JUDGMENT : RAMESH RANGANATHAN, J. 1. This appeal is preferred against the order passed by the learned Single Judge in WPSS No. 1720 of 2007 dated 11.05.2018. The respondent in this appeal had filed the said writ petition seeking a Writ of certiorari to quash the decision of the Grievance Committee dated 23.03.2006 rejecting her claim as communicated by letter dated 30.05.2006 issued by the Assistant Registrar; a Writ of Mandamus directing the respondents to re-fix the basic pay in the scale of Rs.2200-4000 w.e.f. 01.01.1992 under Fundamental Rule 22; and for the pension of the petitioner to be fixed thereafter in the scale of Rs.2000-3200, instead of the scale of Rs.1400-2600. 2. In the order under appeal, the learned Single Judge held that the case of the petitioner, in a nutshell, was that the respondent-writ petitioner had not been protected as per Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1); she had also given the instances of four other persons namely, Mr. G.G. Chhabara, Mr. Bisheshwar Singh, Mr. M.P. Gupta and Mr. S.N. Hussain who were similarly situated to the petitioner and, in their case, their pay was protected; and there was no specific denial to the averments in this regard in the writ petition. The writ petition was disposed of directing the respondents to re-fix the pay of the petitioner by giving him protection under Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1), on the analogy of the persons mentioned in the order, within a period of ten weeks. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 3. The writ petition was disposed of directing the respondents to re-fix the pay of the petitioner by giving him protection under Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1), on the analogy of the persons mentioned in the order, within a period of ten weeks. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal. 3. Sri Vipul Sharma, learned counsel for the appellants, would submit that the respondent-writ petitioner was appointed as a Telephone Supervisor on 10.10.1964 in the scale of pay of Rs.200-400; the said pay scale was revised subsequently to Rs.300-700, and thereafter, to Rs.570-900; in terms of a Foreign Scheme, the respondent-writ petitioner was extended a tenure based appointment for a period of one year; as a result, the respondent-writ petitioner was placed in the higher pay scale of Rs.625-1360; since the scheme continued till 1992, the respondent-writ petitioner was given the higher scale of pay of Rs.625-1360 as revised from time to time; on the scheme coming to an end in the year 1992, she was no longer entitled for the higher pay scale and was only entitled to be extended the pay scale of the post which she substantively held; and the petitioner’s comparison with the other four employees was misplaced in as much as, while initially these four employees were no doubt extended the benefit of Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1), they were subsequently regularly appointed to the higher post and were, therefore, extended the scale of pay applicable to the said post. Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1) reads as under: “F.R. 22 (I) The initial pay of a Government servant who is appointed to a post on a time-scale of pay is regulated as follows:- (a) (1) Where a Government servant holding a post, other than a tenure post, in a substantive or temporary or officiating capacity is promoted or appointed in a substantive, temporary or officiating capacity, as the case may be, subject to the fulfillment of the eligibility conditions as prescribed in the relevant Recruitment Rules, to another post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attaching to the post held by him, his initial pay in the time-scale of the higher post shall be fixed at the stage next above the notional pay arrived at by increasing his pay in respect of the lower post held by him regularly by an increment at the stage at which such pay has accrued or rupees (one hundred) only, whichever is more. “ 4. It is evident therefrom that when a person is appointed in a substantive, temporary or officiating capacity in a higher post carrying duties and responsibilities of greater importance than those attached to the post held by him, his initial pay, in the time-scale of the higher post, shall be fixed at the stage next above the notional pay arrived at by increasing his pay, in respect of the lower post held by him regularly, by an increment at the stage at which such pay had accrued. 5. The case of the appellant is that, since the respondent-writ petitioner was given a tenure based appointment under a Foreign Scheme, she was, in terms of Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1), placed in a higher pay scale; on the scheme itself coming to an end, she was no longer entitled to be extended the higher scale; and she was, thereafter, entitled only to be extended the scale of pay applicable to her substantive post. 6. 6. Sri Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioner, would however contend that, since the four individuals named in the order under appeal, are similarly situated to that of the petitioner, she could not have been denied the higher pay scale, applicable to the post which she held earlier, under Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1); even otherwise the petitioner was entitled, on her own right, to be placed in the higher scale of pay; and denial of the said benefit to the petitioner was wholly unjustified. 7. As noted herein above, the claim of the respondent-writ petitioner, to be continued to be extended the higher scale of pay under Fundamental Rule 22 (a) (1), is on the ground of parity with four other individuals who were extended the said benefit. Except to state that they were similarly situated, the respondent-writ petitioner has not explained as to how they are. The posts which these four individuals held earlier, are not the posts which the respondent-writ petitioner held earlier as a Telephone Supervisor. These four individuals were holding the post of Deputy Registrars, Assistant Administrative Officers and Office Superintendant (Establishment). The petitioner’s plea of discrimination could only have been examined by the learned Single Judge, if these four individuals had been arrayed as respondents in the writ petition. The Supreme Court, in Chandigarh Administration & another vs. Jagjit Singh & another: (1995) 1 SCC 745 , observed:- “…………. we are of the opinion that the basis or the principle, if it can be called one, on which the writ petition has been allowed by the High Court is unsustainable in law and indefensible in principle. Since we have come across many such instances, we think it necessary to deal with such pleas at a little length. Generally speaking, the mere fact that the respondent -authority has passed a particular order in the case of another person similarly situated can never be the ground for issuing a writ in favour of the petitioner on the plea of discrimination. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. The order in favour of the other person might be legal and valid or it might not be. That has to be investigated first before it can be directed to be followed in the case of the petitioner. If the order in favour of the other person is found to be contrary to law or not warranted in the facts and circumstances of his case, it is obvious that such illegal or unwarranted order cannot be made the basis of issuing a writ compelling the respondent authority to repeat the illegality or to pass another unwarranted order. The extraordinary and discretionary power of the High Court cannot be exercised for such a purpose. Merely because the respondent authority has passed one illegal/unwarranted order, it does not entitle the High Court to compel the authority to repeat that illegality over again and again. The illegal/unwarranted action must be corrected, if it can be done according to law-indeed, wherever it is possible, the Court should direct the appropriate authority to correct such wrong orders in accordance with law- but even if it cannot be corrected, it is difficult to see how it can be made a basis for its repetition. By refusing to direct the respondent-authority to repeat the illegality, the Court is not condoning the earlier illegal act/order nor can such illegal order constitute the basis for a legitimate complaint of discrimination. Giving effect to such pleas would be prejudicial to the interests of law and will do incalculable mischief to public interest. It will be a negation of law and the rule of law. Of course, if in case the order in favour of the other person is found to be a lawful and justified one it can be followed and a similar relief can be given to the petitioner if it is found that the petitioners’ case is similar to the other persons’ case. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. But then why examine another person’s case in his absence rather than examining the case of the petitioner who is present before the Court and seeking the relief. Is it not more appropriate and convenient to examine the entitlement of the petitioner before the Court to the relief asked for in the facts and circumstances of his case than to enquire into the correctness of the order made or action taken in another person’s case, which other person is not before the case nor is his case. In our considered opinion, such a course-barring exceptional situations would neither be advisable nor desirable. In other words, the High Court cannot ignore the law and the well-accepted norms governing the writ jurisdiction and say that because in one case a particular order has been passed or a particular action has been taken, the same must be repeated irrespective of the fact whether such an order or action is contrary to law or otherwise. Each case must be decided on its own merits, factual and legal, in accordance with relevant legal principles. The orders and actions of the authorities cannot be equated to the judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts nor can they be elevated to the level of the precedents, as understood in the judicial world. (What is the position in the case of orders passed by authorities in exercise of their quasi-judicial power, we express no opinion. That can be dealt with when a proper case arises.)…...….” (emphasis supplied) 8. In the absence of those four individuals, (with whom the respondent-writ petitioner sought parity), being arrayed as respondents in the writ petition, it would be inappropriate for us to examine whether the petitioner’s claim for parity is justified or not; and whether or not extension of higher pay scales to those four individuals was in accordance with law? 9. While we are satisfied that the respondent-writ petitioner was not entitled to claim the benefit of higher pay scales, in terms of Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1), on the Foreign Scheme coming to an end in the year 1992, Sri Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-writ petitioner, would submit that the petitioner’s claim for being continued in the higher pay scale is not based solely of Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1), but on other grounds also. None of the grounds now sought to be urged before us, by Sri Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner, have even been noted, much less considered in the order under appeal. It would be wholly inappropriate for a Division Bench, in an intra-Court appeal under Chapter VIII Rule 5 of Allahabad High Court Rules, to consider contentions which ought to have been examined, in the first instance, by the learned Single Judge. Suffice it, while setting-aside the order under appeal and in restoring the writ petition to file, to request the learned Single Judge to examine the respondent-writ petitioner’s claim, for being extended the higher scale of pay, on grounds other than in terms of Fundamental Rule 22 (I) (a) (1) or on parity with the other four individuals. 10. Sri Pankaj Miglani, learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioner, would request, this Court to fix a time frame for disposal of the writ petition. While the learned Single Judge would determine his board, we are conscious of the fact that the writ petition relates to the year 2007 and necessitates expeditious disposal. We have no reason to doubt that, on a request being made for an early hearing, the learned Single Judge would give such a request its due consideration. 11. Let a copy of this order be furnished to the learned counsel for the parties, on payment of usual charges, within two days.