JUDGMENT : (1) The petitioners have preferred this writ petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India against the impugned order dated 20.12.2018, passed by the Prescribed Authority in Rent Case no. 09 of 2016, Ashok Kumar and others vs. Firm Shio Narayan Mal Ram Avtar and others on application no. 106C filed under Section 34(g) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 and Rule 22(f) of Rules of 1972 read with Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC. (2) Briefly put, facts of the case are that respondents herein filed rent case no. 09 of 2016, Ashok Kumar and others vs. Firm Shio Narayan Mal Ram Avtar and others, for release of the shop in question under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Act no. 13 of 1972) with the averments that the shop in question was let out by late Banarasi Das Garg, predecessor of the respondents, to the petitioner firm through its partner Purushottam Das on 01.04.1980 at the rate of Rs.700/- per month. After the death of Banarasi Das Garg the respondents became the landlords. Release application has been filed with the averment that the shop in question is bonafidely required by respondent no. 1/landlord for his son so that his son may be settled in business. (3) The release application was contested by the petitioners. However, they admitted the fact that the shop in question was let out to petitioner firm, through its partner Purushottam Das, by late Banarasi Das Garg, but they contended that all the legal heirs of late Banarasi Das have not been impleaded as applicants in the release application. Subsequently, an amendment application was moved seeking certain amendment in the written statement. The application was allowed by the learned Prescribed Authority. The amendment was incorporated and case for fixed for final hearing. Instead of arguing the matter, the petitioners moved an application (paper no. 106C) under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC was filed by the petitioners/tenants stating therein that the land whereupon construction has been raised by the landlord belongs to the State of Uttarakhand as being the Nazul property and the land was leased out in favour of Banarasi Das through registered sale deed dated 01.07.1959. 106C) under Order 1 Rule 10 of CPC was filed by the petitioners/tenants stating therein that the land whereupon construction has been raised by the landlord belongs to the State of Uttarakhand as being the Nazul property and the land was leased out in favour of Banarasi Das through registered sale deed dated 01.07.1959. It is contended that the State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are the necessary party as they are the owners of the property in dispute. (4) The respondents-landlords raised their objections that the State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are not the necessary party and contended that the application has been filed just to delay the hearing of the release application. (5) Learned Prescribed Authority by impugned order rejected the impleadment application on the ground that in the proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of Act no. 13 of 1972, the court is not supposed to decide the title of the property in dispute. In a release application, the Court has to consider the relationship of landlord and tenant, bona fide need and comparative hardship to the parties. Learned Prescribed Authority further observed that the question of title is not involved in the present case, therefore, the State of Uttarakhand through Collector Pauri Garhwal and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are not necessary party and rejected the application. (6) Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that since there was a condition in the lease deed that the lessee will not sublet the property, therefore, the actual owner/landlord is the State Government and being the subtenant the landlords had let out the property, therefore, being the sublessee a release application filed by them is not maintainable. (7) Learned counsel for the petitioners would further submit that intricate question of title is involved in the release application, therefore, the State of Uttarakhand and the Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are the necessary and proper party. He would further submit that the learned Prescribed Authority has committed illegality in rejecting the application. (8) Learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon a decision of Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Krishna Chandra Srivastava and another vs. District Judge, Allahabad and others, 1997 (2) ARC 374 and argued that the Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in the judgment (supra) has held that the intricate question of title can be decided in proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of Act no. 13 of 1972. 13 of 1972. (9) I have gone through the judgment (supra). The facts of the aforesaid case are that a release application was filed by the landlord against the tenant. The tenant raised the question of title. The learned Prescribed Authority allowed the release application after recording the finding that there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. It has also been held that the Prescribed Authority is not precluded from exercising its jurisdiction under Section 21 of the Act whenever the tenant raises an objection regarding the title of the applicant to the disputed property. Hon’ble Allahabad High Court dismissed the writ petition by observing that the intricate question of title can be decided in a release application if the question is raised. (10) The controversy involved in the present case is not identical to the one involved in the aforesaid case. Thus the judgment (supra) is of no help to the petitioners. (11) It is an admitted case of the petitioners that the lease of the land was granted in favour of late Banarasi Das on 01.07.1958 and thereafter he constructed the building over it and let out a portion of the same in the year 1980 at the rate of Rs.700/- per month to the tenant. After the death of Banarasi Das, the respondents became the landlords of the property in question. This fact is also not denied by the petitioners that the respondents are not the landlord of the property in dispute. However, they have contended that besides the respondents, the daughters of late Banarasi Das are also the landladies of the property in question. The tenants-petitioners have not raised the plea that the daughters of late Banarasi Das are also the necessary party to the litigation. (12) Rule 10 of Order 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, is excerpted here-in-below: “1. Who may be joined as plaintiffs All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where- (a) Any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and (b) If such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise. 10. 10. Suit in name of wrong plaintiff (1) Where a suit has been instituted in the name of the wrong person as plaintiff or where it is doubtful whether it has been instituted in the name of the right plaintiff, the Court may at any stage of the suit, it satisfied that the suit has been instituted through a bona fide mistake, and that it is necessary for the determination of the real matter in dispute so to do, order any other person to be substituted or added as plaintiff upon such terms as the Court thinks just. (2) Court may strike out or add parties-The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the name of any party improperly joined, whether as plaintiff or defendant, be struck out, and that the name of any person who ought to have been joinded, whether as plaintiff or defendant, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the suit, be added. (3) No person shall be added as a plaintiff suing without a next friend or as the next friend of a plaintiff under any disability without his consent. (4) Where defendant added, plaint to be amended.-here a defendant is added, the plaint shall, unless the Court otherwise directs, be amended in such manner as may be necessary, and amended copies of the summons and of the plaint shall be served on the new defendant and, if the Court thinks fit, on the original defendant. (5) Subject to the provisions of the Indian Limitation Act, 1877 (15 of 1877)4, section 22, the proceedings as against any person added as defendant shall be deemed to have begun only on the service of the summons.” (13) In a release proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act the relationship of landlord and tenant, the bona fide need and comparative hardship is to be examined by the learned Prescribed Authority. The petitioners have not claimed that they have become the owner of the property in dispute at any point of time. Their contention is that the State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are the owners of the property in dispute. The petitioners have not claimed that they have become the owner of the property in dispute at any point of time. Their contention is that the State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are the owners of the property in dispute. Since the title of the property let out to the petitioners is not in question, in view of this Court, the State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are not the necessary and proper party. A ‘necessary party’ means in whose absence the matter cannot be decided by the court. ‘Proper party’ means the party whose presence is necessary for proper adjudication of the case. Since, neither the State of Uttarakhand nor Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are necessary and proper party, therefore, learned Prescribed Authority has not committed any illegality in the impugned order. (14) The release application is pending since 15.03.2016. In view of Sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 of the U.P. Act no. 13 of 1976, a release application should be decided preferably within two months. The proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act no. 13 of 1972 are summary in nature. The same cannot be treated like a regular suit. Therefore, the Legislature in its own wisdom has mandated the Sub-rule (3) of Rule 15 that the application should be decided within two months from the date of its presentation. Three years are going to lapse and the petitioners after filing the written statement sought amendment which was allowed at the time of hearing on release application. The conduct of the petitioners shows that the petitioners have made every effort to delay the hearing of the release application which amounts to an abuse of the process of law. (15) Section 116 of the Indian Evidence Act estops the tenant to deny the relationship and to say that State of Uttarakhand and Nagar Nigam, Kotdwar are the owners of the property. Since the petitioners are estopped to say anything as they have admitted the fact that the property in question was let out to them by late Banarasi Das, the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents, petitioners cannot be permitted to say anything contrary to it. The jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is limited jurisdiction. The Court can only interfere when the petitioners are able to successfully prove that miscarriage of justice has been done, while passing the impugned order. The jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is limited jurisdiction. The Court can only interfere when the petitioners are able to successfully prove that miscarriage of justice has been done, while passing the impugned order. (16) The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Radhey Shayam and another vs Chhabi Nath and others (2015) 5 SCC 423 considering the nine-Judge Bench judgment in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs State of Maharashtra AIR 1967 SC 1 , has held that the remedy under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is not an appealable remedy and can be used only in a very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned and where there is some perversity in the order passed by the court. (17) Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Rajinder Singh (dead) through LRs and others vs Prem Mai and other (2007) 11 SCC 37 , has expressed its anguish at the delay in disposal of cases in the law courts. Para 11 of the aforesaid judgment is apt in the context of present case. The same is reproduced hereunder: “11. People in India are simply disgusted with this state of affairs, and are fast losing faith in the judiciary because of the inordinate delay in disposal of cases. We request the authorities concerned to do the needful in the matter urgently to ensure, speedy disposal of cases if the people’s faith in the judiciary is to remain.” (18) In the instant case, the petitioners have abused the process of law by delaying the hearing of Rent Case no. 09 of 2016. The writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed in limine with an exemplary cost of Rs.50,000/- to be paid by the petitioners. (19) The writ petition is, accordingly, dismissed. A cost of Rs.50,000/- is imposed upon the petitioners for delaying the hearing of rent case pending since 2016. Learned Prescribed Authority is directed to decide the release application expeditiously and granting of unnecessary adjournment to either of the parties should be avoided. The cost so imposed upon the petitioners shall be paid by them to the respondents/landlords. (20) No order as to costs.