JUDGMENT : 1. By way of present petition filed under Section 482 CrPC, a prayer has been made for quashing the ejahar (i.e. the written information) and the proceedings in Nongpoh P.S. Case No.132(5) of 2018 (G.R. Case No.186 of 2018) registered under Sections 420/403/406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) now pending at the stage of investigation with the Final Form under Section 173 CrPC having not yet been filed. 2. The relevant facts as narrated in the petition may be noticed. 3. The petitioner, by profession, is a civil contractor taking contracts for civil constructions for a number of years. In November/December 2013, the petitioner was approached by the members of Nongpoh Presbyterian Church along with respondent No.4 to construct a church in Nongpoh with the estimated total cost of the work being Rs. 3,30,00,000/- (Rupees three crores thirty lakhs), whereupon, the petitioner agreed to take up the work. Accordingly, the church representatives had given the petitioner an advance amount of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) for starting the work and he immediately commenced the same. However, there was no written agreement executed and the petitioner does not recollect the exact date of commencement of the said work. 4. According to the petitioner, he had diligently worked on the said contract and had frequent visits to the construction site to ensure that the work progressed smoothly. In November 2014 when the petitioner was at the work site, the respondent No.4 along with some other persons came to meet him and alleged that the work was not progressing at the proper pace and some of the materials being used like sand were not of good quality. He was asked to immediately stop the work. It was alleged that the work done by the accused did not amount to Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) but approximately Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs). He was asked to stop the said work and to return back the sum of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs). 5. The petitioner claims that in 2015, the worksite was examined and measured by a qualified engineer who arrived at the conclusion that the total work done was Rs. 37,00,000/- (Rupees thirty seven lakhs). Thereafter, petitioner met respondent No.4 and returned back Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) from the said advance payment of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) which had been paid to him. 37,00,000/- (Rupees thirty seven lakhs). Thereafter, petitioner met respondent No.4 and returned back Rs. 3,00,000/- (Rupees three lakhs) from the said advance payment of Rs. 40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) which had been paid to him. The respondent No.4 accepted the amount of Rs. 3,00,000 (Rupees three lakhs) but continued to insist that he must return back the total amount of Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) without paying any heed to the fact that a qualified engineer had assessed that the work already completed was worth Rs. 37,00,000/- (Rupees thirty seven lakhs). Though the petitioner interjected at several instances that the work done had actually amounted to Rs. 37,00,000/- (Rupees thirty seven lakhs) but he states that being a man of faith and strong belief in Christian dogma did not wanted to argue with the church representatives and tarnish his own name for the sake of monetary benefits. He agreed to pay Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) from his own personal funds to discard all the allegations against him. 6. The petitioner had proposed to pay back the balance amount to respondent No.4 in three installments which was agreed to by the church. The petitioner having an account with the Federal Bank, Shillong issued three cheques to respondent No.4 bearing numbers “000311”, “000312” and “000313” and instructed respondent No.4 to only deposit/en-cash the cheques one at a time and only after he had deposited the requisite money into his account, which fact he would communicate to the respondent No.4 through telephonic conversation. The petitioner stated that despite instructions given by him, the respondent No.4 had chosen to deposit the said cheques simultaneously on the same day i.e. 15.03.2016 which resulted into dishonouring of the cheques. The petitioner further stated that thereafter he was berated with a number of demand letters from the respondent No.4 to pay back the balance amount. He on numerous occasions tried to explain respondent No.4 that the cheques had bounced due to not following his instructions as respondent No.4 was adamant in recovering the balance amount at one go. 7. The respondent No.4 had sent a final letter dated 16.04.2018 to him stating that the cheques had bounced and that balance payment was required to be cleared. 7. The respondent No.4 had sent a final letter dated 16.04.2018 to him stating that the cheques had bounced and that balance payment was required to be cleared. Thereafter, the respondent No.4 initiated criminal proceedings against him by filing an ejahar (written information) dated 22.05.2018 with Nongpoh police station stating, inter alia, that he had misappropriated the money which was given to him as an advance for construction of the church and PS Case No.132(5) of 2018 under Sections 420/403/406 IPC was registered against him which is at the stage of investigation. The said case is going on for last more than ten months and during the course of investigation, the petitioner had been taken to Nongpoh Court for specimen of his handwriting and signature to be recorded by the Magistrate but till date, nothing has been done in the said investigation. Neither any charge sheet nor any final report has been filed against him. Hence, this instant petition for quashing the ejahar (i.e. the written information) and the proceedings in Nongpoh P.S. Case No.132(5) of 2018 (G.R. Case No.186 of 2018) registered under Sections 420/403/406 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) has been filed. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the dispute between the petitioner and respondent No.4 is of civil nature, and, therefore, Criminal Court should not take any cognizance thereof. It was also contended that on plain reading of the complaint, filed by respondent No.4, no criminal offence is disclosed therein. Reference was made to the following judgments, seeking quashing of the complaint:- (i) Indian Oil Corpn. v. NEPC India Ltd. & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 736 ; (ii) State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors. 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; (iii) Binod Kumar & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2014) 10 SCC 663 ; (iv) Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Anr. (2000) 4 SCC 168 ; (v) Anand Kumar Mohatta & Anr. v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home & Anr. 2018(14) Scale 756 and; (vi) G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 636 . 9. Great emphasis was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on para 12 particularly clause (v) in Indian Oil Corpn. case (supra). Para 12 thereof reads thus:- “12. of NCT of Delhi) Department of Home & Anr. 2018(14) Scale 756 and; (vi) G. Sagar Suri & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2000) 2 SCC 636 . 9. Great emphasis was placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on para 12 particularly clause (v) in Indian Oil Corpn. case (supra). Para 12 thereof reads thus:- “12. The principles relating to exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few - Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre1, [ (1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill, [ (1995) 6 SCC 194 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd., [ (1996) 5 SCC 591 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, [ (1996) 8 SCC 164 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, [ (1999) 3 SCC 259 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd., [ (2000) 3 SCC 269 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar, [ (2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh, [ (2001) 8 SCC 645 : 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, [ (2005) 1 SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are: (i) A complaint can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the accused. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint, is warranted while examining prayer for quashing of a complaint. (ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have been initiated with malafides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable. (iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution. (iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. (v) A given set of facts may make out: (a) purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. 10. Support was also gathered from the observations of the Apex Court in paras 25 and 26 in Anand Kumar Mohatta’s case (supra) governing the principles for quashing of the complaint wherein it was recorded as under:- “25. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and others [ 2006 (6) SCC 736 ], this Court observed as follows:- “13. ..... Support was also gathered from the observations of the Apex Court in paras 25 and 26 in Anand Kumar Mohatta’s case (supra) governing the principles for quashing of the complaint wherein it was recorded as under:- “25. In Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Ltd. and others [ 2006 (6) SCC 736 ], this Court observed as follows:- “13. ..... Any effort to settle civil disputes and claims, which do not involve any criminal offence, by applying pressure through criminal prosecution should be deprecated and discouraged. .....” The Court noticed a growing trend in business circles to convert purely civil dispute into criminal cases. We find it strange that the complainant has not made any attempt for the recovery of the money of Rs. One Crore except by filing this criminal complaint. This action appears to be mala fide and unsustainable. 26. In State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [(1992) Supp (1) SCC 335], this Court has set out the categories of cases in which the inherent power under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. can be exercised. Para 102 of the judgment reads as follows:- “102. The backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give and exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised: (1) where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 11. Learned counsel for the respondent No.4 has put in appearance and controverted the submissions of learned counsel for the petitioner. Similarly, reference was also made by the respondent No.4 to various case law to buttress that the present was not a case for quashing of complaint/FIR. Support was drawn from Bhajan Lal’s case (supra) and also Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai & Ors. v. State of Gujarat & Anr. (2017) 9 SCC 641 . On the strength of the judgments, it was submitted that in so far as principles governing the quashing of criminal cases are concerned, there is no quarrel with the legal proposition. Emphasizing the facts in the present case, it was urged that no case for quashing of the complaint filed by respondent No.4 arises. 12. (2017) 9 SCC 641 . On the strength of the judgments, it was submitted that in so far as principles governing the quashing of criminal cases are concerned, there is no quarrel with the legal proposition. Emphasizing the facts in the present case, it was urged that no case for quashing of the complaint filed by respondent No.4 arises. 12. After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I do not find any merit in the contention of learned counsel for the petitioner. 13. In India Oil Corporation case (supra), besides enumerating various grounds for quashing of criminal proceedings, it has been laid down that a given set of facts may make out purely a civil wrong; or purely a criminal offence; or a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. However, commercial transaction or a contractual dispute may not be remedied by civil law alone in case it involves criminal offence. The mere fact that the complaint relates to a commercial transaction or breach of contract, availability of civil remedy or having availed civil remedy itself is not a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The preliminary test is whether the allegations in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not. Similarly, in Anand Kumar Mohatta’s case, the Apex Court deprecated the practice of settling civil disputes and claims by invoking criminal action provided it did not involve any criminal offence. 14. The legal principles as enunciated by the Apex Court in various pronouncements as noticed above are well established and no exception can be taken thereto. However, while adjudicating question regarding quashing of petition under Section 482 CrPC, the facts of each case are required to be examined. 15. It would be expedient to examine the allegations made in the criminal complaint which are reproduced as under:- “Sir, I beg to file this F.I.R. against Shri Bankhrawbor Lyngdoh who is a resident of Risa Colony, Shillong, who have not return the church money amounting to Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) only though several reminders have been issued to him. That the money taken by him was Rs.40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) only for the construction of the Church Building at Nongpoh in which from the date he got the money he simply unloaded some rods, some sand and erecting two cemented posts and nothing else, he disappeared and never resume the work. That the money taken by him was Rs.40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) only for the construction of the Church Building at Nongpoh in which from the date he got the money he simply unloaded some rods, some sand and erecting two cemented posts and nothing else, he disappeared and never resume the work. Sir one time he came and he admitted that he had spent the church money for hospitalization of his wife. That after a joint measurement and a joint calculation about the money spend by him out of the said Rs.40,00,000/- (Rupees forty lakhs) he is bound to return to the church Rs.19,76,000/- (Rupees nineteen lakhs seventy six thousand) only but he himself promised to return a rounded figure of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) only and he said that he will return the money through cheque, later he gave the cheques but when deposited in the Bank authority it was reported that fund is insufficient. That when I called him through phone he never respond, when I went to his resident, his relatives never give a correct information of his where-about and did not give his new mobile number. Copy of the Joint calculation of the expenditure, cheques, and letters sent to him are enclosed for your kind necessary action. So sir there is no way out except filing this FIR against him to kindly please arrest him and punish him as per law.” 16. A perusal of the complaint shows that the allegations made in the complaint are that he had taken money for construction of church building at Nongpoh in which from the date he got the money he simply uploaded some rods, sand and erecting two cemented posts and did nothing else and had disappeared and never resumed work. It is also alleged that one time he came to meet respondent No.4 and admitted that he had spent the church money for hospitalization of his wife. The petitioner promised to pay Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) to respondent No.4 and accordingly, had issued cheques for Rs. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) which were dishonoured on account of insufficient fund. 17. Reading of the aforesaid allegations in the complaint, prima facie, disclose commission of criminal offence by the petitioner as has been claimed by respondent No.4. The petitioner and respondent No.4 are required to prove their respective versions by adducing evidence in support thereof. 18. 20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lakhs) which were dishonoured on account of insufficient fund. 17. Reading of the aforesaid allegations in the complaint, prima facie, disclose commission of criminal offence by the petitioner as has been claimed by respondent No.4. The petitioner and respondent No.4 are required to prove their respective versions by adducing evidence in support thereof. 18. In view of the above, it is concluded that no case for quashing of the ejahar/criminal proceedings is made out. Accordingly, petition is dismissed. Needless to state that any observation made hereinabove shall not be taken as an expression of opinion on the merits of the controversy while deciding the pending criminal proceedings.