JUDGMENT : 1. Heard Shri Sudeep Seth, learned Senior Advocate, assisted by Shri Piyush Kumar Agarwal for the appellant and Shri Dhruv Mathu for the respondent no.3. The notices on behalf of the respondents no.1 and 2 have been accepted by the office of the Chief Standing Counsel. 2. The instant appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 has been preferred challenging the judgment dated 02.07.2019 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.5003 (M/S) of 2018. 3. At the very outset, Shri Dhruv Mathur appearing for the respondent no.3 has raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the above special appeal primarily on the ground that the proceeding initiated before the learned Single Judge was on account of the fact that an order had been passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner/Prescribed Authority under the U.P. Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages) Act, 1978. It has been submitted that since the aforesaid order passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner who acts as a Tribunal has been assailed by preferring a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, thus the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge is not amendable to an intra court appeal in terms of Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 and in support of his submission, he has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court Silk and Kapda Karmchari Union Vs. Deputy Labour Commissioner, Varanasi & others, 2013 8 ADJ 123 wherein relying upon the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others, 2010 AIR(All) 46 (Alld.), it has been held that an appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of the Allahabad High Court Rules, 1952 will not be maintainable if it arises out of an order/judgment made by the learned Single Judge in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution of India in respect of any judgment, order or award by the tribunal, the court or statutory arbitrator. 4. Per contra Shri Sudeep Seth learned Senior Advocate repelling the aforesaid contention has vehemently urged that the above special appeal is very well maintainable as the order passed by the learned Single Judge is without jurisdiction. 4. Per contra Shri Sudeep Seth learned Senior Advocate repelling the aforesaid contention has vehemently urged that the above special appeal is very well maintainable as the order passed by the learned Single Judge is without jurisdiction. It has been submitted that in case if an order is wholly without jurisdiction then in such an event on intra court appeal would be maintainable and has relied upon Division Bench judgment of this Court in the case of Gokul Dairy, Allahabad and others Vs. State of U.P. & others, 2002 AIR(All) 70 and Prof. Y.C.Simhadri, V.C., B.H.U., Varanasi & others Vs. Deen Bandhu Pathak, 2001 45 AllLR 495 . However, Shri Seth has fairly submitted that in ordinary circumstances the appeal would not be maintainable; inasmuch as it arises out of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge which is upon initiation of proceedings under the U.P. Industrial Peace (Timely Payment of Wages Act) which is passed by the Deputy Labour Commissioner which acts as a tribunal. However, he has submitted that since the order of the learned Single Judge is absolutely without jurisdiction. Thus on that count, the appeal is maintainable. 5. In order to ascertain the respective contentions, it would have to be seen whether the order passed by the learned Single Judge is without jurisdiction as alleged by the learned Senior Advocate for the appellant. Shri Seth has contended that the aforesaid matter i.e. Writ Petition No.5003 (M/S) of 2018 was listed before the learned Single Judge on 15.02.2019 on which date the learned Single Judge recused himself. A copy of the order dated 15.02.2019 has been brought on record of the special appeal and is at page 643. The same is reproduced as under:- "List this case in the next cause list before some other Bench after obtaining necessary nomination of Hon'ble the Chief Justice/Senior Judge." 6. It is in furtherance thereof that the matter was placed for nomination and by means of the order dated 27.02.2019, the matter was nominated to one of the Single Judges of this Court. The matter was listed before the Single Judge who was nominated, and the matter before him was taken up on 28.03.2019. Thereafter upon the request of the appellant, the matter was posted for 01.04.2019 on which date the matter was argued by both the parties and the judgment was reserved. The matter was listed before the Single Judge who was nominated, and the matter before him was taken up on 28.03.2019. Thereafter upon the request of the appellant, the matter was posted for 01.04.2019 on which date the matter was argued by both the parties and the judgment was reserved. The judgment came to be pronounced by the learned Single Judge on 03.07.2019 and it is this judgment which has been assailed in the present appeal. 7. It has been submitted by Shri Seth that though the nomination was made on 27.02.2019. However, from 25th of March, 2019, the roster and constitution of Benches changed and it is his submission that with the change of roster, the nomination would also die its natural death. In order to buttress his submission, he has relied upon a Full Bench Judgment of this Court in the case of Amar Singh Vs. State of U.P., 2015 7 ADJ 1 . 8. Relying heavily upon the aforesaid decision, it has been contended that once the nomination is made, the same would be applicable till the time, the roster permits but once there is change in the roster, the nomination also looses its significance whereas the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that this is true only in respect of matters which are part heard and tied up but not so far as the nominated cases are concerned. 9. The Court has considered the submissions of the learned counsel for the parties and also perused the record. 10. As far as the controversy regarding the fate of nominated cases is concerned, the same has been considered by the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Amar Singh Vs. State of U.P. (supra) wherein it has been held as under:- "49. So far as the issue Nos.'E & F' are concerned, we find that nomination of cases are made in different contingencies. For example: (a) where there are large number of fresh cases filed before a particular Bench; (b) when a particular Judge recuses himself from the case; (c) when there are orders on the judicial side by the Supreme Court or a larger Bench of the High Court for the matter being placed before another Bench. 50. For example: (a) where there are large number of fresh cases filed before a particular Bench; (b) when a particular Judge recuses himself from the case; (c) when there are orders on the judicial side by the Supreme Court or a larger Bench of the High Court for the matter being placed before another Bench. 50. The nomination/assignment of fresh cases is made for a particular purpose i.e. to clear the backlog of fresh cases before the particular Judge/Bench having jurisdiction as per the roster. The purposes exhausts itself once the roster is changed. Therefore, in respect of fresh cases the nomination/assignment must come to an end with the change of the roster. 51. So far as the cases which are nominated because of the Judge recuses himself, we are of the considered opinion that having regarding to the status of the case i.e. (a) whether the case has been admitted and (b) whether the case has been fixed for final hearing etc., the Chief Justice may consider making an appropriate nomination i.e. whether the nomination would continue till admission or till disposal of the case or till the change of the roster. This would obliviate any confusion, both in the mind of the litigant as well as in the minds of the officials of the registry, regarding listing of the case after the change of the roster." 11. In the present case, it is no doubt true that the nomination was made but the nomination does not indicate whether it was only till the admission or till final disposal or till the change of roster. 12. If at all the appellant had any doubt, it ought to have moved for taking appropriate course for getting a clarification regarding the same by seeking instructions but no such effort was made by the appellant. 13. It will further be relevant to note that the appellant did not take any such objection before the learned Single Judge. The cause list of the Court is printed under the authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The matter was listed in the cause list before the learned Single Judge under the authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge did not have the jurisdiction. The cause list of the Court is printed under the authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice. The matter was listed in the cause list before the learned Single Judge under the authority of the Hon'ble Chief Justice and therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Single Judge did not have the jurisdiction. Since there was no specific direction while making the nomination, therefore, it cannot be inferred that the nomination would change at the change of the roster. 14. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also could not indicate what prejudice has been caused. The objection sought to be raised does not go to the roots of the jurisdiction nor it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. 15. In this regard the Apex Court in the case of Sneh Lata Goel Vs. Pushplata & others, 2019 3 SCC 594 had the occasion to consider the issue of jurisdiction and after noticing the earlier judgments on the point it has explained in what circumstances the lack of jurisdiction affect a judgment. The relevant paras read as under:- "13.It is well settled that the objection as to local jurisdiction of a court does not stand on the same footing as an objection to the competence of a court to try a case. Competence of a court to try a case goes to the very root of the jurisdiction, and where it is lacking, it is a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction. On the other hand, an objection as to the local jurisdiction of a court can be waived and this principle has been given a statutory recognition by enactments like Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure." 16. In Harshad Chiman Lal Modi vs. DLF Universal Ltd., 2005 7 SCC 791 , this Court held that an objection to territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held thus: "30. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. If it is not raised at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. This Court held thus: "30. The jurisdiction of a court may be classified into several categories. The important categories are (i) territorial or local jurisdiction; (ii) pecuniary jurisdiction; and (iii) jurisdiction over the subject-matter. So far as territorial and pecuniary jurisdictions are concerned, objection to such jurisdiction has to be taken at the earliest possible opportunity and in any case at or before settlement of issues. The law is well settled on the point that if such objection is not taken at the earliest, it cannot be allowed to be taken at a subsequent stage. Jurisdiction as to subject-matter, however, is totally distinct and stands on a different footing. Where a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit by reason of any limitation imposed by statute, charter or commission, it cannot take up the cause or matter. An order passed by a court having no jurisdiction is a nullity." 17. Be that as it may, as the appellant did not raise any such objection before the leaned Single Judge and participated in the proceeding, argued the matter and it was reserved for judgment, which was delivered only on 03.07.2019. Thereafter when it was faced with a verdict against it, only then the present intra court appeal has been preferred on the ground that the learned Single Judge did not have jurisdiction. 18. In the circumstances, we are of the opinion that the appellant having failed to take appropriate recourse at the proper stage and that too in respect of a matter which cannot be termed as an inherent lack of jurisdiction, the appellant is not entitled to raise this issue for the first time before this Court in intra court appeal hence we do not find any force in the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant. 19. Before parting we direct the Registry of this Court to ensure that while sending a file for nomination, a note be put seeking the nomination in terms of the para 50 and 51 of the judgment of the Full Bench of this Court in the case of Amar Singh (supra) to avoid any confusion. The Senior Registrar of this Court is directed to comply with the direction and this order be also communicated to him forthwith. 20. The Senior Registrar of this Court is directed to comply with the direction and this order be also communicated to him forthwith. 20. For the reasons aforesaid and in the aforesaid circumstances, we uphold the preliminary objections. Thus, we are of the considered view that certainly the appeal against the impugned order dated 02.07.2019 would not lie for the reasons as recorded by the Full Bench in the case of Sheet Gupta Vs. State of U.P. & others, 2010 AIR(All) 46 (Alld). 21. In view of the above, we do not find any cogent ground to entertain the above special appeal and the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability raised by the respondent no.3 is upheld. Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed as not maintainable. Interim order granted earlier stands vacated. 22. There shall be no order as to costs.