JUDGMENT 1. Heard learned senior counsel for the appellant and the learned counsel for the respondent Central Coalfield Limited, (for short CCL). 2. The appellant is aggrieved by the impugned Judgement dated 13.12.2018, passed by the Hon''ble Single Judge, in W.P.(S). No.3571 of 2017, whereby, the writ application filed by the appellant, seeking correction in his date of birth, by referring him to the Medical Board for assessment of his age, has been dismissed by the Writ Court. 3. The facts of this case are that the mother of the appellant was in service of the respondent CCL, who took VRS in the year 1999, and at her place, the appellant was appointed to the post of P/R in Giddi Washery, under the CCL. In the service book of the mother of the appellant, which was prepared in the year 1987, the age of the appellant was shown to be 15 years, and accordingly, at the time of his appointment in the year 1999, the appellant claimed to be 27 years old, claiming the year of his birth to be 1972, on the basis of the entry of his age as 15 years in the service book of his mother. The appellant claims to be an illiterate person, having no certificate with regard to the date of birth. While being appointed, the medical examination of his age was made, and by appearance, he was assessed to be of 34 years of age, as on 15.04.1999. This document also bears the signature of the appellant. Pursuant to the appointment, the appellant started working and it is for the first time in the year 2015, he claims to have the knowledge about his age recorded in his service record. Thereafter, he claimed that there was wrong entry of his age, and ultimately, he approached this Court in W.P.(S) No. 3571 of 2017, for correction of the year of his birth from 1965 to the year 1972, claiming that the matter of the petitioner be referred to the Medical Board for re-determination of his age. 4. The Writ Court, while adjudicating the writ application, apart from the other decisions, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein the law has been laid down as under :- "16. 4. The Writ Court, while adjudicating the writ application, apart from the other decisions, relied upon the decision of the Apex Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board & Ors. Vs. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 , wherein the law has been laid down as under :- "16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant - a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, "procrastination is the greatest thief of time" and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis." The Writ Court has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court, in Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr., (1995) 4 SCC 172 , laying down the law as follows :- "10. -------------. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis." The Writ Court has also relied upon the decision of the Apex Court, in Burn Standard Co. Ltd. & Ors. Vs. Dinabandhu Majumdar & Anr., (1995) 4 SCC 172 , laying down the law as follows :- "10. -------------. The fact that an employee of Government or its instrumentality who has been in service for over decades, with no objection whatsoever raised as to his date of birth accepted by the employer as correct, when all of a sudden comes forward towards the fag end of his service career with a writ application before the High Court seeking correction of his date of birth in his Service Record, the very conduct of non-raising of an objection in the matter by the employee, in our view, should be a sufficient reason for the High Court, not to entertain such applications on grounds of acquiescence, undue delay and laches. Moreover, discretionary jurisdiction of the High Court can never be said to have been reasonably and judicially exercised if it entertains such writ application, for no employee, who had grievance as to his date of birth in his "Service and Leave Record" could have genuinely waited till the fag end of his service career to get it corrected by availing of the extraordinary jurisdiction of a High Court. Therefore, we have no hesitation, in holding, that ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of their discretionary writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ application / petition filed by an employee of the Government or its instrumentality, towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction of his date of birth entered in his "Service and Leave Record" or Service Register with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement." Placing reliance on these decisions, the Writ Court held that the appellant had moved after more than 17 years of his service, i.e., at the fag end of his service career and accordingly, his prayer could not be acceded, and the writ application of the appellant was accordingly, dismissed. Aggrieved thereby, the present L.P.A has been filed by the appellant. 5. Aggrieved thereby, the present L.P.A has been filed by the appellant. 5. Learned senior counsel arguing for the appellant has submitted that the impugned Judgement passed by the Writ Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, inasmuch as, according to the extant circular and instructions of the Coal Company, as contained in Annexure-6 to the memo of appeal, it was a fit case for suo motu reference for the assessment of the age of the appellant by the Medical Board, inasmuch as there was difference in the age of the appellant, recorded in the service book of the mother, which showed that in the year 1987, the appellant was aged about 15 years, and the appellant had also claimed to be 27 years old at the time of his appointment in the year 1999, but upon the medical examination, his age was assessed to be about 34 years, giving the year of birth as 1965. 6. Learned senior counsel has further submitted that the appellant had no knowledge about this document till the year 2015, when a pay slip was issued to the appellant, in which, he saw his year of birth recorded and thereafter, the issue of the age was raised and the prayer was made to refer him for the assessment of his age before the Medical Board. In support of her contention, learned senior counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in G.M., Bharat Coking Coal Limited, West Bengal Vs. Shib Kumar Dushad & Ors., (2000) 8 SCC 696 , wherein the law has been laid down as under :- "20. From the provisions in the instructions referred to above, it is clear that in case of dispute over the date of birth of an existing employee who has neither a Matriculation Certificate / Secondary School Certificate nor a statutory certificate in which the Manager has certified the entry regarding the date of birth to be authentic the employer is to refer the matter to the Medical Board. Therefore, no fault can be found with the action taken by the appellant to refer the case of the respondent to the Medical Board. --------------------." 7. Placing reliance on this decision, learned senior counsel submitted that the case of the appellant ought to have been referred before the Medical Board for reassessment of his age. Therefore, no fault can be found with the action taken by the appellant to refer the case of the respondent to the Medical Board. --------------------." 7. Placing reliance on this decision, learned senior counsel submitted that the case of the appellant ought to have been referred before the Medical Board for reassessment of his age. Learned senior counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon''ble Apex Court in High Court of A.P. Vs. N. Sanyasi Rao, (2012) 1 JLJR 77 (SC), submitting that in the said case, correction in the date of birth was ordered to be made at the fag end of the service of the officer concerned. However, the facts of that case clearly show that the representation was made by the officer concerned at the earliest point of time, which was kept pending by the concerned authorities. As such, this decision relied upon by the learned senior counsel does not apply to the facts of this case. 8. Learned counsel for the respondent CCL, on the other hand has opposed the prayer, submitting that there is no illegality in the impugned order passed by the Writ Court, in view of the fact that the issue for correction in the age has been raised almost at the fag end of the service and the same was not raised earlier. 9. Having heard the learned counsels for both the sides, and upon going through the record, we find that though the appellant claimed that at the time of his appointment, he was 27 years old, on the basis of the entry in the service book of his mother, but the fact remains that for the assessment of his age, he was medically examined and on the basis of his appearance, he was found to be about 34 years of age. On the said document, the appellant has also put his signature and as such, he cannot deny the fact that his age was not medically assessed at the time of his appointment. He did not challenge the same for about 17 years, but at the fag end of his service, he claimed that he got the knowledge about that assessment in the year 2015, and has claimed that his age be reassessed by the Medical Board. He did not challenge the same for about 17 years, but at the fag end of his service, he claimed that he got the knowledge about that assessment in the year 2015, and has claimed that his age be reassessed by the Medical Board. This is a clear case in which the appellant, has raised the issue of his age very belatedly, with the only object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement. 10. We are of the considered view that in the facts of his case, the Hon''ble Writ Court has rightly dismissed his writ application, relying upon the decisions of the Apex Court, in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board''s case (supra), and Burn Standard Co.''s case (supra), wherein it has been specifically held that the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside, and ordinarily High Courts should not, in exercise of writ jurisdiction, entertain a writ application / petition filed by an employee, towards the fag end of his service, seeking correction of his date of birth, with the avowed object of continuing in service beyond the normal period of his retirement. 11. We do not find any illegality and / or irregularity in the impugned Judgement passed by the Writ Court, worth any interference in the exercise of the Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction. 12. There is no merit in this appeal and the same is accordingly, dismissed.