JUDGMENT : H.C. Mishra, J. Heard learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the respondent State. 2.The appellants writ petitioners are aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 11.04.2019, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P.(C) No. 1312 of 2019, whereby the writ application filed by the appellants, claiming settlement of retail excise shops, which were allotted to the appellants in a lottery, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge. 3.The appellant No. 1 is an unregistered partnership firm having two partners, namely, Himangshu Mahato and Lalan Kumar Singh (the appellant No. 2), and both of them are citizens of India and are aged more than 21 years. The State of Jharkhand has promulgated its Rules for settlement and management of shops for retail vending of the licensed liquor in the State of Jharkhand, which is known as “Jharkhand Utpad (Madira Ki Khudra Bikri Hetu Dukanon Ki Bandobasti Awam Sanchalan) Nimayawali, 2018” (hereinafter referred to as the “2018 Rules"), which was notified vide notification dated 24.12.2018, making provisions for settlement of shops for retail sale of intoxicant liquors on the lottery basis. The said Rule has been framed under the provisions of Section 89 of the Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915. 4. After framing of the aforesaid Rules, an advertisement was published on 22.02.2019, notifying the process of settlement of the retail shops through lottery, and the date for lottery was fixed as 05.03.2019. For the District of Dhanbad, the list of retail shops to be allotted through lottery, was also published. The appellant No. 1, Royal Infra & Logs, through its partner Lalan Kumar Singh, participated in the bid through on line portal, and its candidature was also accepted, considering the documents furnished by the appellants, along with deposit of Rs. 42,68,059/-, which was transferred online in the designated Bank of the Department of Excise and Prohibition, Government of Jharkhand, for participating in the lottery for settlement of more than one group of excise shops in the District of Dhanbad. The lottery was held, in which the appellants were declared successful with respect to the two shops, bearing Group No. 5 and Group No. 40, and the appellants were communicated accordingly. The appellant No. 2 was communicated to deposit the security deposit amount in terms of Rule 23(3) of the 2018 Rules, which also, the appellants duly deposited. The lottery was held, in which the appellants were declared successful with respect to the two shops, bearing Group No. 5 and Group No. 40, and the appellants were communicated accordingly. The appellant No. 2 was communicated to deposit the security deposit amount in terms of Rule 23(3) of the 2018 Rules, which also, the appellants duly deposited. Subsequently, the appellant No. 2 was telephonically informed by respondent No. 4, the Assistant Commissioner of Excise, Dhanbad, on 06.03.2019 about the cancellation of allotment of the shops, informing him that the appellants had participated in the bid in the name of partnership firm Royal Infra & Logs, and not in the individual name, and in view of the definition of the term 'applicant', read with the definition of the term 'person' as given in the 2018 Rules, according to which the applicant should be a person, who should be a citizen of India, not below the age of 21 years, the allotment of the shops in favour of the appellants was cancelled. 5. The appellants challenged the said decision before this Court in W.P.(C) No. 1312 of 2019, on the ground that the 'partnership' is only a 'relation between persons' and since both the partners of the said firm are the citizens of India, aged more than 21 years each, the allotment of the shops in their favour could not be cancelled, particularly when they were allowed to participate in the lottery in the name of the partnership firm itself, by the respondent authorities, after scrutiny of their documents and accepting the earnest money deposited by them. The Writ Court, however, held that the definition of the word ''Vyakti", which in English is 'person' given in the 2018 Rules, was an exclusive definition, due to the word "Abhipret", which in English is "means". It is held by the Writ Court that since the word "means" is not accompanied with the words "and includes", the definition of the term "person" given in the 2018 Rules, has to be treated in restrictive sense, according to which a “person” meant only a citizen of India aged more than 21 years, and hence, the argument that the term "person" shall also include a partnership firm, as defined in the General Clauses Act, cannot be accepted, and therefore, the application filed by the firm was fit to be rejected at its very threshold. The Writ Court further held that when it came to the notice of the authorities, the candidature of the appellants have been rejected, and merely on the ground that at the initial stage the candidature of the appellants/ petitioners have been accepted, it cannot be said that any right had accrued to the appellants for the settlement of the shops in their favour. The Writ Court has also taken into consideration the definition of “person” given under the Citizenship Act, 1955, which do not include a company or association of body of individuals whether incorporated or not, as defined in the General Clauses Act. Aggrieved by the decision of the Writ Court, the present Letters Patent Appeal has been filed by the appellants. 6. Learned counsel, for the appellants has submitted that the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, in as much as, the appellant No. 1 is a partnership firm comprising of two partners, who are the citizens of India and both of them are aged more than 21 years. Learned counsel has drawn the attention of this Court towards Section 4 of the Partnership Act, which defines the words “partnership”, “partner”, “firm” and “firm name” as quoted herein under :- "4. Definition of “partnership”, “partner”, “firm” and “firm name”. - “Partnership” is the relation between persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. Persons who have entered into partnership with one another are called individually “Partners” and collectively a “firm”, and the name under which their business is carried on is called the “firm name”." 7. Learned counsel submitted that the aforesaid definition clearly shows that there is nothing like a 'firm' in the eyes of law, rather the 'firm' is only a relationship between two or more persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business. It is submitted by learned counsel that the word "Aavedak", which means an “applicant”, is also defined in the aforesaid 2018 Rules, which means the main person or the co-person making application for the settlement of the shops, and it is specifically provided that the application could be made by a person either individually or along with a co-applicant. It is submitted by learned counsel that the word "Aavedak", which means an “applicant”, is also defined in the aforesaid 2018 Rules, which means the main person or the co-person making application for the settlement of the shops, and it is specifically provided that the application could be made by a person either individually or along with a co-applicant. The term “person” has been defined in the 2018 Rules, as a person being the citizen of India and aged not less than 21 years of age. Learned counsel has submitted that the partnership firm has no separate and distinct legal entity apart from the persons who have agreed to share the profits of business. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in V. Subramaniam Vs. Rajesh Raghuvandra Rao, reported in (2009) 5 SCC 608 , wherein the law has been laid down as follows :- "11. It may be mentioned that a partnership firm, unlike a company registered under the Companies Act, is not a distinct legal entity, and is only a compendium of its partners. Even the registration of a firm does not mean that it becomes a distinct legal entity like a company. Hence the partners of a firm are co-owners of the property of the firm, unlike shareholders in a company who are not co-owners of the property of the company." (Emphasis supplied). In this connection learned counsel has also placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Dulichand Laxminarayan Vs. CIT, reported in 1956 SCR 154 , wherein it has been held as follows :- "14. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the law, English as well as Indian, has, for some specific purposes, some of which are referred to above, relaxed its rigid notions and extended a limited personality to a firm. Nevertheless, the general concept of partnership, firmly established in both systems of law, still is that a firm is not an entity or “person” in law but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is only a collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. According to the principles of English jurisprudence, which we have adopted, for the purposes of determining legal rights “there is no such thing as a firm known to the law” as was said by James L.J. in Ex parte Corbett, In re Shand. ------------------. We need only refer to the case of Bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. where it has been laid down by the Privy Council that Indian Law has not given legal personality to a firm apart from the partners. This view finds support from and is implicit in the observations made by this Court in the CIT v. A.V. Figgies & Co."(Emphasis supplied). Placing reliance on these decisions it is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that there is no valid reason in the eyes of law as to why the allotment of the appellants was cancelled simply on the ground that the application was made in the name of the firm and not in the name of individual. 8. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that the term “person” has not been defined in the Jharkhand Excise Act, and as such the meaning of the term “person” has to be derived from the definition of the term given in the General Clauses Act, which defines the “person” to include any company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not, and therefore, even the firm will come under the definition of “person”, and it cannot be deprived from taking part in the lottery for settlement of the liquor shops. Learned counsel has submitted that though under the Jharkhand Excise Act, it is open to the State Government to prohibit the vending of the liquor in the State, and in that case no person shall have the right to carry out the business of liquor vending, but if the said business is allowed by the State Government, the State Government cannot create class within class by depriving any individual or body of individuals, in the present case, the appellant firm, to carry out the business of liquor vending. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kerala Bar Hotels Association and Another Vs. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kerala Bar Hotels Association and Another Vs. State of Kerala and Others, reported in (2015) 16 SCC 421 , laying down the law as follows :- "32. We disagree with the submissions of the respondents that there is no right to trade in liquor because it is res extra commercium. The interpretation of Khoday put forward by Mr Sundaram is, in our opinion, more acceptable. A right under Article 19(1)(g) to trade in liquor does exist provided the State permits any person to undertake this business. It is further qualified by Articles 19(6) and 47. The question, then, is whether the restrictions imposed on the appellants are reasonable."(Emphasis supplied). In this connection, further reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of M.P. and Others Vs. Nandlal Jaiswal And Others, reported in (1986) 4 SCC 566 , wherein the law has been laid down as follows :- "33. ----------------. The contention was that trade or business in liquor is so inherently pernicious that no one can claim any fundamental right in respect of it and Article 14 cannot therefore be invoked by the petitioners. Now, it is true, and it is well settled by several decisions of this Court including the decision in Har Shanker v. Deputy Excise & Taxation Commissioner that there is no fundamental right in a citizen to carry on trade or business in liquor. The State under its regulatory power has the power to prohibit absolutely every form of activity in relation to intoxicants — its manufacture, storage, export, import, sale and possession. No one can claim as against the State the right to carry on trade or business in liquor and the State cannot be compelled to part with its exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing and selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. But when the State decides to grant such right or privilege to others the State cannot escape the rigour of Article 14. It cannot act arbitrarily or at its sweet will. It must comply with the equality clause while granting the exclusive right or privilege of manufacturing or selling liquor. It is, therefore, not possible to uphold the contention of the State Government and Respondents 5 to 11 that Article 14 can have no application in a case where the licence to manufacture or sell liquor is being granted by the State Government. The State cannot ride roughshod over the requirement of that article." (Emphasis supplied). 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has again submitted that in view of the fact that there is nothing in the Act disentitling a partnership firm to entering into a liquor business, the State Government in exercise of its Rule making power cannot frame such guidelines so as to deprive the firm from entering into the liquor vending business. In support of his contention learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Global Energy Limited & Anr. Vs. Central Electricity Regulatory, reported in (2009) 15 SCC 570 , laying down the law as follows :- "25. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the rule-making power “for carrying out the purpose of the Act” is a general delegation. Such a general delegation may not be held to be laying down any guidelines. Thus, by reason of such a provision alone, the regulation-making power cannot be exercised so as to bring into existence substantive rights or obligations or disabilities which are not contemplated in terms of the provisions of the said Act." 10. Lastly, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that it is well settled principle of law that even if the vires of the Rule is not challenged, the ultra vires Rule need not be enforced. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise And Another reported in (2016) 3 SCC 643 , laying down the law as follows :- "29. In this connection learned counsel has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise And Another reported in (2016) 3 SCC 643 , laying down the law as follows :- "29. It would be seen that Shri Aggarwal is on firm ground because this Court has specifically stated that rules or regulations which are in the nature of subordinate legislation which are ultra vires are bound to be ignored by the courts when the question of their enforcement arises and the mere fact that there is no specific relief sought for to strike down or declare them ultra vires would not stand in the court’s way of not enforcing them. --------------."(Emphasis supplied). 11. Placing reliance on the aforesaid decisions it is submitted by learned counsel that the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court confining the definition of the term “person” to include adult citizens of India only, as well as the impugned action of the respondent State cancelling the allotment of the appellants, cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 12. Per contra, learned counsel for the State has submitted that Section 89 of the Jharkhand Excise Act gives the Rule making power to the State Government for carrying out the objects of the said Act, which includes the licenses for the wholesale or retail vend of any intoxicant. It is submitted by learned counsel for the State that the right to carry out the business of liquor vending cannot be claimed as a fundamental right under Articles 14 or 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, and it is open to the State even to impose a complete ban on vending of the liquor. Learned counsel has submitted that in order to regulate the vending of the liquor in the State, 2018 Rules have been framed, which specifically provide that the applicant for the retail shops must be a person, who is a citizen of India and is not less than 21 years of age. Learned counsel for the State submits that since the appellant 'firm' which made the application does not come within the definition of the term “person” given in the 2018 Rules, the State Authorities were perfectly justified in cancelling the allotment of the appellants. Learned counsel for the State submits that since the appellant 'firm' which made the application does not come within the definition of the term “person” given in the 2018 Rules, the State Authorities were perfectly justified in cancelling the allotment of the appellants. In support of his contention learned counsel for the State has placed reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Orissa and Others Vs. Narain Prasad And Others, reported in (1996) 5 SCC 740 , laying down the law as follows :- "35. ----------. Secondly, what does the expression ‘privilege’ mean in the context of intoxicating liquors? The expression is not defined in the Act. In the context of excise enactments, the expression ‘privilege’ really means the licence or permit granted by the State. We may explain: the State is entitled to prohibit the trade in intoxicating liquors altogether; it can impose a total ban; no citizen can claim any fundamental right to manufacture or to trade in these liquors; it is, however, open to the State to lift the ban partially and allow the trade in liquor to be carried on in the manner prescribed; the State says that a citizen can trade in liquor only under a licence to be granted by it for the consideration specified in that behalf and that the trade therein can be carried on only in accordance with the regulatory provisions prescribed by it in that behalf. It is this grant of licence/permit, which is called or is described sometimes as grant of ‘privilege’. ---------------------." (Emphasis supplied). 13. Learned counsel for the State accordingly, submitted that it is the State’s exclusive privilege to grant license to a person, who may only be an adult citizen, as prescribed in the 2018 Rules, which cannot be challenged by a partnership firm, or a company. 14. Having heard learned counsels for both the sides and upon going through the record, we find that the definition of the term “person”, as defined in the 2018 Rules, requires to be examined as to whether it shall have the exclusive meaning, so as to exclude the partnership firm form its ambit all together, and also whether in exercise of the Rule making power, can the State exclude a class of person from entering into the liquor vending business, when it allows such vending in the State. 15. 15. Admittedly the term "applicant", i.e., "Aawedak" has been defined under Rule 2 (xxxii) of the 2018 Rules, to mean the main person making application for settlement of the retail excise shop, or his co-applicant and it also provides that the application may be made by one person individually or jointly with co-applicant. The term "person", i.e., "Vyakti" has been defined under Rule 2 (xxxi) of the aforesaid 2018 Rules, to mean such an individual who is a citizen of India, and aged not less than 21 years of age. This definition is admittedly an exclusive definition of the term 'person', given under the 2018 Rules, as held by the Writ Court, with which we also agree. 16. The term "person" has not been defined under the Jharkhand Excise Act, 1915, but in all its provisions relating to possession, consumption, manufacture, sale, storage, etc., of the intoxicants, such as Sections 18, 19, 22 of the Jharkhand Excise Act, the word "person" has been used. In that case if the word "person" is not defined under the Act, we find that that the State Government was fully justified in defining the term in its 2018 Rules. For the purpose of definition of "person" one cannot look into the definition of the term given in the General Clauses Act, for the simple reason that the definitions given in the General Clauses Act are applicable only to the Central Acts and Regulations. The opening portion of Section 3 of the General Clauses Act is absolutely clear, which reads as follows :- "3. Definitions. - In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context - ********* ." 17. The Hon’ble Single Judge has relied upon the definition of “person” as given in the Citizenship Act, 1955. The preamble of the Act reads as follows :- "An Act to provide for the acquisition and determination of Indian Citizenship." The interpretations are incorporated in Section 2 of the Indian Citizenship Act, which also gives the interpretation for the term "person", reading as follows:- "2. Interpretation. - (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- ********* (f) “Person” does not include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. ********* ." 18. Interpretation. - (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,- ********* (f) “Person” does not include any company or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not. ********* ." 18. When one reads Section 2 of the Indian Citizenship Act, it is apparent that in this Act unless the context otherwise requires, the term “person” does not include any company or association or body of individuals. This clearly shows that if the context otherwise requires, a different meaning of the term "person" may also be interpretated. This apart, the preamble of this Act shows that the aforesaid interpretation is only for the limited purpose of the Citizenship Act, "to provide for the acquisition and determination of Indian Citizenship" and not for any other purpose. As such, we are of the considered opinion that the Hon’ble Single Judge has entered into a manifest error or law in placing reliance upon the interpretation of the term “person” as given in the Citizenship Act, 1955, for the purpose to determine whether the term “person” shall include a firm or not, for carrying out the vending business of intoxicants, in the present case liquor, which purpose is completely alien to the Indian Citizenship Act. 19. We further find that the partnership firm, Royal Infra & Logs, through its partner Lalan Kumar Singh participated in the lottery, which the appellants were declared successful with respect to the two shops, bearing Group No. 5 and Group No. 40. As such, the definition of the words “partnership”, “partner”, “firm” and “firm name”, as defined under Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act becomes relevant for deciding the question whether the appellant firm can be denied the settlement of the shops on the pretext that it is not an individual who is a citizen of India, and aged not less than 21 years of age. Section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act defines 'partnership' as a 'relation' between persons who have agreed to share the profits of business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. 'Partners' are the 'persons' who have entered into partnership. As “partnership” is only a 'relation', then certainly only a relationship cannot either make any application or take part in any bid or tender process. 'Partners' are the 'persons' who have entered into partnership. As “partnership” is only a 'relation', then certainly only a relationship cannot either make any application or take part in any bid or tender process. Taking part in any bid or tender process is essentially a physical act, which is to be performed by a person or individual concerned, either individually or collectively, and admittedly a 'firm' is association of individual partners collectively, who have agreed to share the profits of the business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. If such 'partners' are the 'persons', who are the citizens of India and not aged less than 21 years, we do not see any reason as to why in the garb of Rule 2 (xxxi) of the aforesaid 2018 Rules, the 'firm' can be debarred for making application for allotment of the retail excise shops. In our considered view, a 'firm' which is nothing but an association of individuals who have agreed to share the profits of business, cannot be said to be excluded from the definition of the word 'person', as defined in Rule 2 (xxxi) of the 2018 Rules, if the 'persons' forming such association are the citizens of India, not below the age of 21 years. 20. We find that the case of the appellants are fully covered by the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dulichand Laxminarayan's case (supra) and V. Subramaniam's case (supra), holding that a firm is not an entity or “person” in law but is merely an association of individuals behind it, and there is no such thing as a firm known to the law. The appellants have taken part in the lottery without concealing anything and after depositing the due amounts as required by the respondent State and having been declared successful in the lottery in getting two shops in their favour, subsequently cannot be denied the allotment of those two shops in their favour. The impugned action of the respondent State is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 21. The impugned action of the respondent State is absolutely illegal and arbitrary and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, which cannot be sustained in the eyes of law. 21. We also find force in the submission of learned counsel for the appellants that in exercise of Rule making power, the State cannot frame such a Rule so as to exclude a class of person from entering into the liquor vending business, when it allows such vending in the State. In fact, we find from the 2018 Rules that there is nothing therein to deprive a firm from entering into the business of liquor vending, if the firm is successful in getting the allotment of the liquor shop, but in the present case, Rule 2 (xxxi) of the 2018 Rules, is being interpreted by the respondent authorities in such a way, so as to deprive the appellants of their legitimate fundamental right of carrying on their occupation, trade or business, which was never the intention of the Legislature, while enacting the Jharkhand Excise Act. In the present case the interpretation of the term 'person' given by the respondent authorities is also violative of Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India, as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Kerala Bar Hotels Association's case and Nandlal Jaiswal's case (supra). 22. For the foregoing reasons, we find and hold that the impugned Judgement dated 11.04.2019, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P.(C) No. 1312 of 2019, does not lay down the correct law, and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law, which we hereby, set aside. 23. Consequently, we direct the respondent authorities to make the settlement of the shops in question in favour of the appellants, positively within the period of two months from the date of communication of this order, as the shops were allotted to the appellants in the lottery, after considering their documents and accepting the deposit of the due amount, in accordance with the 2018 Rules framed by the State Government. 24. This Letters Patent Appeal accordingly, succeeds, and is hereby, allowed with the directions and observations as above. The pending Interlocutory Application also stands disposed of.