JUDGMENT : K.S. Mudagal, J. This second appeal of the defendant arises out of the Judgment and Decree dated 15.02.2018 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge & CJM., Chikkaballapura in R.A.No.200/2014. 2. By the impugned judgment and decree, the first appellate court dismissed the appeal of the defendant and confirmed the Judgment and Decree dated 17.07.2014 passed by the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC., Chikkaballapura in O.S.No.207/2009. By the said Judgment, the trial court decreed the suit of the plaintiffs for ejectment. 3. The respondents were the plaintiffs and the appellant was the defendant before the trial court. For the purpose of convenience, the parties will be referred with reference to their rank before the trial court. 4. Subject matter of the suit was shop premises bearing No.05/05 measuring 10' x 12' situated at M.G. Road, Chikkaballapura town. 5. Plaintiffs' case in brief is as follows: The defendant was a tenant in respect of suit schedule property. The tenancy was for a term of 11 months on a monthly rent of Rs.550/-. After the expiry of the term of the Lease, defendant despite the request of the plaintiffs, failed to vacate the premises. Therefore, the plaintiffs issued notice dated 13.02.2009, terminating the tenancy and seeking possession. Even that is not complied. 6. Initially, in his written statement, defendant admitted that he is the tenant under the plaintiffs. However, two years after filing of the written statement, he amended his written statement to contend that the owner of the premises and the landlord is President, Taluk Industrial Co-operative Society and not the plaintiff, namely, Taluk Artisans Co-operative Society. Therefore, there is no jural relationship. He did not dispute the service of termination notice or his reply to the same. 7. On the basis of such pleadings, the trial court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the plaintiffs prove that the lease of the defendant validly terminated? (2) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for vacant possession of the suit schedule property? (3) What order or decree? 8. Parties adduced evidence. On behalf of the plaintiffs, PW-1 was examined and Exs.P.1 to 22 were marked. The defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.D.1 and D.2 were marked. 9. On hearing the parties, the trial court decreed the suit holding that the evidence on record proves the jural relationship between the parties and the tenancy was validly terminated by notice as per Ex.P.3. The defendant was examined as D.W.1 and Exs.D.1 and D.2 were marked. 9. On hearing the parties, the trial court decreed the suit holding that the evidence on record proves the jural relationship between the parties and the tenancy was validly terminated by notice as per Ex.P.3. It was further held that the challenge of defendant to the title of the plaintiffs to the suit property and the jural relationship was unacceptable in view of his admissions in reply notice Ex.P.3 and Ex.P.19 and entries in Assessment Register Extract-Ex.P.14. 10. The defendant challenged the said Judgment and Decree before the First Appellate Court in R.A.No.200/2014. The First Appellate Court, by the impugned Judgment and Decree, dismissed the appeal concurring with the reasoning and findings of the trial court. 11. This being the first appeal under Section 100 of CPC, cannot be admitted for hearing, unless it is shown that the case involves a substantial question of law. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Hazari v/s. Purushottam Tiwari (Dead) by L.Rs, (2001) AIR SC 965, has held that on the question of fact the first appellate court is the last court unless some plerversity is shown. In Paragraph No.15 of the said Judgment, it was held that even on the question of law, the first appellate court is the last Court unless the question raised in the second appeal is a substantial question of law. 12. In Gurnam Singh (Dead) by LRs & Others vs- Lehna Singh (Dead) by LRs, 2019 AIR SC 1441, the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that by invoking Section 100 of CPC, the High Court cannot substitute its opinion to that of the first appellate court unless the case involves a substantial question of law and the conclusions drawn by the lowers courts were (i) contrary to the mandatory provisions of the applicable law; (ii) the judicial precedents of the Apex Court; or (iii) based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. 13. In the light of the aforesaid Judgments, this Court has to see now whether the case involves any substantial question of law and the conclusions drawn by the lower courts are contrary to any applicable law, judicial precedents of the Apex Court or based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. 14. The defendant admitted that he was the tenant of the schedule premises since more than 30 years. 14. The defendant admitted that he was the tenant of the schedule premises since more than 30 years. His only contention was that the owner/landlord of the property is Chikkaballapura Taluka Level Artisans Multipurpose Industrial Co-operative Society and not the plaintiff-Society. 15. Lease-Deed Ex.P.4 is not in dispute. In that the landlord is described as xxx xxx xxx Admittedly, notice- Ex.P.1 was issued on 13.02.2009 by the plain tiff-Society. The defendant issued reply to the said notice on 18.02.2009. 16. In notice Ex.P.1, plaintiff claimed that it is the owner of the property and the landlord. In reply notice RSA. No.735/2018 Ex.P.3 at Para Nos.1, 4 and 6, the defendant unequivocally admitted that he is the tenant under the plaintiff-Society. In the written statement filed by him in 2009, in Para No.9, he admitted that he is the tenant under the plaintiff- Society. Only two years thereafter, he amended his written statement to deviate from the said admission. 17. Ex.P.14 is the Assessment Register Extract pertaining to the suit schedule property. It showed that on the application of the Chikkaballapura Taluka Level Artisans Multi-purpose Industrial Co-operative Society, the name of the katha-holder was changed from "Chikkaballapura Taluka Level Artisans Co-operative Society" to "Chikkaballapura Taluka Level Artisans Multipurpose Industrial Co-operative Society". 18. It is the contention of the plaintiff that only name of plaintiff-Society was changed, but the Society is the same. At the earliest point of time, there were admissions on the part of the plaintiff in the reply notice and its written statement. Though the admissions are not conclusive proof, it was for the defendant to explain those admissions. 19. The only way of explaining such admission of defendant was to examine the other person, who according to him, was the landlord/owner of the property. Defendant did not even dispute his reply-Ex.P.3. Therefore, relying on such unexplained admissions of the defendant, courts below decreed the suit. 20. It cannot be said that the Judgments and Decrees of the Courts below are contrary to any applicable law, judicial precedents or based on inadmissible evidence or no evidence. 21. This Court does not find any substantial question of law in the case. Therefore, the Appeal is dismissed with costs.