ORDER : Shree Chandrashekhar, J. The convicts, namely, Raska Besra, Hopna Besra and Some Besra have challenged the judgment of conviction dated 08.01.2002 and the order of sentence dated 10.01.2002 passed in Sessions Case No. 221 of 1994. 2. The appellants have been convicted under section 302/34 IPC and sentenced to R.I. for life; the appellant no. 1, namely, Hopna Besra was further convicted under section 307 IPC and sentenced to R.I. for 5 years. 3. During the pendency of this criminal appeal, the appellant no. 1, namely, Hopna Besra and the appellant no. 3, namely, Raska Besra have died and Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 92 of 2002 qua the appellant no. 1, namely, Hopna Besra and the appellant no 3, namely, Raska Besra has abated. 4. The informant of this case, namely, Matal Marandi is the son of Shivlal Marandi, the deceased. On the basis of the fardbeyan of Matal Marandi which was recorded on 24.01.1994, Litipara P.S. Case No. 3 of 1994 was lodged on 24.01.1994 against the above-named accused persons and Bhotu Besra. During the trial, the accused, namely, Bhotu Besra has died, after a common charge under section 302/34 IPC was framed against all of them. 5. The prosecution has examined 8 witnesses; the informant has not been examined and the co-villagers, namely, Fachu Besra, Barsan Hansda and Chunda Marandi who have been examined as P.W. 1, P.W. 2 and P.W. 3 respectively have turned hostile. 6. The doctor who has conducted the postmortem examination has not been produced during the trial, however, the postmortem report has been tendered in evidence without objection. 7. The prosecution has projected Mangal Murmu, P.W.-5 as an eye witness; he is an injured witness. 8. Dr. Bindu Bhushan who has examined Mangal Murmu on 25.01.1994 has found a penetrating arrow wound on the right side of his abdomen. In the opinion of P.W.-7 this injury was sharp and simple in nature, caused within 36 hours. 9. In his fardbeyan, Matal Marandi has stated that at about 17:00 hours in the evening of 24.01.1994 he along with his father, namely, Shivlal Marandi and father-in-law, namely, Mangal Murmu had gone to Talpahari for drinks (Haria). From Talpahari they started for home at about 18.30 hrs. At that time his father was walking ahead. At about 19:00 hrs. 9. In his fardbeyan, Matal Marandi has stated that at about 17:00 hours in the evening of 24.01.1994 he along with his father, namely, Shivlal Marandi and father-in-law, namely, Mangal Murmu had gone to Talpahari for drinks (Haria). From Talpahari they started for home at about 18.30 hrs. At that time his father was walking ahead. At about 19:00 hrs. they reached near the house of Bhotu Besra where the accused persons appeared and Hopna fired arrow on his father which hit his father near his right cheek and ear. On receiving arrow injury his father fell down on the road and thereafter the accused persons lifted him to their house. There they started assaulting him again in their courtyard. The informant has alleged that Bhotu Besra was holding a Sabbal, Some Besra and Hopna Besra were holding Tangi and Raska Besra was holding Dabia in their hands and they have assaulted his father with an intention to kill him. According to the informant when he raised hulla several villagers, namely, Fachu Besra, Barsan Hansda, Chunda Marandi and others came there. 10. During the trial, the informant has not been examined by the prosecution. 11. The star witness for the prosecution is Mangal Murmu. In court he has narrated substantially a similar story of the incident which has been narrated by the informant in his fardbeyan recorded on 24.01.1994. In his examination-in-chief, P.W. 5 has stated that his son-in-law, namely, Matal Marandi and Shivlal Marandi were returning from Talpahari in the evening of 23.01.1994. He has stated about the assault on Shivlal Marandi by the appellants. About the present appellant, namely, Som Besra , he has said that he was carrying a Hasua (sickle) – a sharp-edged curved weapon – but in the same breath he has alleged that Som Besra has assaulted Shivlal Murmu with lathi, but then, the postmortem report does not reveal any injury on Shivlal Marandi caused by hard and blunt substance. 12. 12. The post-mortem report reveals the following injuries on Shivlal Murmu: “(1) Incised wound of 2” x 2” x bone depth on chin, (2) incised wound of 2” x 2” x bone depth on upper part of nose (3) A piercing wound of 1 ½” x ½” x muscle depth on right cheek (4) Incised wound of 2” x 1” x muscle depth on right eye brow (5) Incised wound of 2”x 2” x bone depth on left side of upper jaw (6) Incised wound of 2” x 1” x muscle depth on left cheek (7) Incised wound of 1 ½ “ x 1 ½” x cartilage depth on left pinna of ear (8) Incised wound of 2”x 1” x muscle depth on lateral surface of left leg 2” above the ankle joint (9) Incised wound of 3”x 1 ½” x muscle depth on medieval surface of right leg 1” above the ankle joint (10) Clotted blood stain on face, head, legs and neck etc.” 13. There is no universal rule that before conviction of an accused is recorded on the basis of testimony of a sole eye-witness the court must insist on corroboration rather the law is that if testimony of a solitary witness is found cogent, reliable and trustworthy, conviction can be recorded on such evidence. In “Bhimapa Chandappa Hosamani and others Vs. State of Karnataka” reported in “ (2006) 11 SCC 323 ”, the Supreme Court has cautioned that before conviction of an accused is recorded on the basis of testimony of a single witness the court must satisfy itself that testimony of such witness is of such sterling quality that it leaves no doubt about the complicity and involvement of the accused in the crime. In “Lallu Manjhi v. State of Jharkhand” reported in (2003) 2 SCC 401 , the Supreme Court has observed as under: “10. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness. (See: Vadivelu Thevar v. State of Madras [ AIR 1957 SC 614 : 1957 Cri LJ 1000] .)” 14. The evidence of Mangal Murmu on complicity of the accused persons in the incident is reliable and trustworthy. The testimony of Mangal Murmu is corroborated by the medical evidence led through P.W.-7. Normally, testimony of an injured witness should be given greater value and unless such contradiction in the evidence of an injured witness is established which completely shakes the foundation of the prosecution’s case, the testimony of an injured witness is accepted by the courts. On the basis of the evidences produced by the prosecution, we find that presence of the appellant, namely, Som Besra at the place of occurrence and at the time of occurrence are established. The prosecution has also established that he has played a role in the incident in furtherance of common intention of all, but not to murder Shivlal Murmu. 15. Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code postulates vicarious liability of all for the act of one if the criminal act has been done in furtherance of the common intention of all. In the celebrated judgment in “Mahbub Shan V. Emperor” reported in AIR 1945 PC 118 , the Privy Council has observed; “when a criminal act is done by several persons, each of such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if the act was done by him alone”. This observation on section 34 IPC was made after the amendment in 1870 by which before the expression “each of such persons”, the expression “in furtherance of common intention of all” was incorporated and after that the law on applicability of section 34 IPC has remained the same. In “Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab” reported in (1977) 1 SCC 746 , it has been held that the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. In “Ashok Kumar v. State of Punjab” reported in (1977) 1 SCC 746 , it has been held that the existence of a common intention amongst the participants in a crime is the essential element for application of this section. It is not necessary that the acts of the several persons charged with commission of an offence jointly must be the same or identically similar. The acts may be different in character, but must have been actuated by one and the same common intention in order to attract the provision. It has also been observed in “Chinta Pulla Reddy v. State of A.P.” reported in 1993 Supp (3) SCC 134 that section 34 is applicable even if no injury has been caused by the particular accused himself. In “Surinder Singh alias Chhinda and Another Vs. State of Punjab” reported in (2006) 13 SCC 533, the Supreme Court has observed thus: “12. When the factual scenario is seen the application of Section 34 IPC appears to be inappropriate so far murder of the deceased is concerned. In addition, the appellants were not armed. But the evidence is clear that they restrained movement of the deceased when there was a quarrel. There is, however, no definite evidence that the common intention was murder. But the fact that two co-accused were armed with knife and lathi is of relevance and significance. They came together and left together. That being so, the conviction is altered applying the principle set out above. Appropriate conviction will be under Section 304 Part II IPC read with Section 34 IPC. Custodial sentence of seven years would meet the ends of justice”. 16. In the light of the above decisions, we have examined the prosecution’s case and find that the prosecution has failed to establish that the appellant, namely, Som Besra has shared a common intention to murder Shivlal Marandi. The prosecution has also failed to establish that Som Besra had knowledge that death of Shivlal Marandi may be caused in the incident and, therefore, conviction of Som Besra under section 302/34 IPC cannot be sustained in law. 17. Accordingly, conviction of Som Besra under section 302/34 IPC is set aside. 18. The prosecution has also failed to establish that Som Besra had knowledge that death of Shivlal Marandi may be caused in the incident and, therefore, conviction of Som Besra under section 302/34 IPC cannot be sustained in law. 17. Accordingly, conviction of Som Besra under section 302/34 IPC is set aside. 18. However, the prosecution has established that Som Besra came together with the other accused persons, he has participated in dragging of Shivlal Marandi, he was present throughout the occurrence and he left together with the other accused persons. Maybe there is some inconsistency in the prosecution’s case on the weapon held by him, but from the prosecution’s evidence it can be gathered that he has shared common intention to beat Shivlal Marandi. He has played a role in the incident which has resulted in the death of Shivlal Marandi. Therefore, he is liable to be convicted for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, but it is difficult to hold that he had the requisite intention as envisaged under section 304 Part-I IPC. In our opinion, he is liable to be convicted and sentenced to R.I. for 5 years under section 304 Part-II IPC with the aid of section 34 IPC. 19. Ordered accordingly. 20. Mrs. Priya Shrestha, the learned APP states that the appellant, namely, Some Besra is on bail and, accordingly, bail bonds furnished by him are cancelled. 21. The appellant, namely, Some Besra shall surrender before the court below to serve the remaining sentence. 22. Cr. Appeal (DB) No. 92 of 2002 is partly allowed. 23. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith. 24. Let a copy of the judgment be communicated to the trial court through FAX.