JUDGMENT : Irshad Ali, J. 1. Rejoinder affidavit filed today in Court, may be taken on record. 2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri Anurag Narain, learned counsel for the respondent no.3. 3. Facts of the case are that the petitioner is tenant of respondent no.3. Initially, the grand-father of the petitioner was running the shop and after his death, the petitioner is holding the possession over the shop in dispute. Respondent no.3, after giving notice on 17.11.2007, filed S.C.C. Case No.4 of 2008 against the petitioner in the court of Civil Judge, Junior Division, Lakhimpur Kheri for dis-possession of the petitioner from the shop and for recovery of the due amount of rent. The petitioner filed written statement denying the allegations of the plaint. After hearing the parties, the Civil Judge, Junior Division/ Small Causes Court passed a judgment and decree on 29.8.2009, whereby finding has return that it is a religious charitable institution, therefore, as per the admission of the petitioner that he has deposited the rent under Section 30 U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 [hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'], the same cannot be accepted as the rent would have been deposited in the proceeding of the suit on the first day of hearing. Against the judgment and order passed by the Small Causes Court, the petitioner filed a revision before the District Judge, which has also been dismissed by the District Judge vide judgment dated 30th of September, 2010. Both the orders have been challenged before this Court by means of the present writ petition. 4. Submission of learned counsel for the petitioner is that the trial court by recording perverse finding that the petitioner is in arrears of rent, has committed gross illegality as there is no default on the part of the petitioner in depositing the rent. He placed reliance upon the certain receipts and challans showing the deposit of the required rent and has also invited attention of this Court on the narration of facts mentioned by the trial court, wherein these documents were taken into consideration. He next submitted that the trial court while passing the judgment and decree has ignored all these documents and by recording perverse finding on the issue has proceeded to hold that the petitioner is a defaulter and has not paid rent to the respondent no.3. 5. He next submitted that the trial court while passing the judgment and decree has ignored all these documents and by recording perverse finding on the issue has proceeded to hold that the petitioner is a defaulter and has not paid rent to the respondent no.3. 5. He has further submitted that the trial court came to the conclusion that the provisions of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 is not applicable and by recording finding that it is a religious charitable institution, therefore, the deposit under Section 30 of the Act is not permissible in law. He also submitted that the finding is totally perverse in nature and the order passed thereon cannot be sustained. 6. On the other hand, Sri Anurag Narain, learned counsel for the respondent no.3 submitted that the law in this regard is very much settled that the payment of rent to a religious charitable institution is not permissible under Section 30 of the Act, therefore, the trial court as well as the revisional court has committed no error in law in recording the finding in regard to default of payment of rent. In support of this submission, he placed reliance upon the judgments rendered by this Court in the case of Raja Ram (dead) through LRs. v. Xth Addl. District Judge, Kanpur and others, 2004 22 LCD 454 and also in the case of Haider Abbas v. Additional District Judge and others, 2006 24 LCD 452. 7. Next submission of learned counsel for the respondent no.3 is that both the orders do not suffer from any infirmity or illegality and are just and valid order. He also submitted that the findings return by both the courts below are just and valid and do not suffer from infirmity or illegality. 8. Having heard the rival submissions of learned counsel for the parties, I perused the material on record, impugned orders as well as law-reports relied upon by learned counsel for the respondent no.3. 9. The trial court after referring the material submitted by the petitioner has concluded that the petitioner is tenant of a religious charitable institution, therefore, deposit of rent under Section 30 of the Act will not hold the petitioner to support his case and has passed the judgment and decree in favour of respondent no.3 holding the petitioner to be guilty of non-payment of rent and to vacate the premises in dispute. The Revisional Court has also affirmed the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. 10. Earlier, the question as to whether in regard to religious institution, the rent can be deposited under Section 30 of the Act or not came before this Court for consideration in the case of Raj Ram (Supra), wherein this Court has considered in paragraph 3 as under: "In my opinion the lower revisional court rightly reversed the said finding of the trial court. However matter does not end here. In the judgment of the trial court on page 39 of the paper book it has been mentioned that according to the plaintiff, summons of the suit was served upon the tenant on 27.2.1989. The suit was filed on 21.2.1989 and the first date fixed in the summon was 27.3.1989. The tenant deposited the rent from June 1998 to January 1989 under Section 30 of the Act on 10.3.1989. It has been held by me in writ petition No.19656 of 2003 decided on 21.5.2003 and writ petition No.24285 of 2002 being decided today that deposit of rent under Section 30 after knowledge of pendency of suit for eviction on the ground of default is not a valid deposit. Lower revisional court has also not dealt with this aspect of the matter." 11. In the aforesaid case, it has been recorded that after knowledge of the pendency of the suit for eviction on the ground of default, deposit under Section 30 of the Act is not valid. Here in the present case also, the petitioner knowing this fact that it is a religious charitable institution and with knowledge of filing of the suit, deposited the rent so as to take shelter of Section 30 of the Act. 12. In the opinion of the court, the finding return on the point is just and valid and does not suffer from any infirmity. 13. In the case of Haider Abbas (supra), the provisions contained under Order 5 Rule XV C.P.C. was considered and it deals in two parts viz. the first part deals in regard to deposit of the entire amount admitted by the tenant together with the interest and before first hearing of the suit; and the second part deals in regard to deposit of the monthly amount due which has been made throughout the continuation of the suit. the first part deals in regard to deposit of the entire amount admitted by the tenant together with the interest and before first hearing of the suit; and the second part deals in regard to deposit of the monthly amount due which has been made throughout the continuation of the suit. Relevant paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment is extracted hereinbelow: "13. On a careful analysis of the provisions of Order XV Rule 5 CPC we finding that it is divided in two parts. The first part deals with the deposit of the "entire amount admitted by him to be due" together with interest at or before the first hearing of the suit. The second part deals with the deposit of "monthly amount due" which has to be made throughout the continuation of the suit. 14. Explanation 2 to Order XV Rule 5(1) CPC stipulates that "entire amount admitted by him to be due" means the entire gross amount, whether as rent or compensation for sue and occupation after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to the local authority in respect of the building on lessor's account and the amount, if any, deposited in any Court under Section 30 of the Act. The expression "monthly amount due" has been defined in Explanation 3 to Rule 5(1) of Order XV Rule 5 CPC to mean the amount due every month, whether as rent or compensation for use and occupation at the admitted rate of rent, after making no other deduction except the taxes, if any, paid to a local authority, in respect of the building on lessor's account." 14. On perusal of the judgments referred hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that that where a Statute stipulates that word or phrase shall mean particular things, then no other meaning can be assigned. This Court has examined whether the tenant defaulted in payment of rent; if he had not paid or tendered or deposited the rent in the manner required by law; and whether the deposit of rent under some other Act could be construed to be valid deposit. This Court has examined whether the tenant defaulted in payment of rent; if he had not paid or tendered or deposited the rent in the manner required by law; and whether the deposit of rent under some other Act could be construed to be valid deposit. The tenant has admitted that he has deposited the rent for the period from 1.10.2006 to 31.10.2007 under the provisions of Section 30 of the Act and in view of the provisions being not applicable to the case of the petitioner, the deposit cannot be termed to be a valid deposit. 15. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court holds that both the courts below have committed no illegality in passing the judgment and decree dated 29.8.2009 and judgment dated 30.9.2010. 16. In view of the above, this writ petition lacks merits and is hereby dismissed. 17. However, it is directed that the petitioner shall vacate the premises in dispute within a period of three months from the date of production of a certified copy of this order.