Brushlin M. Sangma v. Garo Hills Autonomous District Council
2019-06-25
H.S.THANGKHIEW
body2019
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. This application under Article 226 has been filed assailing the impugned termination order dated 18.08.2014, whereby the petitioner has been terminated from service of Driver in the Department of Directorate of Information & Public Relation, Meghalaya, Shillong. The brief facts are that the petitioner in the year 1990 was appointed on temporary basis which was regularized thereafter in 1997. On being transferred vide order dated 30.10.2003, the petitioner being aggrieved had represented against the same but the same was rejected vide office order dated 03.11.2003 and he was directed to join his place of posting within 15(fifteen) days. It appears that the petitioner did not join to his new posting which thereafter resulted in a show cause notice being issued to the petitioner on 30.09.2006 under Rule 9 of the Meghalaya (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964 as adapted along with a statement of allegations. Thereafter, the enquiry proceedings proceeded and show cause/written statement of defense were filed by the petitioner and from the materials of records it is seen that on the basis of an enquiry report, the termination order was issued. 2. Mr. K.C. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that though it is a fact that the petitioner had absented himself from duties, the reasons were that he was in ill health and was also not allowed to join to his new place of posting. That apart, he submits that the Departmental Proceedings after its initiation were delayed and in fact had come to a complete standstill and that thereafter the Department had even agreed to settle the case of the petitioner by allowing him to go on voluntary retirement, which was however belied as the respondent No. 3 instead issued the order of termination. He submits that the departmental proceedings not being in accordance with the prescribed procedure was vitiated and as such prayed that the impugned termination order being illegal be set aside. 3. Mr. H. Kharmih, learned Addl. Sr. GA in his reply has contended that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner which was for a long period in fact over 5(five) years had made him liable to be dealt with under F.R. 19 of the Meghalaya FR & SR Rules.
3. Mr. H. Kharmih, learned Addl. Sr. GA in his reply has contended that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner which was for a long period in fact over 5(five) years had made him liable to be dealt with under F.R. 19 of the Meghalaya FR & SR Rules. He further submits that the petitioner never made any attempt to join his new place of posting and in fact was avoiding to resume his duties which made him liable for departmental proceedings which were accordingly drawn up and which had rightly resulted in the termination of the service of the petitioner. He further submits that the unauthorized absence of the petitioner rendered him unfit to be kept in service and that the departmental proceedings cannot be said to have been vitiated as the petitioner had examined the materials and was aided by a Defense Assistant. 4. I have heard learned counsels for the parties and having examined the materials on record, it appears that commissions and omissions have been occasioned by both parties, on the one hand by the petitioner who was on unauthorized absence for over 5(five) years which rightfully had attracted that he be dealt with as per FR 19 and on the other hand the respondents, who in the conduct of the departmental proceedings have given a total go-bye to procedure established by law i.e. the Meghalaya (Discipline & Appeal) Rules, 1964. Moreover, another aspect that deserves consideration, is the fact that the petitioner had applied for voluntary retirement after meeting the respondent No. 3, which though forwarded to the respondent No. 2 was rejected vide letter dated 30.04.2014 and instead the respondent No. 3 was directed to take action as per rules in conformity with FR 19 of the Meghalaya FR & SR 1984 which thereafter resulted in the termination order dated 18.08.2014. 5. In this backdrop, wherein the termination order based on a vitiated departmental proceeding would not stand judicial scrutiny and the conduct of the petitioner which is also discreditable, in the last hearing, the learned Addl. Sr. GA sought time to examine and explore the possibility if the matter could be resolved by the Department before any final orders were passed by this Court. 6. Today, the learned Addl. Sr.
Sr. GA sought time to examine and explore the possibility if the matter could be resolved by the Department before any final orders were passed by this Court. 6. Today, the learned Addl. Sr. GA at the bar has informed this Court that given the circumstances and taking into account the fact that the petitioner had applied for voluntary retirement, the same would be considered by the Department. Mr. K.C. Gautam, learned counsel for the petitioner on this proposal of the State respondents, agrees and accepts the same and further submits that the petitioner would abide by the orders passed by this Court which would bring some relief to the petitioner and also a closure to the entire matter. 7. Having considered the proposal of the State respondents that the application for voluntary retirement will be considered and also the stand of the petitioner in accepting the same, this consent order is being passed disposing of the instant case with the directions that; the concerned respondents No. 2 and 3, shall take up for consideration the application for voluntary retirement filed by the petitioner which was forwarded vide letter dated 09.10.2013 (Annexure-35 to the affidavit of the respondents) by the respondent No. 3 to the respondent No. 2 and decide on the same in accordance with law preferably within a period of 4(four) months from the date a certified copy of this order is presented. 8. Consequently, the impugned termination order dated 18.08.2014 in view of the above wherein both the parties have consented to the terms of disposal is set aside. It is further made clear that the setting aside of the termination order will not entitle the petitioner to reinstatement in service, but has been done only to facilitate the process of consideration of his voluntary retirement application. 9. The matter accordingly stands disposed of. 10. No order as to costs.