JUDGMENT : Bela M. Trivedi, J. 1. The petitioner-Shri Bavanji Jethabhai Sutaria claiming to be the tenant of the respondent No. 5 in respect of the Plot No. 6 admeasuring 933.25 sq.mts. of Revenue Survey No. 1114 situated within the city limits of Jamnagar has filed the present petition seeking following main relief: "B. Be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents not to disturb/take the possession and/or obstruct the possession and/or evict/dispossess from Plot No. 6 collectively admeasuring total 933.25 sq. metres of Revenue Survey No. 1114 situated within the city limits of Jamnagar and which are also well-known as "Vraj - 2" which are in physical possession of the petitioner without following due process of law." 2. As per the case of the petitioner, the petitioner had entered into a rent agreement/lease agreement on 1-4-2012 with the respondent No. 5 in respect of the plots in question for a period of 10 years. The respondent No. 5 was making hindrances in the petitioner's putting up fence and were not giving N.O.C. for electric connection, and therefore, the petitioner had filed a Regular Civil Suit No. 158 of 2017 against the said respondent No. 5 in the Civil Court, Jamnagar seeking declaration and permanent injunction. Pending the said suit, the parties had arrived at a settlement on 8-7-2017, whereby the respondent No. 5 gave no objection if the suit was allowed. Accordingly the suit came to be allowed vide the decree dated 8-7-2017 passed by the Civil Court, Jamnagar. It is further the case of the petitioner that on 8-10-2016, 9-12-2016, 22-1-2017 and 17-7-2017 public notices were issued for the auction sale of the suit plots in the local newspapers by the respondent No. 4-Axis Bank Limited. The petitioner had missed out the earlier public notices, however, when he came to know about the notice dated 17-7-2017, the petitioner through his Advocate had issued a public notice on 22-8-2017. The petitioner at that time came to know that the respondent No. 6 i.e. M/s. Giriraj Enterprise had availed cash-credit facilities from the respondent No. 4-Bank to the tune of Rs. 5 Crores and failed to repay the dues within the prescribed time-limit and therefore, the respondent No. 4 had initiated action against the respondent No. 6 under the provisions contained in the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. 5 Crores and failed to repay the dues within the prescribed time-limit and therefore, the respondent No. 4 had initiated action against the respondent No. 6 under the provisions contained in the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. Since, the possession of the petitioner of the plots in question were at stake, and the respondent-Bank and its officials were harassing the petitioner, the petition has been filed. 3. The petition has been resisted by the respondent Nos. 1 to 4 by filing affidavit-in-reply contending inter alia that the petition was thoroughly misconceived and not maintainable in view of the various pronouncements of decisions by the Supreme Court and this Court. It has also been contended that the petitioner had not come with clean hands and suppressed material facts from the Court. 4. The Co-ordinate Bench by passing the order on 29-9-2017, had directed the parties to maintain status quo. 5. Learned Advocate Ms. Shivani Rajpurohit appearing for respondent Nos. 1 to 4 and Mr. A.M. Thacker for respondent Nos. 7 to 13 raising preliminary objections as regards the maintainability of the present petition vehemently submitted that the petition without exhausting the statutory efficacious remedy by filing appropriate proceeding before the D.R.T., was not maintainable. They have placed reliance of decision of Supreme Court in case of Union Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon, reported in 2010 (8) SCC 110 and Kanaiyalal Lalchand Sachdev v. State of Maharashtra, reported in 2011 (2) SCC 782 . The learned Advocates for the concerned respondents have also placed reliance upon the decision of the Supreme Court in case of Federal Bank Limited v. Sagar Thomas, reported in 2003 (10) SCC 733 , and of this Court in case of Ionic Metalliks v. Union of India, reported in 2015 (2) GLH 156 , to submit that the respondent-Bank being the private Bank, cannot be called public body, and therefore, the writ petition against the respondents was not maintainable. 6. However, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. 6. However, the learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta appearing for the petitioner placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Indian Bank v. Nippon Enterprises South, reported in 2016 (15) SCC 79 , and in case of Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India, reported in 2016 (3) SCC 762 submitted that the petitioner being the tenant of the respondent No. 5, the respondent-Bank could not take possession of the disputed plots from the petitioner under the guise of enforcement of provisions of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, more particularly when there is a consent-decree passed by the Competent Court in favour of the petitioner. 7. At the outset, it may be stated that the petitioner under the guise of invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India has tried to thwart the proceedings initiated by the respondent-Bank against the respondent Nos. 5 and 6 under the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. As clearly transpiring from the public notice, the plots in question were sought to be auctioned in view of the measures taken by the respondent-Bank under the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act for the unpaid dues of the said borrower respondent No. 6 and the guarantor respondent No. 5. The petitioner claiming to be the aggrieved person, instead of challenging the said auction/measure taken by the respondent-Bank before the alternative statutory forum i.e. D.R.T. under Sec. 17 of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act has approached this Court. 8. At this juncture, it may be noted that the Supreme Court has strongly deprecated the tendency of the High Courts in entertaining the Writ petition filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India by the petitioners, without availing the alternative efficacious remedy available to them, and more particularly in the matters which arise under the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. In case of Authorised Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., reported in 2018 (3) SCC 85 , the Supreme Court recently while dealing with the alternative remedy available under the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act has held as under: "3. The S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act is a complete Code by itself, providing for expeditious recovery of dues arising out of loans granted by financial institutions, the remedy of appeal by the aggrieved under Sec. 17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, followed by a right to appeal before the appellate Tribunal under Sec. 18. The S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act is a complete Code by itself, providing for expeditious recovery of dues arising out of loans granted by financial institutions, the remedy of appeal by the aggrieved under Sec. 17 before the Debt Recovery Tribunal, followed by a right to appeal before the appellate Tribunal under Sec. 18. The High Court ought not to have entertained the writ petition in view of the adequate alternate statutory remedies available to the respondent. The interim order was passed on the very first date, without an opportunity to the Appellant to file a reply. Reliance was placed on United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tandon, 2010 (8) SCC 110 , and General Manager, Sri Siddeshwara Co-operative Bank Limited v. Ikbal, 2013 (10) SCC 83 . The writ petition ought to have been dismissed at the threshold on the ground of maintainability. The Division Bench erred in declining to interfere with the same. 4. xxx xxx xxx 5. xxx xxx xxx 6. xxx xxx xxx 7. xxx xxx xxx 8. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act states that the banking and financial sector in the country was felt not to have a level playing field in comparison to other participants in the financial markets in the world. The financial institutions in India did not have the power to take possession of securities and sell them. The existing legal framework relating to commercial transactions had not kept pace with changing commercial practices and financial sector reforms resulting in tardy recovery of defaulting loans and mounting non-performing assets of banks and financial, institutions. The Narasimhan Committee I and II as also the Andhyarujina Committee constituted by the Central Government Act had suggested enactment of new legislation for securitisation and empowering banks and financial institutions to take possession of securities and sell them without Court intervention which would enable them to realise long-term assets, manage problems of liquidity, asset liability mismatches and improve recovery. The proceedings under the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, (hereinafter referred to as 'the D.R.T. Act') with passage of time, had become synonymous with those before regular Courts affecting expeditious adjudication. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. xxx xxx xxx 10. In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Sec. 13(4) of the Act. All these aspects have not been kept in mind and considered before passing the impugned order. 9. xxx xxx xxx 10. In Satyawati Tandon (supra), the High Court had restrained further proceedings under Sec. 13(4) of the Act. Upon a detailed consideration of the statutory scheme under the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, the availability of remedy to the aggrieved person under Sec. 17 before the Tribunal and the appellate remedy under Sec. 18 before the Appellate Tribunal, the object and purpose of the legislation, it was observed that a writ petition ought not to be entertained in view of the alternate statutory remedy available holding: "43. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues, etc. the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are a Code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure for recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, the High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute. * * * 55. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the D.R.T. Act, and the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, and exercise jurisdiction under Art. 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 11. XXX XXX XXX 12. xxx xxx xxx 13. xxx xxx xxx 14. xxx xxx xxx 15. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection." 11. XXX XXX XXX 12. xxx xxx xxx 13. xxx xxx xxx 14. xxx xxx xxx 15. It is the solemn duty of the Court to apply the correct law without waiting for an objection to be raised by a party, especially when the law stands well settled. Any departure, if permissible, has to be for reasons discussed, of the case falling under a defined exception, duly discussed after noticing the relevant law. In financial matters, grant of ex-parte interim orders can have a deleterious effect and it is not sufficient to say that the aggrieved has the remedy to move for vacating the interim order. Loans by financial institutions are granted from public money generated at the tax payers expense. Such loan does not become the property of the person taking the loan, but retains its character of public money given in a fiduciary capacity as entrustment by the public. Timely repayment also ensures liquidity to facilitate loan to another in need, by circulation of the money and cannot be permitted to be blocked by frivolous litigation by those who can afford the luxury of the same. The caution required, as expressed in Satyawati Tandon (supra), has also not been kept in mind before passing the impugned interim order: "46. It must be remembered that stay of an action initiated by the State and/or its agencies/instrumentalities for recovery of taxes, cess, fees, etc. seriously impedes execution of projects of public importance and disables them from discharging their constitutional and legal obligations towards the citizens. In cases relating to recovery of the dues of banks, financial institutions and secured creditors, stay granted by the High Court would have serious adverse impact on the financial health of such bodies/institutions, which (sic. will) ultimately prove detrimental to the economy of the nation. Therefore, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect in exercising its discretion to grant stay in such matters. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 ; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Of course, if the petitioner is able to show that its case falls within any of the exceptions carved out in Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari v. Antarim Zila Parishad, AIR 1969 SC 556 ; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , and Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn. Ltd.,: AIR 2003 SC 2120 , and some judgments, then the High Court may, after considering all the relevant parameters and public interest, pass an appropriate interim order." 9. The Supreme Court in the subsequent order dated 5-10-2018 in the case of ICICI Bank Ltd. v. Umakanta Mohapatra, Civil Appeal Nos. 10243 to 10250 of 2018 observed as under: "Despite several judgments of this Court, including a judgment by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha, as recently as on 30-1-2018, in Authorized Officer, State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., 2018 (3) SCC 85 , the High Courts continue to entertain matters which arise under the Securitization and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 (S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I.), and keep granting interim orders in favour of persons who are Non-Performing Assets (N.P. As.). The writ petition itself was not maintainable, as a result of which, in view of our recent judgment, which has followed earlier judgments of this Court, held as follows: "18. We cannot help but disapprove the approach of the High Court for reasons already noticed in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heady Engineering Works (P) Ltd., 1997 (6) SCC 450 , observing: 32. When a position in law is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate Courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate Courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops." The writ petition, in this case, being not maintainable, obviously, all orders passed must perish, including the impugned order, which is set aside." 10. It is time that this tendency stops." The writ petition, in this case, being not maintainable, obviously, all orders passed must perish, including the impugned order, which is set aside." 10. In view of the aforestated clear legal position settled by the Supreme Court, and in view of the fact that the petitioner has not exhausted the alternative remedy available to him under Sec. 17 of the S. A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, challenging the measures undertaken by the respondent-Bank under Sec. 13(4) of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, the present petition could not be entertained and deserves to be dismissed on that ground alone. 11. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta appearing for the petitioner had sought to submit that the petitioner being the tenant in respect of the plots in question, he cannot be evicted taking recourse to the provisions contained in the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, in view of the settled legal position by the Supreme Court in case of Vishal N. Kalsaria v. Bank of India, reported in 2016 (3) SCC 762 . He also submitted that the D.R.T. would not have jurisdiction to decide about the tenancy rights of the petitioner qua the original owners who were the borrowers of the respondent-Bank. However, the learned Advocate Ms. Shivani Rajpurohit appearing for the respondent-Bank submitted that the said tenancy was not genuine inasmuch as, if the tenancy was created prior to the mortgage-deed executed in favour of the Bank, the respondent-borrowers would have disclosed such facts and the same would have been mentioned in the mortgage-deed itself which has not been mentioned and if the tenancy was created subsequent to the execution of the mortgage-deed, the consent of the respondent-Bank was required in view of the position of law settled by the Supreme Court in case of Harshad Govardhan Sondagar v. International Assets Reconstruction, reported in 2014 (6) SCC 1 , in which consent was not taken by the Bank. Learned Advocate Ms. Rajpurohit appearing for the respondent-Bank also submitted that the petitioner under the guise of being the tenant has raised the dispute of the civil nature seeking relief against the respondent-Bank which is a private Bank, and therefore, the petition itself is not maintainable. 12. Learned Advocate Ms. Rajpurohit appearing for the respondent-Bank also submitted that the petitioner under the guise of being the tenant has raised the dispute of the civil nature seeking relief against the respondent-Bank which is a private Bank, and therefore, the petition itself is not maintainable. 12. In the opinion of the Court, any person aggrieved by the measures taken by the Secured Creditor under Sec. 13(4) of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act, could make an application to the D.R.T. by filing an application under Sec. 17 of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act. The provisions contained in sub-sec. (3) of Sec. 17 of the S.A.R.F.A.E.S.I. Act gives ample power to the D.R.T. to examine the facts and circumstances of the case and pass appropriate orders as it may deem fit. Sub-sec. (4A) of Sec. 17 also gives ample power to the D.R.T. to decide about the claim of any tenancy or leasehold rights upon the Secured Asset as contemplated in the said provision. The Court also finds substance in the submission of Ms. Rajpurohit appearing for the Bank that the petition seeking substantive relief against the respondent-Bank which is a private Bank would not be maintainable under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Supreme Court in the case of Federal Bank Limited v. Sagar Thomas, reported in 2003 (10) SCC 733 , in which it has been held inter alia that a private company carrying on banking business as a Scheduled Bank cannot be termed as an institution or company carrying on any statutory or public duty which may be enforced through issue of writ under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. 13. Learned Senior Advocate Mr. Shalin Mehta has lastly submitted that the petitioner is ready to go before the D.R.T. or an alternative forum as may be legally available to him, however, the interim relief granted by the Court be extended for sometime. The said submission also cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal position to the effect that the forum of writ Court cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and final relief to any litigant. The said submission also cannot be accepted in view of the settled legal position to the effect that the forum of writ Court cannot be used for the purpose of giving interim relief as the only and final relief to any litigant. As held by the Supreme Court in various decisions, if the Court comes to the conclusion that the matter requires adjudication by some other appropriate forum and relegates the parties to the said forum, it should not grant any interim relief in favour of such a litigant for interregnum period till the parties approach the alternative forum and obtain the interim relief. Beneficial reference of the decisions of the Supreme Court in case of Kalabharti Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania, reported in 2010 (9) SCC 437 , and in case of State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, reported in AIR 1952 SC 12 and in case of Amarsarjit Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1962 SC 1305 , be made in this regard. 14. In that view of the matter, the petition being devoid of merits is dismissed. Interim relief granted earlier stands vacated forthwith. Rule is discharged.