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2019 DIGILAW 1756 (HP)

Gian Chand And Sons & Others v. Joginder Kaur

2019-11-20

SANDEEP SHARMA

body2019
JUDGMENT Sandeep Sharma, J. - Petitioners, who are tenants, after having suffered an order of eviction at the hands of learned Rent Controller as affirmed by learned appellate Authority, has approached this Court in the instant proceedings filed under Section 24 of the H.P. Urban Rent Control Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the ''Act''). For clarity of facts, parties shall be referred to as the "landlady" and the "tenants". 2. For having bird''s eye view, necessary facts as emerge from the record are that the landlady filed an eviction petition under Section 14 of the Act, seeking eviction of tenants from the tenanted premises known as Building No.88/2, The Mall, Shimla, comprising of one room, having been let out on annual rent of Rs.85/-, as per Municipal record. Landlady averred in the petition that building being 100 years old and in dilapidated condition, requires immediate reconstruction. Landlady also averred that tenants have not paid the rent of the premises in his occupation since the date the building as a whole was purchased by her and as such they are in arrears of rent. Landlady also averred that building in dispute is of an old style and she bonafidely requires the same for reconstruction after its demolition, but, such reconstruction cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated. Landlady also averred that the building is three storeyed, out of which the top floor is in her occupation and the floor below the same is in the occupation of another tenant, against whom she is also filing a separate petition for ejectment. Landlady claimed before the Court below that she wants to reconstruct the building as per modern construction and with modern facilities for which she has got sufficient funds. Landlady averred before the Court below that after reconstruction she requires the premises for her own use and occupation and the occupation of her family. She claimed before the Rent Controller that she is residing in rented accommodation as she does not own any other building in Shimla nor has she got vacated any such premises owned by her without sufficient cause within five years before filing of the present petition. Landlady also averred that tenants have removed a common wall between the properties No.87/2 owned by them and 88/2, which has materially impaired the value and utility of the premises, which is more than 100 years old. 3. Landlady also averred that tenants have removed a common wall between the properties No.87/2 owned by them and 88/2, which has materially impaired the value and utility of the premises, which is more than 100 years old. 3. The aforesaid petition came to be resisted and contested by the tenants on various grounds inter alia maintainability and cause of action. On merits, tenants submitted that M/s Gian Chand & Sons, a partnership firm consisting of respondents No.2 and 3, is in possession of premises in question on annual rent of Rs.94/-. Tenants further submitted that property was originally owned by Musmmat Deva Trust and was managed by one Shri Rajeshwar Prasad, as a Trustee, who vide his letter dated 12.12.1995 informed tenant-respondent No.l that rent of the building is now to be paid to one Shri Om Prakash Kochhar, Resident of 125, Staff Road, Ambala Cantt, Haryana. Whereafter, in the year 1997, one person, namely; Shri Vivek Sharma informed tenant-respondent No.l that he had purchased the property in question from Musmmat Deva Trust and he has further sold it to the respondent-landlady. Tenants claimed that they used to deposit the rent in the bank account No.4843 in the Bank of India. Tenants denied that the building was residential in nature and that they have removed any common wall in between properties No.87/2 and 88/2, The Mall, Shimla, Tenants also denied that building in question has outlived its life or it is more than 100 years old and its reconstruction cannot be done without its being vacated. Tenants also denied that they are in arrears of rent and the premises in question is bonafidely required by the landlady for her use and occupation. Tenants claimed that there is no provision for toilet or kitchen etc. in the tenanted premises and it cannot be said that the premises in question is bonafidely required by the landlady for her use and occupation. Tenants specifically submitted before the Court below that there is no common wall between buildings No.88/2 and 87/2, The Mall, Shimla. 4. Tenants claimed that there is no provision for toilet or kitchen etc. in the tenanted premises and it cannot be said that the premises in question is bonafidely required by the landlady for her use and occupation. Tenants specifically submitted before the Court below that there is no common wall between buildings No.88/2 and 87/2, The Mall, Shimla. 4. Learned Rent Controller, after framing the issues, put the parties on trial and subsequently vide JUDGMENT/ORDER dated 13.01.2014 allowed the petition of the landlady on the grounds of arrears of rent, building is in dilapidated condition and the same is required by the landlady for the purpose of rebuilding and reconstruction, however, declined the petition on the ground of bonafide requirement for her own use and occupation. Rent Controller also held that the premises are non-residential and the landlady has failed to establish that the respondents have materially impaired the value and utility of the premises. 5. Being aggrieved and dis-satisfied with the aforesaid impugned order/judgment passed by the learned Rent Controller, both the landlady and tenants filed two different rent appeals bearing Rent Appeal Nos.70-S/14 of 2014 and 47-S/14 of 2014 in the Court of appellate Authority-II, Shimla, who vide judgment dated 2.1.2016 accepted the Rent Appeal bearing No.47-S/14 of 2014, having been filed by landlady, whereas it dismissed the other Rent Appeal bearing No./70-S/14 of 2014, having been filed by the tenants, constraining the tenants to file the instant revision petition. 6. Shri Ajay Kumar Sood, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr.Sumit Sood, Advocate, has submitted that the learned appellate Authority has fallen in grave error while reversing the findings returned by learned Rent Controller qua issue Nos.2, 4 and 5. Mr.Sood argued that eviction petition itself was not maintainable since the ground of eviction was not available to the landlady on the date of filing of the petition and therefore eviction order being contrary to law deserves to be set aside on this ground alone. Mr.Sood further argued that learned appellate Authority has miserably failed to assign cogent and convincing reasons while disagreeing with the findings recorded by Rent Controller qua aforesaid issues because there is no evidence worth the name suggestive of the fact that the tenants have materially impaired the value and utility of the premises and landlady after reconstruction requires the premises in question for her own use and occupation. Mr.Sood further contended that findings returned by the Court below are totally perverse in as much as they are not based upon proper appreciation of evidence available on record and as such deserves to be quashed and set aside. 7. Per contra Mr.G.C. Gupta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms.Meera, Advocate, representing the landlady argued that the judgment passed by the learned appellate Authority below cannot be said to be perverse and as such it does not warrant any interference. Mr.Gupta further argued that the consideration or examination of the evidence by High Court in its revisional jurisdiction, especially under Rent Control Act, is confined to find out that finding of fact recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. He further argued that findings of fact recorded by court/authority below cannot be interfered by High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction unless same are shown to be perverse. 8. Before ascertaining the correctness and genuineness of aforesaid submissions having been made on behalf of the learned counsel for the parties vis-a-vis impugned judgment passed by learned appellate Authority, this Court at first instance would like to elaborate on the scope of its revisional jurisdiction under Rent Control Act. Honble Apex Court in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander and Others, (1988)3 SCC 131 held that the question whether the requirement of the landlord is bonafide ornot is essentially one of fact, notwithstanding the circumstance that a finding of fact in that behalf is a secondary and inferential fact drawn from other primary or perceptive ones. Honble Apex Court further held that all conclusions drawn from primary facts are not necessarily questions of law, rather they can be, and quite often are, pure questions of fact. In the aforesaid judgment Honble Apex Court held that the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 15(5) of the E.P. Rent Restrictions Act, can re-appreciate the evidence, especially qua the ground of bonafide need of landlord. 9. Subsequently Honble Apex Court in Rukmini Amma Saradamma vs. Kallyani Sulochana and Others, (1993)1 SCC 499 , held that revisional Court has no jurisdiction to re-appreciate the evidence. Honble Apex Court while dealing with Section 20 of Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 held that revisional court under Section 20 of the Act cannot act as a first and second court of appeal. Honble Apex Court while dealing with Section 20 of Kerala Building (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 held that revisional court under Section 20 of the Act cannot act as a first and second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisonal jurisdiction will get obliterated. In the aforesaid judgment Honble Apex Court observed that even the word "propriety" in Section 20 does not indicate that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. The revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. In this regard the Honble apex Court has held as under:- "20. We are afraid this approach of the High Court is wrong. Even the wider language of Section 20 of the Act cannot enable the High Court to act as a first or a second court of appeal. Otherwise the distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdiction will get obliterated. Hence, the High Court was not right in re-appreciating the entire evidence both oral or documentary in the light of the Commissioner''s report (Ext. Cl and C2 mahazar). In our considered view, the High Court had travelled far beyond the revisional jurisdiction. Even by the presence of the word "propriety" it cannot mean that there could be a re-appreciation of evidence. Of course, the revisional court can come to a different conclusion but not on a re-appreciation of evidence; on the contrary, by confining itself to legality, regularity and propriety of the order impugned before it. Therefore, we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the High Court with reference to the exercise of revisional jurisdiction". 10. Having noticed divergence of opinion and incongruity in the aforesaid decisions rendered by Honble Apex Court, a Constitutional Bench came to be constituted in case titled Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , whereby the Constitutional Bench was called upon to decide the scope of the revisional jurisdiction and the expression "legality and propriety" provided under the relevant statutes. The essential question being as to whether in exercise of such powers, the revisional authority could re-appreciate the evidence or not, the Honble Supreme Court answered the reference by making following observations:- "43. The essential question being as to whether in exercise of such powers, the revisional authority could re-appreciate the evidence or not, the Honble Supreme Court answered the reference by making following observations:- "43. We hold, as we must, that none of the above Rent Control Acts entitles the High Court to interfere with the findings of fact recorded by the First Appellate Court/First Appellate Authority because on re-appreciation of the evidence, its view is different from the Court/Authority below. The consideration or examination of the evidence by the high Court in revisional Jurisdiction under these Acts is confined to find out that finding of facts recorded by the Court/Authority below is according to law and does not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous that, if allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of Justice, is open to correction because it is not treated as a finding according to law. In that event, the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under the above Rent Control Acts shall be entitled to set aside the impugned order as being not legal or proper. The High Court is entitled to satisfy itself as to the correctness or legality or propriety of any decision or order impugned before it as indicated above. However, to satisfy itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, the High Court shall not exercise its power as an appellate power to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. Revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of reconsideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. Where the High Court is required to be satisfied that the decision is according to law, it may examine whether the order impugned before it suffers from procedural illegality or irregularity." 11. In the aforesaid judgment Honble Apex Court categorically held that consideration or examination of evidence by High Court in revisional jurisdiction under Rent Control Acts is confined to find out that findings of fact recorded by the Court/Authority are according to law and do not suffer from any error of law. In the aforesaid judgment Honble Apex Court categorically held that consideration or examination of evidence by High Court in revisional jurisdiction under Rent Control Acts is confined to find out that findings of fact recorded by the Court/Authority are according to law and do not suffer from any error of law. A finding of fact recorded by Court/Authority below, if perverse or has been arrived at without consideration of the material evidence or such finding is based on no evidence or misreading of the evidence or is grossly erroneous and if such finding is allowed to stand, it would result in gross miscarriage of justice, can be definitely corrected by the High Court in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. However, High Court while satisfying itself to the regularity, correctness, legality or propriety of the impugned decision or the order, shall not exercise its power as an appellate court to re-appreciate or re-assess the evidence for coming to a different finding on facts. In nutshell, Honble apex Court in aforesaid judgment ruled that revisional power is not and cannot be equated with the power of re-consideration of all questions of fact as a court of first appeal. 12. Having taken note of aforesaid judgment of Honble Apex Court rendered by Constitution Bench in case titled Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd vs. Dilbahar Singh, (2014) 9 SCC 78 , a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in case titled Kewal Krishan Sehgal and Others vs. Rajeshwar Kumar and another, Latest HLJ 2019 (HP) 222 , has very ably summarized the following broad principles to be kept in mind while exercising revisional jurisdiction: "(i) The term ''propriety'' would imply something which is legal and proper. (ii) The power of the High Court even though under than the one provided under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not wide enough to that of the appellate Authority. (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority. (v) The expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression "appeal". (iii) Such power cannot be exercised as the cloak of an appeal in disguise. (iv) Issues raised in the original proceedings cannot be permitted to be reheard as a appellate Authority. (v) The expression "revision" is meant to convey the idea of much narrower expression than the one expressed by the expression "appeal". The revisional power under the Rent Control Act may not be as narrow as the revisional power under Section 115 of the CPC but certainly it is not wide enough to make the High Court a second court of first appeal. While holding so the Court reiterated the view taken in Dattonpant Gopalvarao Devakate vs. Vithalrao Maruthirao Janagawal, (1975) 2 SCC 246 . (vi). The meaning of the expression "legality and propriety" so explained in Ram Dass vs. Ishwar Chander, (1988) 3 SCC 131 was only to the extent that exercise of the power is not confined to jurisdictional error alone and has to be "according to law". (vii) Whether or not the finding of fact is according to law or not is required to be seen on the touch stone, as to whether such finding of fact is based on some legal evidence or it suffers from any illegality like misreading of the evidence; overlooking; ignoring the material evidence all together; suffers from perversity; illegality; or such finding has resulted into gross miscarriage of justice. Court clarified that the ratio of Ram Dass (supra) does not expo sit that the revisional power conferred upon the High Court is as wide as an appellate power to reappraise or reassess the evidence for coming to a finding contrary to the findings returned by the authority below. (viii) In exercise of its revisional jurisdiction High Court shall not reverse findings of fact merely because on reappreciation of the evidence it may have a different view thereupon. (ix) The exercise of such power to examine record and facts must be understood in the context of the purpose that such findings are based on firm legal basis and not on a wrong premise of law. (x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal. (xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. (x) Pure findings of fact are not to be interfered with. Reconsideration of all questions of fact is impermissible as Court cannot function as a Court of appeal. (xi) Even while considering the propriety and legality, high Court cannot reappreciate the evidence only for the purposes of arriving at a different conclusion. Consideration of the evidence is confined only to adjudge the legality, regularity and propriety of the order.(xii) Incorrect finding of fact must be understood in the context of such findings being perverse, based on no evidence; and misreading of evidence." 13. Now, keeping in mind aforesaid law laid down by Honble Apex Court, this Court shall proceed to examine the correctness of the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties vis-a-vis impugned judgment passed by appellate Authority. 14. In the case at hand landlady in para-4 of the rent petition has categorically averred that the premises in question are residential but same are being used as a godown by the respondents-tenants without the consent of landlady-petitioner or the Rent Controller. Aforesaid assertion made on behalf of landlady has been refuted on behalf of the tenant, who in his reply claimed that the property in question is being used as godown from the very beginning and the premises are/were not residential at any point of time. Learned Rent Controller on the basis of evidence held that since premises sought to be vacated is non-residential premises and, as such, he need not examine the question, "whether the premises in question are bonafide required by the petitioner for her own use and occupation?" because such ground was not permissible for non-residential building prior to the amendment carried out in the Act in the year 2012. Appellate Authority while reversing the aforesaid finding returned by the learned Rent Controller held that after amendment Act No.8 of 2012, landlady can seek eviction of the tenant on the ground of his own personal bonafide requirement or for family members from the residential premises or commercial premises. It is not in dispute that vide amendment carried out in Rent Act, which came into force w.e.f. 16.3.2012 eviction can be sought from non-residential premises on the ground of bonafide requirement. The question, whether amending Acts have retrospective operation or shall be prospective in operation, has been elaborately dealt with by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Kewal Krishan Sehga''s case supra. The question, whether amending Acts have retrospective operation or shall be prospective in operation, has been elaborately dealt with by the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in Kewal Krishan Sehga''s case supra. It would be apt to reproduce following paragraphs of the judgment (supra) herein below:- "11. It is not in dispute that the premises in question are ''non-residential. It is further not in dispute that it was vide amendment carried out in the Rent Act which came into force w.e.f. 16.3.2012 that eviction could be sought from ''non-residential premises'' on the ground of bonafide requirement. However, before the amendment was in fact carried out, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab 1995 (2) RCR 672 : (1996) 1 SCC 1 , struck down a same or similar provision that existed in the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act wherein also there was no provision in the Rent Act seeking eviction on the ground of bonafide requirement of ''nonresidential premises''. It was held that the provisions in the Rent Act which deprives the landlord of their right to seek ejectment from the nonresidential premises are violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and classification created in this Act between residential and nonresidential for bonafide of landlord has no reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved under the Rent Act. It was in this background that the Himachal Pradesh Urban Rent Control Act came to be amended and brought in conformity with the law as laid down in Harbilas Rai Bansal''s case (supra). 12. Subsequently, the Hon''ble Supreme Court in Satya Wati vs. Union of India 2008 (2) SLJ 721 and Ashok Kumar vs. Ved 10 Parkash (2010) 2 SCC 264 . In Satya Wati''s case (supra) the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Delhi Rent Act, whereas in Ashok Kumar''s case (supra) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Haryana Rent Control Act that was the subject matter of the Us. In Satya Wati''s case (supra) the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Delhi Rent Act, whereas in Ashok Kumar''s case (supra) , the Hon''ble Supreme Court was dealing with the Haryana Rent Control Act that was the subject matter of the Us. In Ashok Kumar''s case it was specifically held that it will not make difference that Harbilas''s case was under the Rent Act enacted by the legislature of State of Punjab, whereas the Haryana Rent Act was enacted by the different legislature of the State of Haryana and, therefore, negated the contention that because of the legislature having been enacted by two different States, the ratio in Harbilas case would not apply as was contended by the tenants therein. Rather the Hon''ble Supreme Court held that the judgment in Harbilas was applicable to the Haryana Rent Act as it has persuasive value for the Court while considering the constitutionality of a very similar provision albeit in different Legislation. It shall be apposite to refer to the relevant provisions as contained in paras 21 to 24 of the judgment, which reads thus: "21. Thus, in view of the overall discussions made hereinabove, we are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that an eviction petition filed by a landlord for eviction of a tenant cannot be filed under Section 13 of the Act when such eviction proceeding relates to a non-residential building. 11 22. Before parting with this Judgment, a short submission of the learned counsel for the appellant needs to be dealt with. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the case of Harbilas (supra) and Rakesh Vij vs. Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, (2005) 8 SCC 504 , were rendered on the amendments made to East Punjab Rent Act, whereas the case of Mohinder Prasad Jain vs. Manohar Lal Jain, (2006) 2 SCC 724 and the issue before us concerned removing a classification which existed from the inception of the legislation. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, a decision and reasoning concerning East Punjab Rent Act cannot apply to a question with respect to the present Act because both the legislations are products of different legislatures and the rationale behind one cannot be compared at par with that of the other. 23. Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the appellant, a decision and reasoning concerning East Punjab Rent Act cannot apply to a question with respect to the present Act because both the legislations are products of different legislatures and the rationale behind one cannot be compared at par with that of the other. 23. The learned counsel for the appellant, in support of this contention, relied on a decision of this Court in the case of State of Madhyapradesh vs. G.C.Mandawar, AIR 1954 SC 493 and strong reliance on para 9 of this decision was pressed by the learned counsel for the appellant, which may be quoted :- "9.It is conceivable that when the same Legislature enacts two different laws but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where, as here, the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different legislatures." 24. There is no quarrel in the aforesaid principle laid down by this Court in the aforesaid decision. However, we do not see why the decision concerning one legislation cannot hold persuasive value for the Court while considering the constitutionality of a very similar provision, albeit in a different legislation." 13. As observed above, the provisions of Rent Act have now been amended and brought in conformity with the judgment laid down in Harbilas case (supra). The Hon''ble Supreme Court in Hari Dass Sharma vs. Vikas Sood and others (2013) 5 SCC 243 has itself applied the provisions of the amending Act to the pending proceeding before it as would be evident from para-19 of the report which reads thus: "19. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the directions contained in para 27 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, but grant time to the respondents to vacate the building within three months from today. We make it clear that it will be open for the respondents to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2009. Considering, however, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs." 14. We make it clear that it will be open for the respondents to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2009. Considering, however, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs." 14. In view of the law expounded in Hari Dass case (supra), it can conveniently be held that the provisions of the amending Act have retrospective operation and this was so noticed by learned Division Bench of this Court in Chaman Lal Bali vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and another AIR 2016 (HP)168 . 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, it can conveniently be held that the eviction petition filed by the landlord even prior to the amendment so carried out in the Rent Act, was maintainable." 15. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court, having noticed various judgments passed by Honble Apex Court, has categorically held that provisions of amending Act have retrospective operation and as such it can be held that eviction petition filed by the landlady, even prior to amendment so carried out in the Act, seeking eviction from the non-residential premises on the bonafide requirement, is not maintainable. Though in the case at hand, as has been observed hereinabove, landlady has specifically claimed the tenanted premises to be residential, but, in view of aforesaid law laid down by this Court, even if it is presumed that landlady was not able to prove that the premises sought to be evicted are residential, it would not make any difference, rather, as per amending Act, which has been held to be retrospective in operation, landlady is well within his/her right to seek eviction of the tenant from the non-residential premises also. 16. In view of the aforesaid, there is no merit in the arguments/submissions of Shri Sood that the eviction petition being not maintainable ought to have been dismissed and accordingly the same is rejected. 17. Next submission made by Mr. Ajay Sood, learned Senior counsel for the tenants, that Courts below have erred while concluding that premises sought to be evicted are in dilapidated condition and the landlady bonafidely requires the same for her own use and occupation after reconstruction, has also no merit. 17. Next submission made by Mr. Ajay Sood, learned Senior counsel for the tenants, that Courts below have erred while concluding that premises sought to be evicted are in dilapidated condition and the landlady bonafidely requires the same for her own use and occupation after reconstruction, has also no merit. At this stage, it would be apt to take note of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act, which is reproduced as under:- "14(3) (c). In the case of any building or rented land, if he requires it to carry out any building work at the instance of the Government or local authority or any Improvement Trust under some improvement or development scheme or if it has become unsafe or unfit for human habitation or is required bona fide by him for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated or that the building or rented land is required bonafide by him for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without the building or rented land being vacated: [Provided that the tenant evicted under this clause shall have right to reentry on new terms of tenancy, on the basis of mutual agreement between the landlord or tenant, to the premises in the rebuilt building equivalent in area to the original premises for which he was tenant. Provided further that in case of non residential premises, the landlord shall not compel the tenant for a change of business under the new terms of tenancy; and]". 18. It is quiet apparent from the bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law that landlord with a view to avail the benefit of the aforesaid provision of law is only required to show that he/she requires the building bonafidely for demolition and reconstruction. 18. It is quiet apparent from the bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions of law that landlord with a view to avail the benefit of the aforesaid provision of law is only required to show that he/she requires the building bonafidely for demolition and reconstruction. Honble Apex Court in Jagat Pal Dhawan vs. Kahan Singh (deah) by LRs and Others, (2003)1 SCC 191 though held that while trying eviction petition on grounds of demolition or reconstruction, the Court may look into the relevant facts regarding age and condition of building, availability of necessary funds and whether building plan has been sanctioned by local authorities in order to assess landlord''s bonafides, even if the statute concerned has not provided specific ingredients for grant of eviction, but the question, whether the requirement of sanctioned building plan is sine qua non before passing of eviction order of the tenant, came up for consideration before the Honble Apex Court in Hari Dass Sharma vs. Vikas Sood and Others, (2013)5 SCC 243 , wherein the HonTale Apex Court, having taken note of the findings returned by it in its earlier decision/judgment in Jagat Pal Dhawan''s case supra, clarified that under Section 14(3)(c) of the Act, the requirement of having a duly sanctioned plan was not a condition precedent for maintaining an eviction petition. 19. The aforesaid ratio of judgment in Hari Dass Sharma''s case supra, repeatedly came to be followed by this Court in catena of judgments i.e. Karam Chand and others vs. Jasbir Kaur and others, C.R. No. 125 of 2012, decided on 16.8.2013, Roshan Lal Bhardwaj vs. Ashok Sud and another, C.R. No. 4034 of 2013 decided on 4.10.2013, R.R.Sharma vs. Gopla and others, C.R. No. 4053 of 2013 decided on 24.10.2013, Deepak Boot House and another vs. Dr. Piyare Lal Sood, 2014 (1) Shim. L.C. 47 , Janmejai Sood vs. Ram Gopal Sood, C.R. 62 of 2013 decided on 4.11.2014, Vinod Kumar vs. Varinder Kumar Sood, C.R. No. 60 of 2013 decided on 13.5.3015 and Shri Jagdev Prasad vs. Smt.Sunita Kumari and Others, CR No. 188 of 2015, decided on 31.12.2015. 20. In the aforesaid judgments, it came to be categorically held that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of rebuilding or re-construction, the existing condition of the building is not of much importance or relevance. 20. In the aforesaid judgments, it came to be categorically held that for the purpose of eviction on the ground of rebuilding or re-construction, the existing condition of the building is not of much importance or relevance. It has been further held in these judgments that even the availability of requisite funds and availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authorities are some of the ingredients, which may have some bearing while deciding the plea of bonafides raised by landlord. But, definitely all these are not essential pre-requisites to maintain an eviction petition. In the above referred judgments it has been categorically held that even if the condition of the building is good but still if the landlord considers it to be unsuitable for him/her, he/she can seek eviction on the ground of reconstruction or rebuilding. The age and condition of building is also not material and Court is only required to see whether the petitioner bonafide requires the building for the purpose of reconstruction and rebuilding or not. 21. Honble Apex Court in Shiv Sarup Gupta vs. Dr.Mahesh Chand Gupta, (1999)6 SCC 222 has elaborately dealt with the concept of bonafide requirement and has held that a requirement in the sense of felt need, which is an outcome of a sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with a mere pretence or pretext to evict a tenant, refers to a state of mind prevailing with the landlord claiming to occupy the premises for himself or for any other family member. Honble Apex Court has held that the only way of peeping into the mind of the landlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placing himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself, whether in the given facts, substantiated by the landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere, honest. If the answer is in positive, the need is bonafide. 22. Now, in the aforesaid backdrop, this Court would advert to the facts of the present case vis-a-vis evidence available on record to ascertain the correctness of the plea of learned Senior counsel representing the tenants that impugned judgments passed by learned Courts below are perverse being not based upon proper appreciation of evidence. Precisely, as per landlady, building is 100 years old, whereas respondents-tenants claim building to be 60 years old. Precisely, as per landlady, building is 100 years old, whereas respondents-tenants claim building to be 60 years old. With a view to substantiate the aforesaid claim with regard to age of the building, respondents-tenants examined expert RW-2 Mr.J.K. Mahondroo, but statement made by him as well as claim of the tenants stands falsified with assertions made by the tenant RW-1 Padam Chand, who claimed that he purchased this building bearing No.87 adjoining to the building in dispute about 60 years back from the previous owner and the building in question was existing prior to the purchase of said building. Since tenant-respondent himself claimed that the building in question is sandwiched between other two buildings, learned Rent Controller rightly concluded that building in question must have been constructed prior to those buildings as the owners of these buildings are different. It is also not in dispute that one portion of this building is in possession of the landlady. 23. AW-1 Naveen Ahuja, who happens to be son of the landlady, deposed that the building is not habitable as the construction of the building is very old. He also deposed that the building is made of "Dhajji" walls and same have become weak. The wooden floor and roof of the building has already got rotten and deteriorated. He deposed that landlady intends to reconstruct the building on old lines but this building cannot be reconstructed without vacating the same. He also deposed that many buildings near the building in question have been reconstructed. He also deposed that they have filed an eviction petition before Court No.4 against tenant Vinod, who is tenant in the ground floor in this building. 24. AW-4 Sanjeev Kumar, who inspected the building in the presence of the parties, very categorically stated in his report that this building has outlived its life. The over all condition of all the three floors is not good as they are in a dilapidated condition. This witness also deposed that the premises are not fit and safe for human habitation. It has also come in the deposition of this witness that the economic value of the property/building in question would increase if the building in question is reconstructed as per the present day design and specifications. This witness also submitted in his report that the reconstruction cannot be carried out without vacating the premises by its occupants. It has also come in the deposition of this witness that the economic value of the property/building in question would increase if the building in question is reconstructed as per the present day design and specifications. This witness also submitted in his report that the reconstruction cannot be carried out without vacating the premises by its occupants. He also deposed in his report that no repair of the building is possible. With a view to rebut the aforesaid evidence led on record by landlady, tenants examined expert RW-1 J.K. Mahindroo, who deposed that building is in sound condition. This witness deposed that building Nos.87, 88 and 89 constitutes a compact unit and building in question cannot be reconstructed independently. Though this witness claimed and stated that building Nos.87, 88 and 89 constitutes a compact unit, but it has never been the case of the tenants that all these buildings at one point of time were owned by same person or these were constructed at one point of time. Rather, all these three buildings were presumably constructed by different persons at the different times, especially when tenants claim that they had purchased this property (having No.87 adjoining to that in dispute (60 years back) from the previous owners. As per RW-1 J.K. Mahindroo, expert, if this building is demolished/disturbed, the adjoining building Nos.87 and 88 shall also fall, whereas, the expert AW-4 Sanjeev Kumar in his report has specifically provided/ mentioned the mode by which building can be reconstructed. AW-4 has categorically stated that the building in question can be reconstructed by laying three pillars on the side. Tenants, with a view to dispute the mode and manner prescribed by AW-1 Sanjev Kumar, produced his witness RW-1 J.K. Mahindroo, expert, who made an attempt to refute the aforesaid mode of reconstruction by saying that if reconstruction is done in the manner suggested no space capable of habitation would be left. Report submitted by AW-4 Sanjeev Kumar clearly suggests that building in question can be reconstructed by raising three pillars on the side. Question, whether after reconstruction it would be habitable or not, is something which is to be seen by landlady/ owner of the building and definitely tenants cannot dictate terms about the requirements of the landlady. 25. Report submitted by AW-4 Sanjeev Kumar clearly suggests that building in question can be reconstructed by raising three pillars on the side. Question, whether after reconstruction it would be habitable or not, is something which is to be seen by landlady/ owner of the building and definitely tenants cannot dictate terms about the requirements of the landlady. 25. This Court cannot loose sight of the fact that in the modern age, modern techniques have developed and as such it cannot be said that reconstruction cannot be done without causing damage to the other adjoining building. Similarly, it is not in dispute that property in question is situated on the Mall, Shimla and in case it is permitted to be reconstructed with the modern techniques its economic value would definitely be enhanced, which would further result in increase in the income of landlady. Moreover, photographs placed on record Ex.PW-4/Dl to Ex.PW-4/D6 clearly supports the version put forth by AW-4 Sanjeev Kumar that the building is in dilapidated condition and it requires to be reconstructed and rebuilt. Hence, this Court finds no fault with the findings of Courts below that landlady bonafidely requires the building in question for reconstruction and rebuilding and such reconstruction cannot be carried out without vacating the premises. 26. Landlady, in her petition, also raised a ground that the tenants have materially impaired the value and utility of the building. AW-4 Sanjeev Sharma, who inspected the building, deposed that wall between building No.88 and building No.87 has been removed. Removal of a wall by a tenant without the consent of landlady can definitely come under the mischief of material impairment of value and utility of the premises constituting a valid ground of eviction. (See Section 12). As per tenant, wall was never existing and the building is in the same condition as was taken by them from the original owner/landlord. Landlady has pleaded that the respondent has removed the common wall and as such materially impaired the value and utility of the premises. 27. AW-2 Naveen Ahuja, special power of attorney of landlady, claimed that this wall was removed when tenant reconstructed his adjoining building, whereas, tenant (RW-1) denied factum, if any, with regard to reconstruction of his building. He deposed that he simply changed the counter of his shop and has not renovated the building. 28. 27. AW-2 Naveen Ahuja, special power of attorney of landlady, claimed that this wall was removed when tenant reconstructed his adjoining building, whereas, tenant (RW-1) denied factum, if any, with regard to reconstruction of his building. He deposed that he simply changed the counter of his shop and has not renovated the building. 28. Tenants in their reply to the rent petition claimed that two buildings namely; building No.87 and 88 do not share any common wall. Tenants further claimed that building No.87, The Mall, Shimla, does not have any wall on the side of building No.88, The Mall, Shimla and, as such, there is no question, if any, of removal of the common wall between property Nos.87/2 and 88/2.However, such defence taken by tenants appears to be highly improbable. No doubt, special power of attorney of landlady, AW-1 Naveen Ahuja, admitted in his cross-examination that neither he nor his mother i.e. landlady ever entered the premises in question, but he deposed that he tried to enter the premises at one point of time, but permission was not given to him. Learned Rent Controller having taken note of aforesaid admission made on the part of AW-1, who happens to be son of landlady, observed that it is not understandable how AW-1 can say that the tenant had removed the wall at a particular time. Learned Rent Controller also drew adverse inference on account of ignorance feigned by AW-1 to the suggestion put to him that whether there exists any common wall between building Nos.87 and 88 on the middle floor. But, if the cross-examination conducted on this witness is perused in its entirety, it clearly reveals that this witness categorically stated that there is a wall between these two buildings on the ground floor. The aforesaid statement made by AW-1 is of great significance, in view of the fact that the building No.88 and building No.87 are adjoining and landlady is exclusive owner of building No.88/2. Once tenants admitted themselves to be tenants in the premises in question i.e. building No.88/2, it cannot be accepted that there was no wall between building Nos.87 and 88 on the middle floor, especially when it stands duly proved on record that there is a wall between these two building son the ground floor. Once tenants admitted themselves to be tenants in the premises in question i.e. building No.88/2, it cannot be accepted that there was no wall between building Nos.87 and 88 on the middle floor, especially when it stands duly proved on record that there is a wall between these two building son the ground floor. Moreover, order of the Rent Controller, when read in its entirety, itself suggests that it, having carefully perused the evidence led on record with regard to aforesaid aspect of the matter, did not agree with the claim of the tenants that there was no wall from the beginning in the middle floor and the entire portion comprised in buildings No.87, 88 and 89 was a compact unit/one hall, but, since landlady failed to state when and who removed the wall, learned Rent Controller proceeded to decide the aforesaid issue against the landlady. 29. It is not in dispute that tenants are owners of building No.87, whereas the landlady is the owner of building No.88 and the building No.89 was owned by another owner. Careful perusal of site plan Ex.AW-1/C as well as Ex.RW-2/E suggests that half portion of the wall is shown with lines in building Nos.88 and 89, whereas half portion has been shown with doted lines where there is no wall. Careful perusal of aforesaid plan, which has not been disputed or rebutted, clearly suggests that till date there is wall in the half portion of the premises in question and, as such, version put forth by tenant-respondent and his technical expert RW-1 to the effect that no wall ever existed on the spot, cannot be accepted. Technical expert AW-4 deposed that tenants have removed one load bearing wall towards shop No.88. Though Mr.Sood, learned Senior Counsel has argued that the aforesaid report cannot be taken into consideration, especially when samecame to be placed on record at the instance of landlady, but interestingly no suggestion worth the name ever came to be put to aforesaid technical expert AW-4 and for that matter to AW-1 that wall in question was not removed or demolished by the tenants. Having noticed technical report, submitted by the technical expert, Ex.AW-1/C, site plan, which stands un-rebutted, this Court has no reason to find fault with the finding returned by learned appellate Authority that removal of wall by tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the building. Having noticed technical report, submitted by the technical expert, Ex.AW-1/C, site plan, which stands un-rebutted, this Court has no reason to find fault with the finding returned by learned appellate Authority that removal of wall by tenant has materially impaired the value and utility of the building. Leaving everything aside, additions or alteration being permanent in nature would definitely render tenants premises impaired. Since it stands duly proved on record that addition or alteration has resulted in a material impairment of the value and utility of the premises and the building in question requires immediate reconstruction on account of its dilapidated condition, this Court finds no reason to interfere in the well reasoned findings returned by learned appellate Authority which otherwise appears to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence. 30. Having taken note of various judgments passed by Honble Apex Court as well as this Court on the issue of bonafide requirement, reproduced hereinabove, this Court finds no fault in the findings returned by appellate Authority, whereby it set aside findings of the Rent Controller qua issue No.3. Otherwise also, perusal of judgment rendered by Rent Controller qua the aforesaid issue reveals that the plea of landlady that she requires premises in question for personal bonafide use and occupation came to be rejected on the ground that since petition for eviction was filed on behalf of landlady prior to amendment of the year 2012, eviction from non-residential premises could not be sought on the ground of personal use and occupation. Issue with regard to applicability of amended Act, whereby right has been given to landlady to seek eviction even from the non-residential premises on the ground of personal bonafide use or occupation stands duly settled as having been taken note hereinabove. Since amending Act has been held to be its retrospective operation, finding recorded by Rent Controller qua the non availability of aforesaid ground in favour of landlady rightly came to be rejected by the appellate Authority. 31. Similarly, this Court finds no error in the findings returned by Court below qua the issue of arrears of rent. Learned Rent Controller, having taken note of the evidence adduced by respective parties, has held the tenants to be in arrears of rent w.e.f. January, 2007 to 31 st December, 2013. 31. Similarly, this Court finds no error in the findings returned by Court below qua the issue of arrears of rent. Learned Rent Controller, having taken note of the evidence adduced by respective parties, has held the tenants to be in arrears of rent w.e.f. January, 2007 to 31 st December, 2013. Evidence on record clearly reveals that it is the case of the tenants themselves that no rent has been paid after 2006 and as such no fault, if any, can be found in the findings returned by the trial Court qua the issue of arrears of rent, which has been further upheld by appellate Authority. 32. Having carefully examined evidence led on record by the respective parties vis-a-vis impugned orders/judgments passed by the Courts below, this Court is unable to persuade itself to agree with the contention raised by Shri Sood that judgment recorded by learned appellate Authority is perverse as it is based upon total mis-appreciation and misreading of evidence, rather this Court finds the findings recorded by learned appellate Authority to be based upon proper appreciation of evidence, as such, no interference is called for. 33. Consequently, in view of detailed discussion made hereinabove, this Court sees no reason to interfere in the judgment passed by learned appellate Authority, which is based upon proper appreciation of evidence as well as law. Hence this revision is dismissed. Accordingly, judgment passed by learned appellate Authority is upheld. There shall be no order as to costs. 34. Interim order, if any, stands vacated. All miscellaneous applications are disposed of.