Judgment Gita Mittal, C.J.—By way of the instant appeal, a challenge has been pressed against the judgment dated 27th May, 2016 passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Bhaderwah in the case arising out of FIR No.96/2012 registered by Police Station, Bhaderwah on 23rd July, 2012 under Sections 302/323/147/148/149 of the Ranbir Penal Code (‘RPC’ hereafter). 2. We have heard Mr. F A Natnoo, learned AAG for the appellant and Mr. Anmol Sharma, learned Advocate who has been appointed Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the respondent at length. We have also perused the record of the trial court. 3. The facts giving rise to the case to the extent necessary are briefly noted hereafter. It was the case of the prosecution before the trial court that on 24th July, 2012, Mahi Gujjar (PW-2) accompanied by his brother Kaya Gujjar (PW-1) lodged a written report with the Police Station, Bhaderwah alleging that on 23th July, 2012, at about 4.30 p.m., he had gone to the Ganottru Dhar area for grazing cattle. The accused party was present there who made a murderous assault on him as well as his brother Sawar Din resulting in injuries to them. Unfortunately, Sawar Din succumbed to his injuries and died on the spot. Mahi Gujjar alleged that he had also received injuries on his head in the said incident. 4. Kaya Gujjar, PW-1 informed the police that he along with some other persons carried the body of the deceased to the District Hospital, Bhaderwah after lifting it from the place of occurrence which was located at a distance of 25 km from Bhaderwah. So far as the motive for offence is concerned, Kaya Gujjar stated that the accused persons wanted to forcibly grab the land under their possession at Dhar for which reason they were attacked with an axe and sticks. 5. On this report, FIR No.96/2012 was registered at Police Station, Bhaderwah under sections 302/323/147/148/149 of the RPC. 6. During investigation, the investigating officer got the post-mortem conducted on the body of the deceased through the doctors at the Bhaderwah Hospital and thereafter handed over the body to the legal heirs. The investigating officer seized and sealed the blood stained clothes of the deceased; visited the place of occurrence where from he seized blood stained and sample clay which was sealed in different packets. The investigating officer seized and sealed the blood stained clothes of the deceased; visited the place of occurrence where from he seized blood stained and sample clay which was sealed in different packets. These packets were sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory, Jammu, after getting them re-sealed from an Executive Magistrate, for expert opinion. 7. On 25th July, 2012, Mohd Sultan, Babber Ahmed, Abdul Gani Bhat and Shah Mohd were arrested by the police. 8. The prosecution further alleged that pursuant to a disclosure statement made by Mohd Sultan, the police effected recovery of an axe which was lying in a corner of a room below a heap of wood situate at a Gwari. This axe which was seized after it was identified by Mahi Gujjar (PW-2). 9. The investigating officer also got the statements of Mahi Gujjar and his brother Kaya Gujjar recorded under Section 164-A of the CrPC before a Magistrate. Statements of other witnesses were recorded by the investigating officer under section 161 of the CrPC and a report of the post-mortem obtained from the Hospital. 10. The prosecution story reveals that the accused persons had a long standing enmity with the complainant party over a piece of land situate at Dhar. On the fateful day, a quarrel has arisen when the complainant party asked the accused persons not to allow their mules to graze over their land at which accused persons got enraged. It was alleged that Mohd Sultan gave an axe blow on the left leg of the deceased below the knee resulting in serious injury, his falling down and died on the spot. 11. PW-2 Mahi Gujjar alleged that he also suffered injuries in the scuffle with the wooden part of the axe. The two accused persons fled from the spot after the occurrence. During investigation, the culpability in the crime of Abdul Gani Bhat and Mohd Sultan could not be established. For these reasons, the charges for commission of offence under sections 147/148/149 of the RPC were dropped from the challan, which was filed in the court. These two persons were given the benefit of section 169 of the RPC and were released from the custody. 12. For these reasons, the charges for commission of offence under sections 147/148/149 of the RPC were dropped from the challan, which was filed in the court. These two persons were given the benefit of section 169 of the RPC and were released from the custody. 12. On a consideration of the material which was placed before the trial court, by an order dated 21st December, 2012, the respondent Mohd Sultan and co-accused Babber Ahmed were charged with commission of offences under sections 302/323/34 of the RPC to which they pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. In support of its case, the prosecution examined 14 witnesses. After the close of the prosecution evidence, the statement of accused Mohd Sultan was recorded on 25th August, 2015 under section 342 of the CrPC in which he denied truth of the prosecution evidence and alleged that a false case has been foisted against him. The respondent did not lead any evidence in defence. 13. Because there was not even an iota of evidence against him on record, the learned Trial Judge dispensed with the examination of accused Babber Ahmed. After hearing arguments under section 273 of the CrPC, accused Babber Ahmed was acquitted on 01st September, 2015. This order was not assailed by the prosecution and has attained finality. 14. After a consideration of the entirety of evidence, by the impugned judgment dated 27th May, 2015, the learned Trial Judge has held that the prosecution has failed to establish the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused person. This judgment has been challenged before us by way of the present appeal. The parameters on which a sentence of acquittal would be reversed by the appellate court are well settled by judicial precedent. The same are within very narrow compass. 15. In the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Ram Swaroop and others Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 13 SCC 134 , the Supreme Court observed thus:— “25...........................................It is well settled that if two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the view which favours the accused must be preferred. 15. In the pronouncement of Supreme Court in Ram Swaroop and others Vs. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 13 SCC 134 , the Supreme Court observed thus:— “25...........................................It is well settled that if two views are reasonably possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the view which favours the accused must be preferred. Similarly it is well settled that if the view taken by the trial court while acquitting the accused is a possible, reasonable view of the evidence on record, the High Court ought not to interfere with such an order of acquittal merely because it is possible to take the contrary view. It is not as if the power of the High Court in any way is curtailed in appreciating the evidence on record in an appeal against acquittal, but having done so, the High Court ought not to interfere with an order of acquittal if the view taken by the trial court is also a reasonable view of the evidence on record and the findings recorded by the trial court are not manifestly erroneous, contrary to the evidence on record or perverse.” (Emphasis supplied) 16. The above principle was reiterated in State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , the Supreme Court has held as follows:— “11. The decision taken by this Court in the aforementioned case, has been further reiterated in State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 , wherein this Court observed thus:— “Generally the order of acquittal shall not be interfered with because the presumption of innocence of the accused is further strengthened by acquittal. The golden thread which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases is that if two views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case, one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other to his innocence, the view which is favourable to the accused should be adopted. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. The paramount consideration of the Court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is prevented. A miscarriage of justice which may arise from acquittal of the guilty is no less than from the conviction of an innocent. In a case where admissible evidence is ignored, a duty is cast upon the appellate court to reappreciate the evidence in a case where the accused has been acquitted, or the purpose of ascertaining as to whether any of the accused committed any offence or not. (see Bhagwan Singh v. State of M.P.) The principle to be followed by the appellate court considering the appeal against the judgment of acquittal is to interfere only when there are compelling and substantial reasons for doing so. If the impugned judgment is clearly unreasonable, it is a compelling reason for interference.” (Emphasis supplied) 17. Again in (2009) 12 SCC 629 , Vijay Kumar Vs. State by Inspector of Police, Madras and Another, the Supreme Court summed up the legal position as follows:— “12. The principles which have been set out in innumerable cases have been reiterated as under:— (1) In an appeal against an order of acquittal, the High Court possesses all the powers, and nothing less than the powers, it possesses while hearing an appeal against an order of conviction. (2) The High Court has the power to reconsider the whole issue, reappraise the evidence and come to its own conclusion and finding in place of the findings recorded by the trial court, if the said findings are against the weight of the evidence on record, or in other words, perverse. (3) Before reversing the findings of acquittal, the High Court has to consider each ground on which the order of acquittal was based and to record its own reason for not accepting those grounds and not subscribing to the view expressed by the trial court that the accused is entitled to acquittal. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (4) In reversing the finding of acquittal, the High Court has to keep in view the fact that the presumption of innocence is still available in favour of the accused and the same stands fortified and strengthened by the order of acquittal passed in his favour by the trial court. (5) If the High Court, on a fresh scrutiny and reappraisal of the evidence and other material on record, is of the opinion that there is another view which can be reasonably taken, then the view which favours the accused should be adopted. (6) The High Court has also to keep in mind that the trial court had the advantage of looking at the demeanour of witnesses and observing their conduct in the Court especially in the witness- box. (7) The High Court has also to keep in mind that even at that stage, the accused was entitled to benefit of doubt. The doubt should be such as a reasonable person would honestly and conscientiously entertain as to the guilt of the accused.” 18. It is thus well settled law that this court while hearing an acquittal appeal can re-appreciate the evidence, however, it should not interfere with the order of acquittal if the view taken by the trial court is also a reasonable view of the evidence on record and the findings recorded by the trial court are not manifestly erroneous, contrary to the evidence on record or perverse. (See: Ram Swaroop and ors v. State of Rajasthan, (2004) 13 SCC 134 ; Upendra Pradhan v. State of Orissa, (2015) 11 SCC 124 and State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram, (2003) 8 SCC 180 .) 19. We find that the prosecution placed a case of direct evidence before the trial court relying on the testimony of Kaya Gujjar (PW-1) and Mahi Gujjar (PW-2) as eye witnesses in the case. In the witness box Kaya Gujjar appearing as PW-1, in his examination-in-chief supported the above allegations. However, in cross examination while maintaining that there was a dispute between the parties regarding a piece of land situated at Dhar, Kaya Gujjar stated that he had no dispute with Mohd Sultan. So far as the incident is concerned, Kaya Gujjar categorically stated that he was at some distance from the place of occurrence and that, at that time, on account of fog, visibility was less. So far as the incident is concerned, Kaya Gujjar categorically stated that he was at some distance from the place of occurrence and that, at that time, on account of fog, visibility was less. PW-1 stated that the visibility was so poor that Kaya Gujjar could not even see Mahi Gujjar who was following him behind at a distance. This witness stated that he could identify the accused who was running away, only after reaching the spot. Kaya Gujjar denied that in his statement under section 164-A CrPC, he had stated that 6 persons were involved in the occurrence contending that only the respondent Mohd Sultan was responsible for the murder. The witness denied knowledge of the cause over which the occurrence took place. At another place, he stated that the accused person had already left the spot when he reached there. 20. Given the above testimony, Kaya Gujjar PW-1 was thus not a witness to the murder. 21. We now come to the testimony of the other main witness of the prosecution, also examined as eye witness. This witness was Mahi Gujjar examined as PW-2 who was the real brother of the deceased and also the complainant in the case. According to this witness, Kaya Gujjar and the deceased were grazing cattle at Ganottru Dhar when a fight broke out between the deceased and the respondent Mohd Sultan, during the course of which the respondent inflicted an axe blow on the left leg below the knee of the deceased. This witness testified that when he rushed to the spot, he too suffered a blow by axe on his head at the hands of the accused who thereafter ran away. The witness alleged that he fell unconscious and regained consciousness after half an hour and that in the meantime his brother telephonically informed the police about the incident who visited the spot at 8.00 p.m. The deceased was stated to have died at village Thanala when he was being brought to the Bhaderwah Hospital. This witness has stated that the police had seized an axe on the spot itself which was identified by him in the court. In cross examination, this witness however also completely discredited his own testimony. This witness also stated that there was a thick fog at the time of occurrence due to which it was difficult to even identify each other. In cross examination, this witness however also completely discredited his own testimony. This witness also stated that there was a thick fog at the time of occurrence due to which it was difficult to even identify each other. According to PW-2, he was sitting on the roof top of his Kotha along with his nephew and that it was not possible to view the place of occurrence or the spot because it was at a distance of 3 km from the place of occurrence. PW-2 further stated that Kaya Gujjar PW-1 was also sitting along with them at his Kotha. The witness further stated that, on account of heavy rain, all of them were sitting inside the Kotha. In cross examination, the witness stated that the deceased was all alone with his cattle and that he does not even know exactly as to which part of the Dhar the deceased had gone with his cattle. The witness stated that Faqir Mohd had helped the police in the investigation and had lodged report to the police on 23rd July, 2012 against the six people but later on only the accused persons were framed in the case at his instance. The witness denied having seen the accused Babber on the spot. 22. Kalu Gujjar examined as PW-3 was not a witness to the occurrence but visited the spot after hearing of the murder of the deceased. He was a witness to the seizure of the sample and blood stained clay from the spot. This witness further corroborated PWs-1 and 2 to the effect that, on the date of the occurrence, it was raining heavily and there was a thick fog all around. Inasmuch the witness had no personal knowledge with regard to circumstances in which the deceased was killed, his testimony is not relevant. However, the witness stated that the accused persons were implicated on account enmity with them. 23. Juman Gujjar, another brother of the deceased examined as PW-7, was put in the witness box as an eye witness. However, he completely denied having witnessed the incident. 24. From an examination of the record, it appears that the prosecution was unable to establish even the recovery of the axe on an alleged disclosure by the respondent. Bhasir Ahmed PW-8 who was examined to establish the disclosure statement, denied that Mohd Sultan had made a disclosure in his presence. However, he completely denied having witnessed the incident. 24. From an examination of the record, it appears that the prosecution was unable to establish even the recovery of the axe on an alleged disclosure by the respondent. Bhasir Ahmed PW-8 who was examined to establish the disclosure statement, denied that Mohd Sultan had made a disclosure in his presence. Similarly Abdul Qayoom PW-5 who was examined to establish the recovery of the axe at the instance of Mohd Sultan, denied that the axe was recovered in his presence at the instance of the accused. Rehmatullah, PW-6 who was being examined for the very purpose for which Abdul Qayoom was examined deposed the similar lines as PW-5. 25. So far as the cause of death is concerned, the prosecution examined Dr. Abdul Hamid Zargar, who had conducted the post mortem on the body of the deceased as PW-11 who found the following injuries on the body of the deceased:— “(1) A large 4 cm x 3 cm x 4 cm deep cut wound present on left popliteal fossa with blood clot present, clot removed shows underlying poplitieal vessels cut through and through with retracted popliteal artery. Edges of cut sharp, central portion of cut wound having more width than edges. (2) All the underlying tendons were cut. No body injury seen.” 26. The doctor had opined that the deceased died on account of profused bleeding leading to hemorrhagic shock with subsequent cardio-respiratory arrest and death. In his cross examination, the witness stated that the injury in question was not so serious or fatal which could have caused death in the ordinary course and had the patient been shifted earlier to the hospital, his life could be saved. Thus the prosecution case was discredited by the medical evidence as well. 27. Yet another important fact needs to be noted. There is no evidence that the axe which was allegedly recovered was shown to the doctor Abdul Hamid Zargar or his opinion sought as to whether the injury on the body of the deceased was possible by the recovered axe. Thus, there is no evidence to connect the axe which was recovered, to the death of the deceased. 28. There is no evidence that the axe which was allegedly recovered was shown to the doctor Abdul Hamid Zargar or his opinion sought as to whether the injury on the body of the deceased was possible by the recovered axe. Thus, there is no evidence to connect the axe which was recovered, to the death of the deceased. 28. The above narration would show that the two witnesses Kaya Gujjar PW-1 and Mahi Gujjar PW-2 are the brothers of the deceased Sawar Din who met his death due to profused bleeding from an injury leading to hemorrhagic shock with subsequent cardio-respiratory arrest on account of a deep cut wound on left popliteal fossa. Though these two witnesses were produced as eye witnesses, however, these two witnesses have not witnessed the occurrence. As per their testimony in the court, they were not even present on the spot. According to these witnesses, there was thick fog at the time of the occurrence and it was not possible to view the place of incident from the spot where the witnesses were placed. According to PW-2, the Kotha where he was sitting along with his nephew was at a distance of 3 km from the place of occurrence. PW-2 has stated that he did not know the circumstances in which the deceased had died and that he had named the accused as being the perpetrators of the crime in his statement under section 164-A of the CrPC at the instance of the Faqir Mohd. Thus, the testimony of PWs-1 and 2 does not help the case of the prosecution at all. 29. The prosecution has also not been able to establish any disclosure statement by the respondent or recovery of any article pursuant thereto which would have made disclosure statement attributed to the accused person admissible to the extent that it results in discovery of the weapon of offence. In the instant case, the prosecution was unable to establish even the making of the disclosure let alone recovery of the articles pursuant thereto. 30. In the above background, we are of the view that the conclusion of the learned Trial Judge that prosecution had failed to establish the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt cannot be faulted. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed. 30. In the above background, we are of the view that the conclusion of the learned Trial Judge that prosecution had failed to establish the case against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt cannot be faulted. For all these reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The same is dismissed. Gita Mittal, C.J.—Judgment is pronounced by me in terms of Rule 138(4) of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court Rules, 1999.