JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. Mahesh Tewari, counsel for the petitioners along with Mr. Anurag Kumar, counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners. 2. Heard Mr. T. N. Verma, counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party- Vigilance Bureau. 3. This petition has been filed for setting aside/quashing the order taking cognizance dated 17.06.2014 by the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Hazaribagh in Special Case No. 3 of 2014, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 477 (A) and 120(B) of the Indian Penal Code and Section 9 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 against 26 persons including the petitioners. This case is now said to be pending in the court of the learned Special Judge (Vigilance), Hazaribagh. 4. Counsel for the petitioners submits that in the present case, F.I.R. was lodged as back as in the year 1996 and the charge-sheet was submitted on 27.08.2013 and cognizance against the petitioners including other accused persons was taken on 17.06.2014. He submits that all the petitioners before this Court were the contractors, who were involved in the execution of certain contract work involved in this case. 5. The learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that vide letter no. 482 dated 03.10.1997 issued by the Superintendent of Police to the Chief Engineer (Transport), South Chotanagpur, Road Construction Department, the Superintendent of Police had requested for giving a technical report in connection with the allegation and he had also indicated that the police was finding it difficult to investigate the matter in absence of a technical report vis-a-vis the allegations levelled against the accused persons. The learned counsel submits that in spite of this letter , no technical report was ever obtained and ultimately, the charge-sheet was submitted without any material against the petitioners in the entire investigation. 6. The learned counsel further refers to Annexure-6 , which is a letter dated 23.10.2000 to submit that he has stated in para 14 of the present petition that against the work, only Rs. 10,000/- was paid to the contractor and the rest amount could not be paid due to non-allotment of fund. Accordingly, he submits that at best the alleged allegation of defalcation of money, if any, is to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- only so far as the petitioners are concerned. 7. 10,000/- was paid to the contractor and the rest amount could not be paid due to non-allotment of fund. Accordingly, he submits that at best the alleged allegation of defalcation of money, if any, is to the extent of Rs. 10,000/- only so far as the petitioners are concerned. 7. So far as the merits of the case is concerned, the counsel appearing on behalf of the Vigilance Bureau submits that the amount which is involved in this case is not Rs. 10,000/-, but the amount regarding defalcation of money as mentioned in the case-diary is much more relating to various contractors. He further submits that substantial amount has not yet been adjusted or disbursed to the contractors. He further submits that the prosecution sanction has already been received on 07.02.2013, which is apparent from the para 592 of the case-diary. 8. The learned counsel for the Vigilance Bureau further submits that so far as the cognizance is concerned, it is always taken of an offence and not against the offenders and the Sections, under which the petitioners are to be charged, depends upon later stage of the case. 9. He further submits that so far as the First Information Report is concerned, the same itself has been filed on the basis of the audit report and the audit report forms a part of the First Information Report. He further submits that the audit report itself indicates financial irregularities in connection with the allotment and execution of the work. He further submits that at the stage of taking cognizance, this Court may not interfere and the plea which has been raised by the petitioners, can be certainly taken at the stage of trial, as the charge has already been framed. The counsel also submits that it is not clear from the records as to whether the petitioners had filed any discharge petition before the learned court below or not, but certainly it is not in dispute that the charge has already been framed by the learned court below. I.A. No. 8351 of 2019 10. The counsel also submits that it is not clear from the records as to whether the petitioners had filed any discharge petition before the learned court below or not, but certainly it is not in dispute that the charge has already been framed by the learned court below. I.A. No. 8351 of 2019 10. The counsel further submits that he has filed one interlocutory application being I.A. No. 8351 of 2019 wherein he has specifically stated in para 6 that the case was fixed for evidence since 11.04.2017, but till the date of filing of the interlocutory petition i.e. 31.08.2019, the prosecution has failed to produce any charge-sheeted witness before the learned Special Court and the petitioners were always physically present or appeared through their lawyer before the learned court below, and the trial has not been completed within a period of three years from the date of framing of charge on 08.03.2017. The learned counsel submits that this fact assumes importance in view of the judgment passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Raj Deo Sharma (II) Vs. State of Bihar” reported in (1999) 7 SCC 604 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has considered directions issued by earlier Benches of the Hon’ble Supreme Court regarding the time-frame within which the prosecution has to proceed in the trial in the matter of evidence. The learned counsel refers to para 2 of the aforesaid judgment to submit that the direction no. (iii), as quoted in para 2, which in turn is a quotation from the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in (1992) 1 SCC 225 (Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak) indicates that if the trial is for an offence punishable with imprisonment for a period not exceeding seven years, whether the accused is in jail or not, the court shall close prosecution evidence on completion of three years from the date of recording the plea of the accused on the charge framed, whether the prosecution has examined all the witnesses or not within the said period, and the court can proceed to the next step provided by law for the trial of the case, unless for very exceptional reasons to be recorded and in the interest of justice the court considers it necessary to grant further time to the prosecution to adduce evidence beyond the aforesaid time-limit. 11. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in view of the aforesaid direction which has been issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of “Abdul Rehman Antulay Vs. R. S. Nayak”(Supra) as well as considered and quoted in the aforesaid judgment reported in (1999) 7 SCC 604 (Supra), the present interlocutory application has been filed for the closure of the trial. 12. However, during the course of argument, the learned counsel for the petitioners does not dispute the fact that there has been certain miscalculation in making the statement in para 6 of the petition, in as much as , three years from the date of framing of charge (charge was framed on 08.03.2017) has not yet expired. Considering this aspect of the matter that admittedly three years from the date of framing of the charge has not yet expired, this Court is not inclined to entertain this interlocutory application and accordingly, this interlocutory application being I.A. No. 8351 of 2019 is hereby dismissed as not maintainable. 13. After hearing the counsel for the parties and after considering the materials on record, this Court finds that it is not in dispute that F.I.R. was lodged in the year 1996, charge-sheet was submitted on 29.08.2013, cognizance was taken on 17.06.2014, and ultimately, the charge was framed against the petitioners on 08.03.2017. This Court finds that as per the allegations made in the audit report, which forms part of the F.I.R., it has been inter alia mentioned that certain works were executed time and again by giving different description and large scale irregularities were done in the tender process which, inter alia, resulted in defalcation of huge amount as mentioned in the audit report. It is not in dispute from the side of the petitioners that the petitioners were the contractors relating to execution of work involved in the present case along with other contractors. This Court finds that although the Superintendent of Police was asking for certain technical report at one point of time and it is stated by the petitioners that no such technical report was furnished , this by itself cannot be a ground to quash the entire criminal proceedings including the order taking cognizance. Merely because there is no technical report, as asserted by the counsel for the petitioners, it cannot be said that no criminal case is made out against the petitioners. 14. Merely because there is no technical report, as asserted by the counsel for the petitioners, it cannot be said that no criminal case is made out against the petitioners. 14. So far as reliance upon Annexure- 6 to the petition is concerned, it is not clear as to whether it relates to the petitioners or not. Even assuming that the amount of alleged defalcation is not huge (as submitted by the petitioners), this court is of the considered view that the same by itself cannot be a ground to quash the entire criminal proceedings when it relates to defalcation of public money. The allegation involved in this case when read with the audit report, which is a part of the F.I.R, indicates strong suspicious circumstances in commission of offence by the accused persons which is enough for taking cognizance. This Court is not inclined to quash the criminal proceedings against the petitioners including the order taking cognizance in exercise of power under section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code. Accordingly, the present petition is hereby dismissed. 15. This Court further finds that the charges have already been framed by the learned court below and the trial has commenced, although it appears that no witnesses have been produced from the side of the prosecution so far. 16. However, dismissal of this case will not prejudice the case of the petitioners in any manner whatsoever and it will be open to the petitioners to take all points, at appropriate stage, as may be available to them as per law. 17. Pending interlocutory application, if any, is dismissed as not pressed. 18. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. 19. Let a copy of this order be communicated to the learned court below through ‘FAX’. 20. Let the original case diary received from the learned court below, be immediately sent back.