JUDGMENT : REKHA DIKSHIT, J. 1. This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated 05.02.2013 passed by learned Special Judge, C.B.I., Court No.1, Lucknow in Criminal Case No.6 of 2001 (State v. Ugrasen Singh), arising out of R.C.No.16A/2000, under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station C.B.I./S.P.E., Lucknow, whereby the Special Judge has convicted the accused-appellant namely, Ugrasen Singh under Section 7 of Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced him for two and a half years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo three months additional rigorous imprisonment. 2. The facts and circumstances leading to this case in a nutshell are that Deputy Prasad Sharma, Khalasi in the P.W.I.(Construction), N.E.R., Gonda made a written complaint on 28.08.2000 to the Superintendent of Police, Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.)/S.P.E. stating therein that Ugrasen Singh while posted and functioning as P.W.I. (Construction) N.E.R., Gonda demanded Rs.500/-per month from the complainant for giving him attendance on the muster-sheet without doing any government work. When the complainant failed to give the money demanded by the appellant, he wrote a memorandum dated 31.05.2000 alleging therein that the complainant was absent from his duty and when the appellant enquired about his absence, the complainant misbehaved with him. The complainant met the appellant on 25.08.2000 and 27.08.2000, the appellant again demanded Rs.1,500/-for month of June to August as illegal gratification. The complainant requested that due to illness of his wife, he could not arrange the said amount, but now he shall manage Rs.1,000/-for the month of June and July, 2000 to give the appellant, who threatened him that if the same amount is not given till 29.08.2000, he will be shown absent in the muster-sheet for the period 06.08.2000 to 15.09.2000 and get his wages deducted accordingly. Since the complainant do not want to give illegal gratification, he made a complaint to the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I. and after formation of trap laying team, trap was laid after following the pre-trap procedure as prescribed under the law and the appellant was caught red-handed while demanding and accepting the bribe amount of Rs.1,000/-, in presence of independent witness, near Quarter No.252-B, Khera Railway Colony, Gonda on 29.08.2000 around 07:00 p.m., and the amount of Rs.1,000/-was recovered from the back, right side, pocket of his trouser. The procedure regarding hand-wash was followed in presence of the witnesses and the appellant was accordingly arrested and charged under Section 7 & 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to ‘Act’). 3. The investigation was conducted by Shri S.A.H. Rizvi, Inspector, who after completion of investigation submitted charge-sheet exhibit Ka16 against the accused-appellant. The Investigating Officer also obtained prosecution sanction exhibit Ka-1 from the competent authority to prosecute the appellant under Sections 7 and 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Act. The charge against the accused-appellant under aforesaid sections was framed, to which he denied and claimed trial. 4. To bring home the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as nine witnesses namely P.W.-1 Ram Ashrey Pandey (Sanctioning Authority), P.W.-2 Deputy Prasad Sharma (complainant), P.W.-3 Jagat Ram (Shadow witness), P.W.-4 Dhirendra Rai, the then Inspector, C.B.I. (T.L.O.), P.W.-5 Avadhesh Kumar (independent witnesses), P.W.-6 Om Prakash Srivastava (witness), P.W.-7 Rohit Srivastava (earlier Investigating Officer), P.W.-8 S.A.H. Rizvi (T.L.O.) and P.W.-9 H.N. Pandey (Investigating Officer). 5. P.W.-1 Ram Ashrey Pandey has proved prosecution sanction order dated 04.02.2002 exhibit Ka-1 against the appellant in his oral deposition. 6. P.W.-2 Deputy Prasad Sharma, complainant of the present case has proved the complaint dated 28.08.2000 exhibit Ka-2, pre-trap memorandum dated 29.08.2000 exhibit Ka-3, hand-wash solution exhibit Ka-4, 5, 6, 7, post trap memorandum dated 29.08.2000 exhibit Ka-8, envelope carrying the recovered currency exhibit Ka-9 and connected papers exhibit Ka-10, 11, 12 related to the recovery and attendance of himself. He has also stated in his oral testimony that the appellant demanded Rs.1,000/-to fix his attendance in the muster-sheet and which was recovered from him in the trap proceedings. 7. P.W.-3 Jagat Ram, shadow witness, who accompanied the complainant in the trap proceedings and has proved exhibit Ka-3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 11, 12 in his oral testimony. He has further proved his signatures on envelope exhibit Ka-12/1 and has substantiated the entire prosecution story in his oral deposition. 8. P.W.-4 the then C.B.I. Inspector, Trap Laying Officer has proved first information report exhibit Ka-14, site plan exhibit Ka-15 and pre-trap, post trap and other relevant papers pertaining to the investigation of the case. 9. He has further proved his signatures on envelope exhibit Ka-12/1 and has substantiated the entire prosecution story in his oral deposition. 8. P.W.-4 the then C.B.I. Inspector, Trap Laying Officer has proved first information report exhibit Ka-14, site plan exhibit Ka-15 and pre-trap, post trap and other relevant papers pertaining to the investigation of the case. 9. P.W.-5 Avadhesh Kumar, who is a witness of the recovery of currency from the appellant has proved exhibit Ka-2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and exhibit Ka-16 in his oral testimony. He has further substantiated the facts pertaining to the pre-trap and post trap proceedings conducted during the trap of the appellant. 10. P.W.-6 Om Prakash Srivastava has proved signature of the appellant exhibit Ka-13/1 on the muster-sheet in his oral testimony and has also deposed regarding period of posting of the appellant at the office of Gonda. 11. P.W.-7 Rohit Srivastava is the Investigating Officer, who has proved documents pertaining to the investigation of the present case. 12. P.W.-8 S.A.H. Rizvi, Investigating Officer has proved first information report exhibit Ka-14, C.F.S.L. report exhibit Ka-18 and has deposed regarding investigation conducted by him in the present case. 13. P.W.-9 H.N. Pandey submitted charge-sheet exhibit Ka-17 and has proved charge-sheet filed by the earlier Investigating Officer exhibit Ka16 in his oral testimony. 14. Incriminating evidence and circumstances were put to the appellant under Section 313 Cr.P.C. in which he denied all of them and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the present trap, though he neither demanded nor accepted any money from the complainant in lieu of marking his attendance in the muster-sheet. He has also stated that the solution after hand-wash did not turn pink and the Trap Laying Officer has implicated him falsely after fake proceedings of post trap. He has further stated that the complainant used to borrow money from him for his family expenses and when he used to get the salary, the same was returned by him, in such consequence he gave him Rs.1,000/-which has been portrayed as a bribe for marking his attendance, because he scolded the complainant for not being regular on his duty, due to which he was inimical towards him. In defence, the appellant has produced D.W.-1 Dharm Dev, D.W.-2 Juggi Lal, D.W.-3 Subhash Chandra, D.W.-4 Prem Chandra Srivastava, D.W.-5 M.M. Khan and the appellant himself D.W.-6 Ugrasen Singh in evidence. 15. D.W.-1 & D.W.-2, who are railway employees working as Khalasi, have categorically deposed in their oral testimony that the complainant borrowed Rs.2,000/-from the appellant and have also substantiated that the appellant scolded the complainant for being irregular on his duty. They have also stated that the appellant is a person of good character and commands good reputation in the Department. D.W.-3 Subhash Chandra has deposed in his oral testimony that on the date of incident the complainant returned Rs.1,000/-to the appellant which he borrowed from him, but the C.B.I. arrested the appellant in a trap case pertaining to bribery. D.W.-4 Prem Chandra Srivastava has categorically stated in his oral testimony that the appellant has a good image and reputation in the Department. D.W.-5 M.M. Khan, who resides opposite the house of the appellant, has stated about entire incident of the trap case in which the appellant was arrested. D.W. -6 the appellant Ugrasen Singh has denied the entire prosecution story and proved exhibit Kha-1, document pertaining to his relieving in the Department, in this consequence, he has also proved order dated 16.02.2000 exhibit Kha-2 and medical certificate exhibit Kha-3 in his deposition. It has also been deposed that at the time of incident, the complainant was not working under the subordination of the appellant, as such, there was no occasion to demand any bribe or money in context of the attendance of the complainant in the muster-sheet. The recovery of muster-sheet from the house of the appellant is said to be fake. 16. The trial court held that the appellant committed the said incident and prosecution established the circumstances, proving the appellant guilty, under Section 7 of the Act and sentenced him for two and a half years rigorous imprisonment with fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default of payment of fine, he shall undergo three months additional rigorous imprisonment. Aggrieved by the verdict of the conviction, the appellant preferred the present appeal. 17. Heard Mr. Nandit Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Bireshwar Nath, learned counsel for the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) and perused the record. 18. Aggrieved by the verdict of the conviction, the appellant preferred the present appeal. 17. Heard Mr. Nandit Kumar Srivastava, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Bireshwar Nath, learned counsel for the Central Bureau of Investigation (C.B.I.) and perused the record. 18. Learned counsel for the appellant has categorically denied any demand of bribe by the appellant from the complainant, P.W.-2-Deputy Prasad Sharma and submitted that since the complainant was not working under the appellant, there was no reason to demand any money from him in context of his attendance in the muster-sheet. It has further been argued that P.W.-3 is independent witness, who has been declared hostile and the trial court has erred in relying upon the story. The trial court has failed to appreciate the fact that the alleged demand is not corroborated by any independent witness. When there was no demand made by the appellant mere recovery itself could not be a ground for conviction. As far as the recovery of treated currency is concerned, if the demand is not proved beyond reasonable doubt, recovery would be of no consequence. 19. Per contra, learned counsel for the C.B.I., contended that the prosecution has established the guilt of appellant in the commission of offence in this case. The FIR version has fully been supported by oral and documentary evidence, based on the said evidence, the court below rightly convicted the appellant and the impugned judgment warrants no interference. 20. Considered the rival contentions and perused the impugned judgment and order of the trial court and material on record. 21. In the present case, a trap was laid by the Trap Laying Officer for arrest of the appellant while accepting bribe of Rs.1,000/-from the complainant for marking his attendance in the muster-sheet on 29.08.2000 in front of the house of the appellant. The pre-trap and post trap proceedings were conducted and finally the appellant was arrested after acceptance and recovery of the bribe money. The appellant was charged under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which read as under: “7. The pre-trap and post trap proceedings were conducted and finally the appellant was arrested after acceptance and recovery of the bribe money. The appellant was charged under Sections 7 and 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, which read as under: “7. Public servant taking gratification other than legal remuneration in respect of an official act.—Whoever, being, or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or forbearing to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person or for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the Central Government or any State Government or Parliament or the Legislature of any State or with any local authority, corporation or Government company referred to in clause (c) of section 2, or with any public servant, whether named or otherwise, shall be punishable with imprisonment which shall be not less than six months but which may extend to five years and shall also be liable to fine. (Explanations) —(a) “Expecting to be a public servant”. If a person not expecting to be in office obtains a gratification by deceiving others into a belief that he is about to be in office, and that he will then serve them, he may be guilty of cheating, but he is not guilty of the offence defined in this section. (b) “Gratification”. The word “gratification” is not restricted to pecuniary gratifications or to gratifications estimable in money. (c) “Legal remuneration”. The words “legal remuneration” are not restricted to remuneration which a public servant can lawfully demand, but include all remuneration which he is permitted by the Government or the organisation, which he serves, to accept. (d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (d) “A motive or reward for doing”. A person who receives a gratification as a motive or reward for doing what he does not intend or is not in a position to do, or has not done, comes within this expression. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section. 13. (e) Where a public servant induces a person erroneously to believe that his influence with the Government has obtained a title for that person and thus induces that person to give the public servant, money or any other gratification as a reward for this service, the public servant has committed an offence under this section. 13. Criminal misconduct by a public servant.— (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct,— (a) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain from any person for himself or for any other person any gratification other than legal remuneration as a motive or reward such as is mentioned in section 7; or (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate from any person whom he knows to have been, or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned; or (c) if he dishonestly or fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts for his own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant or allows any other person so to do; or (d) if he,— (i) by corrupt or illegal means, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (ii) by abusing his position as a public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; or (iii) while holding office as a public servant, obtains for any person any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage without any public interest; or (e) if he or any person on his behalf, is in possession or has, at any time during the period of his office, been in possession for which the public servant cannot satisfactorily account, of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to his known sources of income. Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “known sources of income” means income received from any lawful source and such receipt has been intimated in accordance with the provisions of any law, rules or orders for the time being applicable to a public servant. (2) Any public servant who commits criminal misconduct shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall be not less than one year but which may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine.” 22. The very inception of the case has been questioned on the premise that there was no demand made by the appellant from the complainant. Moreover at the time of incident, he was not even working under the administrative control of the appellant. The prosecution witness Jagat Ram (P.W.-3), who was shadow witness and accompanied the complainant in the proceedings of the trap, has categorically denied any demand on behalf of the appellant. His entire statement merely indicates that when the complainant and the appellant met each other, the complainant offered him the said amount, which he initially denied and later on accepted, but nowhere there is mention of any demand on the part of the appellant. It is only the complaint filed by the complainant before the Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., which states the demand on the part of the appellant, but as far as the oral demand is concerned, it is not and, cannot be corroborated merely by filing of complaint and the statement of the complainant. More so, in view of the fact that no such demand was made at the time of trap by the appellant. Recorded conversation between the appellant and the complainant also do not make it clear whether there was any demand or not as, is stated by the other prosecution witnesses. In this context, learned counsel for the appellant has referred to the following judgments: (1) State through Central Bureau of Investigation v. Dr. Anup Kumar Srivastava; AIR 2017 SC 3698 in which the Supreme Court held as under: “21. Further, what constitutes illegal gratification is a question of law; whether on the evidence that crime has been committed is a question of fact. If, therefore, the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of a bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace wholly, the presumption of innocence, the charge cannot be said to have been established. 22. Further, what constitutes illegal gratification is a question of law; whether on the evidence that crime has been committed is a question of fact. If, therefore, the evidence regarding the demand and acceptance of a bribe leaves room for doubt and does not displace wholly, the presumption of innocence, the charge cannot be said to have been established. 22. In P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of A.P. (2015) 10 SCC 152 , this Court has held as under:- 22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise.” (2) Krishan Chander v. State of Delhi; (2016) 3 SCC 108 in the Supreme Court held as under: “35. It is well-settled position of law that the demand for the bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. It is well-settled position of law that the demand for the bribe money is sine qua non to convict the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. The same legal principle has been held by this Court in the case of B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.; (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 55, A. Subair v. State of Kerala; (2009) 6 SCC 587 and P. Satyanarayana Murthy (supra) upon which reliance is rightly placed by the learned senior counsel on behalf of the appellant… 39. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the approach of both the trial court and the High Court in the case is erroneous as both the courts have relied upon the evidence of the prosecution on the aspect of demand of illegal gratification from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW-2) by the appellant though there is no substantive evidence in this regard and the appellant was erroneously convicted for the charges framed against him. The prosecution has failed to prove the factum of demand of bribe money made by the appellant from the complainant Jai Bhagwan (PW-2), which is the sine qua non for convicting him for the offences punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) read with Section 13(2) of the PC Act. Thus, the impugned judgment and order of the High Court is not only erroneous but also suffers from error in law and therefore, liable to be set aside.” (3) P. Satyanarayana Murthy vs. District Inspector of Police, State of A.P. (2015) 10 SCC 152 in the Supreme Court held as under: “20. This Court in A. Subair vs. State of Kerala (2009) 6 SCC 587 , while dwelling on the purport of the statutory prescription of Sections 7 and 13(1)(d) of the Act ruled that (at SCC P. 593, para 28) the prosecution has to prove the charge thereunder beyond reasonable doubt like any other criminal offence and that the accused should be considered to be innocent till it is established otherwise by proper proof of demand and acceptance of illegal gratification, which are vital ingredients necessary to be proved to record a conviction. 22. 22. In a recent enunciation by this Court to discern the imperative prerequisites of Sections 7 and 13 of the Act, it has been underlined in B. Jayaraj in unequivocal terms, that mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Section 7 as well as Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act. It has been propounded that in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand, thus, has been held to be an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Sections 13(1)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasised, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, it was held that in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise.” 23. The proof of demand of illegal gratification, thus, is the gravamen of the offence under Sections 7 and 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act and in absence thereof, unmistakably the charge therefor, would fail. Mere acceptance of any amount allegedly by way of illegal gratification or recovery thereof, dehors the proof of demand, ipso facto, would thus not be sufficient to bring home the charge under these two sections of the Act. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. 26. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder. 26. In reiteration of the golden principle which runs through the web of administration of justice in criminal cases, this Court in Sujit Biswas vs. State of Assam (2013)12 SCC 406 had held that suspicion, however grave, cannot take the place of proof and the prosecution cannot afford to rest its case in the realm of “may be” true but has to upgrade it in the domain of “must be” true in order to steer clear of any possible surmise or conjecture. It was held, that the Court must ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided and if in the facts and circumstances, two views are plausible, then the benefit of doubt must be given to the accused.” (4) B. Jayaraj v. State of A.P.; (2014) 13 SCC 55 in which the Supreme Court held as under: “8. In the present case, the complainant did not support the prosecution case insofar as demand by the accused is concerned. The prosecution has not examined any other witness, present at the time when the money was allegedly handed over to the accused by the complainant, to prove that the same was pursuant to any demand made by the accused. When the complainant himself had disowned what he had stated in the initial complaint (Exbt.P-11) before LW-9, and there is no other evidence to prove that the accused had made any demand, the evidence of PW-1 and the contents of Exhibit P-11 cannot be relied upon to come to the conclusion that the above material furnishes proof of the demand allegedly made by the accused. We are, therefore, inclined to hold that the learned trial court as well as the High Court was not correct in holding the demand alleged to be made by the accused as proved. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The only other material available is the recovery of the tainted currency notes from the possession of the accused. In fact such possession is admitted by the accused himself. Mere possession and recovery of the currency notes from the accused without proof of demand will not bring home the offence under Section 7. The above also will be conclusive insofar as the offence under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) is concerned as in the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be established. 9. Insofar as the presumption permissible to be drawn under Section 20 of the Act is concerned, such presumption can only be in respect of the offence under Section 7 and not the offences under Section 13(1)(d)(i)(ii) of the Act. In any event, it is only on proof of acceptance of illegal gratification that presumption can be drawn under Section 20 of the Act that such gratification was received for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Proof of acceptance of illegal gratification can follow only if there is proof of demand. As the same is lacking in the present case the primary facts on the basis of which the legal presumption under Section 20 can be drawn are wholly absent.” 23. To sum up, demand of bribe by the appellant to the complainant has not been established by the prosecution, acceptance and recovery of the same has also not been established by the corroborative evidence of independent witness P.W.-3, who has been declared hostile, as such, his testimony could not be treated as trustworthy. The complainant has merely substantiated the averments in the complaint made by him to Superintendent of Police, C.B.I., but the same has not been corroborated either by documentary or oral evidence. As for as acceptance and recovery is concerned, it has been almost admitted by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with the explanation that the complainant returned him the money borrowed by him from the appellant. As for as acceptance and recovery is concerned, it has been almost admitted by the appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. with the explanation that the complainant returned him the money borrowed by him from the appellant. It is sufficient, if the appellant succeeds in proving a preponderance of probability in favour of his case stating therein that the alleged bribe money was in fact the loan borrowed by the complainant, more so, in view of the fact that the complainant was not working under the subordination of the appellant at the time of incident. Thus, it can be concluded that the demand by the appellant has not been established by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt, mere acceptance and recovery cannot be the basis of the guilt of the appellant. 24. Thus, on the basis of analysis made herein above, this Court is of the view that the trial court’s finding on the point of holding guilty the accused appellant for the offence under Section 7 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is not in accordance with the evidence and law and the same is not sustainable, and the appeal filed by the appellant is liable to be allowed. 25. For all the reasons stated above, the appellant is entitled to the benefit of doubt and accordingly is entitled to acquittal. 26. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order dated 05.02.2013 passed by learned Special Judge, C.B.I., Court No.1, Lucknow in Criminal Case No.6 of 2001 (State v. Ugrasen Singh), arising out of R.C.No.16A/2000 at Police Station C.B.I./S.P.E., Lucknow is hereby set aside. The appellant Ugrasen Singh is acquitted on benefit of doubt of the charges levelled against him. 27. Appellant Ugrasen Singh is on bail. He need not surrender. His bail bonds and sureties stand discharged. 28. Let a certified copy of this judgment along with lower court record, if any, be sent to the trial court concerned for its compliance forthwith.