JUDGMENT : Mir Alfaz Ali, J. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. B. Islam and learned Addl. P.P. for the State/respondent No. 1, Mr. H.K. Sarma. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 06-07-2015, passed by learned Addl. Session Judge (FTC), Barpeta, in Sessions Case No. 81/2012. By the said judgment, learned Addl. Session Judge convicted the appellant u/s 304 IPC and sentenced her to rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 5,000/- with default stipulation. 3. As per prosecution case, on 27-02-2003, the accused appellant, who happened to be the daughter-in-law of the informant, mixed poison with milk, which was boiled by her and fed the same to a 1 year child, being her nephew, her sister-in-law and another lady, who happened to be her neighbor, all of whom fell ill after consuming the milk and ultimately died. The husband of the victim Kod Bhanu, the neighbor, who was also served with milk and died after consumption of milk, lodged the FIR (Ext. 7), on the basis of which, police registered Bagbar P.S. Case No. 30 of 2003 u/s 304 IPC and commenced investigation. In course of investigation, the bodies were sent for post mortem examination and Dr. Suresh Sarma (PW 12) conducted the post mortem examination. However, the autopsy doctor could not ascertain the cause of death, and as such, the visceras were preserved and the same were sent for chemical examination. The chemical examination of the viscera and the samples of milk and cream gave positive test for organophosphorus pesticide. 4. On conclusion of investigation, charge-sheet was laid against the accused/appellant under Section 304 IPC and eventually she stood trial. 5. In course of trial, the appellant denied the charge. Prosecution examined as many as fifteen witnesses and proved a number of documents in order to establish the charge. On appreciation of evidence learned trial court convicted the appellant u/s 304 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence to prove beyond doubt that accused/appellant mixed the poison, and as such, the conviction and sentence of the appellant, warrant interfered by this Court. 7. On appreciation of evidence learned trial court convicted the appellant u/s 304 IPC and awarded sentence as indicated above. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that there was no evidence to prove beyond doubt that accused/appellant mixed the poison, and as such, the conviction and sentence of the appellant, warrant interfered by this Court. 7. Pw 13, Samudra Baishya, Scientific Officer, Toxicology Department, FSL, Assam, Kahilipara, who carried out the chemical examination deposed, that he received one glass jar containing 150 c.c. of milk and one glass jar containing 1.50gm of cream. He also stated to have received two sets of containers containing viscera. The FSL reports (Exts.-4, 5 & 6), also show that sample of milk/cream and two visceras were examined by the PW 13. Apparently three persons died and visceras were also preserved from the body of all the three persons as revealed from the evidence of the doctor. We fail to understand why the viscera of one of the victim was not sent for chemical examination. It therefore, remained in the mystery from the above evidence of PW 12, PW 13 and the exhibits 4, 5 & 6, as to, whose viscera was sent for chemical examination. PW 13 stated in the cross-examination that he did not mention as to what percentage of the organophosphorus pesticide was found in the sample or what percentage of such pesticide could cause death of a person. It is also surprising to note that the post mortem examination was conducted in a very perfunctory manner and the doctor, even did not prepare the post mortem examination report of each of the victim. Rather, PW 12, the autopsy doctor, prepared a common post mortem examination report for all the three victims. It is needless to say, that no further report was submitted by the doctor as to the cause of death. Be that as it may, the fact remained is that three persons died after consuming the milk and cream and the factum of death has not been disputed. 8. Apparently there was no direct evidence indicating as to who mixed the poisonous substance with the milk. Be that as it may, the fact remained is that three persons died after consuming the milk and cream and the factum of death has not been disputed. 8. Apparently there was no direct evidence indicating as to who mixed the poisonous substance with the milk. However, the learned trial court essentially relying on the following circumstances recorded the conviction of the appellant and imposed sentence (i) At the relevant time, PW 1, the informant had gone to her father's house to serve milk and accused/appellant alone was available in the house. (ii) Extra judicial confession made by the accused/appellant before the villagers. 9. On our thorough scrutiny of the evidence, we find that PW 1, the mother-in-law of the victim stated in her evidence, that the accused/appellant boiled the milk, then she served it to Saniara (daughter of PW 1), one of the victim, and also to Kod Bhanu (another victim) who happened to be a neighbor and also fed the same to 1 year child, the nephew of the accused/appellant. She also tried to project in her evidence, that the appellant made Saniara and the child to consume the milk in spite of their reluctance. She also stated, that when the accused-appellant served milk to Kod Bhanu, she asked her not to consume the milk, as it had a foul smell akin to kerosene. She further went on saying, that when after consuming the milk, Akas Ali told, that it had some foul smell, the accused brought some sugar and mustard oil and mixed the same with the milk in order to neutralize the foul smell. However, during cross-examination, PW 1 admitted to have stated in her statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C., before police, that she boiled the milk and cream was also prepared by her and she herself served the same to the victims Kod Bhanu and also to Saniara. It was also in her previous statement recorded u/s 161 CrPC, that PW 1 herself added the mustard oil and sugar to the milk in order to neutralize the foul smell. Therefore, PW 1 apparently stood contradicted with her previous statement on material facts, which in our considered opinion rendered her evidence unworthy of credence. It was also in her previous statement recorded u/s 161 CrPC, that PW 1 herself added the mustard oil and sugar to the milk in order to neutralize the foul smell. Therefore, PW 1 apparently stood contradicted with her previous statement on material facts, which in our considered opinion rendered her evidence unworthy of credence. PW 2, PW 3 and PW 5, all being the members of the same family also tried to project in their evidence, that it was the appellant, who boiled the milk, prepared cream out of it and served the same to the victims. We also find in the evidence of PW 3, that she also stated before police that it was PW 1, who served the milk to the victims. Therefore, the evidence of PW 1, PW 2, PW 3 and PW 5 that the accused/appellant boiled the milk, prepared cream out of it and served the same to the victims was hardly worthy of trust. However, it is in the evidence, that the appellant fed the milk to a 1 year child being her nephew. When evidently PW 1 herself boiled the milk, prepared cream out of it and served it to her daughter and Kod Bhanu, the neighbor, feeding of milk to the child by the appellant, appears to be quite natural. Though PW 3 tried to project that the accused forcefully fed the child, no such statement was made before police regarding forceful feeding and such statement for the first time in court appear to be exaggerated and sheer embellishment. 10. The learned trial court was also convinced that the boiling of milk, preparing cream out of it and serving of milk was not done by the accused/appellant but by the PW 1 herself. However, the learned trial court observed that boiling or serving the milk was immaterial, what was material is, who mixed the poisonous substance with the milk. Learned trial court came to a finding, that as the PW 1 went to her parents' house to serve milk to her father and none other than the appellant was present in the house, naturally the finger of suspicion pointed towards the accused/appellant. But surprisingly, there was no legal evidence on record, that PW 1 went to her parents' house to provide milk to her father and came back after 2/3 hours. But surprisingly, there was no legal evidence on record, that PW 1 went to her parents' house to provide milk to her father and came back after 2/3 hours. It was only in her previous statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. which was brought on record by the defence, in order to discredit the PW 1, that she went to her parents' house to provide milk to her father. Therefore, the very premise, on which the finding of the learned trial court rests is, that the accused was alone in the house after the PW 1 left for her paternal house, was wrong, inasmuch as, the statement recorded u/s 161 Cr.P.C. is not an evidence, nor such statement can be used, except for contradicting the maker of such statement. Therefore, the first circumstance on which the learned trial court heavily relied, in our considered view, was based on no evidence. This apart, suspicion, however, strong may be, cannot take the place of proof. 11. Along with the above circumstances, as indicated above, the learned trial court placed reliance on the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before the villagers and also the police. On our scrutiny of the evidence, we find that PW 3, PW 4, PW 6, PW 8, PW 9, PW 10 and PW 12 spoke about the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before the villagers or the police. According to PW 3, the accused confessed her guilt after she was arrested. PW 4, who was a gaonburah stated in his evidence, that having come to know about the occurrence, when he went there on the following morning, the appellant confessed before them, but in his cross he candidly stated that he went to the place of occurrence accompanied with the police and magistrate and on being asked by them, the appellant confessed the guilt. Therefore, according to PW 4 also, the so-called confession was made by the appellant before police. PW 6, however, stated that the accused firstly confessed before the villagers gathered at the place of occurrence and later before the police. PW 8 stated, that the accused firstly confessed before them, that she mixed poison with milk and served it to the victims. However, from her cross-examination, it was revealed that the so-called confession was made before the police and the villagers. PW 8 stated, that the accused firstly confessed before them, that she mixed poison with milk and served it to the victims. However, from her cross-examination, it was revealed that the so-called confession was made before the police and the villagers. PW 9 stated that when police came to the P.O. the accused confessed before the police. According to PW 10, when police and the public quizzed the accused, initially she did not confess, but as the police browbeat her to speak the truth, she confessed. From the evidence of all the above prosecution witnesses, what we find is that the accused/appellant made the so-called confession before the police, where villagers were also present. However, the learned trial court, as we find in the impugned judgment, tried to segregate the confession in two parts, one made before the villagers and the other before the police. It is to be borne in mind, that the evidence adduced by the witnesses has to be considered as a whole and not in piece meal. If the oral testimony of the all the prosecution witnesses, who deposed about confession are taken together, it crystallizes, that the so-called confession was extracted by police and the public jointly. Therefore, in our considered view there was no scope to segregate the confession. What is most important to note is, that the so-called confession made before the police and the villagers, was the consequence of coercion and threat, as is evident from the testimony of PW 10. Therefore, no credibility can be attached to the soc-alled extra-judicial confessional statement. The acceptability of a confession, be it judicial or extra-judicial, depends on its voluntariness and truthfulness. Unless a confession satisfy the twin test of voluntariness and truthfulness, it can't be acted upon. The evidence on record, in our considered view, clearly demonstrated that the so-called confession made before the police and the villagers were made under threat and coercion. Therefore, such confession cannot be considered as evidence in view of Sections 24/25 of the Evidence Act. Thus, the second circumstance on which the learned trial court relied was also not based on any legal evidence. 12. In Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra reported in, (1984) AIR SC 1622 the Apex Court laid down the following golden principles for proof of a criminal charges which solely rests on circumstantial evidence : "152. Thus, the second circumstance on which the learned trial court relied was also not based on any legal evidence. 12. In Sharad Birdhi Chand Sarda vs State Of Maharashtra reported in, (1984) AIR SC 1622 the Apex Court laid down the following golden principles for proof of a criminal charges which solely rests on circumstantial evidence : "152. A close analysis of this decision would show that the following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an accused can be said to be fully established: (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established. It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the circumstances concerned 'must or should' and not 'may be' established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction between 'may be proved' and 'must be or should be proved' as was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade & Anr. V. State of Paharashtra where the following observations were made "Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict and the mental distance between 'may be' and 'must be' is long and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions." (2) The facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. They should not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is guilty, (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency. (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be proved, and (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused. 153. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence." 13. It is therefore, settled position of law that when a criminal charge rests solely on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances have to be proved conclusively and the circumstances so proved, must form such a complete chain, that it leads to the conclusion, which is consistent only and only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. It is therefore, settled position of law that when a criminal charge rests solely on circumstantial evidence, all the circumstances have to be proved conclusively and the circumstances so proved, must form such a complete chain, that it leads to the conclusion, which is consistent only and only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. There should not be any scope for a second hypothesis or a second possible conclusion which can be consistent with the innocence of the accused. 14. From the evidence discussed hereinabove, we find, that not to speak of forming a chain of circumstances for leading to the irresistible conclusion consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, even the circumstances on which reliance was placed for recording the conviction, were not proved conclusively and solidly. Therefore, we are unable to concur with the finding of the learned trial court recording conviction of the accused u/s 304 IPC and imposing sentence upon him. Accordingly, we set aside the conviction and sentence of the accused/appellant and allow the appeal. The accused/appellant, if in jail, he shall be released forthwith, unless not required in any other case. 15. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of. 16. Send back the LCR along with a copy of this judgment. A copy of this judgment be also sent to the Superintendent of the District Jail, Barpeta.