JUDGMENT : 1. Heard the parties. 2. This Judgment shall dispose of above said writ petitions, since common questions of facts and law are involved in these writ petitions. 3. The core grievance of the petitioners in all the writ petitions is that they are not granted 2nd ACP and or 3rd MACP as the case may be. Additionally, petitioner in W.P.(S) No.6281/2018 is aggrieved by non-payment of difference amount of revised gratuity, arrears of amount of leave encashment, arrears of revised pay-scale from the year, 2001-2005. 4. All the aforesaid petitioners were appointed on different dates to different posts under Bihar State Agricultural Board, Patna and after working for more than 30 years of service, have retired on different dates on attaining respective age of superannuation from Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board and as such, they are entitled from the aforesaid benefit on completion of qualifying service for getting ACP/MACP. Aggrieved by the aforementioned claim, the petitioners represented before the respondents, but no heed was paid on the said representations. Left with no other efficacious, alternative and speedy remedy, the petitioners have been constrained to approach this Court invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for redressal of their grievances. 5. Learned counsels for the petitioners jointly submit that petitioners are entitled for the benefits of MACP, which has been given to other employees of the Marketing Board. The petitioners have already received the benefit of 1st and 2nd Time Bound Promotion/ ACP and on completion of 30 years of service, they are entitled for the benefits of MACP, which came into effect on 01.01.2006 but the same has not been enhanced to them even after their superannuation. Learned counsels further argue that the respondents have adopted pick and choose method as similarly situated employees have been granted the said benefit of MACP, but the petitioners have been deprived from the same. Learned counsels further argue that there is no provision for pension for Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board, the respondents are bound to pay the interest on the due amount of the petitioners. Learned counsels further argue that there is no provision for pension for Jharkhand State Agricultural Marketing Board, the respondents are bound to pay the interest on the due amount of the petitioners. Drawing the attention towards the supplementary counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and it is submitted that the stand of the Marketing Board regarding financial crunch is not tenable in the eyes of law as the Board has more than Rs.250 Crores in Bank and just to mislead the Court, the plea of financial crunch has been taken. Learned counsels further argue that the Board does not get any aid from Government. The Board has paid the benefit of MACP to other 300 employees. Once the Board has taken a decision to extend the benefits of MACP to its employees in parity with the employees of State Government from 01.01.2009, the petitioners are also entitled for the said benefits as Annexure-4 dated 25.06.2014 is fully applicable to the petitioner and as such, entitlement of the petitioners could not denied by the respondents. Learned counsels for the petitioners further argue that petitioners are also entitled for interest as no fault on delayed payment was there on the part of the petitioners. They lastly argue that decision of the Marketing Board is not fair and it is against the Statutory Provisions, Annexure-B to the counter-affidavit is not followed by any office order and no communication has been made to the petitioners and as such, said order is also not tenable in the eyes of law. Learned counsel for the petitioners have placed reliance on para 29 & 33 in case of State of Karnataka & Ors. Vs. Karnataka Pawn Brokers Association & Ors., reported in (2018) 6 SCC 363 . 6. On the other hand, counter-affidavit has been filed on behalf of the respondents controverting the statement made by the petitioners in the respective writ applications. 7. Dr. A.K. Singh, learned counsels for the respondents vehemently opposes the contention of the learned Sr. counsel for the petitioners and argues that writ petitions are not maintainable as it is the case of inordinate delay, the petitioners have approached this Court after more than 7 to 10 years after retirement and 15 years from the date of their entitlement. Learned counsel emphatically argues that the petitioners’ reliance on Annexure-4 is totally misconceived to this Court as the same is not applicable. Learned counsel emphatically argues that the petitioners’ reliance on Annexure-4 is totally misconceived to this Court as the same is not applicable. Learned counsel draws the attention of the Court towards Annexure B to the counter-affidavit dated 29.08.2019 and submits that said Annexure fully applies in the case of the petitioners and as such, they are not entitled for the benefit of MACP. Dr. A.K. Singh, further argues that though the petitioners have tried to make out the case of the discrimination but no specific name of the employees, who have been given the said benefits and when the payment was made, have not been demonstrate and merely making statement does not entitle the petitioners to get the benefit of MACP. It is further argued that there is no malice in the action of the Board. On 27 April, 2015, the State Government has deleted Clause 27 of the Jharkhand Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 2000 and the Board has been empowered to take decision in the matter of grant of MACP in light of clause 17 of Appendix 1 of Resolution dated 01.09.2009 of the Finance Department and in exercise of that power the Board has decided not to extend the benefit of MACP to its employees. Since, it is policy decision of the Board, the Court cannot be expected to interfere in the matter. 8. Be that as it may, having gone through the rival submissions of the parties and after perusal of materials on record, this Court is of the considered view that no case is made out for interference on the following grounds : (I.) Admittedly, the petitioners have approached this court after inordinate delay. The petitioners having retired long back and have approached this Court after more than 7 to 10 years and no explanation has been given for inordinate delay rather same has been justified by the learned counsel for the petitioners that they had been continuously representing before the respondents for redressal of their grievances. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held thus: 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, reported in (2014) 4 SCC 108 has held thus: 16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances delay and laches may not be fatal but in most circumstances inordinate delay would only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis. 17. In the case at hand, though there has been four years’ delay in approaching the court, yet the writ court chose not to address the same. It is the duty of the court to scrutinise whether such enormous delay is to be ignored without any justification. That apart, in the present case, such belated approach gains more significance as the respondent employee being absolutely careless to his duty and nurturing a lackadaisical attitude to the responsibility had remained unauthorisedly absent on the pretext of some kind of ill health. We repeat at the cost of repetition that remaining innocuously oblivious to such delay does not foster the cause of justice. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. On the contrary, it brings in injustice, for it is likely to affect others. Such delay may have impact on others’ ripened rights and may unnecessarily drag others into litigation which in acceptable realm of probability, may have been treated to have attained finality. A court is not expected to give indulgence to such indolent persons — who compete with “Kumbhakarna” or for that matter “Rip Van Winkle”. In our considered opinion, such delay does not deserve any indulgence and on the said ground alone the writ court should have thrown the petition overboard at the very threshold. Further, the Hon’ble Apex Court in case of C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, reported in (2008) 10 SCC 115 has held thus : 10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 14. We are constrained to refer to the several facets of the issue only to emphasise the need for circumspection and care in issuing directions for “consideration”. If the representation on the face of it is stale, or does not contain particulars to show that it is regarding a live claim, courts should desist from directing “consideration” of such claims. Further, the Hon’le Apex Court in case of U.P. Jal Nigam v. Jaswant Singh, reported in (2006) 11 SCC 464 has held thus : 6. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. The question of delay and laches has been examined by this Court in a series of decisions and laches and delay has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When a person who is not vigilant of his rights and acquiesces with the situation, can his writ petition be heard after a couple of years on the ground that same relief should be granted to him as was granted to person similarly situated who was vigilant about his rights and challenged his retirement which was said to be made on attaining the age of 58 years. A chart has been supplied to us in which it has been pointed out that about 9 writ petitions were filed by the employees of the Nigam before their retirement wherein their retirement was somewhere between 30-6-2005 and 31-7-2005. Two writ petitions were filed wherein no relief of interim order was passed. They were granted interim order. Thereafter a spate of writ petitions followed in which employees who retired in the years 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, woke up to file writ petitions in 2005 and 2006 much after their retirement. Whether such persons should be granted the same relief or not? 16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years’ salary and increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay and are continuing in service. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay and are continuing in service. (II.) The basis for making claim regarding the entitlement of MACP benefit is Annexure-4 dated 25.06.2014 to the rejoinder and on perusal of the aforesaid Annexure dated 25.06.2014, it appears that in a meeting dated 24.10.2013 vide letter dated 25.06.2014 it was resolved that in view of Sankalp Sankhya 2981/Finance dated 01.09.2009, the employees of Marketing Board will get central pay scale and other benefits similar to employees of the State Government including the benefit of ACP, the said office order was issued on 25.06.2014 and nowhere it was mentioned that it is to be given retrospective effect. The petitioners retired long back. The Hon’ble Apex Court in case of N.T. Devin Katti v. Karnataka Public Service Commission, reported in (1990) 3 SCC 157 has held thus: 9. In our opinion the State Government’s view was contrary to the directions contained in para 11 of its order dated July 9, 1975, which is as under: “11. This government order supersedes the government order cited in the preamble and shall come into force with immediate effect, subject to the provision that the reservation already made for any category of posts or service and advertised before the issue of this government order shall remain unchanged and shall be deemed to have been validly made. All official memoranda, circulars and instructions issued in pursuance of the government orders superseded by this government order shall also be deemed to have been superseded if such instructions are contrary to the provisions of this government order.” (emphasis supplied) Indisputably the aforesaid government order superseded all earlier government orders on the subject including the Government Order dated September 6, 1969 but while superseding those orders provision was made in para 11 to save the selection which was pending. Para 11 clearly stated that though earlier government orders laying down percentage of reservation required to be made in favour of Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and other backward classes including the mode of selection in preparing the select list, stood superseded, but it saved the reservations made for any category of post or service in respect of which advertisement had already been issued before the issue of the Government Order dated July 9, 1975. This follows from the expression “reservations already made for any category of posts or service advertised before the issue of this government order shall be deemed to have been validly made”. These directions stipulated that where reservations were already made and advertisement had been issued, and the selection was pending on July 9, 1975, the same shall remain unaffected and the selection shall be made in accordance with the earlier government orders, and the same shall be treated to have been made validly. Para 11 is in the nature of a saving clause, its object and purpose was to save the selections in respect of which proceedings had already been initiated by issuing advertisement. In view of the government’s own directions, as contained in para 11 of its order the amended mode of selection was not applicable therefore the Commission rightly followed the mode of selection prescribed under the Government Order dated September 6, 1969 as admittedly the said order was in force prior to July 9, 1975. 11. There is yet another aspect of the question. Where advertisement is issued inviting applications for direct recruitment to a category of posts, and the advertisement expressly states that selection shall be made in accordance with the existing rules or government orders, and if it further indicates the extent of reservations in favour of various categories, the selection of candidates in such a case must be made in accordance with the then existing rules and government orders. Candidates who apply, and undergo written or viva voce test acquire vested right for being considered for selection in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the advertisement, unless the advertisement itself indicates a contrary intention. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement, however he has no absolute right in the matter. Generally, a candidate has right to be considered in accordance with the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement as his right crystallises on the date of publication of advertisement, however he has no absolute right in the matter. If the recruitment Rules are amended retrospectively during the pendency of selection, in that event selection must be held in accordance with the amended Rules. Whether the Rules have retrospective effect or not, primarily depends upon the language of the Rules and its construction to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent is ascertained either by express provision or by necessary implication; if the amended Rules are not retrospective in nature the selection must be regulated in accordance with the rules and orders which were in force on the date of advertisement. Determination of this question largely depends on the facts of each case having regard to the terms and conditions set out in the advertisement and the relevant rules and orders. Lest there be any confusion, we would like to make it clear that a candidate on making application for a post pursuant to an advertisement does not acquire any vested right of selection, but if he is eligible and is otherwise qualified in accordance with the relevant rules and the terms contained in the advertisement, he does acquire a vested right of being considered for selection is accordance with the rules as they existed on the date of advertisement. He cannot be deprived of that limited right on the amendment of rules during the pendency of selection unless the amended rules are retrospective in nature. Though, Rule always have prospective effect unless mentioned in express language also and as such, nothing has been mentioned in the office order dated 25.06.2014 that it has given retrospective effect and as such, it is not applicable in the case of the petitioners rather relying on the same by the petitioners is totally misconceived. (III.) From Annexure-B of the counter-affidavit dated 29.08.2019, it appears that it is applicable to retired employees also wherein it is clearly mentioned that Clause 27 of the Jharkhand Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 2000 has been repealed by the Government and as such, main source of the income has come to an end. (III.) From Annexure-B of the counter-affidavit dated 29.08.2019, it appears that it is applicable to retired employees also wherein it is clearly mentioned that Clause 27 of the Jharkhand Agricultural Produce Markets Act, 2000 has been repealed by the Government and as such, main source of the income has come to an end. It is difficult for the Board to pay even the salary to the existing employees and benefit of MACP cannot be extended in view of the financial crunch faced by the Marketing Board. (IV.) The plea of discrimination is also not attracted in this case as nothing has been brought on record to show that any of the similarly situated employees have been granted the benefits of MACP. By making a bald statement, does not entitle the petitioners to get the benefit of MACP and also for making a case of discrimination. V. The policy decision of the Marketing Board not to grant ACP/MACP to any of its employee is fully justified and reasonable since the Board is facing financial crunch. 9. As a sequel to the aforesaid observations, rules, guidelines and judicial pronouncement, I find no merit in the instant cases and as such, no interference is warranted. Accordingly, aforesaid writ petitions stand dismissed. 10. So far as other benefits as prayed by petitioner in W.P.(S) No.6281 of 2018 is concerned, the petitioner therein is at liberty to prefer a fresh representation before the respondents, claiming dues/arrear other than MACP, within a period of two weeks’ from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. On receipt of such representation, the respondents are directed to take a conscious decision and pass a reasoned order regarding the aforesaid benefits as per his entitlement, in accordance with law, within a period of six weeks’ thereafter. Needless to say that if the petitioner is found entitled for any of the amount, same shall be extended to him, within a period of further two weeks’. 11. Pending I.A., if any, also stands disposed of.