JUDGMENT : B.A. PATIL, J. 1. The present appeal has been preferred by the complainant challenging the order of acquittal passed by the XXXIII Additional CMM, Bengalauru City (SCCH-5) in C.C. No. 35679/2010, dated 21.10.2017. 2. I have heard the learned counsel for the appellant. Learned counsel for the third respondent has remained absent. Though respondent Nos.1 and 2 are served, they have not put in their appearance. 3. The case of the complainant before the trial Court is that accused No.1 along with accused Nos.2 and 3 were administering accused No.1-Committee under the name and style "M/s.Paralympic Committee of India. Accused No.2 was the President and accused No.3 was the Treasurer and they were authorized signatories. The complainant is a renowned hotel under the name and style "The Chancery Pavilion" an Unit of M/s.Hyagreeva Hotels and Resorts Private Limited, Bengaluru. In relation to the transaction concerning the payment of hotel bills towards room rents, room services, etc. and other incidental services rendered by the complainant-Hotel to the accused and its guests, accused became due and liable to pay the complainant a sum of Rs.25 Lakhs and towards payment of the said amount, a cheque bearing No.543429, dated 2.12.2009 was issued and when the said cheque was presented through its banker, the same was dishonored for 'insufficient funds' and thereafter on 4.3.2010 a legal notice came to be issued by the complainant to the accused. Accused neither paid the amount nor given any reply and as such the complaint under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act (Act' for short) was filed. 4. In order to prove its case, the complainant-Hotel got examined the General Power of Attorney, the authorized representative of the complainant-Hotel as PW.1 and got marked the documents as Exs.P1-P200. On behalf of the accused, accused Nos.2 and 3 were examined as DWs.1 and 2 and no documents were marked on their behalf. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the trial Court has passed the impugned order acquitting the accused. As against the said order of acquittal, the complainant is before this Court. 5. On behalf of the accused, accused Nos.2 and 3 were examined as DWs.1 and 2 and no documents were marked on their behalf. After hearing the learned counsel appearing for the parties, the trial Court has passed the impugned order acquitting the accused. As against the said order of acquittal, the complainant is before this Court. 5. It is the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant-complainant that the trial Court without application of its judicial mind only by relying upon the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of A.C. Narayanan vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, 2015 AIR SCW 1125 has come to a wrong conclusion holding that the authorized representative is not having any personal knowledge about the transaction in question and therefore he cannot be examined as a witness and his evidence cannot be relied upon to substantiate the case of the complainant. It is his further submission that burden is on PW.1 to prove that he is aware of the transaction which has been taken place between the complainant and the accused. Relying upon the said facts and circumstances, the trial Court ought to have convicted the accused. He further submitted that while acquitting the accused, the other evidence, documents produced and presumption in law have not been appreciated by the trial Court. As per Section 139 of the Act, if accused admits his signature on the cheque, the initial presumption has to be drawn that the said cheque has been issued for discharge of debt or liability. Thereafter, the burden shifts upon the accused to rebut the said presumption on preponderance of probabilities. Without considering the said aspect, the impugned order came to be passed. On these grounds, he prayed to allow the appeal by setting aside the impugned order. 6. On perusal of the records and the impugned order, it is clear that the complainant has got examined the authorized representative as PW.1. But when accused No.2 was got examined as DW.1, he has admitted the signature on the cheque at Ex.P1. However, he has not specifically stated as to where and for which purpose the said cheque has been issued and how the said cheque has reached the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rangappa vs. Sri. But when accused No.2 was got examined as DW.1, he has admitted the signature on the cheque at Ex.P1. However, he has not specifically stated as to where and for which purpose the said cheque has been issued and how the said cheque has reached the complainant. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rangappa vs. Sri. Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441 , has observed that once the cheque relates to the account of the accused and he accepts and admits the signature on the said cheque, then initial presumption as contemplated under Section 139 of N.I. Act has to be raised. It is mandatory presumption and accused has to rebut the said presumption on preponderance of probabilities either on the basis of the evidence of the complainant or by leading separate evidence on behalf of the accused. The trial Court without looking into the said proposition of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court has wrongly come to the conclusion only on the basis of the decision in the case of A.C. Narayanan Vs. State of Maharashtra and another (cited supra) that the authorized person is not having any acquaintance with the case and as such the case of the complainant has not been proved. Though a presumption has to be drawn as contemplated under Section 139 of the Act, without looking into the said principle the trial Court has recorded the finding, which is not sustainable in law. Even otherwise, the said finding was there, ultimately the trial Court ought to have answered on these issues and ultimately ought to have passed the order of acquittal or it ought to have convicted the accused. 7. Even at paragraph-22 of the impugned order it has been observed by the trial Court that accused might have admitted issuance of cheque at Ex.P1 in favour of the complainant-Hotel. But, as said in the beginning of the impugned order, there is neither any pleading in the complaint nor in the affidavit in respect of examination-in-chief of PW.1, and there is no mention about the mode of transaction as to whether the amount mentioned in the cheque at Ex.P1 is a legally enforceable debt. By observing so, the trial Court come to the wrong conclusion and ultimately acquitted the accused. Ignoring the basic principle of law, the trial Court has erred in passing the impugned order. By observing so, the trial Court come to the wrong conclusion and ultimately acquitted the accused. Ignoring the basic principle of law, the trial Court has erred in passing the impugned order. Under such facts and circumstances, I feel that the order of acquittal passed by the trial Court is not sustainable in law and it is not in accordance with the principles laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Rangappa vs. Sri Mohan (cited supra) and therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. 8. Accordingly, appeal is allowed. Impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the XXXIII Additional CMM, Bengaluru City (SCCH-5) in C.C. No. 35679/2010, dated 21.10.2017 is set aside. The matter is remitted to the trial Court with direction to consider afresh the material placed on record with reference to the observations made by this Court in this judgment and thereafter to pass appropriate orders by giving full opportunities to both the parties.