JUDGMENT Mohammad Rafiq, J. - These two appeals seek to challenge the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 30.04.2019, whereby two writ petitions filed by appellant Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar were dismissed. Appeal No.699/2019 arises out of Writ Petition No.26712/2018, while Appeal No.700/2019 has been filed against the judgment passed in Writ Petition No.26717/2010. In Writ Petition No.26717/2018, the appellant/writ-petitioner impugned the order dated 30.11.2018 passed by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Rajasthan, in Appeal No.35/2018, which was filed by respondent no.2 Dr. Shobha Tomar as well as entire proceedings of the said appeal. In Writ Petition No.26712/2018, the appellant/writpetitioner impugned the order dated 30.11.2018 passed by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department in Appeal No.36/2018 filed by respondent no.2 Dr. Shobha Tomar, who therein challenged the order dated 09.08.2017 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur, whereby the amended trust-deed dated 02.01.2017 (registered on 03.01.2017) produced by appellant Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar, was placed on record. By order dated 30.11.2018 the Commissioner Devasthan Department over ruled the preliminary objections raised by the appellant as to maintainability of the appeal on the ground of delay as also res judicata on the presumption that appeal against the same order had already been dismissed earlier. Since the parties to the dispute are common and the facts are also similar, learned Single Judge decided both the writ petitions by common judgment. Therefore we shall also decide these two appeals by present judgment simultaneously. 2. In order to appreciate the dispute between the parties, we first need to take note of the background facts. The Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur by order dated 16.04.2015 took on record the minutes of the meeting of the trust known as Indian Medical Trust, Jaipur, dated 02.02.2015, whereby the respondent no.2 Dr. Shobha Tomar was appointed as Vice Chairman and respondent no.6 Dr. Swati Tomar as Trustee. As per the allegations of the appellant, those minutes were forged therefore he filed an application under Section 24 of the Rajasthan Public Trusts Act, 1959 (for short, 'the Act of 1959') before the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, for further inquiry in relation to the said forgery, which was registered as Application No.01/2016 and order was made by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur on 04.08.2016 restraining Dr. Shobha Tomar and Dr. Anurag Tomar from holding any meeting without presence and consent of Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar. Shobha Tomar and Dr. Anurag Tomar from holding any meeting without presence and consent of Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar. While on one hand, the appellant submitted written complaint to the police, which was registered as F.I.R. No.454/2016 at Police Station Chandwaji, Jaipur Rural, for offence under Sections 420, 406, 467, 468, 471 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code on 02.12.2016, on the other hand, he filed Writ Petition No.7897/2017 before the Single Bench of this Court challenging the proceedings pending before the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, under Section 24 of the Act of 1959. The Single Bench, vide judgment dated 01.08.2017, partly allowed the writ petition filed by the appellant and upheld the order dated 04.08.2016 setting the appellant at liberty to initiate contempt proceedings in the event of infringement of restraint order dated 04.08.2016 made by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur in Case No.01/2016 in accordance with the law. By the said judgment dated 01.08.2017, the learned Single Judge also dismissed the Writ Petitions No.3999/2017, 1648/2017, 6047/2017 and 4507/2017 instituted by the Indian Medical Trust as also Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar and Dr. Swati Tomar, as office bearers of the Indian Medical Trust. The Assistant Commissioner (First) passed the consequential order dated 09.08.2017 giving effect to the judgment of the Single Bench of this Court dated 01.08.2017. The said judgment of the learned Single Judge was challenged by both the parties in Special Appeals. The Division Bench of this Court disposed of the appeals vide judgment dated 11.08.2017, by setting aside the directions contained in para 40 of the judgment of learned Single Judge, which pertained to the question whether Shri Jayanti Lal Patel, a trustee, who earlier tendered resignation on 17.03.2012, could participate in the meeting held on 02.04.2015 pursuant to notice dated 31.01.2015 on the premise that his resignation has not been approved. The Division Bench, while disposing of the appeal, passed following order:- "With the above observations, all the appeals are disposed of. The order passed by Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, after the order of learned Single Judge, will not be appropriate for the appellant to challenge before the appellate authority as we have never called upon to address the court on the said point." 3. The order passed by Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department, after the order of learned Single Judge, will not be appropriate for the appellant to challenge before the appellate authority as we have never called upon to address the court on the said point." 3. The respondents no.2 and 3 thereafter filed an application before the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur, on 21.08.2017 praying for recall of the order dated 09.08.2017. The appellant filed appeal before the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, challenging the maintainability of the said application. The Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 26.12.2017 dismissed the Appeal No.35/2017 observing that the Division Bench in its judgment dated 11.08.2017 has merely set aside para 40 of the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 01.08.2017 and not the rest of the judgment, therefore, the judgment of learned Single Judge on other aspects was still binding and since no final order has been passed on the application filed by the respondents no.2 and 3 by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, the appeal was premature and not maintainable. The respondents no.2 and 3 then filed contempt petition, being Contempt Petition No.1563/2017 before the Division Bench of this Court seeking action against the Assistant Commissioner (First) for not passing any order on their recall application, however, the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 11.01.2018, with the observation that it will be open for them to challenge the order that may be finally passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, if the same is contrary to aforesaid Division Bench order. The respondents no.2 and 3 therefore filed Appeal No.17/2018 on 11.04.2018 under liberty, purported to have been granted by the Division Bench in its order dated 11.01.2018, before the Commissioner Devasthan Department, challenging the order dated 09.08.2017 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department. This appeal was accompanied by an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act on 11.04.2018. It was thereafter that the Assistant Commissioner (First), by order dated 20.04.2018, consigned the application for recall of the order dated 09.08.2017 to record on the premise that now pursuant to liberty granted by the order of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017, the respondents no.2 and 3 have already filed Appeal No.16/2018 (arising out of Case No.1/2016) and Appeal No.17/2018 (arising out of Case No.6/2017), therefore no action was needed on the recall application. The Commissioner Devasthan Department by order dated 07.05.2018 dismissed Appeal No.16/2018 filed against the order dated 09.08.2017 as not maintainable, being premature and time barred. In the meantime, the respondents no.2 and 3 filed petition seeking review of the order of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017. The Division Bench by order dated 09.07.2018 disposed of the review petition however with liberty to review-petitioners (respondents no.2 and 3 herein) to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department dated 09.08.2017 by way of appropriate proceedings and passed the following order:- "6. It is very clear from the above that the observations made by the learned Single Judge in para no.40 were quashed and set aside. It is not to be taken as conclusion by either of the side as stated in para second which we have reproduced above. 7. However, it will be open for the present applicants to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department dt. 9.8.2017 by way of appropriate proceedings. 8. We make it clear that if the whole appeal is allowed only on the basis of para no.40 of the learned Single Judge, our order is very clear and since order dt. 9.8.2017 has been passed prior to our order, we are not inclined to interfere but subsequently the appeal has to follow our Division Bench judgment dt. 11.8.2017 and appropriate order will be passed in accordance with law. 9. With the above observations, the review petitions stand disposed of." 4. It is against the backdrop of the afore-noted facts the respondents no.2 and 3 filed Appeal No.35/2018 challenging the orders dated 09.08.2017 and 20.04.2018 passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, Jaipur, in Case No.1/2016. At this stage, the appellant again approached this Court by filing Writ Petitions No.19172/2018 and 19173/2018 with the prayer that the appellate authority be restrained from entertaining aforementioned appeals and proceedings therein be quashed and set aside. An argument was raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge that since earlier appeal filed by the respondents no.2 and 3 was dismissed being premature as well as barred by limitation, they are estopped from filing subsequent appeal on the same facts. An argument was raised by the appellant before the learned Single Judge that since earlier appeal filed by the respondents no.2 and 3 was dismissed being premature as well as barred by limitation, they are estopped from filing subsequent appeal on the same facts. The argument of the respondent before the learned Single Judge was that they have filed the appeal again in view of the liberty contained by the Division Bench of this Court in Review Petition No.79/2018 decided on 09.07.2018. The learned Single Judge therefore refused to entertain the writ petition on merits and directed the parties to appear before the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Jaipur, on 22.10.2018, with liberty to them to raise all their objections and legal grounds available to them under law, and directed the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, Jaipur, to decide the pending appeal within a period of two months and also directed the parties to maintain the status quo as it existed on that day. Still not satisfied with the aforesaid directions of the learned Single Judge, the appellant again filed appeal before the Division Bench of this Court, being Special Appeals (Writ) No.1320/2018 and 1321/2018. An objection was raised by the appellant before the Division Bench that the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 01.08.2017 may be understood by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department Department, to mean as if he has to decide both appeals on issue of jurisdiction as well on merits. On this, learned counsel appearing for respondent Dr. Shobha Tomar, stated that she would have no objections if the appeals are disposed of directing the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, to first decide the preliminary objection concerning the maintainability of two appeals bearing Nos.35/2018 and 36/2018 filed before him. The Division Bench, taking note of the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and the respondent no.2, disposed of both the appeals vide order dated 23.10.2018, the relevant portion of which reads thus:- "5. Needless to state the issue of jurisdiction needs to be decided with reference to earlier two appeals filed by the respondents which were disposed of by the Commissioner Devasthan Department and in respect of which decision the stand of the respondents is that liberty was granted by the Division Bench of this Court to file fresh appeals, as assertion denied by the appellant. 6. 6. Needless to state the previous decisions would be considered by the Commissioner Devasthan Department on the issue of maintainability of the two appeals. 7. The two appeals are disposed of in above terms." 5. The Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 30.11.2018, dismissed the preliminary objections as to maintainability of the appeal raised by the appellant. The appellant still not being satisfied with the said order yet again filed two more writ petitions before the Single Bench of this Court. The learned Single Judge, by judgment dated 30.04.2019, impugned in the present appeals, has dismissed both the writ petitions. It is against that judgment that the present set of appeals has again been filed by the appellant. 6. Mr. S.S. Hora, learned counsel for the appellant, has argued that the learned Single Judge fell in error in not appreciating the legal position as is evident from the manner in which the issues which arose for consideration were dealt with by him. In spite of the fact that the appeal against the order dated 09.08.2017 passed by the Assistant Commissioner had already been dismissed by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, on 07.05.2018, and that order was never challenged in any proceedings and therefore attained finality. The learned Single Judge failed to address as to how appeal against the very same order dated 09.08.2017 was maintainable in the second round. It is well settled that the right of appeal is creature of statute and cannot be availed unless expressly provided for. Reliance is placed on the judgment of the Supreme Court in D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 and Super Casettes Industries Vs. State of U.P., (2009) 10 SCC 531 7. It is argued that liberty granted by the Court also cannot confer jurisdiction upon any authority which otherwise is not so empowered under the statute. Reliance in support of this argument is placed on judgment of the Supreme Court in Ranjit Kumar Marmu Vs. Lachmi Narayan Bhomroj, (2013) 14 SCC 572 and Kewal Chand Mimani Vs. S.K. Sen, (2001) 6 SCC 512 8. Learned counsel submitted that if the order dated 30.11.2018 is allowed to stand, it would result in an anomalous situation where two contradictory orders would concurrently hold the field, one, dismissing the appeal dated 07.05.2018 and another, entertaining the appeal dated 30.11.2018. S.K. Sen, (2001) 6 SCC 512 8. Learned counsel submitted that if the order dated 30.11.2018 is allowed to stand, it would result in an anomalous situation where two contradictory orders would concurrently hold the field, one, dismissing the appeal dated 07.05.2018 and another, entertaining the appeal dated 30.11.2018. There being no power of review with the Assistant Commissioner, the appeal in the second round could not be entertained. 9. It is argued that the learned Single Judge did not deal with the erroneous reasons given by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, in the order dated 30.11.2018. The reason given primarily for treating the appeal to be maintainable was that the Division Bench in order dated 23.10.2018 had directed the matter to be heard and decided in two months. This was complete misreading of order dated 23.10.2018 passed by the Division Bench which had directed that in deciding the issue of maintainability, the previous decisions on appeals filed earlier would have to be considered. No such consideration was at all made in the impugned order dated 30.11.2018. 10. The learned counsel argued that the learned Single Judge supplied two reasons for holding the appeal in the second round to be maintainable. Firstly, he held that the appeal in the previous round was premature as no cause of action had arisen till 07.05.2018. This was plainly wrong as the cause of action of order dated 09.08.2017 was very much in existence and that was not the argument before the Commissioner, rather argument of the petitioner was that change in entry now without order of competent Civil Court under Section 22 of the Act of 1959 would be premature. Secondly, the learned Single Judge held that limitation did not apply in challenging the order dated 09.08.2017 as the said order was passed under Section 23 of the Act of 1959. This proposition was used both to criticize the earlier rejection of appeal dated 07.05.2018, though validity of order dated 07.05.2018 was not subject matter of proceeding before the learned Single Judge, as well as to hold the fresh appeal, which was hopelessly barred by limitation, would be maintainable. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge is unsustainable. This proposition was used both to criticize the earlier rejection of appeal dated 07.05.2018, though validity of order dated 07.05.2018 was not subject matter of proceeding before the learned Single Judge, as well as to hold the fresh appeal, which was hopelessly barred by limitation, would be maintainable. The reasoning of the learned Single Judge is unsustainable. The learned Single Judge in this regard held that the question of limitation is no longer res integra in view of ratio of his own judgment dated 17.05.2018 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.1416/2018 titled Sudhir Heeralal Dhadda Vs. Assistant Commissioner-I. It is submitted that the aforesaid judgment is subject matter of challenge in D.B. Special Appeal (Writ) No.785/2018 and 786/2018, therefore, the view in Sudhir Heeralal Dhadda has not attained finality. The legal basis of Sudhir Heeralal Dhadda is contrary to the scheme of Sections 19, 20, 23 and 24 of the Act of 1959. 11. Learned counsel has rather placed reliance on the decision taking a contrary view, in Sita Ram Das Vs. Shri Chaturbhuj Nathji Mandir, (1988) 2 RajLR 107 , in which this Court while discussing the scheme of Sections 17 to 23 held that appeal under Section 20 would lie in respect of findings of further enquiry under Section 23. In fact both the appeals filed by Shobha Tomar were filed under Section 20 as that is the only provision of appeal. However, the learned Single Judge without adverting to the analysis of the provisions, held that in respect of findings of enquiry under Section 23, appeal does not lie under Section 20. This was clearly erroneous and is evident even on consideration of Section 24 which provides for further enquiry and specifically provides that Sections 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23 would apply to it. 12. Learned counsel argued that the appellate authority has got no power to entertain an appeal beyond a period of two months. The Limitation Act including the scheme of its Section 5 applies only to Courts and not to statutory authorities. 12. Learned counsel argued that the appellate authority has got no power to entertain an appeal beyond a period of two months. The Limitation Act including the scheme of its Section 5 applies only to Courts and not to statutory authorities. It is argued that the issue before the learned Single Judge was about maintainability alone and he held that the Assistant Commissioner should have suo motu corrected his order dated 09.08.2017 under Section 26 of the Act of 1959, which is wholly erroneous particularly when that order has been examined by the Division Bench of this Court; firstly while deciding the appeal, then review petition and then contempt petition. The learned Single Judge has failed to consider the only statutory remedy available to the respondents under Section 22 of the Act of 1959 was of filing the civil suit. 13. Mr. Deepak Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent no.2, opposed the appeals and submitted that the learned Single Judge in his judgment has examined all arguments which the appellant is now seeking to raise. Impugned judgment does not suffer from any infirmity. The learned Single Judge has merely ordered for the time bound implementation of the orders of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017 and 09.08.2017, which have remained unimplemented for the period of almost two years because of failure of the administrative authority in complying with the provisions of law. It is submitted that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the Devasthan Department has failed in its duty to comply with Section 26 of the Act of 1959 which makes it necessary for the Assistant Commissioner to enforce the changes made due to the orders of the Division Bench dates 11.08.2017 and 09.07.2018, irrespective of any application moved by any party. 14. It is argued that the learned Single Judge has rightly decided the issues involved in the writ petition and has not gone beyond the scope of the jurisdiction. The appellant has wrongly stated in the appeals that the learned Single Judge has gone beyond the issues which were subject matter in the writ petition and gave observation on merits of the order dated 09.08.2017. The entire controversy was regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed before the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by the respondent seeking enforcement of the changes in the Indian Medical Trust resulting from the order dated 11.08.2017 passed by the Division Bench. The entire controversy was regarding the maintainability of the appeal filed before the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by the respondent seeking enforcement of the changes in the Indian Medical Trust resulting from the order dated 11.08.2017 passed by the Division Bench. The appellant has challenged the maintainability of such appeal before the Commissioner on several grounds, which includes the issues pertaining to second round of litigation, appeal being time barred. On the contrary, the respondent submitted that the issues raised by the appellant does not have any merit and pleaded that the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, be directed to enforce the order of the Division Bench as the authorities have failed to perform their duties prescribed under Section 26 of the Act of 1959. 15. It is submitted that the appellant has wrongly stated that the learned Single Judge has gone beyond the issues which were subject matter of the writ petition. Learned Single Judge has rather rightly settled the core issue of dispute between the parties and issued appropriate direction to the authority. The learned Single Judge has merely decided on the maintainability of the proceedings before the Commissioner. However, the Commissioner is yet to hear the parties on merits and then decide the case on merits. The learned Single Judge has merely ordered enforcement of the orders of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017 and 09.07.2018 and has not commented on the rights created or extinguished due to implementation of such orders. The parties are set free to agitate all such issues before the Commissioner. Thus, the appellant is wrong in stating that the learned Single Judge has decided the legality of the order dated 09.08.2017 as the same is yet to be determined by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department. The learned Single Judge has rightly held that the order dated 09.08.2017 of the Assistant Commissioner was passed on the basis of paragraph 40 of the order dated 01.08.2017. Since that paragraph 40 has been deleted by the Division Bench vide its order dated 11.08.2017, the changes are required to be made in the register of the trust in order to implement aforementioned order of the Division Bench, which was again reiterated by the Division Bench vide order dated 09.07.2018. 16. Mr. Deepak Chauhan, learned counsel argued that the Assistant Commissioner is duty bound to enforce the judgment of the Division Bench. 16. Mr. Deepak Chauhan, learned counsel argued that the Assistant Commissioner is duty bound to enforce the judgment of the Division Bench. It has passed the order dated 09.08.2017 by exercising the powers conferred under Section 26 of the Act of 1959. When the paragraph 40 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge has been declared null and void by the Division Bench vide its order dated 11.08.2017 and 09.07.2018, the Assistant Commissioner was bound to alter the earlier entries in the register, which were made in compliance of paragraph 40 of the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The respondent even moved an application dated 21.08.2017 seeking compliance of the order of the Division Bench, however, the Department never acted on such application of the respondent and kept on delaying the enforcement by raising one or the other technical objections. It is submitted that the respondent is entitled to be reinstated as the Trustee of the Trust and all the entries made in the record are to be ratified because of paragraph 40. 17. Mr. Deepak Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent, argued that the order of the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, dated 30.11.2018 is in compliance with the legal principles and it has rightly found the appeal of the respondent to be maintainable. All objections raised by the appellant are devoid of merits. It is evident from the order dated 09.08.2017 that such order has been passed under the provisions of Section 23 read with Section 26 of the Act of 1959. When the order has been passed under Section 23, the same is appealable under Section 23(4) itself. Further, Section 23 of the Act does not stipulate any time period for challenging such order. As far as the order dated 20.04.2018 is concerned, such order has been passed upon the application dated 21.08.2017 made under Section 26 read with Sections 23 and 24 of the Act of 1959. Appeal against the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner under Section 24 of the Act shall lie under Section 23. As both Sections 23 and 24 pertain to the modification of the entries in the register, the procedure of Section 23 would be equally applicable in case of proceedings under Section 24 of the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner moved an application dated 03.08.2017 before the Commissioner seeking compliance of order dated 01.08.2017 of learned Single Judge. As both Sections 23 and 24 pertain to the modification of the entries in the register, the procedure of Section 23 would be equally applicable in case of proceedings under Section 24 of the Act. Furthermore, the petitioner moved an application dated 03.08.2017 before the Commissioner seeking compliance of order dated 01.08.2017 of learned Single Judge. The same was acted upon by the Commissioner on 04.08.2017 itself by directing the Assistant Commissioner to enforce the order dated 01.08.2017. The Appeal No.35/2018 was also filed to seek similar relief from the Commissioner as the Assistant Commissioner failed to act on the application of the respondent dated 21.08.2017 seeking enforcement of the order dated 11.08.2017 of the Division Bench. 18. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 further argued that the Commissioner has rightly held that the appeal filed by the respondent is maintainable as it has been filed in compliance of the order dated 09.07.2018 of the Division Bench of this Court. The Commissioner has never previously considered on merits the validity of the entries made through the order dated 09.07.2017. It is for the first time that the Commissioner shall be determining the validity of the orders passed by the Assistant Commissioner on 09.07.2017 and 20.04.2018. Thereby, all the objections challenging the maintainability of the appeal pending before the Commissioner are untenable, ill-founded and liable to be rejected. The Commissioner has rightly held the appeal to be maintainable. 19. It is argued that the earlier appeal of the respondent was dismissed by the Commissioner by order dated 07.05.2018 by holding it to be premature. He never considered on merits the challenge to validity of order dated 09.08.2017 of the Assistant Commissioner and further the order of Assistant Commissioner dated 20.04.2018 has never been appealed against before the Commissioner. The learned Single Judge has rightly relied on the judgment in Sudhir Heeralal Dhadda, supra, wherein the subsequent appeal before the Commissioner would not be barred by the principles of res judicata when the previous appeal was dismissed as being abated. The said judgment is still pending for consideration before the Division Bench, however, operation of the same has not been stayed. The Division Bench while deciding the review petition vide order dated 09.07.2018 not just granted the right to the appellant to challenge the order dated 09.08.2018 but also duly specified the forum before which such order is to be challenged. 20. The Division Bench while deciding the review petition vide order dated 09.07.2018 not just granted the right to the appellant to challenge the order dated 09.08.2018 but also duly specified the forum before which such order is to be challenged. 20. It is argued that the appellant is trying to mislead this Court by wrongly interpreting the provisions of the Act of 1959. Filing of a civil suit before the Civil Court is provided under Section 22 of the Act of 1959. The remedy of a civil suit is only available to challenge the order passed under Section 21 which is pertaining to the entries of new trust and not regarding the modifications made in the entries of the existing trust. The matters pertaining to the modification made in the entries of the existing trust are specifically covered under the provisions of Sections 23, 24 and 26 of the Act of 1959. The present case is pertaining to the modification of entries regarding the existing trust which are resulting from the judgment of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017 and 09.07.2018. It is submitted that the remedy of civil court is not available in the instant case. 21. We have given our thoughtful consideration to rival submissions and perused the material on record. 22. We may at the very outset note that the dispute is in between appellant Dr. Balveer Singh Tomar, on one hand and his estranged wife Dr. Shobha Tomar and his step-son Dr. Anurag Tomar, on the other. The appellant has approached this Court not once but several times, in writ petition before Single Bench of this Court and thereafter in appeal before Division Bench, details whereof we have already mentioned in the opening paras of the judgment. When the respondents filed proceedings under Section 24 of the Act of 1959, before the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, for recording changes of the entries, appellant filed Writ Petition No.7897/2017, which was dismissed by learned Single Judge vide order dated 01.08.2017. The Division Bench, by judgment dated 11.08.2017, set aside para 40 of that judgment of the learned Single Judge on the premise that what was observed therein was not subject matter of dispute between the parties. The Division Bench, by judgment dated 11.08.2017, set aside para 40 of that judgment of the learned Single Judge on the premise that what was observed therein was not subject matter of dispute between the parties. Thereafter when the respondent filed application before Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, on 21.08.2017 praying for recall of the order dated 09.08.2017, the appellant/writ-petitioner challenged those proceedings by filing appeal before the Commissioner, Devasthan. The Commissioner, Devasthan, dismissed the appeal by order dated 26.12.2017 on the premise that the Division Bench in its judgment dated 11.08.2017 has merely set aside para 40 of the judgment and remaining part of the judgment was kept intact, which would be binding on for all the purposes. On that basis, the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, concluded that since no final order has been passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, the appeal filed by the respondents no.2 and 3 was premature and was not maintainable. The respondent no.2 then filed contempt petition before Division Bench of this Court alleging that the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, was not passing any order on the recall application, however, later on the said contempt petition was dismissed as withdrawn with the observation that it would be open for the petitioners to challenge the final order passed by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, if eventually the same is contrary to the Division Bench judgment. Respondents no.2 and 3 again filed Appeal No.16/2018 on 11.04.2018 under liberty, purported to have been granted by the Division Bench in its order dated 11.01.2018, before the Commissioner Devasthan Department, challenging the order dated 09.08.2017. Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, considering that now pursuant to the liberty granted by the Division Bench of this Court by order dated 11.08.2017, vide order dated 20.04.2018 consigned the application to records. Against the order dated 20.04.2018, the respondents no.2 and 3 have already filed appeal, but the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 07.05.2018 dismissed the same as not maintainable, being premature and time barred. At this stage, the respondent no.2 filed petition seeking review of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017. The Division Bench by order dated 09.07.2018 disposed of the review petition with liberty to the respondents no.2 and 3 to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan, dated 09.08.2017. At this stage, the respondent no.2 filed petition seeking review of the judgment of the Division Bench dated 11.08.2017. The Division Bench by order dated 09.07.2018 disposed of the review petition with liberty to the respondents no.2 and 3 to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan, dated 09.08.2017. Para 7 of the judgment dated 09.07.2018 of the Division Bench makes it clear that the Division Bench set the appellant in that appeal, i.e., respondents no.2 and 3 herein, at liberty to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, dated 09.08.2017 by way of appropriate proceedings. It is thus evident that earlier appeal was simply dismissed as premature and time barred and was not dismissed on merits. 23. Indisputably, the Division Bench order dated 11.08.2017 in SAW No.1128/2017 has attained finality as far as the appellant is concerned. It was only the respondents no.2 and 3, who filed the review petition. In para 7 of the judgment deciding the review petition the liberty was granted to the review-petitioners to challenge the order of the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, by way appropriate proceedings. Since the appeal earlier filed was not decided on merits, liberty having been granted by the Division Bench of this Court, entertainment of this appeal by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, cannot be said to be illegal. In any case, the respondents could not be left remediless. As far as the recall application is concerned, the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, consigned the same to the record on the premise that now pursuant to the liberty granted by the Division Bench, the respondents no.2 and 3 have already filed the appeal. The Division Bench of this Court in Review Petition again gave that liberty to the respondents. Said appeal, which was filed subsequent to the aforesaid order of the Division Bench cannot therefore be treated as premature. As far as the limitation in filing the appeal is concerned, the limitation should be taken to have been extended and delay, if any, treated to have been condoned by order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 09.07.2018. 24. As far as the limitation in filing the appeal is concerned, the limitation should be taken to have been extended and delay, if any, treated to have been condoned by order of the Division Bench of this Court dated 09.07.2018. 24. Being dissatisfied with the proceedings, the appellant again approached this Court by filing Writ Petitions No.19172/2018 and 19173/2018, which were disposed of by learned Single Judge vide judgment dated 08.10.2018 with liberty to the parties to raise all their objections and available legal grounds under the law. At the same time, the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, was directed to decide the pending appeal within a period of two months. Even this order dated 08.10.2018 was challenged by the appellant before the Division Bench by way of SAW No.1320/2018 and 1321/2018. A specific argument has been raised on behalf of the appellant that the direction of the learned Single Judge contained in the judgment dated 08.10.2018 may be understood by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, to mean that the appeal has to be decided both on the issue of jurisdiction as well as on merits. The Division Bench by judgment dated 23.10.2018, taking note of the submission of the respondent no.2 that she would have no objection if the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, first decide the preliminary objection about maintainability of the appeal, disposed of the appeals by observing that issue of jurisdiction needs to be decided by the appellate authority with reference to earlier two appeals of the respondent. The Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 30.11.2018, held the appeal to be maintainable against which the appellant again filed two Writ Petitions challenging the order dated 30.11.2018. The learned Single Judge has now dismissed the writ petitions by the impugned judgment. The Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 30.11.2018 merely held the appeal maintainable and has not passed any order on merits of the case. It is open to the parties to contest the matter on merits. We do not find any infirmity in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. 25. In so far as the order dated 30.11.2018 of the Commissioner, Devasthan Department is concerned, the same had to be passed by him because of the insistence of the appellant before the Division Bench, which has, in its judgment dated 23.10.2018, taken note of his preliminary objection. 25. In so far as the order dated 30.11.2018 of the Commissioner, Devasthan Department is concerned, the same had to be passed by him because of the insistence of the appellant before the Division Bench, which has, in its judgment dated 23.10.2018, taken note of his preliminary objection. The Commissioner, Devasthan Department, by order dated 30.11.2018, overruled the preliminary objections raised by the appellant as to maintainability of the appeal on the ground of delay as also res judicata. And if that has now been done, the appellant cannot be permitted to challenge the order at every stage, i.e., by filing writ petitions and thereafter special appeals on each and every occasion, which is nothing but sheer abuse of the process of the court. The learned Single Judge gave the time limit of two months to the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, to decide the appeals on both aspects, i.e., the aspect of its maintainability as also merits. The appellate authority could have decided both the issues simultaneously but it is on insistence of the appellant in his appeal to get the preliminary objections decided first, to which the respondent did not object, that the Division Bench in its order dated 23.10.2018 observed that the issue of jurisdiction needs to be decided with reference to earlier two appeals filed by the respondents which were disposed of by the Commissioner, Devasthan Department and in respect of which decision the stand of the respondents is that liberty was granted by the Division Bench to file fresh appeals. Now when the Commissioner, Devasthan Department, has decided the question with regard to maintainability of the appeals, he should be allowed to decide the appeals on merits. 26. Even when the proceedings are undertaken by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, with regard to any change appearing in any of the entries recorded in the register with reference to Section 23, such order would be appealable under Section 23(4) of the Act of 1959. 26. Even when the proceedings are undertaken by the Assistant Commissioner (First), Devasthan Department, with regard to any change appearing in any of the entries recorded in the register with reference to Section 23, such order would be appealable under Section 23(4) of the Act of 1959. It is evident from Section 22(1) of the Act of 1959 that any working trustee or person having interest in a public trust or any property found to be trust property aggrieved by any entry made under Section 21 may, within six months from the date of the publication thereof on the notice board of the office of the Assistant Commissioner under sub-section (1) of Section 21, institute a suit in a civil court to have such entry cancelled or modified. However, the provisions of Section 23 are entirely different, which do not refer to any fresh entry but rather envisage changes occurring in any of the entries recorded in the register. It is further evident from Section 23(1), which provides that where any change occurs in any of the entries recorded in the register, the working trustee shall, within ninety days from the date of the occurrence of such change, or, where any change is desired in such entries in the interest of the administration of such public trust, report in the prescribed form and manner such change or proposed change to be Assistant Commissioner. Sub-section (2) of Section 23 provides that for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded in the register, the Assistant Commissioner may hold any inquiry. Sub-section (3) of Section 23 in continuation then provides that if, after holding such inquiry as he may consider necessary under sub-section (2) either on receipt of a report under sub-section (1) or otherwise, the Assistant Commissioner is satisfied that a change has occurred or is necessary in any of the entries recorded in the register in regard to the particular public trust, he shall record a finding with the reasons therefor and the provisions of section 29 shall apply to such finding as they apply to a finding under Section 19. It is thereafter that sub-section (4) of Section 23 provided that the Assistant Commissioner shall cause the entries in the register to be amended in accordance with the finding recorded under subsection (3) or, if an appeal has been filed therefrom, in accordance with the decision of the Commissioner on such appeal and the provisions of Sections 21 and 22 shall apply to such amended entries as they apply to the original entries. 27. In view of the above discussion, we do not find any infirmity or illegality in the view taken by the learned Single Judge. The impugned judgment is upheld. The appeals fail and are hereby dismissed. 28. A copy of this judgment be placed in the file of the connected matter.