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2019 DIGILAW 1705 (ALL)

Santosh Kumar Shukla v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court II, Kanpur

2019-07-16

J.J.MUNIR

body2019
JUDGMENT : Jahangir Jamshed Munir, J. 1. This writ petition is directed against an award of the Presiding Officer, Labour Court (IInd), U.P., Kanpur dated 21.7.2005 (published on 16.9.2005) passed in Adjudication Case No. 124 of 2004, whereby an award has been made to the effect that upon the workman explaining his unauthorized absence and forgoing wages for the period of his absence, together with other related service benefits for the said period which he would have to forgo in writing, the respondents shall reinstate the workman in service from the date he makes an application in those terms. 2. The petitioner is Santosh Kumar Shukla, who has come up against the aforesaid award through this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. He is hereinafter referred to as the 'workman'. The second respondent are the other party to the proceedings before the Labour Court, being the Employers. They are M/s. Rajendra Alloys Limited, Jainpur Industrial Area, Kanpur Dehat. M/s. Rajendra Alloys Limited, the second respondent, is hereinafter referred to as the 'Employers'. 3. Pending this petition the Employers, who were a company registered under the Companies Act, have been wound up by an order made by this Court in Company Petition No. 73 of 2015, decided on 25.8.2017. The Official Liquidator has been appointed as liquidator of the Employers, ordered to take over their assets, and to proceed and act in accordance with Rule 114 of the Companies (Court) Rules, 1959. In view of this supervening event the Official Liquidator attached to this Court, and since appointed liquidator of the Employers, has been impleaded as respondent No. 3 vide an order of this Court dated 7.2.2018. The Official Liquidator is hereinafter referred to by that designation. 4. According to the workman's case he was appointed by the Employers in their establishment in the month of October, 1993 as a Watchman, falling under the control of the Security Department. The workman could not report for his duties from 14.3.1998 to 7.7.1998 as he fell severely ill, afflicted by some kind of an Ulcer and to remedy which he remained under treatment up to 7.7.1998. The workman could not report for his duties from 14.3.1998 to 7.7.1998 as he fell severely ill, afflicted by some kind of an Ulcer and to remedy which he remained under treatment up to 7.7.1998. It is the workman's further case that after recuperating when he reported back to duty on 10.7.1998, alongwith a medical fitness certificate dated 7.7.1998 issued by S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow and presented together with an application dated 10.7.1998 before the Works Manager, it was forwarded to the Managing Director of the Employers. It is asserted by the workman that the Employers did not allow him to join duties and instead, removed him from service. He made representations as well as personal requests, but all in vain. The workman, therefore, moved an application dated 9.9.1998 to the Labour Commissioner to bring about a settlement between him and the Employers. No settlement, however, could be arrived at. This led the Deputy Labour Commissioner to submit a failure report to the Government, in consequence of which a reference was made by the Government vide an order dated 11.4.2000 to the Labour Court, under Section 4-K of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (for short the 'Act') in the following terms (translated into English from Hindi vernacular):-- "whether the act of the Employers in removing from service/depriving from work their workman Sri Santosh Kumar Shukla s/o. Sri Seva Lal, Gunman with effect from 10.7.1998 is legal and proper? If not, to what relief/compensation is the concerned workman entitled to? From what date and in what terms?" 5. A recount of proceedings before the Labour Court would show that Adjudication Case No. 124 of 2000 was registered on the basis of the reference dated 11.4.2000 and both parties, that is to say, the workman and the Employers were ordered to file their written statements alongwith documentary evidence vide notice dated 12.7.2000. Both sides put in their written statements as well as rejoinder statements, copies whereof are on record as Annexures 2, 3, 4 and 5 to this petition. The workman's written statement is one dated 19.8.2000, whereas the employers written statement is dated 23.10.2000. The workman filed his rejoinder statement dated 2.11.2000, whereas the Employers filed their rejoinder statement dated 17.5.2001. The workman filed documentary evidence through a list dated 6.8.2001, carrying in all eight documents. The workman's written statement is one dated 19.8.2000, whereas the employers written statement is dated 23.10.2000. The workman filed his rejoinder statement dated 2.11.2000, whereas the Employers filed their rejoinder statement dated 17.5.2001. The workman filed documentary evidence through a list dated 6.8.2001, carrying in all eight documents. The workman examined himself in support of his case and was cross-examined by the Employers, all done on 25.3.2004. 6. The stand of the Employers before the Labour Court put forward through their written statement is to the effect that the workman absented without information, or submitting a leave application, and that until time of filing the written statement by the Employers, he had not reported to join duties. It was further said that the Employers have not terminated the workman's services. Instead, a stand was taken that in case the workman is willing to work for the employers he may, explaining cause for his unauthorized absence, come back and join duties. The workman in answer to the said stand urged that it is incorrect to say that he never reported back to duty. He pointed out that he submitted an application dated 10.7.1998 to join duties, but was not allowed to work regarding which the workman complained in writing to the Managing Director of the Employers. Later on, he took steps before the Labour Authorities. 7. It has figured in the award of the Labour Court that documentary evidence has been filed on behalf of the workman vide list 11-B, and the workman has examined himself in support of his case as WW-1. On the other hand, the Employers have not filed any documentary evidence or led any oral evidence, either. The Labour Court has looked into the documents submitted by the workman in support of his case of suffering a serious ailment between 11.3.1998 and 7.7.1998, on account whereof he could not report to the Employers and discharge his duties. It is recorded that the workman was first admitted at Shanti Nursing Home, and thereafter, at the S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow. It is further recorded that after regaining health, he reported back on 10.7.1998 to the Employers, alongwith an application to join, dated 10.7.1998. The Labour Court has looked into Exhibit W-8, which is a medical certificate dated 28.3.1998, issued by Shanti Nursing Home, where the workman has been indicated to be ill and advised rest for a period of one month. The Labour Court has looked into Exhibit W-8, which is a medical certificate dated 28.3.1998, issued by Shanti Nursing Home, where the workman has been indicated to be ill and advised rest for a period of one month. It may be remarked that Exhibit W-8 appears to be an incorrect mention of the exhibit number by the Labour Court, inasmuch as Exhibit W-8 is a hand written copy of the application dated 10.7.1998, submitted by the workman to the Works Manager of the Employer, a xerox copy of which is annexed to the rejoinder-affidavit filed in this petition. The effect of the aforesaid document would be considered in some detail, later in this judgment. 8. The Labour Court has further noted that there is Exhibit W-5, being a letter dated 30.4.1998 issued by Shanti Nursing Home, referring the workman to the S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow. Exhibit W-4 is a medical certificate issued by the S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow which shows that the workman underwent different tests between 1.5.1998 to 1.6.1998 there. It has been remarked by the Labour Court that the said certificate does not show that during this period of time the workman was advised any kind of rest. Exhibit W-3 is a medical certificate issued by the S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow, which shows that the workman remained an indoor patient from 4.6.1998 to 15.6.1998, for a period of 11 days with the said hospital at Lucknow. It further shows that he was advised rest from 15.6.1998 to 10.7.1998. The Labour Court recorded the Employers' stand that the workman never intimated them about his indisposition, or did he ever move any leave application. 9. It has been further recorded by the Labour Court that the Employers took a specific stand that the workman in his written statement does not mention intimating the Employers about his ailment, or sending them a leave application. It is further noticed by the Labour Court, that the Employers have pointed out that it is for the first time that the workman in the rejoinder statement to the Employers written statement, asserted that he sent information about his indisposition, but does not say how he sent that information. It is also recorded at the pointing out of the Employers, that the workman has not said even in his examination-in-chief before the Labour Court, that he sent information of his illness to the Employers. It is also recorded at the pointing out of the Employers, that the workman has not said even in his examination-in-chief before the Labour Court, that he sent information of his illness to the Employers. It is also recorded as the Employers case by the Labour Court that the workman has not filed any such document to show, that he gave information of his illness to the employer, or sent any leave application on that account. The application dated 10.9.1998, which is a joining report submitted to the Works Manager of the Employers, has been noticed by the Labour Court to have been denied by them. The stand of the Employer recorded is that so far as the application dated 10.7.1998 is concerned, the workman never appeared to join duty or did he submit that application for the purpose. 10. The Labour Court has held that so far as the case of the workman vis-a-vis reporting to join his duties on 10.7.1998 is concerned, the application which has been described as Exhibit W-l by the Labour Court is addressed to the Works Manager of the Employer, whereon there is an endorsement bearing someone's signatures. The Labour Court has held that the workman has deposed in the witness box that the said signatures are those of the Production Manager, Sri Prema Chandran, but the application is addressed to the Works Manager. There is no date mentioned below the signatures, or is there any seal of receipt from the Employers, impressed upon the document. In addition, it has been held further that once submitted to the Employers establishment, a document on which an endorsement is made by an Officer of the Employer, the documents becomes property of the office. From this it has been concluded that the said document should have been in the Employers office and not with the workman. Since the workman has produced the aforesaid letter, bearing the said endorsement from his custody, instead of taking out summons to secure production of the same by the Employers, the document becomes suspect on which no reliance can be placed. The Labour Court has concluded, therefore, that the workman's deposition is not worthy of acceptance to the effect that on 10.7.1998, he presented himself at the Employers establishment to join duties and submitted the application Exhibit W-1, requesting that he be permitted to join duties after sanctioning him leave. The Labour Court has concluded, therefore, that the workman's deposition is not worthy of acceptance to the effect that on 10.7.1998, he presented himself at the Employers establishment to join duties and submitted the application Exhibit W-1, requesting that he be permitted to join duties after sanctioning him leave. It is in view of the said finding that the award in terms indicated in the opening part of this judgment has been made, requiring the workman to appear before the Employer, tender his explanation for the period of his unauthorized absence, and, further in writing undertake not to claim wages for the period of his absence which, if done, the Employer would be obliged to reinstate the workman from the date an application is made in terms of the above directions. Aggrieved by the aforesaid direction which does not accept the workman's case regarding good cause for his absence and further does not accept the workman's case that he reported to his Employers to join duty on 10.7.1998 vide application of the said date, the present writ petition has been filed. 11. Heard Sri S.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the petitioner. No one appeared on behalf of the Employers, or the Official Liquidator. It must be recorded here that the Official Liquidator was directed to be served by this Court vide order dated 7.2.2018, and in compliance, notice was issued by RPAD on 17.2.2018. The office report dated 29.3.2018 shows that neither acknowledgment or undelivered cover has been returned after service of notice. Therefore, service upon respondent No. 3 would be deemed to be sufficient. 12. This petition was entertained vide order dated 22.5.2006 and notice pending admission was issued. Counter and rejoinder-affidavits have been exchanged, post issue of notice, between the workman and the Employers, as hereinabove detailed. Subsequently, by an order dated 30.7.2018 this petition was admitted to hearing. Accordingly, it came up for final hearing on 17.4.2019, where the workman's counsel alone addressed this Court. The hearing concluded the same day and judgment was reserved. 13. Upon a perusal of the impugned award it cannot be much faulted insofar as it has denied relief to the workman in terms of back wages for the period of his absence, between 14.3.1998 to 10.7.1998. The hearing concluded the same day and judgment was reserved. 13. Upon a perusal of the impugned award it cannot be much faulted insofar as it has denied relief to the workman in terms of back wages for the period of his absence, between 14.3.1998 to 10.7.1998. This is on account of the fact that the workman was not able to show by any evidence that he either sent any intimation of his indisposition to his Employers, or ever made an application requesting sanction of leave. So far as the finding of the Labour Court, disbelieving the stand of the workman in presenting himself for duty at the Employers establishment is concerned, the reasoning adopted is flawed. The entire edifice for rejection of this part of the workman's case is based on disbelieving the document, which is the workman's application to join duties, addressed to the Works Manager of the Employers, dated 10.7.1998. 14. A perusal of the impugned award shows that the said document has been disbelieved as ingenuine, for more than one reason. The first reason to disbelieve the said document is the fact that the endorsement made on the said application does not bear a date beneath the signatures of the Employers' Manager, who forwarded it to the Managing Director. This reason in itself is not worthy of acceptance. It has become common place these days not to mention or write dates under one's signatures. It is so much a part of contemporary ways and the behavior of educated men. When the document dated 10.7.1998 was drawn up, this Court has no hesitation to take judicial notice of the fact that the practice amongst well educated persons of scribing dates below their signatures, or elsewhere on a document, had been marginalized to a rare few, who would still continue with this good practice. Thus, absence of a date below one's signatures in contemporary times and until time when the document in question was written, cannot be made the subject-matter of any adverse inference as to the veracity of the endorsement, as well as the signatures. The other consideration that the document does not bear a seal of receipt, is also not of much consequence. A seal of receipt is invariably impressed when a document is presented in the office to a ministerial hand. The other consideration that the document does not bear a seal of receipt, is also not of much consequence. A seal of receipt is invariably impressed when a document is presented in the office to a ministerial hand. In the event of a document being directly presented to an Officer, the absence of a seal of receipt, or its non entry in some kind of a receipt register is quite natural. On that ground also, the document has been suspected in manifest error by the Labour Court. 15. There is another ground to condemn the document that the Labour Court has adopted. It is observed in the impugned award that the application dated 10.7.1998, was testified to by the workman in his deposition to have been received by one Sri Prema Chandran, a Production Manager with the Employers. The Labour Court has made much of this by saying that this application, though addressed to the Works Manager should have been received and dealt with by the Production Manager, militates against the genuineness of the document, and all that is endorsed on it on the Employers' behalf. This also does not appear to be even a remotely good reason to disbelieve the document. An application addressed to the Works Manager may well have been put up before the Production Manager, impromptu when the workman suddenly appearance to join duties on 10.7.1998. After all the Production Manager, whose name has been specified by the workman in his testimony in the witness box is not claimed to be a stranger to the Employers establishment. It is nobody's case that the Production Manager, going by the name of Prema Chandran was not there. If the Production Manager received the application and forwarded it to the Managing Director, the application being addressed to the Works Manager, that in itself is no ground to doubt its genuineness. 16. So far the opinion expressed by the Labour Court that this application has come to be filed from the wrong custody, the Labour Court is right in saying that in case an application of this kind were presented to the Employers establishment, with an endorsement made by the Production Manager, or any other Officer of the Employer forwarding it to the Managing Director, the document has become property of the Employers' establishment, which must remain in their office. The document in original should have come from the Employers office, upon being summoned. It could not have come from the custody of the workman, which if true, would certainly make it gravely suspect and not worthy of much credence. A look, however, at the list of documents filed by the workman before the Labour Court, a copy whereof is annexed as Annexure 6 to the writ petition, shows that the list of documents dated 16.8.2001 bears reference to the aforesaid application dated 10.7.1998. The document is described in the list, in the following words (in Hindi vernacular): ^^oknh larks"k dqekj 'kqDyk oDlZ eSustj jktsUnzk ,yk;l fyŒ tSuiqj dkuiqj nsgkr dks fn;s x;s izkFkZuk&i= fnukad 10-07-1998 dh QksVks dkihA^^ (emphasis by Court) 17. A look at the description of the document in the list which has not been disputed, either before the Labour Court or before this Court to be one carrying an incorrect description of the document, clearly shows that the document filed before the Court was a photostat copy of the application dated 11.7.1998, that was filed before the Works Manager of the Employers by the Workman, when he appeared to join duties. It is, therefore, entirely misplaced on the Labour Court's part to say that the document should have come from the Employers possession, on being summoned, and the fact that the workman has filed it, makes it suspect. The workman has not filed the document in original, but merely a photostat copy thereof, which bears the impression of the endorsement that has been made on the original, which to all seeming would be available with the Employers. It is true that the workman has not applied for the original to be summoned, but it is equally true that the employers have not led any evidence, documentary or oral, to support their case and rebut that of the workman. The case of the workman set up before the Labour Court is, therefore, without any evidence in rebuttal from the Employers. Seen in the above perspective, to doubt the veracity of the application dated 10.7.1998 which the workman presented at the Employers establishment, where on an endorsement was made by the Production Manager, forwarding it to the Managing Director of the Employers, is a finding by the Labour Court which is indeed perverse. 18. Seen in the above perspective, to doubt the veracity of the application dated 10.7.1998 which the workman presented at the Employers establishment, where on an endorsement was made by the Production Manager, forwarding it to the Managing Director of the Employers, is a finding by the Labour Court which is indeed perverse. 18. It is, accordingly, held that on the state of evidence forthcoming, the Employers wrongfully denied the workman, his right to join duties on 10.7.1998. This is particularly so as the employers have taken a stand that they have not terminated the workman's services and are willing to accept him back in service, subject to workman furnishing good explanation for his absence. The explanation offered by the workman is that on account of an ailment for which he was treated at the S.G.P.G.I., Lucknow, and was advised rest during the period in question from time to time, he could report for work. There is no evidence in rebuttal on this score by the Employers. Therefore, this Court finds as above indicated that the workman was wrongfully denied joining his duties on 10.7.1998, when he did appear to report for duty after regaining health. It may be remarked here that it is not that the Employers could not have proceeded against the workman for his unauthorized absence. They could have taken disciplinary action against him, after permitting him to join duties. However, it was not open to the Employers to have simply told the workman to go away, when he appeared at their gate to report for work. 19. The issue about the entitlement to back wages during the period when the workman remained absent without intimation, or submitting a leave application is the next that falls for decision. The law in this regard has been very recently laid down by the Supreme Court in Chief Regional Manager, United India Insurance Company Limited v. Siraj Uddin Khan in Civil Appeal No. 5390 of 2019, decided on 11th July, 2019. In the said decision, their Lordships, after a comprehensive review of authority about the applicability of the principle of "no work no pay", in the context of reinstatement vis-a-vis unauthorized absence, have held thus: 16. We may notice some of the judgments of this Court where issue of back wages has been considered by this Court. In the said decision, their Lordships, after a comprehensive review of authority about the applicability of the principle of "no work no pay", in the context of reinstatement vis-a-vis unauthorized absence, have held thus: 16. We may notice some of the judgments of this Court where issue of back wages has been considered by this Court. This Court in Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) and others, (2013) 10 SCC 324 , was considering a case where the question was considered as to whether the appellant was entitled to wages for the period she was kept out of service forcibly by the management of school. In paragraph No. 22, following was laid down: "22. The very idea of restoring an employee to the position which he held before dismissal or removal or termination of service implies that the employee will be put in the same position in which he would have been but for the illegal action taken by the employer. The injury suffered by a person, who is dismissed or removed or is otherwise terminated from service cannot easily be measured in terms of money. With the passing of an order which has the effect of severing the employer-employee relationship, the latter's source of income gets dried up. Not only the employee concerned, but his entire family suffers grave adversities. They are deprived of the source of sustenance. The children are deprived of nutritious food and all opportunities of education and advancement in life. At times, the family has to borrow from the relatives and other acquaintance to avoid starvation. These sufferings continue till the competent adjudicatory forum decides on the legality of the action taken by the employer. The reinstatement of such an employee, which is preceded by a finding of the competent judicial/quasi judicial body or Court that the action taken by the employer is ultra vires the relevant statutory provisions or the principles of natural justice, entitles the employee to claim full back wages. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. If the employer wants to deny back wages to the employee or contest his entitlement to get consequential benefits, then it is for him/her to specifically plead and prove that during the intervening period the employee was gainfully employed and was getting the same emoluments. The denial of back wages to an employee, who has suffered due to an illegal act of the employer would amount to indirectly punishing the employee concerned and rewarding the employer by relieving him of the obligation to pay back wages including the emoluments." 17. We may hasten to add that present is not a case where respondent was kept away from the work on account of dismissal. Admittedly, the respondent attained the age of retirement on 20.6.2012 and order terminating his services was passed only on 26.6.2012, which was rightly held to be ineffective. 18. We may notice another judgment of this Court in Airports Authority of India and others v. Shambhu Nath Das alias S.N. Das, (2008) 11 SCC 498 . In the above case, the respondent did not join after expiry of the leave. The respondent was issued a warning that unless he joins on or before 30.10.1985, failing which it would be presumed that he had voluntarily abandoned his service with the consequence that his name would be struck off the rolls with effect from 1.11.1985. The said order was challenged by the respondent and learned Single Judge on 10.11.1995 directed the Airports Authority of India to allow the respondent to join duty but it was held that he shall not be entitled for the arrears of pay for the period he was absent. The order of learned Single Judge was again challenged by the respondent without joining. The Division Bench set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and remanded the matter back to the learned Single Judge. Learned Single Judge directed the appellant to reinstate the respondent and further directed that insofar as the salary of the writ petitioner is concerned, during the period he stayed away from the work, Airports Authority of India, is directed to consider the matter sympathetically and, if it is permissible under its rules, allow to him half of the salary and other benefits during the period from 17.10.1985 till 10.11.1995. The Airports Authority of India accepted the judgment and allowed him to join w.e.f. 1.11.1999 and passed an order on 14.5.2002 holding that the period of unauthorised absence was to be treated as dies-non and the claim for back wages was accordingly disallowed on the principle of "no work no pay". The order dated 14.5.2002 was once again challenged by the respondent claiming back wages, which was allowed by the learned Single Judge. On further denial of claim, matter was taken by respondent to learned Single Judge to issue certain directions. Against the learned Single Judge's Order, matter was taken in appeal before Division Bench, where direction to pay 50% of back wages was issued. Allowing the appeal, this Court stated following in paragraph Nos. 8 to 11: "8. This order of the learned Single Judge has been set aside by the Division Bench vide the impugned order dated 21-3-2007 with the observations that the order of the High Court in CR (W) No. 5715 of 1986 which had directed that the respondent be paid 50% of the back wages for the period from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 should be complied with. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant has pointed out that as the respondent had not attended to his duties for almost 15 years despite having been called upon to do so repeatedly, the direction of the Division Bench to grant him back wages from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 was clearly not justified on the principle of "no work no pay". She has pointed out that the appellant Authority would have been fully justified even if it had dismissed the respondent from service, but on the contrary, a huge benefit had already been given to him as he had been taken back in service despite having remained absent for almost fifteen years. 10. The learned counsel for the respondent has, however, supported the judgment of the Division Bench. We are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that the respondent did not report for duty for 15 years, there was no justification whatsoever to grant him any back wages on the general principle that nobody could be directed to claim wages for the period that he remained absent without leave or without justification. We are of the opinion that in the light of the fact that the respondent did not report for duty for 15 years, there was no justification whatsoever to grant him any back wages on the general principle that nobody could be directed to claim wages for the period that he remained absent without leave or without justification. We also find that the judgment dated 13-8-1999 which had attained finality had directed as under: "(a) Insofar as the salary of the writ petitioner is concerned during the period he stayed away from the work, the respondent Airports Authority of India, is directed to consider the matter sympathetically and, if it is permissible under its rules, allow to him half of the salary and other benefits." 11. This claim was considered by the competent authority and rejected for valid reasons. We are, thus, unable to endorse the High Court's order for payment of 50% back wages for the period from 17-10-1985 to 10-11-1995 which are far in excess of the directions in the order dated 13-8-1999. We accordingly allow this appeal, set aside the order of the Division Bench and restore the order of the learned Single Judge dated 15-4-2004." 19. This Court held that there was no justification whatsoever to grant any back wages to the respondent on the general principle that nobody could be directed to claim wages for the period that he remained absent without leave or without justification. 20. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, the impugned award to the extent that it directs the workman's claim to the back wages to be considered from the date that he appears before the Employer and submits an application infuturo to join duties, does not commend itself to this Court. The rights of the workman about his entitlement to join are to be reckoned with effect from 10.7.1998, which clearly appears to be the date when the workman did appear before the employer, asking their permission to resume work which was declined. To that extent, the award of the Labour Court is clearly bad and deserves to be modified. It would have normally taken the shape of a direction to reinstate the workman in service with back wages, reckoned from 10.7.1998. To that extent, the award of the Labour Court is clearly bad and deserves to be modified. It would have normally taken the shape of a direction to reinstate the workman in service with back wages, reckoned from 10.7.1998. But, in this case the difficulty indicated hereinabove arises from the fact that the Employers, a corporate entity have been wound up with effect from 25.8.2017, under an order of this Court of the said date, passed in a winding up petition by the learned Company Judge. May be, the Employers had become a dysfunctional and an unviable unit much earlier. Relief of reinstatement to the workman would, therefore, be absolutely out of context, in all these changed circumstances. Even otherwise, the workman has now turned 70 years. If the Employers were a working establishment he could not have been reinstated, and for that reason too the Award of the Labour Court would have to be modified to provide the workman, a lump sum compensation. 21. In the opinion of this Court, the workman is entitled to the award of a lump sum compensation for the wrong done to him by the Employer in not permitting him to join duties illegally on 10.7.1998. The workman was in receipt of salary, as this Court has been informed, in the sum of Rs. 2500/- per mensem together with a deduction of Rs. 200/- towards EPF from his salary, and a like sum being contributed by way of Employers Contribution to the fund. The current wages for a workman of the petitioner's class have been acknowledged before this Court, by both parties to be Rs. 17,000/- to 18,000/- per month. The workman, however, has crossed the age of superannuation some ten years ago. He would have in any case retired, even if he was working, ten years back. 22. In the opinion of this Court, the ends of justice would be met by modifying the impugned award dated 21.7.2005 passed by the Labour Court, and in substitution of the direction there made, to order that the Employer, now represented by the Official Liquidator, respondent No. 3, shall pay to the workman a lump sum of Rs. 2,50,000/- together with simple interest @ 6% per annum, reckoned with effect from 10.7.1998 till date of realization. 2,50,000/- together with simple interest @ 6% per annum, reckoned with effect from 10.7.1998 till date of realization. The aforesaid order shall be complied with by the Official Liquidator, within six weeks of its production before him by the petitioner. 23. The writ petition is allowed in part. Costs easy.