JUDGMENT : 1. Petitioners are aggrieved by the orders dated 31.05.1994 passed by Consolidation Officer, Roorkee; 27.11.2001 passed by Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation and 15.06.2007 passed by Deputy Director, Consolidation (Annexure 4, 8 & 10 to the writ petition). 2. Facts of the case in brief are that respondent – Sadilal (respondent herein) filed an objection under Section 9 of Consolidation of Holdings Act stating that name of petitioner No. 1 and Mohd. Hasan S/o Alimuddin has been wrongly recorded in revenue records as Bhumidhar with transferable rights over the land comprised in plot no. 228, 259 and 231/7 situate in Village Padali Gujjar, Tehsil Roorkee, District Haridwar. The said objection was registered as Case No. 787 before Consolidation Officer, Roorkee (West). Respondent contended before the Consolidation Officer that he had purchased part of land from Sri Razzak S/o Visarat and regarding the remaining land he contended that he is in adverse possession and accordingly, his name has been recorded in category 9 in the revenue records. 3. Consolidation Officer issued notice to the petitioners, however, they did not participate in the proceedings despite notice. Ultimately, the Consolidation Officer partly allowed the case in favour of respondent vide order dated 31.05.1994 and ordered that name of the respondent be recorded as Bhumidar with transferable rights in place of petitioner No. 1 and another in respect of plot no. 228 admeasuring 2 Biswa 10 Biswansi, plot No. 259/1 admeasuring 12 Biswa and Plot No. 259/2 admeasuring 6 Biswa on the basis of adverse possession. 4. Petitioners did not challenge the order passed by Consolidation Officer for a considerable period of time and after seven years they filed an appeal under Section 11 (1) of the Consolidation of Holdings Act before the Settlement Officer of Consolidation, Haridwar. Respondent also filed an appeal with the prayer that the order dated 31.05.1994 passed by the Consolidation Officer be modified and he be recorded as Bhumidhar with transferable rights in respect of 3 Biswa land comprised in plot No. 228 and 1 Bigah 7 Biswa land comprised in plot No. 259/1 on the basis of sale deed executed in his favour by the previous owner. The appeal filed by the respondent was partly allowed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The petitioner thereafter filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act which too has been dismissed by learned Deputy Director of Consolidation. The appeal filed by the respondent was partly allowed by the Settlement Officer Consolidation. The petitioner thereafter filed a revision under Section 48 of the Act which too has been dismissed by learned Deputy Director of Consolidation. Thus, feeling aggrieved, petitioner has approached this Court. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. A bare perusal of the order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation reveals that no sufficient cause was shown by the petitioners for the delay of seven years in filing the appeal. The order passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation has been affirmed by the Deputy Director, Consolidation. Undoubtedly, a liberal approach has to be adopted while considering the delay condonation application. However, it does not mean that every application for condonation of delay has to be allowed irrespective of the fact whether sufficient cause has been shown or not. Long delay of seven years caused by the petitioners in filing the appeal indicates that either they were not diligent in pursuing the remedy or they had accepted the judgment given by Consolidation Officer and one fine morning, they changed their mind and decided to challenge the order passed by Consolidation Officer. 6. It is settled position in law that in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court does not act as a Court of Appeal. It can neither review nor re-appreciate, nor reweigh the evidence upon which determination of a subordinate court or inferior tribunal purports to be based. This Court cannot correct errors of fact or even of law and cannot substitute its own decision for that of the inferior court or tribunal as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Shamshad Ahmad & others Vs Tilak Raj Bajaj & others reported in (2008) 9 SCC 1 . 7. Similar view was expressed by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gulshera Khanam Vs Aftab Ahmad reported in (2016) 9 SCC 414 . Para 30 to 35 of the said judgment are extracted below:- “(30) This takes us to examine the first question as to whether the High Court was justified in its writ jurisdiction to reverse the concurrent findings of the two courts below and was, therefore, justified in holding that the appellant's (landlady) need for expansion of clinic run by her daughter was not bona fide. (31) The Constitution Bench of this Court settled the law relating to exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court while deciding revision in rent matters under the Rent Control Act in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , Justice R.M. Lodha, the learned Chief Justice speaking for the Bench held in para 43 thus: (SCC pp. 101-102) “43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate court/first appellate authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the court/authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the High Court in revisional jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the court/authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by court/authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or reassess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity” (32) Coming now to the facts of this case, keeping in view the principle of law laid down in the aforementioned case and on perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority/Civil Judge and the first appellate court, we find that both the courts properly appreciated the facts and evidence adduced by the parties and on that basis recorded all necessary findings (detailed above) in favour of the appellant and granted decree of eviction against the respondent. This the Prescribed Authority/ Civil Judge and the first appellate court could do in their respective jurisdiction and, in our opinion, both the courts rightly did it in the facts of this case. (33) Likewise, when we peruse the impugned judgment, we find, as rightly urged by the learned counsel for the appellant, the High Court did not keep in mind the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (supra) so also the principle laid down by this Court in relation to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India in the case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai & Ors., (2003) 6 SCC 675 while deciding the writ petition and proceeded to decide like the first appellate court. The High Court as is clear from the judgment probed all factual aspects of the case, appreciated evidence and then reversed the factual findings of the appellate court and the Prescribed Authority. This, in our view, was a jurisdictional error, which the High Court committed while deciding the writ petition. In other words, the High Court, in our view, should have confined its inquiry to examine as to whether any jurisdictional error was committed by the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal. It was, however, not done. This, in our view, was a jurisdictional error, which the High Court committed while deciding the writ petition. In other words, the High Court, in our view, should have confined its inquiry to examine as to whether any jurisdictional error was committed by the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal. It was, however, not done. (34) In our considered opinion, the question in relation to the bona fide need of the appellant's daughter to expand the activities of running the clinic was rightly held by the Prescribed Authority and the first appellate Court in appellant’s favour by holding the appellant’s need to be bona fide and genuine. We find no ground on which the High Court could have upset the concurrent finding on this question in its writ jurisdiction under Article 227, which is more or less akin to revisional jurisdiction of the High Court. The High Court also failed to hold that findings of the two courts were so perverse to the extent that any judicial person could ever reach to such conclusion or that the findings were against any provision of law or were contrary to evidence adduced etc. (35) The High Court, in our view, should have seen, as was rightly held by the two courts below, that the appellant's daughter had been running her medical clinic in shop No. 7 for quite some time. This fact was not in dispute. Though a feeble attempt was made by the respondent contending that after appellant's daughter's marriage, she has started living in Moradabad and, therefore, her need to run the clinic and expand its activity is not bona fide but this plea did not find favour with Prescribed Authority and the first appellate Court and, in our view, this being a pure finding of fact, was binding on the High Court in its writ jurisdiction.” 8. The orders passed by the Consolidation Officer; Assistant Settlement Officer of Consolidation and Deputy Director, Consolidation are reasoned & well considered. This Court does not find any reason to interfere with these orders in exercise of supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The writ petition is therefore dismissed. No order as to costs.