JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India, Mr. D.C. Mishra, learned A.C. to Sr. S.C.-III appearing for the respondent-State of Jharkhand and Mr. Ramit Satender, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar. 2. The present appeal has been filed against the judgment dated 26.09.2015 and decree signed on 13.10.2015 passed by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-I, Ranchi in Title Appeal No. 130 of 2003, whereby, the Title Appeal filed by the appellant/plaintiff has been dismissed and judgment and decree dated 29.09.2003 (decree signed on 12.11.2003) passed by learned Sub-Judge-VII, Ranchi in Title Suit No. 185 of 1999 has been affirmed. 3. The appellant/plaintiff had instituted the suit being Title Suit No. 185 of 1999 for declaration that no person other than the appellant/plaintiff society and its members has any right, title and interest in any of the lands of village-Hundru, P.S. Doranda, District-Ranchi described in Schedule of the plaint. It was further prayed in the title suit that none among the defendants or their agents, servants and employees have any right to interfere with the rights of the appellant/plaintiff society and its members in the suit lands. It was further prayed that a decree may be passed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff declaring the sale deed executed by the raiyats of the lands, which is purchased by the appellant/plaintiff itself and on behalf of the society, namely, Anamika Sahkari Grih Nirman Samittee. It was further prayed that possession of the appellant/plaintiff over the suit land be confirmed and in case it is found that the appellant/plaintiff society and its members have been dispossessed from the suit land, possession be restored to the appellant/plaintiff by evicting all agents, servants and employees of the respondents/defendants through the process of the court. It was further prayed in the title suit to declare that the suit lands described in the Schedule of the plaint were never acquired compulsorily under the Land Acquisition Act claiming perpetual injunction, and restraining the respondents/defendants from any interference in any manner with possession and enjoyment of the land in question and also for the costs. 4. The appellant/plaintiff pleaded before the courts below that the appellant/plaintiff is a society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co operative Societies Act, having registration No.23/R/1986. 4. The appellant/plaintiff pleaded before the courts below that the appellant/plaintiff is a society registered under the Bihar and Orissa Co operative Societies Act, having registration No.23/R/1986. The appellant/plaintiff contended that in the light of the judgment dated 12.02.1999 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1024 of 1996(R) and as per the direction passed by this Court in L.P.A. No. 74 of 1999(R) vide order dated 05.04.1999, the title suit was instituted urgently without serving any notice to the defendants under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure and it was prayed before the court below that leave under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure be granted to the appellant/plaintiff for the same. The purpose of the appellant/plaintiff society for acquiring the lands was that after acquisition of lands in suitable area and after division of the same in sub-plots, such subplots will be distributed, allocated and transferred to its members. To that purpose, the appellant/plaintiff society acquired the lands in Village-Hundru for valuable consideration through registered documents from the owners of the lands. It was alleged that some of the lands have been purchased by some members of the society out of the lands purchased in the name of the society. The appellant/plaintiff-society further made out a case in the court below that the land under R.S. Khata No. 164, Khewat No.2 of Village Hundru is kayami raiyati land of Mahli Mahto, S/o Late Bechan and before the final publication of R.S. record of right, two sons of Mahli Mahto namely Mani Nath Mahto and Gariba Mahto had separated and possessed the lands and in remarks column of the khatian, separate possession of both sons of Mahli Mahto in respect of different plots were noted. Under the said Khata, Plot No. 812 having an area of 1.42 acres and Plot No. 871 having area of 1.78 acres were recorded and owned by said Mani Nath Mahto and after his death the same developed upon his only son Jagatpal Mahto who also died leaving behind four sons namely Shankar Gope, Krishna Gope, Ramchandra Gope and Chhotu Gope. The further case of the appellant/plaintiff was that Shankar Gope for his own and as the guardian of minor Chhotu Gope, Krishna Gope and Ramchandra Gope transferred the entire land of R.S. Plot Nos. 871 and 812 along with standing house thereon being holding no.10 under ward no. The further case of the appellant/plaintiff was that Shankar Gope for his own and as the guardian of minor Chhotu Gope, Krishna Gope and Ramchandra Gope transferred the entire land of R.S. Plot Nos. 871 and 812 along with standing house thereon being holding no.10 under ward no. 29 of Ranchi Municipal Corporation, to the appellant/plaintiff-society. The alleged sale was made for a consideration of Rs.5,63,000/-by six deeds of sale executed by Shankar Gope and his brothers in favour of appellant/plaintiff-society for transferring the entire 2.66 acres of land comprised with the house. The lands of R.S. Plot No.833 having an area of 49 decimals and Plot No. 837 having an area of 58 decimals of Khata No. 164 of Village Hundru were exclusively owned and possessed by Gariba Mahto, S/o Mahli Mahto, who was recorded raiyat. Gariba Mahto died leaving behind two daughters namely Chhotan Devi and Lagan Devi, out of them Lagan Devi died leaving behind her only son namely Ganesh Gope. It was further case of the appellant/plaintiff that by registered Power of Attorney dated 11.8.1995, said Chhotan Devi and Ganesh Gope empowered and authorized Md. Ali, the secretary of the appellant/plaintiff society, to sell the said Plot Nos.833 and 837. The said secretary of the appellant/plaintiff-society by virtue of deeds dated 11.12.1995 and 12.01.1996 sold different portions of Plot No.833 to four different members of the appellant/plaintiff-society. The secretary of the appellant/plaintiff-society further sold the lands of Plot No.837 in favour of its members through sale deed dated 20.11.1995. It was further contended that Plot nos.841 and 842 of Khata No.231 having an area of 1.17 acres and 0.45 acres of Village Hundru P.S. Doranda District Ranchi were recorded in R.S. as Kayami raiyati lands of Lakshman Ahir, who died leaving behind his widow Mostt. Jeetan Ahirin and two sons namely Bihari Gope and Monu Gope. It was further alleged that entire area of the aforesaid two plots were divided into three equal parts amongst the heirs of Lakhsman Ahir leaving 12 decimals for road. All three heirs of Lakshman Ahir sold their respective shares by executing registered sale deeds dated 14.12.1988, 26.08.1988 and 01.12.1989 respectively in favour of the appellant/plaintiff-society. On the basis of these facts, the appellant/plaintiff-society pleaded that they have been put in possession of the purchased land. All three heirs of Lakshman Ahir sold their respective shares by executing registered sale deeds dated 14.12.1988, 26.08.1988 and 01.12.1989 respectively in favour of the appellant/plaintiff-society. On the basis of these facts, the appellant/plaintiff-society pleaded that they have been put in possession of the purchased land. Similarly lands along with Kachha house having an area of 0.67 acres in R.S. Plot No.839 under Khata No.140 of same Village having M.S. Holding No.9/A under Ward No.29 of Ranchi Municipal Corporation was owned and possessed by Dubey Sao, Gulha Sao, Bhakan Sao, Damodar Sao, Kamindra sao, all sons of late Rungtu Sao and Mostt. Devki Devi, widow of Kolha Sao and Kali Sao and Chandra Sao both sons of late Jaban Teli. It was further pleaded that in need of money and for legal necessity the aforesaid owners of Holding no.9/A sold a portion of land measuring 0.45 acres to the appellant/plaintiff-society by virtue of registered sale deed dated 28.12.1989 and the appellant/plaintiff-society came in peaceful possession of the property. The land of R.S. Plot No.835 under Khata No.184 of the same village having total area of 0.83 acres, Holding No.8 ward no.29 of Ranchi Municipal Corporation was originally belonged to Mane Mahto who died leaving behind his only son Rijhu Gope and on whose death his four sons namely Mahabir Gope, Bhubneshwar Gope, Chandan Gope and Basudeo Gope inherited the house property as alleged by the appellant/plaintiff-society. It was further alleged that Chandan Gope died leaving behind his widow Smt. Chaman Devi and Basudeo Gope also died leaving behind his two sons namely Mahesh Gope and Suresh Gope. All the aforesaid persons became the owners and possessors of the said property. It was further alleged that R.S. Plot No. 801 of Khata No. 90 of Village-Hundru was originally possessed by Raghubir Ahir and after his death his widow Titan Ahirin inherited the property, who died much before 1956 and as per Hindu Law of Succession, the said land developed upon Mane Mahto, the brother of Raghubir Ahir. Plot Nos. 801 and 835 are adjacent to each other and the said Mane Mahto encompassed both the plots within one boundary wall and the entire property comprised in both the plots became Holding no.8 and the said lands ultimately developed upon Mahabir Gope, Bhuneshwar Gope, Smt. Chaman Devi, Suresh Gope and Mahesh Gope. Plot Nos. 801 and 835 are adjacent to each other and the said Mane Mahto encompassed both the plots within one boundary wall and the entire property comprised in both the plots became Holding no.8 and the said lands ultimately developed upon Mahabir Gope, Bhuneshwar Gope, Smt. Chaman Devi, Suresh Gope and Mahesh Gope. It was further contended that the said owners, for the legal necessity, sold the same to the appellant/plaintiff-society through registered sale deeds dated 18.01.1990, 29.09.1987 and 10.12.1987 respectively and after purchase the appellant/plaintiff-society was exclusive owner and possessor of the entire Holding no.8 comprised of R.S. Plot Nos. 801 and 835. It was further contended that the lands were divided into sub-plots and some of them were allotted and transferred to different members of the appellant/plaintiff-society and some of the lands are yet to be allotted and are in possession of the appellant/plaintiff-society. The appellant/plaintiff-society further made out a case in the court below that R.S. Plot Nos. 723 and 724 having an area of 4 decimals and 6 decimals respectively of Khata No. 170 of Village-Hundru comprised a house referred as Holding no.7 under Ward no. 29 of Ranchi Municipal Corporation which originally belonged to one Mahesh Ghashi and on his death the said property was inherited by his only son Suku Ghashi, who died leaving behind his only son Raj Kumar Naik who also died leaving behind his only son Balku Naik, who became the owner and possessor of the aforesaid holding comprised of Plot Nos. 723 and 724. It was further contended that the said Balku Naik sold the entire 0.71 acres of land to the appellant/plaintiff-society by registered sale deed dated 19.04.1989 and the appellant/plaintiff-society came in possession of the purchased land. The appellant/plaintiff-society after purchase of the land made sub-plots after obtaining valid sanction from the competent authority and also got sanctioned plan in the year 1989 vide Case No. 138/1988-89. It was further contended that after purchase the appellant/plaintiff-society has submitted a lay out plan, which was sanctioned vide order dated 29.11.1989 passed in Case no. 574 of 1989, before the Ranchi Regional Development Authority for construction of the house. Thereafter the name of the appellant/plaintiff-society and its member mutated in the Shrista of Anchal and obtained the rent receipt thereof and, therefore, the appellant/plaintiff-society became the owner of the land in question. 574 of 1989, before the Ranchi Regional Development Authority for construction of the house. Thereafter the name of the appellant/plaintiff-society and its member mutated in the Shrista of Anchal and obtained the rent receipt thereof and, therefore, the appellant/plaintiff-society became the owner of the land in question. It was further contended that the lands have been acquired from time to time for Ranchi Aerodrome, but after consideration of all the concerned and allied records, the local revenue authority as well as the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi were fully satisfied that the lands possessed by the appellant/plaintiff-society were not the subject matter of any acquisition proceeding. It was further contended that without any basis, the Defence Estate Officer of Bihar and Orissa Circle, Danapur written a letter to the appellant/plaintiff-society objecting the construction over the plots of the appellant/plaintiff-society and claimed that the said plots had been acquired for defence purpose during 2nd world war. It was further pleaded by the appellant/plaintiff-society that after thorough enquiry by the District Revenue Authority including the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi, the Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi and the Commissioner of the Chhotanagpur Division at Ranchi, it was found that during 2nd world war, there was temporary taking of possession of lands, but there was no permanent acquisition. The said letter was challenged by the appellant-society before this Court by filing C.W.J.C. No. 1024/1996 (R) annexing therein the letter dated 29.01.1996 written by the Station Commandant, Station Headquarter, Ranchi, restraining the appellant/plaintiff-society from commencing any work on the said acquired plots. The said letter dated 29.01.1996 was quashed by this Court vide order dated 12.02.1999 and the respondents/defendants were directed not to interfere with the possession of the appellant/plaintiff-society without obtaining order from the court of competent jurisdiction. The respondents/defendants have filed L.P.A. No. 74 of 1999(R) before this Court against the order dated 12.02.1999 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1024 of 1996(R) contending therein that in exercise of powers conferred under Rule 75A(I) of the Defence of India Rules and by notifications dated 25.04.1942 and 09.04.1943, the plots involved in the suit property had been requisitioned and defendant nos. 1 to 3 have established the airfield at Ranchi for defense purpose on permanent basis after parting compensation in accordance with law to the raiyats and holder of the plots. The appellant/plaintiff-society also filed counter affidavit in L.P.A. No. 74/1999(R). 1 to 3 have established the airfield at Ranchi for defense purpose on permanent basis after parting compensation in accordance with law to the raiyats and holder of the plots. The appellant/plaintiff-society also filed counter affidavit in L.P.A. No. 74/1999(R). The Division Bench of this Court set aside the order passed in C.W.J.C. 1024/1996(R) vide order dated 05.04.1999. The appellant/plaintiff-society filed a review petition for review of the said order passed in L.P.A. 74/1999(R), but the same was also dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court. 5. On the above backgrounds and facts, the appellant/plaintiff-society has instituted Title Suit No. 185 of 1999. In the suit, all the defendants have appeared and filed their separate written statements. Defendant nos. 1, 2 and 3 have filed their written statements contending therein that the appellant/plaintiff-society has no cause of action for the suit and the suit is not maintainable and the suit is also barred by limitation and adverse possession and also by waiver, estoppel and acquiescence. It was contended by the respondents/defendants that vendors of the appellant/plaintiff-society are necessary parties and they have not been made party in the suit. The suit is bad under the provisions of Urban Ceiling Act and the appellant/plaintiff-society cannot acquire more lands than ceiling limit and the said vendors cannot sell more than ceiling limit. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that the suit is bad under the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the provisions of Section 80 CPC has not been complied with at any time. The documents of acquisition are against the provisions of Urban Ceiling Act and the appellant/plaintiff-society has not acquired title over any portion of the suit lands. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that the suit lands are within the Ranchi district and the object of the appellant/plaintiff-society is to override the provisions of statute and the provisions of Urban Ceiling Act. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that neither the said vendors nor the appellant/plaintiff-society have acquired any right, title and interest over the suit lands. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that neither the said vendors nor the appellant/plaintiff-society have acquired any right, title and interest over the suit lands. It was also contended by the respondents/defendants that they are in possession of the suit lands along with many other plots in Village-Hundru since 25.04.1942 by requisition under the Defence of Indian Act, 1939 and Rules framed thereunder and subsequently after acquisition by the Union Government on different dates under statute have acquired permanent right and title under both law. The vendors of the appellant/plaintiff-society had filed C.W.J.C. No. 3427 of 1995 before this Court, which was dismissed vide order dated 03.01.1995 and they did not prefer any suit against the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 3427 of 1995. They have suppressed this fact. It was further contended that the said plots are in possession of the respondents/defendants since 1942 in their own right and the said deeds are created by the appellant/plaintiff-society in collusion with the said persons and no consideration money was paid as per deed. The deeds are collusive and the same are creating documents in favour of the appellant/plaintiff-society and none of them are in possession of Plot Nos. 841 and 842. Respondent no.1 is in possession of the land since it was notified in 1942 for airfield and alleged owners were not in possession after 1942. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that as per letter no. 335 (ii) dated 28.08.1989 written by the appellant/plaintiff, which was also annexed in C.W.J.C. No. 1024 of 1996(R), wherein they claimed title over 75 numbers of plots, whereas, as per letter no. 754 dated 20.06.1989, they claimed title over 11 number of plots only, which is also mentioned in the Schedule of lands of the plaint and it was contended that this contradiction itself proves the collusion which is null and void. It was also contended that even if the R.R.D.A. has sanctioned any plan that will not prove the title of the appellant-society, the respondents/ defendants will not be bounded by the same. It was also contended that even if the R.R.D.A. has sanctioned any plan that will not prove the title of the appellant-society, the respondents/ defendants will not be bounded by the same. The appellant/plaintiff has suppressed the real facts and managed to get some documents prepared in collusion with some persons and, if any, report made by the District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi is on record, they may be made by misleading the facts, which was later on questioned by the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi vide letter dated 27.03.1996 and also enquired in that regard. The lands were requisitioned during 2nd world war in 1942 and respondents/defendants are in possession of the same and the appellant/plaintiff-society had rightly been asked not to enter on the suit lands unlawfully and not to attempt any construction in which the respondents/defendants are in peaceful possession. It was also contended that the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi vide letter dated 03.08.1972 had intimated the Special Land Acquisition Director, Government of Bihar that their lands were acquired in 1943-44, but as per file 11 of 1944 the relevant record no. IR-8/43-44 has been misplaced during transit to the office of Commissioner, Ranchi. It was also contended that either the letters are fabricated or are issued in collusion without verifying the facts. It was further contended that the Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi had written a letter being letter no. 97(ii) dated 27.03.1996 to the Secretary, Home Department (Special), Bihar that the land had been acquired and earlier letter no. 117(i) dated 15.10.1992 did not appear to be based on facts and, therefore, the same was subject to enquiry. The lands along with other lands have been acquired with the knowledge and notice to all concerned without any objection for more than 50 years and the appellant/plaintiff-society has created documents in collusion with some persons to raise false claim. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that the appellant/plaintiff-society set up one Shankar Gope to file a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3427 of 1995, which was withdrawn by him vide order dated 03.04.1995 for filing Civil Suit, but no suit has been filed by him. It was further contended by the respondents/defendants that the appellant/plaintiff-society set up one Shankar Gope to file a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 3427 of 1995, which was withdrawn by him vide order dated 03.04.1995 for filing Civil Suit, but no suit has been filed by him. Thereafter, the appellant/plaintiff-society falsely claimed many plots including the suit plots, but subsequently the appellant/plaintiff amended the plaint and filed a writ petition being C.W.J.C. No. 1024 of 1996(R) before this Court challenging the letter dated 29.01.1996., which was allowed and the letter dated 29.01.1996 was quashed. The defendants/respondents had filed L.P.A. No. 74 of 1999(R), against the order passed in C.W.J.C. No. 1024 of 1996(R), which was allowed by the Division Bench of this Court vide order dated 05.04.1999. On the basis of above facts, the lands were required for establishing aerodrome both civil and defence and as such the lands were permanently acquired as per law and therefore, it cannot be said that the lands were requisitioned for limited period under Section 75(A) of the Defence of India Rules. The plots were firstly requisitioned and thereafter acquired permanently during 1942-44 under the Defence of India Rules and Land Acquisition Act. It was further contended that during 2nd world war, complete block in Village Hundru, Hinoo, Hethu, Kalyanpur, Hesag, Latma, Santranjy were acquired for the safety purposes under the Defence of India Act, 1939 and Land Acquisition Act, 1894 between 1940 and 1945 for establishing Aerodrome and quarters and therefore area of 1064.55 acres was requisitioned and later acquired and, thereafter, the respondents/defendants came in possession. The details of statements under the signatures of different officials were also annexed with the written statement filed by the respondents/defendants. The Land Acquisition Officer submitted the details of cost of acquisition and lands required for the Ranchi Airfield on 28.08.1955 including the suit land. A map was prepared for Ranchi Airfield in Villages Hinoo, Hundru, Kalyanpur and other areas measuring 1121.38 acres in one block by District Kanungo, Ranchi, Land Acquisition Officer, Military Estate Officer (now designated as Defence Estate Officer), Bihar and Orissa Circle, Danapur Cantt. and for that purpose sanction was sought for transfer of 107.51 acres out of required land to State of Bihar for H.E.C. Ranchi and other purposes for consideration of Rs.3,95,636.50/-. and for that purpose sanction was sought for transfer of 107.51 acres out of required land to State of Bihar for H.E.C. Ranchi and other purposes for consideration of Rs.3,95,636.50/-. There was demarcation of 1121.33 acres of land of Defence Department for construction of Aerodrome in presence of Additional District Land Acquisition Officer, Ranchi, Executive Engineer, C.P.W.D. and Aerodrome Officer and a map was prepared after measurement on 16.12.1981 and certificate to this effect was also prepared. The lands were acquired in accordance with law and rules for the public and urgent purposes. On the above facts, the respondent/defendants contended that the appellant/plaintiff and its vendors were never in possession after acquisition of land by respondent no.1 and its claim is false and concocted. The respondents/ defendants had also filed their written statements respectively contending therein that the suit is not maintainable and it is barred by limitation as the provisions of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with and, hence, this Court may not entertain this Second Appeal 6. On the basis of pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial court: (i) Whether the suit, as framed is maintainable? (ii) Whether the plaintiffs have got cause of action for the present suit? (iii) Is the suit barred by law of limitation and adverse possession? (iv) Is the suit barred under the provisions of Section 80 C.P.C.? (v) Is the land in question has been acquired by the Government for the purpose of Aerodrome and quarters? (vi) Whether the plaintiff acquired valid title on the basis of sale deeds and mutation upon the land in dispute? (vii) Whether the vendors have any right for transferring the disputed land in favour of plaintiff? (viii) Whether the plaintiff has got permission from the R.R.D.A.? (ix) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the decree as claimed for? 7. The trial court after framing all the issues, documents exhibited before the court and evidences adduced on behalf of the parties and also after going through the witnesses of prosecution witnesses and defence witnesses came to the finding that the appellant/plaintiff-society has got no valid cause of action on the suit land and accordingly dismissed the suit vide judgment dated 29.09.2003. 8. 8. The appellant/plaintiff has filed an appeal being Title Appeal No. 130 of 2003, which was also dismissed by learned Additional Judicial Commissioner-I, Ranchi vide judgment dated 26.09.2015. The appellate court has discussed the grounds taken by the appellant/plaintiff and respondents/defendants and considered the judgment of the trial court including the issues framed by the trial court. The appellate court has also considered the documents and papers filed on behalf of the appellant/plaintiff and respondents/defendants in paragraphs 10 and 11 of the impugned judgment, which are quoted herein below: “10. Following papers and ducuments have been filed on behalf of the plaintiff :- Ext-1 – Rent receipt dated 18-12-1989 in the name of Anamika Sahkari Grih Nirman Saitee Ltd. Secretary. Ext-1/A- Rent receipt dated 08-11-1989 in the name of the Anamika Sahkari Grih Nirman Samitee Ltd. Ext-1/b- Rent receipt dated 22-11-1989 in the name of Budhwa Teli and others. Ext-1/c- Rent receipt dated 08-11-1987 in the name of Laxman Ahir. Ext-1/d- Rent receipt dated 24-02-1988 in the name of Madho Ghasi and others. Ext-1/e Rent receipt dated 24-02-1988 in the name of Tuni Teli and Sarju Teli. Ext-1/f- Rent receipt dated 30-04-1988 in the name of Sukhu Ghasi. Ext-1/g- Rent receipt dated 25-09-1987 in the name of Timran Ahir. Ext-1/h- Rent receipt dated 03-03-1988 in the name of Smt. Maya Prasad. Ext-1/j- Rent receipt dated 27-09-1988 in the name of K. Bihari. Ext-1/k- Rent receipt dated 06-08-1994 in the name of Shankar Gope and others. Ext-1/L- Rent receipt dated 08-01-1989 in the name of Barindra Nath Mukherjee. Ext-2 Registered sale deed dated 17-01-1989 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Ashok Kumar Shrivastava. Ext-2/a- Registered sale deed dated 22-03-1988 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Banka Bihar Das. Ext-2/b- Registered sale deed dated 20-10-1987 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Smt. Maya Prasad. Ext-2/c- Registered sale deed dated 06-05-1988 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Barindra Nath Mukherjee. Ext-2/d- Registered sale deed dated 23-10-1989 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Jawahar Singh. Ext-2/e- Registered sale deed dated 31-03-1989 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/f- Registered sale deed dated 03-06-1989 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/g- Registered sale deed dated 02-04-1988 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/e- Registered sale deed dated 31-03-1989 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/f- Registered sale deed dated 03-06-1989 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/g- Registered sale deed dated 02-04-1988 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/h- Registered sale deed dated 18-01-1988 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/i- Registered sale deed dated 14-03-1988 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/j- Registered sale deed dated 13-12-1988 executed by Bihari Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/k- Registered sale deed dated 26-08-1988 executed by Munu Gope and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/l- Registered sale deed dated 28-12-1989 executed by Dubey Sao and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/m- Registered sale deed dated 18-01-1988 executed by Renu Sinha and others in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/o- Registered sale deed dated 11-12-1995 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Radheshyam. Ext-2/p- Registered sale deed dated 06-11-1995 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Kiran Devi. Ext-2/q- Registered sale deed dated 11-12-1995 executed by the plaintiff in favour of Manraj. Ext-2/r- Registered sale deed dated 20-11-1996 executed in favour of the plaintiff. Ext-2/s- Registered sale deed dated 10-12-1987 executed by Mahabir Gope and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-2/t- Registered sale deed dated 06-04-1988 executed by Shankar Gope and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-2/u- Registered sale deed dated 28-09-1987 executed by Mahabir Gope and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-2/v- Registered sale deed dated 19-04-1988 executed by Balku Nayak and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-2/w- Registered sale deed dated 18-01-1990 executed by Mahabir Gope and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-2/x- Registered sale deed dated 01-12-1989 executed by Jitan Ahirin and others in favour of plaintiff. Ext-3- Certificate dated 03-02-1990 by the RRDA with respect to the RS Plot no 812 of village-Hundru. Ext-3/a- Certificate dated 03-02-1990 given by the RRDA with respect to plot no 839 of village-Hundru. Ext-3/c- Certificate dated 03-02-1990 given by the RRDA with respect to plot no 836 of village-Hundru. Ext-3/e- no objection by the competent authority cum Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under 26 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976. Ext-3/f- Certified copy of the revisional survey Khatian of khata no 140 plot no 839 of village-Hundru in the name of Laxman Ahir. Ext-3/e- no objection by the competent authority cum Deputy Commissioner, Ranchi under 26 of the Urban Land Ceiling and Regulation Act, 1976. Ext-3/f- Certified copy of the revisional survey Khatian of khata no 140 plot no 839 of village-Hundru in the name of Laxman Ahir. Ext-3/g- Certified copy of the revisional survey Khatian of khata no 231 plot no 839 of village-Hundru in the name of Laxman Ahir. Ext-4- Certified copy of the order dated 23-04-1999 passed by the Hon'ble High Court in LPA no 74 of 1999. Ext-4/2- Certified copy of the order dated 12-02-1999 passed by the Hon'ble High Court in CWJC no 1024 of 1996 R. Ext-5- Registration certificate of the plaintiff society. Ext-5/1- Registration certificate of the plaintiff society. Ext-5/2- Clearance certificate issued by the District Land Acquisition officer, Ranchi dated 28-08-1989. Ext-6- Advocate's notice dated 29-04-2000 given on behalf of the plaintiff to the secretary, Land Reforms Department. Ext-6/1- Acknowledgment of the advocate's notice issued to the secretary Land Reforms Department, Patna. Ext-6/2- Acknowledgment of the advocate's notice sent to the Lt Col. Commandant, Station head quarter, Ranchi. Ext-6/3 to 6/8- Postal receipt regarding dispatch of advocate's notice dated 29-04-2000 given on behalf of the plaintiff. Ext-7- Certified copy of revisional survey Khatian of Khata no 90 of village-Hundru in the name of Most Jitan Ahirin. Ext-7/b- Certified copy of revisional survey Khatian of Khata no 164 of village-Hundru in the name of Mahli Mahto. Ext-9- Letter dated 29-04-1995 issued by the Commissioner and Secretary Home Special Department; Government of Bihar duly addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and Land Reforms Department, Bihar Patna and others. Ext-10- Letter dated 07-11-2006 issued by the Land Acquisition officer, Ranchi deputing Mithlesh Prasad to depose in the suit. Ext-11- Certified copy of the registered power o attorney dated 09-08- 1995 executed by Chhatan Devi and others in favour of Md Ali, Secretary of the plaintiff society with respect to the lands of plot nos. 833 and 837 of Khata no 164 of village- Hundru. 11. Papers and documents filed on behalf of the defendants/respondents are as under :- Ext-A/1- Plan showing Ranchi Air Field Area in village- Hinoo, Hundru, Hethu and Kalyanpur prepared on 17/12/1981. Ext-A-1/1- Map of the year 1964 showing Ranchi Air Field Area. Ext-A 1/2- Plan showing Ranchi Air Field Area. 833 and 837 of Khata no 164 of village- Hundru. 11. Papers and documents filed on behalf of the defendants/respondents are as under :- Ext-A/1- Plan showing Ranchi Air Field Area in village- Hinoo, Hundru, Hethu and Kalyanpur prepared on 17/12/1981. Ext-A-1/1- Map of the year 1964 showing Ranchi Air Field Area. Ext-A 1/2- Plan showing Ranchi Air Field Area. Ext-B-1- letter dated 24/11/1955 written by Land acquisition officer, Ranchi to the Deputy Director, Land Hiring and Disposal Services, Eastern command, Alipur, Calcutta. Ext-C/1- Detailed survey/demarcation of defence land acquired for Ranchi Airfield. Ext-D-1- Notification dated 21.05.1940 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Ext-D-1/1- Notification dated 06.01.1941 cancelling acquisition of 2.54 acres of land notified vide ext.-D-1. Ext-D-1/2 Notification dated 06-01-1941 under section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act. Ext. D-1/3- Notification dated 30-08-1941 making correction in the earlier notification i.e. in ext. D-1/2. Ext-D-1/4- Notification dated 30-08-1941 making correction in the earlier notification. Ext-D-1/5- Notification dated 30-08-1941 making correction in the earlier notification. Ext-D1/6- Notification dated 30-08-1941 under section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act.” 9. The appellate court after appreciating all the evidences and documents came to the finding that the suit land was acquired by the Government in the year 1942-44 by paying compensation to the owners, so the suit land acquired by the appellant/plaintiff-society through different sale deeds does not confer any title to the appellant/plaintiff-society as it was earlier acquired by the Government for defence purposes of aerodrome and quarter by paying compensation to the parties. Creation of Jamabandi in favour of the appellant/plaintiff society with respect to the suit land does not create right of the appellant/plaintiff society over the suit land. The vendors of the appellant/plaintiff-society have no right for transferring the suit land in favour of the appellant/plaintiff-society and on the basis of sale deeds mutation and rent receipts the appellant/plaintiff-society has not acquired title over the suit land. On the basis of above facts, the issues were decided as against the appellant/plaintiff-society and in favour of the respondents/defendants. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellate court has failed in taking into account the fact that deeds were executed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff by which the appellant/plaintiff has came into possession. 10. Mr. Indrajit Sinha assisted by Mr. Saket Upadhyay, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellate court has failed in taking into account the fact that deeds were executed in favour of the appellant/plaintiff by which the appellant/plaintiff has came into possession. He further argues that so far as requirement of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is concerned, that has already been fulfilled in this case. The defendants/respondents have already appeared in the suit and contested the case and in that view of the matter Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not attracted in this case. He also submits that there is no acquisition proceeding and both the fact finding courts have failed to take into consideration these facts. To substantiate his arguments, he is placing reliance upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2009) 12 SCC 194 , paragraphs 36 to 39 and submits that in view of this judgment, the judgment and decree passed by the courts below are not sustainable. He further submits that there is substantial question of law involved in this appeal. 11. Per contra, Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India submits that statutory provision of Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has not been complied with and in that view of the matter, suit itself was not maintainable. He further submits that in view of the judgment passed by the Division Bench of this Court in L.P.A. No. 74 of 1994(R), the appellant/plaintiff was directed to file suit immediately, but the same was filed after six months. In that view of the matter waiver under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure is not attracted as the suit was filed after six months of such liberty. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent-Union of India is placing reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders , reported in (2006) 12 SCC 119 . Paragraphs 14 to 18 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein below: “14. To substantiate his arguments, learned counsel for the respondent-Union of India is placing reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of A.P. v. Pioneer Builders , reported in (2006) 12 SCC 119 . Paragraphs 14 to 18 of the aforesaid judgment are quoted herein below: “14. From a bare reading of sub-section (1) of Section 80, it is plain that subject to what is provided in sub-section (2) thereof, no suit can be filed against the Government or a public officer unless requisite notice under the said provision has been served on such Government or public officer, as the case may be. It is well settled that before the amendment of Section 80 the provisions of unamended Section 80 admitted of no implications and exceptions whatsoever and are express, explicit and mandatory. The section imposes a statutory and unqualified obligation upon the court and in the absence of compliance with Section 80, the suit is not maintainable. The service of notice under Section 80 is, thus, a condition precedent for the institution of a suit against the Government or a public officer. The legislative intent of the section is to give the Government sufficient notice of the suit, which is proposed to be filed against it so that it may reconsider the decision and decide for itself whether the claim made could be accepted or not. As observed in Bihari Chowdhary, the object of the section is the advancement of justice and the securing of public good by avoidance of unnecessary litigation. 15. It seems that the provision did not achieve the desired results inasmuch as it is a matter of common experience that hardly any matter is settled by the Government or the public officer concerned by making use of the opportunity afforded by the said provisions. In most of the cases, notice given under Section 80 remains unanswered. In its 14th Report (reiterated in the 27th and 54th Reports), the Law Commission, while noting that the provisions of this section had worked a great hardship in a large number of cases where immediate relief by way of injunction against the Government or a public officer was necessary in the interests of justice, had recommended omission of the section. In its 14th Report (reiterated in the 27th and 54th Reports), the Law Commission, while noting that the provisions of this section had worked a great hardship in a large number of cases where immediate relief by way of injunction against the Government or a public officer was necessary in the interests of justice, had recommended omission of the section. However, the Joint Committee of Parliament, to which the Amendment Bill, 1974 was referred, did not agree with the Law Commission and recommended retention of Section 80 with necessary modifications/relaxations. 16. Thus, in conformity therewith, by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976 the existing Section 80 was renumbered as Section 80(1) and sub-sections (2) and (3) were inserted with effect from 1-2-1977. Sub-section (2) carved out an exception to the mandatory rule that no suit can be filed against the Government or a public officer unless two months’ notice has been served on such Government or public officer. The provision mitigates the rigours of sub-section (1) and empowers the court to allow a person to institute a suit without serving any notice under sub-section (1) in case it finds that the suit is for the purpose of obtaining an urgent and immediate relief against the Government or a public officer. But, the court cannot grant relief under the subsection unless a reasonable opportunity is given to the Government or public officer to show cause in respect of the relief prayed for. The proviso to the said sub-section enjoins that in case the court is of the opinion that no urgent and immediate relief should be granted, it shall return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1). Subsection (3), though not relevant for the present case, seeks to bring in the rule of substantial compliance and tends to relax the rigour of sub-section (1). 17. Thus, from a conjoint reading of sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 80, the legislative intent is clear, namely, service of notice under sub-section (1) is imperative except where urgent and immediate relief is to be granted by the court, in which case a suit against the Government or a public officer may be instituted, but with the leave of the court. Leave of the court is a condition precedent. Such leave must precede the institution of a suit without serving notice. Leave of the court is a condition precedent. Such leave must precede the institution of a suit without serving notice. Even though Section 80(2) does not specify how the leave is to be sought for or given, yet the order granting leave must indicate the ground(s) pleaded and application of mind thereon. A restriction on the exercise of power by the court has been imposed, namely, the court cannot grant relief, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving the Government or a public officer a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of relief prayed for in the suit. 18. Having regard to the legislative intent noticed above, it needs little emphasis that the power conferred on the court under subsection(2) is to avoid genuine hardship and is, therefore, coupled with a duty to grant leave to institute a suit without complying with the requirements of sub-section (1) thereof, bearing in mind only the urgency of the relief prayed for and not the merits of the case. More so, when want of notice under sub-section (1) is also made good by providing that even in urgent matters relief under this provision shall not be granted without giving a reasonable opportunity to the Government or a public officer to show cause in respect of the relief prayed for. The provision also mandates that if the court is of the opinion that no urgent or immediate relief deserves to be granted it should return the plaint for presentation after complying with the requirements contemplated in subsection (1).” 12. Learned counsel for the respondent-Union of India further submits that lands were acquired as per Ext.-D series as per the notifications of Land Acquisition Act. He further submits that two fact finding courts have already discussed the entire facts including the documents and it is not in the domain of this Court to re-appreciate the documents and evidences by entertaining this Second Appeal. 13. Mr. D.C. Mishra, learned A.C to Sr. S.C.-III and Mr. Ramit Satender, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-State of Bihar have adopted the arguments advanced by Mr. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India. 14. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the arguments advanced by the parties, this Court finds that two fact finding courts have come to the concurrent finding and dismissed the suit and appeal. Pratyush Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the respondent-Union of India. 14. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the arguments advanced by the parties, this Court finds that two fact finding courts have come to the concurrent finding and dismissed the suit and appeal. This Court finds that both the Courts below have considered each aspect of the matter minutely and discussed the evidence threadbare and came to the concurrent finding. This Court is conscious of the fact that under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure if any substantial question of law is involved then only this Court can entertain the Second Appeal. This Court is not inclined to re-examine the documents and evidences, which have already been adduced before the courts below. This Court further finds that there is no substantial question of law, involved in this Second Appeal and accordingly, the same stands dismissed. 15. Let the Lower Court Records be sent back to the court below.