JUDGMENT : Defects pointed by the office are ignored. 2. Since all these appeals arise out of the same impugned Judgment, they have been heard together and they are being disposed of by this common Judgment. 3. Heard learned counsel for the appellants, learned counsel for the State and learned counsel for the Jharkhand Tourism Development Corporation, (herein after referred to as ‘J.T.D.C.’). 4. The appellants herein are aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 08.01.2019, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P.(C) No. 3140 of 2018 and analogous matters, whereby the writ applications have been dismissed by the Writ Court, inter alia, on the ground that the writ petitioners had made suppression of the fact that they were given notice before the impugned action. However, at the very outset, it may be made clear that in two of the writ applications it was stated that notice was given to them, whereas in two of the writ applications it was stated that the impugned action against them was without any notice. 5. The facts of this case, as revealed from the impugned Judgment and the record, are that the appellants herein had been allotted shops in Hotel Natraj Bihar Complex, at Deoghar, by the then Bihar State Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., pursuant to an advertisement published in the year 1996. The unregistered agreement of lease was executed between the Bihar State Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., Patna, and the respective petitioners/their predecessors in interest, pursuant whereto they were running the shops in the said Hotel Natraj Bihar Complex, on the payment of the lease amount. After the bifurcation of the State of Bihar in the month of November, 2000, the respondent J.T.D.C., has stepped into the shoes of the Bihar State Tourism Development Corporation. 6. The impugned Judgment shows that the lease agreement between the Bihar State Tourism Development Corporation Ltd., and the appellants writ petitioners, was for a period of sixty-six years, based on certain terms and conditions. Condition No.4, stipulated about making the payment of the municipal charges by the lessees, and condition No. 9 prohibited the lessees from transferring or sub-letting the property or any part thereof, to any other person/firm, without prior permission of the lessor. Condition No.4, stipulated about making the payment of the municipal charges by the lessees, and condition No. 9 prohibited the lessees from transferring or sub-letting the property or any part thereof, to any other person/firm, without prior permission of the lessor. Condition No. 20 in the lease agreement stated as follows:- “If it comes to the notice of the lessor at any stage during the lease period that the lease of the aforesaid property has been obtained by misrepresentation or misstatement or suppression of the fact or fraud or if the lessee violates any of the terms and conditions of this lease agreement or if he/she fails to clear all his/her dues including statutory charges/dues payable to the lessor or any other competent authority/authorities within three months of the same failing as dues, then the lessor shall have rights to take any or all action as stated hereunder: (i) The lease may be terminated/canceled without any compensation to the lessee. (ii) The lessee shall be summarily evicted and expenses incurred in getting the lessee evicted including penal interest thereon shall be recoverable from the lessee and dues. (iii) All the properties of the lessee situated in and around the said leased property shall be seized and disposed off by the lessor and the entire proceeds shall be forfeited irrespective of the amount. (iv) The lessee shall be blacklisted and shall not be allowed to take part in future in any settlement process of any property of the lessor.” 7. According to the case of the appellants, the respondent J.T.D.C., came up with an order of cancellation of their lease agreements, under the aforesaid Clause 20 thereof, for the alleged violations of the terms and conditions Nos. 4 and 9 of the lease agreements. Though the petitioners in two writ applications stated on oath that no notice was given to them prior to the cancellation of allotment, but this apparently is a false statement, as notice was issued to them prior to cancellation of the allotment, and they had also responded thereto. In the other two writ petitions, however, it was stated that the notice was given to them prior to the cancellation of the allotment. 8. In the other two writ petitions, however, it was stated that the notice was given to them prior to the cancellation of the allotment. 8. As a consequence of the cancellation of agreement of lease, the Sub-Divisional Officer/Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Deoghar, by his impugned notices/orders dated 28.06.2018, directed the appellants writ petitioners to vacate the shops in question within a period of one week, failing which, the shops were to be vacated with the use of force at their expenses. Aggrieved thereby, the writ petitioners moved before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 3140 of 2018 and analogous matters, in which there was an ad-interim order passed in their favour, by virtue of which they continued in the possession of the leased shops. It may be stated that after the dismissal of their writ applications, the shops of the appellants have been sealed by the respondent authorities. and presently they are out of the possession of the shops in question. 9. The notice issued to the writ petitioners by the respondent J.T.D.C., stated about the violation of conditions No. 4 and 9 of the lease agreement, according to which the writ petitioners were in default in making the payment of the municipal charges, and it was also found by the J.T.D.C., that they had sublet the shops allotted to them and the shops were being run by other persons. The writ petitioners had responded to the notice issued to them, in which non-payment of the municipal dues was admitted by them, whereas violation of condition No. 9 was disputed. The fact however, remains that finding both the violations on the part of the writ petitioners, the J.T.D.C., cancelled the lease agreements with the appellants writ petitioners, and moved before the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, for getting the premises vacated, pursuant whereto the orders/notices dated 28th June, 2018, were issued by the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, to the appellants writ petitioners, informing them that their lease had been terminated by the J.T.D.C., and they were to vacate the shop premises within a period of one week, failing which they shall be evicted there from by the use of force. As stated above, the writ petitioners challenged the cancellation of their lease agreements, as well as the orders/notices dated 28th June, 2018 issued to them, in the Writ Court. 10. As stated above, the writ petitioners challenged the cancellation of their lease agreements, as well as the orders/notices dated 28th June, 2018 issued to them, in the Writ Court. 10. While adjudicating these matters, the Writ Court has observed that so far as the allegation of subletting the shop by the writ petitioners are concerned, though the same had been disputed, but the petitioners had obtained the interim order of maintaining the status-quo in their favour, by suppressing the material facts on the ground of violation of the principles of natural justice, and they had continued in the shop premises for a long period. The Hon’ble Single Judge, relying upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd. Vrs. State of Bihar and Ors., reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 , Arunima Baruah Vrs. Union of India and Ors., reported in (2007) 6 SCC 120 and K.D. Sharma Vrs. SAIL, reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481, amongst the other decisions, held that the writ petitioners had not moved with clean hands before the Court and they had also made false statements about the issuance of notice, and accordingly, dismissed the writ applications. The Writ Court also took note of the violation of condition No. 4 of the lease agreement by the writ petitioners, as it was an admitted fact that the municipal dues were not paid by the writ petitioners. 11. As the jurisdiction of the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, in issuing the impugned notices/orders were also challenged by the writ petitioners, the Writ Court held that he was having the jurisdiction to evict the petitioners, and thus, all the writ applications were dismissed by the Writ Court. Aggrieved thereby, the present L.P.As., have been filed by the appellants writ petitioners. 12. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants have submitted that in two writ applications, the statements regarding the non-issuance of the notice were vague, but in other two writ applications there was no suppression of this material fact. We have also gone through the statements made in the writ applications and we make it clear that the statements were not vague, rather they were specific, stating that no notice was given prior to the cancellation of their allotments, which fact was not correct, as the notices were actually given to the appellants, and they had also responded to the notices. 13. 13. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants however, has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Riya George Vrs. Kannur Medical College & Ors., reported in 2019 SCC OnLine SC 252, wherein where, the petitioner had not made a full, fair and candid disclosure of all the facts, it was held by the Apex Court as follows :- “26. Ordinarily, this should result in the dismissal of the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. However, justice to the petitioner should not become a victim of the prestige of this Court. ----------.” (Emphasis supplied). 14. Learned counsel for the appellants has also submitted that in any event, there was no suppression of the fact in the two writ applications, and the impugned action of the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, evicting the writ petitioners, was absolutely without jurisdiction and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, as before passing the eviction order against the writ petitioners, no further notice was given to the writ petitioners by him. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the impugned action had been taken in purported exercise of the power under the Bihar Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, 1956, (herein after referred to as the ‘Act’). It is submitted by learned counsel that the said Act is applicable to the persons in unauthorised occupation of the Government premises. Learned counsel has also submitted that the premises in question are not Government premises, as they belonged to the J.T.D.C., and not directly to the State Government. It is further submitted by learned counsel that in any event the writ petitioners were the lease holders of the property and they were not the unauthorized occupants of the lease property, and as such, this Act is not applicable to the writ petitioners at all, and no action could have been taken under the Act for evicting them from the shops in question. 15. 15. Learned counsel has further drawn our attention to Sections 3 and 4 of the aforesaid Act, and it is submitted that before taking any action under the Act, the allotment if any, had to be cancelled under Section 3 of the aforesaid Act by the ‘competent authority’ under the Act, which has been defined under Section 2(b) of the Act, to mean any officer not below the rank of a Sub-Deputy Collector or a Sub Deputy Magistrate, authorized by the State Government by a notification. It is submitted by learned counsel that in the present case the allotments of the writ petitioners have been cancelled by the authorities of the J.T.D.C., who are not the competent authorities under the Act to cancel the allotments. It is further submitted that in any event, no notice was issued to the writ petitioners in the Forms as prescribed under Rule 3 of the Bihar Government Premises (Rent, Recovery and Eviction) Rules, 1957. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that even otherwise, the impugned action of the respondent authorities is absolutely illegal and wholly without jurisdiction, which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 16. Learned counsel appearing for the J.T.D.C., on the other hand, has opposed the prayer, submitting that the writ petitioners have violated the conditions 4 and 9 of the lease agreements, as it was found that they had not paid the municipal taxes as required under the agreements, and they had also sublet the premises. The violation of condition 4 of the lease agreement is also admitted by the writ petitioners and in that view of the matter, Clause 20 of the lease agreement clearly authorized the J.T.D.C., to terminate/cancel the lease agreements, without any compensation to the lessees and under clause (ii) thereof, the lessees are liable to be summarily evicted from the premises, and they are also liable to be blacklisted, under clause (iv) thereof. 17. Learned counsel for the J.T.D.C., further submitted that after due notice to the appellants and considering their reply to the notice, their lease agreements were cancelled by the J.T.D.C., and action was taken for their eviction from the premises under the aforesaid Act. 17. Learned counsel for the J.T.D.C., further submitted that after due notice to the appellants and considering their reply to the notice, their lease agreements were cancelled by the J.T.D.C., and action was taken for their eviction from the premises under the aforesaid Act. Learned counsel has drawn our attention towards Section 4 of the Act and has pointed out that Section 4 (a) deals with the person in authorized occupancy of the Government premises and once it is found that the Government premises have been sublet by the allottee, the competent authority under the Act is empowered under this section for evicting of the person from the premises concerned. Learned counsel has also submitted that the shops, in question, are the Government property, though it is in possession of the J.T.D.C., and the provisions of the Bihar Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act is applicable to the said premises. In support of his contention, learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Patna High Court in Dr. P.Dayal Vs. The State of Bihar and Ors., reported in 1984 PLJR 134 , wherein where, the property in question, belonged to an University, it was held that it was a Government property, and the provisions of the aforesaid Act applied to it. Learned counsel submitted that in that view of the matter, there is no illegality in eviction of the appellants from the shops in question. 18. Learned counsel further pointed out that in two of the writ applications, it was falsely stated that no notice was given to them prior to the impugned action, and the appellants were also able to get ad-interim order in their favour on the basis of such false statement. Learned counsel has submitted that the writ Court has rightly relied upon the decisions referred above, holding that the writ was not maintainable at the hands of those writ petitioners who had approached the Court, suppressing the material facts, or had not approached the Court with clean hands. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court. 19. Learned counsel accordingly, submitted that there is no illegality in the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court. 19. Learned counsel for the State has also supported the contentions of the learned counsel for the J.T.D.C., and has drawn our attention towards Clause 31 of the agreement of lease, entered between the writ petitioners and the J.T.D.C., which specifically provides that in case of any abolition/supersession/dissolution of the Tourism Development Corporation, the property shall vest with the State Government. Placing reliance on this clause, learned counsel submitted that this clearly shows that the shops, in question, are primarily Government property. Learned counsel has also laid stress upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Riya George’s case (supra), as relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants, in which, it is held that ordinarily, the suppression of the fact would result in dismissal of the writ application. It is submitted by the learned counsel that no extraordinary situation has been brought before us, to show as to why, this ordinary law of the land should not take effect in the case of the writ petitioners. Learned counsel for the State has further placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dalip Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., reported in (2010) 2 SCC 114 , wherein, the Hon’ble Apex Court has heavily deprecated the action of making false statements before the Courts and has also taken note of the fact that new creed of litigants have cropped up with this habit. The said appeal was dismissed by the Hon’ble Apex Court on the same ground. Learned counsel has thus, submitted that it is a clear case, in which, the appellants writ petitioners had not approached the Court with clean hands and there is no infirmity in the action taken against the writ petitioners under the provisions of the Act. 20. Having heard learned counsels for the parties and upon going through the record, we find that though in two writ applications, out of which, L.P.A. No.81 of 2019 and L.P.A. No. 103 of 2019 arise, there was a clear statement that no notice was given to the writ petitioners prior to the impugned action. This is clearly a false statement, inasmuch as, even these writ petitioners had responded to the notice given to them for cancellation of their lease agreements. This is clearly a false statement, inasmuch as, even these writ petitioners had responded to the notice given to them for cancellation of their lease agreements. In other two writ petitions, however, no false statement was been made. 21. The main contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the impugned action against the writ petitioners was taken in exercise of the powers under the Bihar Government Premises (Rent Recovery and Eviction) Act, Sections 3 & 4 of which read as follows :- "3. Cancellation of allotment. - If any Government premises is required for any public purpose, the competent authority may, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, cancel the allotment under which such premises is held or occupied by a person: Provided that before cancelling the allotment under this Section, the competent authority shall require such person to show-cause within fifteen days why the allotment should not be cancelled. 4. Power to evict certain persons from Government Premises. - Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any law for the time being in force, if the competent authority is satisfied- (a) that the person authorized to occupy any Government premises has, whether before or after the commencement of this Act:- (i) sub-let, without the permission of the State Government or of the competent authority, the whole or any part of such premises; or (ii) committed or is committing such acts of waste as are likely to affect materially the value or utility of the premises; or (iii) otherwise acted in contravention of any of the terms, express or implied, under which he is authorized to occupy such premises; (b) that any person is in unauthorized occupation of any Government premises, the competent authority may, by notice served by registered post or in such other manner as may be prescribed, order that the person as well as any other person who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, shall vacate the premises within [one week] of the date of the service of the notice; and if any person refuses or fails to comply with such order, the competent authority may evict that person from, and take possession of, the premises and may for that purpose use such force as may be necessary. Provided that if within one week of the service of notice to him, the person concerned files a show cause, the competent authority shall consider and shall pass such order thereon, as he may consider necessary, and if the show cause is rejected, necessary steps for eviction of the person concerned may be taken." 22. A plain reading of Section 3 of the Act clearly shows that this section is not applicable to the facts of this case, in as much as, this provision is applicable where the Government premises was required for any public purpose. In the cases in hand, the appellants writ petitioners were sought to be evicted from the shop premises, not because of the fact that their shops were required for any public purpose, rather due to the fact that the writ petitioners lessees had violated the conditions of the lease agreement. Accordingly, there is no application of Section 3 of the Act in the case of the writ petitioners. 23. The case of the appellants writ petitioners is squarely covered by Section 4 of the aforesaid Act, as the case of the writ petitioners is that they were in authorised possession of the property. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellants that since the appellants were not in unauthorised possession of the Government premises, the Act shall not apply to them, is absolutely misconceived, in view of Sub-section (a) of Section 4, which clearly speaks about the persons in authorised possession of the Government premises, and in case of violation of any of the three conditions mentioned under clauses (i) to (iii), the competent authority under the Act is entitled to serve the notice to such violator, who may be in occupation of the whole or any part of the premises, to vacate the premises within one week of the date of the service of the notice, and if any person refuses or fails to comply to such notice/order, the competent authority may evict that person, and take possession of the premises. This was the notice/order, which was served upon the appellants writ petitioners by the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, by his impugned notices/orders dated 28.06.2018. Under the proviso to Section 4, the writ petitioners had still the opportunity to respond to such notice within a week, and had they responded to the notice, the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, was required to pass appropriate order thereon. This was the notice/order, which was served upon the appellants writ petitioners by the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, by his impugned notices/orders dated 28.06.2018. Under the proviso to Section 4, the writ petitioners had still the opportunity to respond to such notice within a week, and had they responded to the notice, the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, was required to pass appropriate order thereon. In the present case, however, the writ petitioners did not respond before the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar, rather they directly approached this Court. As such the plea cannot be taken that before issuance of this notice/order, no notice was issued to them by the SDO-cum-SDM, Deoghar. 24. Learned counsel for the appellants have argued before us that the said notice is not in the Form prescribed under the Rules and we have also gone through the Forms prescribed in the Rules, but we find that the said notice is neither in the prescribed Form B, nor in the prescribed Form D as prescribed under the Rules. We find that the notice/order, though may not be in the prescribed Form, but it is issued in exercise of the power under Section 4 of the Act, and there is substantial compliance of this provision. 25. The submission of learned counsel for the appellants that the premises in question are not Government premises, as it belonged to the J.T.D.C., is again without any merit. Clause 31 of the agreement of lease, referred to above, coupled with the decision of the Patna High Court in Dr. P. Dayal's case (supra), leave no scope of ambiguity that the shops in question are the Government premises, to which the provisions of the aforesaid Act apply. 26. In the facts of this case, we find no illegality in the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court, dismissing the writ applications relying upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd.'s case, Arunima Baruah's case, and K.D. Sharma's case (supra), holding that in case there is suppression of material facts by the writ petitioner or the writ petitioner had not approached the Court with clean hands, the writ application cannot be entertained. At least in two matters before us, we find that the writ applications suffered from the same vice. At least in two matters before us, we find that the writ applications suffered from the same vice. We also find that there was admitted violation of Condition 4 of the lease agreement, i.e., non-payment of the statutory dues by all the writ petitioners. Though the writ petitioners claimed that they had not violated condition 9 of the lease agreement, as they had not sublet the shop premises, but the fact remains that this is a disputed question of fact, which could not be looked into by the Writ Court. 27. For the foregoing reasons, we do not find any illegality in the impugned Judgment dated 08.01.2019, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P.(C) No. 3140 of 2018 and analogous matters, worth any interference in exercise of the Letters Patent Appellate jurisdiction. 28. At this juncture, learned counsel for the appellants submits that since the shop premises have been sealed by the respondents, the appellants may be given an opportunity to remove their property from the sealed shops. We find this submission of the learned counsel for the appellants fair enough. We accordingly, direct the respondents to give reasonable opportunity to the appellants to remove their property from the shops in question, on the date(s) fixed by them, with due information to the appellants. 29. There is no merit in all these Letters Patent Appeals, which are accordingly, dismissed with the directions as above. The pending Interlocutory Applications also stand disposed of.