for such circumstances under section 27 of the General Clauses Act, cannot be held to be made universally applicable and it all depends on facts and circumstances of each case. 11. In matrimonial cases, family Courts or trial Courts should be slow in accepting service of notice if not personally effected on contesting respondent and particularly before placing such party exparte as it may lead to several civil consequences flowing there from. In the instant case we notice that though Court had ordered for issuance of notice both through process of Court as well as by RPAD, it has chosen to ignore the fact that notice issued through Court had not been served on respondent wife and petitioner had not taken steps to effect service of notice on wife through process of Court. However, trial court has accepted steps taken by petitioner for sending notice through RPAD. As such, we are of the considered view that service of notice effected on respondent wife cannot be held sufficient. Insofar as judgment of Madhan and Company rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court which has been relied upon by learned counsel appearing for the respondent would disclose that addressee therein had left the address where he was said to have been residing as such postal authorities had returned the postal article with an endorsement "left without address" and had returned the postal article to the sender. It was also noticed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that acceptance or refusal can be treated as service on the addressee. It was also noticed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that acceptance or refusal can be treated as service on the addressee. Yet another fact which swayed in the mind of the Hon'ble Apex Court was the fact that respondent had also caused the copy of the notice affixed on one of the doors of the premises in question in the presence of two inhabitants of the locality on 09.12.1976. It is in the facts obtained in the said case Hon'ble Apex Court held service of notice was sufficient. Whereas, in the instant case, where civil rights of the parties are involved namely not only the right of the wife was involved but also that of her daughter who was born out of the wedlock being involved, trial Court on mere postal endorsement as "unclaimed" could not have held service of notice as sufficient. One another factor which we are perforced to notice is, both petitioner as well as respondent were working as teachers at undisputed point of time and they knew that during the period when postman attempts to serve or deliver a postal article they would not be in their house or in other words they would be discharging their duties working as teachers in their school. Knowing fully well this fact petitioner had not taken steps to serve the notice or effect service of summons through process of Court by furnishing process fee. But had only chosen to send the notice through registered post acknowledgment due to residential address. Hence, for this precise reason learned trial judge while ordering notice on 31.05.2017 had ordered for issue of notice to respondent "through process of Court apart from ordering notice through RPAD". In the light of service of notice through Court not having been effected on the respondent and even registered postal article which has been sent to the respondent having been returned as unclaimed it cannot be presumed that there was due service of notice on appellant herein as such on this short ground alone, judgment and decree passed by the trial Court is liable to be set aside. 12. 12. In view of the fact that Sri K.L.Patil appearing for the respondent has fairly submitted that the petition filed under section 13 (1) (ib) would not be maintainable, we also make it clear that learned trial Court was not required to go into said issue and as such we have also not examined said issue. 13. However, he has contended that issue relating to cruelty requires to be adjudicated by the learned trial judge and as such he has prayed for matter being remitted back to trial Court. In the background of said contention, we have perused the pleadings as laid by the parties before learned trial judge. 14. A plain reading of petition filed before learned trial judge would indicate that on account of appellant wife having not respected the parents of her husband was the ground sought to be made out by petitioner contending that it amounted to inflicting cruelty on him. Petition averments would also disclose that on account of wife having not spoken to him properly on many occasions he alleged it would amount to cruelty. Filing of the petition was preceded by issuance of notice as per Ex.P.3. Even allegations made in the legal notice would disclose that alleged acrimony between himself and his wife as well as wife not speaking to his parents in a proper manner and disrespecting the elders in the family as incidents amounting to cruelty. It is also alleged by him that respondent wife had refused to take care of his elderly mother in a proper manner and it amounted to cruelty. There are the grounds on which he sought for dissolution of marriage. 15. The expression cruelty cannot be defined with abstract principle it has inseparable nexus to human conduct and human behavior. It all depends on the status of the parties and the background from which they hail from. Cruelty does not necessarily mean that there should be physical violence. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person, which depends upon the environment in which they have grown, sensitivity, educational, social background and the like. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be for variety of reasons and it cannot be infinite. It can be soft or brutal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mayadevi Vs. The concept of cruelty differs from person to person, which depends upon the environment in which they have grown, sensitivity, educational, social background and the like. Cruelty in matrimonial cases can be for variety of reasons and it cannot be infinite. It can be soft or brutal. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mayadevi Vs. Jagadish Prasad, (2007) AIR SC 1426 has held that the cruelty which is a ground for dissolution of marriage may be defined as willful and unjustifiable conduct of such character as to cause danger to life, limb or health, bodily or mental, or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. It has been held at paragraph No.10 : 10. The expression 'cruelty' has been used in relation to human conduct or human behaviour. It is the conduct in relation to or in respect of matrimonial duties and obligations. Cruelty is a course of conduct of one, which is adversely affecting the other. The cruelty may be mental or physical, intentional or unintentional. If it is physical, the Court will have no problem in determining it. It is a question offact and degree. If it is mental, the problem presents difficulties. First, the enquiry must begin as to the nature of cruel treatment, second the impact of such treatment in the mind of the spouse, whether it caused reasonable apprehension that it would be harmful or injuries to live with the other. Ultimately, it is a matter of inference to be drawn by taking into account the nature of the conduct and its effect on the complaining spouse. However, there may be a case where the conduct complained of itself is bad enough and per se unlawful or illegal. Then the impact or injurious effect on the other spouse need not be enquired into or considered. In such cases, the cruelty will be established if the conduct itself is proved or admitted (See Shobha Rani V. Madhukar Reddi, (1988) AIR SC 121 and A.Jayachandra V. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22 ). 16. To constitute cruelty the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty so as to arrive at a conclusion that spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than ordinary wear and tear of married life. 16. To constitute cruelty the conduct complained of should be grave and weighty so as to arrive at a conclusion that spouse cannot be reasonably expected to live with the other spouse. It must be something more serious than ordinary wear and tear of married life. The conduct, taking into consideration the circumstances and background has to be examined to reach a conclusion whether conduct complained of amounts to cruelty in the matrimonial law. Thus, such conduct alleged by the husband against wife contending the words used by her amounts to cruelty has to be examined or considered in the background of several factors and as already noticed herein above like the social status education, mental conditions, customs and traditions. The cruelty so alleged must be of a type so as to satisfy the conscious of the Court that by such cruelty inflicted by the spouse the married life cannot be continued further or in other words it would be impossible for them to live together without mental agony and torture. In fact Hon'ble Apex Court in Mayadevi's case referred to supra has held that tolerance to each other fault to a certain bearable extent has to be there in every marriage as otherwise the very institution of marriage would crumble on account of minor disputes or difference which would normally occur in any married life. The minor tiff's between husband and wife cannot be held to be abnormal. However, such differences of opinion and situations like agree to disagree being normal way of life that too between husband and wife, by itself cannot be a ground for either of the spouse to say or contend that in all circumstances to come such incidents are to be treated as amounting to cruelty. Too technical approach with hyper sensitivity would definitely be counterproductive to the institution of marriage. Keeping these sound principles in mind when the allegations made in the legal notice preceding the institution of petition for dissolution of marriage as well as averments made in the petition itself are perused, it would clearly indicate that on few occasions wife is said to have spoken in a rough manner or has not respected her in-laws. However, that by itself would not amount to cruelty and as observed in Mayadeiv's case referred to herein supra. However, that by itself would not amount to cruelty and as observed in Mayadeiv's case referred to herein supra. Such instances are bound to happen or occur in any institution of marriage and either ignoring such incidents or handling with deafness would definitely save the institution of marriage. As otherwise marriage would breakdown if such incidents are considered or construed as cruelty. 17. That apart we have also perused the averments made in the petition to notice that disrespecting persons who purported to have conducted mediation for bringing about rapprochement between husband and wife has been sought to made as a ground amounting to cruelty, which would not detain as too long to brush aside the same, in as much as third parties who have intervened in settling the matter and exchange of words by wife with said persons cannot be construed as cruelty inflicted on the husband. 18. For these myriad reasons we are of the considered view that a legations or averments made in the petition cannot be held or construed as one amounting to cruelty so as to fall within the mischief of section 13(1) (ia) of the Act. For the reasons aforestated, we proceed to pass the following: ORDER 1. Appeal is hereby allowed. 2. Judgment and decree passed in M.C.No.59/2017 dated 07.08.2017 by Principal Judge, Family Court, Gadag is set aside and petition filed in M.C.No.59/2017 is dismissed. 3. No order as to costs.