JUDGMENT : S. Sujatha, J. These Company Applications involving similar and akin issues, have been considered together and are disposed of by this common order. 2. The applicants have sought for the leave to proceed with the Execution Cases pending on the file of the Competent Executing Court at Bengaluru, the details of which are as under:- Applicant Name C.A.No. Execution Pet. No. Amount Date of Decrees JB 2443 INC. 88/2018 1272/2014 75,76,84,714/- 13.12.2013 & 23.06.2014 Awas Ireland Leasing Three Ltd. 89/2018 1275/2014 80,85,28,351/- 13.12.2013 & 23.06.2014 PAFCO 2919 INC. 92/2018 1276/2014 84,78,18,865/- 13.12.2013 & 23.06.2014 PAFCO 2916 INC. 95/2018 1274/2014 91,97,44,093/- 13.12.2013 & 23.06.2014 Awas Ireland Leasing Three Ltd. 96/2018 1273/2018 125,10,63,295/- 13.12.2013 & 23.06.2014 3. The applicants are claiming to be the decree holders in the respective Execution Petitions filed against the respondent - Company (in liquidation) pending on the file of the competent Executing Court at Bengaluru. It is submitted that by the judgment and decree passed by the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court, Royal Courts of Justice, United Kingdom (for short 'Court'), the Company (in liquidation) was directed to pay the applicants certain amounts in respect of the currently ascertained claims and the said judgment passed by the Court has reached finality. The applicants have instituted the Execution Petitions before the competent Executing Court at Bengaluru and the same are pending consideration. It is submitted that the Company was wound up by the order of this Court dated 07.02.2017 in Company Petition No.162/2013. The Executing Court has issued notice to the Official Liquidator pursuant to the said winding up order passed by this Court. However, the Official Liquidator has not entered appearance in the said proceedings. In the circumstances, these applications are filed seeking leave of the Court to proceed with the respective Execution cases. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Sri S.S. Naganand, appearing for the Applicants submitted that the order passed by the Division Bench in OSA No.5/2017 inasmuch as requesting the Official Liquidator not to precipitate the matter during the pendency of the appeal has not been modified/clarified further. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Sri S.S. Naganand, appearing for the Applicants submitted that the order passed by the Division Bench in OSA No.5/2017 inasmuch as requesting the Official Liquidator not to precipitate the matter during the pendency of the appeal has not been modified/clarified further. No doubt, the winding up order passed by this Court on 07.02.2017 is the subject matter of OSA No.5/2017, the Official Liquidator has not taken any steps to seek for further clarification inasmuch as the role to be taken by the Official Liquidator in the cases of the present nature where the decree holders are waiting to execute their decrees, a legitimate right which they are entitled to. On the other hand, the Official Liquidator is objecting for the leave to be granted by this Court in terms of the reply filed before this Court. Indeed, the Official Liquidator is not competent to object for the leave sought by the applicants as per Section 446 of the Companies Act, 1956 ('Act' for short). The Official Liquidator may participate in the execution proceedings and raise objections if any, but not in the Company Applications filed by the applicants under Section 446 of the Act. 5. Learned Senior Counsel placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Basavaiah and Others vs. Sri. Krishnarajendra Mills Ltd., (2001) ILR(Kar) 3158 in support of his contentions. 6. Learned counsel Sri. Shrishail Navalgund appearing for the Official Liquidator would contend that many creditors of the respondent - Company have initiated legal proceedings against the respondent - Company (in liquidation) before various Forums. The applicants herein are such of the unsecured creditors who are before this Court seeking leave of this Court to continue the respective execution proceedings pending before the Executing Courts. Inviting the attention of the Court to Sections 447, 456 of the Act, learned counsel submitted that pursuant to the winding up order passed by the Company Court, the said order shall operate in favour of all the creditors and all the contributories of the Company as if it has been made on the joint petition, of a creditor and of a contributory. On passing of the winding up order, the Official Liquidator shall take into his custody or under his control, all the property, effects and auctionable claims to which the Company is or appears to be entitled. On passing of the winding up order, the Official Liquidator shall take into his custody or under his control, all the property, effects and auctionable claims to which the Company is or appears to be entitled. It is, thereafter, the Official Liquidator is required to call for the claims of the creditors and the workmen in terms of Section 529, 529A and 530 of the Act. The status of the decree holder has become equivalent to that of a creditor who has no overriding the effect above the rights of the secured creditors as defined under Section 125 of the Act. It is further submitted that pursuant to the order dated 25.04.2017 passed in OSA No.5/2017, I.A.No.3/2019 has been filed by the Official Liquidator seeking for vacating the interim order and the same is pending consideration. By virtue of the interim order passed in OSA No.5/2017, the proceedings to be initiated by the Official Liquidator pursuant to passing of the winding up order is suspended but not the winding up per se. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in Company Application No.73/2013 in C.P.No.303/2010 (D.D.12.04.2013). 7. I have carefully considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the material on record. 8. The factual aspects inasmuch as the applicants being the decree holders of the decrees awarded by the High Court of Justice Queen's Bench Division Commercial Court, Royal Courts of Justice, United Kingdom is not in dispute. Now the epicenter of the dispute revolves round the leave to be granted under Section 446 of the Act to proceed with the Execution Petitions filed by the applicants which are pending consideration before the competent Executing Court pursuant to the winding up order passed by this Court on 07.02.2017 in COP No.162/2013. 9. Section 446 of the Act reads thus:- "Sec 446 - Suits stayed on winding up order. (1) When a winding up order has been made or the Official Liquidator has been appointed as provisional liquidator, no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced, or if pending at the date of the winding up order, shall be proceeded with, against the company, except by leave of the 4[Tribunal] and subject to such terms as the 4[Tribunal] may impose. 5[(2) 4[Tribunal] shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, have jurisdiction to entertain, or dispose of (a) any suit or proceeding by or against the company ; (b) any claim made by or against the company (including claims by or against any of its branches in India) ; (c) any application made under section 391 by or in respect of the company ; (d) any question of priorities or any other question whatsoever, whether of law or fact, which may relate to or arise in course of the winding up of the company ; whether such suit or proceeding has been instituted, or is instituted, or such claim or question has arisen or arises or such application has been made or is made before or after the order for the winding up of the company, or before or after the commencement of the Companies (Amendment) Act, 1960 (65 of 1960).] 7[****] 1[(4) Nothing in sub-section (1) or sub-section (3) shall apply to any proceeding pending in appeal before the Supreme Court or a High Court.]" 10. In terms of the said provisions, it is mandatory to seek leave of the Company Court when winding up order has been passed or provisional Official Liquidator has been appointed to proceed with the legal proceedings pending at the date of the winding up order. 11. Now the question would be whether this Court exercising Section 446(1) of the Act can permit the applicants to proceed with the execution proceedings. There is much difference between the proceedings related to the original suit and the execution. In the case of original suit, it is the debt which has to be quantified whereas in the execution proceedings the crystallized quantification made by the Court requires to be executed. There is much difference between the proceedings related to the original suit and the execution. In the case of original suit, it is the debt which has to be quantified whereas in the execution proceedings the crystallized quantification made by the Court requires to be executed. In the case of Basavaiah, supra, the Division Bench of this Court in the context of the proceedings initiated under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 ('I.D. Act' for short) qua the leave sought under Section 446(1) of the Act has observed that proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act are in the nature of execution proceedings and therefore do not require leave of the Company Court under Section 446(1) of the Act, proceeds on an misconception that execution proceedings are not legal proceedings and that leave of the Company Court under Section 446(1) of the Act is not required for initiating or continuing an execution proceedings. In paragraph Nos.15, 18 and 19 it is observed thus:- "15. Courts have consistently held that if any execution proceedings are to be initiated or proceeded with after the order of winding up (even in regard to decrees obtained prior to the order of winding up), the leave of the Company Court is required for such initiation or continuation of the execution proceedings [See Bank of Bihar Limited, Patna v Secretary of State and Others , Official Liquidator, Calicut Bank Limited v Nekkat, Ram Achhyavar Singh v J.K. Manufacturers, Industrial Finance Corporation of India v Century Metals Limited and Sarju Thakur v Registrar of Companies]. Therefore proceedings under Section 33-C(2) of I.D. Act, even if they are in the nature of execution proceedings, requires the leave of the Company Court, under Section 446 of Companies Act. 18. Section 446 of the Act makes it clear that no suit or other legal proceeding shall be commenced or proceeded with after a winding up order is made, without leave of the Company Court. We have already held that proceedings under Section 33(2) is a legal proceeding, for purposes of Section 446. Even if the said proceeding had been initiated prior to the order of winding up, as the order of winding up was passed during the pendency of such proceeding, it was mandatory for the applicants to have obtained leave of the Company Court. Even if the said proceeding had been initiated prior to the order of winding up, as the order of winding up was passed during the pendency of such proceeding, it was mandatory for the applicants to have obtained leave of the Company Court. A statutory mandate cannot be avoided on the ground of ignorance or hardship. It should also be noticed that the order was obtained ex parte without impleading the Official Liquidator who represented the company in liquidation. The Official Liquidator has refused to accept the order of the Labour Court. It is therefore not valid and unenforceable. The fact that in some other matters, the relevant contentions were not urged or that the Official Liquidator did not challenge the validity cannot be a ground for ignoring the requirements of Section 446(1). Consequently, these applications are liable to be rejected. 19. The learned Counsel for the applicants submitted that to avoid further delay leave may be granted under Section 446(1) of the Act to enable the quantification of their claim against the company by the Labour Court, after due notice to the Official Liquidator. The learned Counsel for Official Liquidator [respondent] has no objection for such permission being granted in these applications. As applicants, who are workmen, have been litigating for nearly two decades, interests of justice would be served if leave to proceed with the applications under Section 33-C(2) of I.D. Act is granted in these applications, instead of driving them to file fresh applications for leave under Section 446." 12. It is true that this Court has placed reliance on the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court to declare that the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act even if they are in the nature of execution proceedings requires leave of the Company Court under Section 446 of the Act. This judgment would rather support the Official Liquidator than the applicants for the reason that even in the execution proceedings, leave of the Company Court under Section 446 of the Act is necessary. Consequently, in the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, the leave granted under Section 446 of the Act would enable the quantification of the claim of the employees against the Company by the Labour Court after due notice to the Official Liquidator. Consequently, in the proceedings under Section 33C(2) of the I.D. Act, the leave granted under Section 446 of the Act would enable the quantification of the claim of the employees against the Company by the Labour Court after due notice to the Official Liquidator. The workmen who were litigating for nearly two decades were entitled to the quantification of their claim against the Company. Moreover, the claim of the workmen stands on a different pedestal in view of Section 529A of the Act. 13. This Court finds force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the Official Liquidator that the applicants cannot be treated as secured creditors to be out of the liquidation proceedings and the applicants cannot seek priority over the claims breaking the queue to recover the amount, merely based on the decree obtained from foreign Courts and the execution proceedings pending before the Indian Courts. The Companies Act provides a machinery/mechanism for the Official Liquidator to consider the claims of the creditors and the said proceedings have to be in consonance with the provisions of the Act. In the present scenario, granting permission to the applicants would adversely affect the rights of other creditors and all the contributors of the Company, who are standing in the queue. This appears to be the essence of Sections 447, 456, 529, 529A and 520 of the Act, permitting the applicants to proceed with execution proceedings would amount to giving a preferential right to such decree holders finally disturbing the rights of the secured creditors. The resultant factor, i.e., disturbing the rights of the secured creditors if to be avoided or interest of all the creditors should be uniformly safeguarded or maintained, this Court must exercise the power under Section 446(1) with circumspection while considering the permission claimed by the decree holders in the execution proceedings to execute their decrees. No doubt, the judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Judicature at Madras has no binding effect on this Court, certainly it has some persuasive value and the view of this Court as aforesaid is fortified by the decision of the High Court of judicature at Madras referred to supra. In the circumstances, the Company Applications being devoid of merits stand dismissed. However, the applicants are entitled to enforce their rights along with other creditors in accordance with law.