JUDGMENT : Sunil B. Shukre, J. 1. Heard Mr. Deshpande, the learned Counsel for Petitioners and Mrs. Jachak, the learned AGP for Respondent No.1. Nobody is present for Respondent No.2. 2. This Petition, terming the two provisions of law as contained in Section 11 and Section 15 of the erstwhile Bombay Tenancy & Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act, 1958, now renamed as the Maharashtra Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region) Act (Bom. Act XCIX of 1958) (hereinafter be referred to as 'the Tenancy Act' for the sake of brevity) with no changes effected to these provisions of law as arbitrary, challenges the vires of these two provisions of law on the touch stone of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. 3. Sections 11 and 15, for the sake of convenience, are reproduced as under : “11. Maximum Rent. Notwithstanding any agreement, or usage or any decree or order of a court or any law, the maximum rent payable by a tenant shall not exceed – (a) three times the land revenue on the land in respect of which announcement of the Settlement has been made at any time within [thirtyfive years] immediately proceeding the commencement of this Act or is made at any time after such commencement; (b) four times the land revenue on the land in any other case. 15. Refund of rent recovered in contravention of provisions of the Act and other penalties. If any landlord or any person on his behalf recovers rent from any tenant in contravention of the provisions of sections 11, 12, 13 or 14th landlord shall forthwith refund the excess amount recovered to the tenant and shall be liable to pay such compensation to the tenant as may be determined by the Tahsildar in this behalf and shall also be liable to such penalty as may be prescribed by rule made under tis Act.” 4. It would be clear from Section 11 that a limit on the maximum rent payable by a tenant to an agricultural landlord has been placed. The limit is of three times the land revenue on the land in respect of which announcement of the Settlement has been made at any time within Thirtyfive years immediately proceeding the commencement of this Act or is made at any time after such commencement. The limit is of three times the land revenue on the land in respect of which announcement of the Settlement has been made at any time within Thirtyfive years immediately proceeding the commencement of this Act or is made at any time after such commencement. The ceiling in case of any other land is four times the land revenue on the land. 5. Perusal of Section 15 shows that if any landlord has recovered rent from his tenant in contravention of Section 11 or Sections 12, 13 or 14, the landlord is required to refund the excess amount recovered to the tenant along with the compensation determined by the Tahsildar. Thus, Section 15 is intimately connected to Section 11 and fate of Section 15 here would depend upon what happens to Section 11. 6. It is the submission of the learned Counsel for Petitioners that the provision of Section 11 was made in the year 1958 and its revision was not made thereafter with the result that today, going by the purchase value of Rupee, the amount of rent collectible from tenant at its maximum rate has been reduced to ridiculously low proportions. He further submits that this has adversely affected financial position of various trusts like the Petitioner No.1 and it is threatening their survival. He submits that since the year 1958 there has been no Settlement of the land revenue and so the ceilings prescribed in clauses – (a) and (b) of Section 11 way back in the year 1958 have become practically meaningless and have to be termed arbitrary and against the principle of rule of law which envisages justness and fairness of procedure and that means justice informs all and not only a few. He further submits that if Section 11 goes, Section 15 insofar as it is linked to Section 11, also does not survive. 7. Mrs. Jachak, the learned AGP submits that Section 11 ceiling is a matter of legislative policy, and therefore, this Court has no jurisdiction to strike down this provision of law. She further submits that similar would be the argument in case of challenge to Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. 8. In order to appreciate the rival arguments, it would be necessary for this Court to ascertain the legislative intent in inserting Section 11 in the Tenancy Act. 9. She further submits that similar would be the argument in case of challenge to Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. 8. In order to appreciate the rival arguments, it would be necessary for this Court to ascertain the legislative intent in inserting Section 11 in the Tenancy Act. 9. We have seen that Section 11 imposes ceilings at different rates on the rent collectible by the landlord from the tenant. The intention of the legislature, according to the principles of interpretation, firstly has to be found out from the plain language of the provision under construction, and if it cannot be, one can look into the objects of the statute. Here, when we examine Section 11, we find that it does not reveal anything more than the limits upto which rent can be recovered and the manner in which the rent payable must be computed. This does not leave any clue about the intention of the legislature. This makes us turn to the recitals made at the beginning of the Tenancy Act. They indicate that the Tenancy Act has been enacted with three objects in mind. Firstly, for amending the law relating to tenancy of agricultural lands and sites used for allied pursuits in the Vidarbha Region of the State of Maharashtra and to make certain provisions in regard to those lands. Secondly, the Act is for governing the relations of landlord and tenant of agricultural lands and sites used for allied pursuits in the Vidarbha Region. The third object of the Tenancy Act is to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands and dwelling houses and sites used for allied pursuits and also to provide for the assumption of the management of agricultural lands in certain circumstances, all in the interest of the general public. These objects give us an insight into what was going on in the mind of legislature and thus reveal the legislative intent in no uncertain terms. 10. One of the intentions of the Tenancy Act is to regulate and impose restrictions on the transfer of agricultural lands in the interest of general public and the other intention is to make the law governing the relations of landlords and tenants of agricultural lands, in the larger interest of public. These objects are seen to be taking their concrete shape in the provisions made in Section 11 of the Tenancy Act. These objects are seen to be taking their concrete shape in the provisions made in Section 11 of the Tenancy Act. In order to regulate the relations of landlord and tenant and also the transfer of agricultural lands, a ceiling of three times the land revenue or four times the land revenue, as the case may be, has been placed upon the rent recoverable by the landlord from a tenant. The legislature thought that if such restrictions are not placed, the exploitation of the tenants, the tillers of the land, not much in the bargaining position, at the hands of the rich and strong agricultural landlords, would be the order of the day, and therefore, the limits are placed upon the rent recoverable from agricultural tenants. 11. Keeping in view such an object of the Tenancy Act, we do not think that the provisions contained in Section 11 of the Tenancy Act could be termed arbitrary or preventing or resulting in an unequal situation for the landlords. Rather, in our view, this section restores the unequal situation of the agricultural tenants and evenly balances equities between the landlord and tenant. If landlords are financially distressed, Section 11 is not and cannot be the cause. It may, if any, lay in the low levels of land revenue, but that is something which is within the executive sphere circumscribed by statutory provisions. Here, no challenge has been made to land revenue Settlement currently in operation. Thus, the argument made on this count on behalf of the Petitioners is rejected, and therefore, it cannot be said that Section 11 of the Tenancy Act is arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. This conclusion would also apply to the challenge made to the validity of Section 15 of the Tenancy Act. 12. Now, we would deal with the argument made on behalf of the Petitioners relating to the ridiculously low proportions of the maximum rent payable by the tenant to his landlord. The maximum rent payable by a tenant under Section 11 of the Tenancy Act is directly linked to the amount of the land revenue settled by the executive in terms of the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short, 'the MLR Code' for the sake of convenience). 13. The maximum rent payable by a tenant under Section 11 of the Tenancy Act is directly linked to the amount of the land revenue settled by the executive in terms of the provisions of Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966 (for short, 'the MLR Code' for the sake of convenience). 13. The learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the land revenue was settled sometime in the year 1955 and he invites our attention to a specific pleadings made in this regard in the Petition in amended paragraph no. 7B to which there is no specific denial coming forth from the State. He submits that if the land revenue is increased by making a fresh Settlement, much relief would be received by the landlords like the Petitioners. He submits that, as a matter of law, the State is under duty to make the new Settlement after expiry of every thirty years from the last Settlement. He invites our attention to the provision of Section 93 of the MLR Code. 14. The argument impresses us. If the land revenue was settled, really in the year 1955, now it would be time for the Government to embark on the process of fresh Settlement in terms of the provisions contained in Chapter-VI of the MLR Code. This is also the mandate of Section 93 of the MLR Code. For the sake of convenience, this Section is reproduced as under : “93. Term of settlement A settlement shall remain in force for a period of thirty years and on the expiry of such period, the settlement shall continue to remain in force until the commencement of the term of a fresh settlement.” 15. In view of the above referred provision of law, we would only expect that the State Government shall give its serious consideration to making of fresh Settlement of the land revenue. The reason being, as it appears to us, that the provisions contained in Section 93 are of mandatory nature when they prescribe that “A settlement shall remain in force for a period of thirty years” thereby indicating the legislative intent of not giving any validity to the Settlement for an indefinite period of time. This provision of law lays down that on expiry of every period of 30 years, new Settlement must be made, though the expired Settlement may continue to remain in force until the commencement of new Settlement. This provision of law lays down that on expiry of every period of 30 years, new Settlement must be made, though the expired Settlement may continue to remain in force until the commencement of new Settlement. Continuation of the expired Settlement is only for a temporary period, just to lend continuity to law and ensure smooth transition to new regime. This part of Section 93 is transitory in nature. A transitory provision by its very nature has temporary life and as such cannot be allowed to assume a permanent form or otherwise the legislative intent of having a new Settlement on the expiry of every thirty years period would be frustrated leading to breach of principle of rule of law, which is in the present context, about non-arbitrariness of State action and infusing certainty and sanctity into the State made law. 16. It is for these reasons that we would say that now the time is ripe, rather overripe, for the State Government to seriously consider performance of its mandatory duty under Section 93 of the MLR Code. In this view of the matter, we find no merit in this Petition and it deserves to be dismissed, however, not without giving any direction to the Respondent No.1, State. 17. The Writ Petition is dismissed. However, the Respondent No.1 is directed to seriously consider implementation of the provisions contained in Section 93 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code, 1966, as expeditiously as possible, and in accordance with law. 18. Rule is discharged. No order as to costs.