JUDGMENT : The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the award dated 27.03.2006 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 13 of 1995 whereby the order passed by the petitioner-company terminating the services of the respondent No.2 has been set aside and the petitioner has been directed to reinstate the respondent No.2 in service with full back wages with continuity of service. Further prayer has been made for quashing notification No. 4/D2-1604/95 L & E-319 dated 25.05.1995 (Annexure-3 to the writ petition) issued by the Government of Bihar through the Department of Labour, Employment and Training (the appropriate government) referring the industrial dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No.2 for adjudication to the learned Labour Court at Jamshedpur after more than 12 years from the date of discharge of the respondent No.2 from the service of the petitioner i.e w.e.f. 01.05.1983. 2. The factual matrix of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the respondent No.2 was an employee of the petitioner-company and was in occupation of quarter No. K2/7 situated at Cross Road No. 23 in Telco Colony, Jamshedpur. The petitioner vide letter No.ADM/TAD/III/13/82 dated 20.03.1982, directed the respondent No.2 to hand over the vacant possession of the said quarter alleging that the same was in his unauthorized occupation. The respondent No.2 having not vacated the said quarter, was issued a chargesheet dated 02.04.1982 and was asked to submit his explanation by 11.05.1982. Captain A.P. Verma was appointed as Administrative Officer and Mr. P. K. Bairagi was appointed as enquiry officer, who conducted the enquiry and finally prepared the report on 25.11.1982 finding the respondent No.2 guilty of the charge of unauthorized occupation of the company’s quarter being an act of misconduct under Sub-Clause XXV of Order 24 of the Standing Order of the petitioner-company. The General Manager of the petitioner-company held the respondent No.2 guilty of the charges levelled against him and an order of punishment discharging him from the service of the petitioner-company w.e.f. 01.05.1983 was passed. Accordingly, the Divisional Manager (Administration and Security) of the petitioner-company issued an establishment form on 30.03.1983 communicating the respondent No.2 about the order of his discharge from the service of the petitioner-company w.e.f. 01.05.1983. Accordingly, the Divisional Manager (Administration and Security) of the petitioner-company issued an establishment form on 30.03.1983 communicating the respondent No.2 about the order of his discharge from the service of the petitioner-company w.e.f. 01.05.1983. After about six and half years, the respondent No.2 for the first time on 15.12.1989 made the claim of his reinstatement with full back wages and other benefits. The appropriate government vide notification No. 4/D2-1604/95 L&E-319 dated 25.05.1995, referred the said industrial dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court at Jamshedpur under section 10(1)(C) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 with the following terms of reference:- “Whether the termination of service of Sri Ram Manohar Dubey, workman of M/s Tata Engineering and Locomotive Company Ltd., Jamshedpur by the management is proper? If not, what relief the workman is entitled to?” 3. The learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur vide impugned award dated 27.03.2006, answered the said reference in favour of the respondent No.2 finding him not guilty of any misconduct and ordered for his reinstatement in service with full back wages and continuity of service. 4. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner-company, submits that during the pendency of the said reference, the respondent No.2 retired on 15.01.2001 on attaining the age of superannuation and as such the learned Labour Court should not have directed the petitioner-company for his reinstatement. The respondent No.2 sat idle for about six and half years after the order of his discharge from service. Moreover, the impugned notification dated 25.05.1995 referring the said industrial dispute for adjudication to the learned Labour Court, Jamshedpur was issued by the appropriate government after more than 12 years and as such the learned Labour Court was also required to consider the said aspect of the matter and should have answered the reference in favour of the petitioner-company treating the claim of the respondent No.2 to be stale one. It is further submitted that the record of the case would suggest that the past conduct of the respondent No.2 was not good and he was earlier punished twice for different offences. Though the present order of discharge may not have any connection with his past conduct, yet while considering any relief to be granted to the respondent No.2, his past record was of relevant consideration. Though the present order of discharge may not have any connection with his past conduct, yet while considering any relief to be granted to the respondent No.2, his past record was of relevant consideration. Learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that the order of punishment was passed after serving proper charge sheet and providing due opportunity of hearing to the respondent No.2 to present his case, who duly participated in the domestic enquiry. As such, the principles of natural justice were duly followed before passing the order of discharge against the respondent No.2. The learned Labour Court had limited scope in interfering with the order passed in the disciplinary proceeding against the respondent No.2, once it was found by the learned Labour Court that the order of discharge was passed after following the principles of natural justice. It is also submitted by learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner-company that the said industrial dispute was neither apprehended nor existed after such a long time and therefore the impugned notification of reference dated 25.05.1995 is bad in law, stale and has been issued without application of mind. 5. Per-contra, Mr. Mahesh Tewari, learned counsel for the respondent No.2, submits that the petitioner-company failed to prove that Mr. M. K. Sinha, Assistant Manager (Town Administration), Telco Ltd., Jamshedpur was authorized by the Board of Directors to issue chargesheet or to order for holding domestic enquiry or to appoint the enquiry officer. It is further submitted that the enquiry officer was not appointed by any competent authority of the petitioner-company and this fact was fairly admitted by the management witness before the learned Labour Court. The enquiry officer in his cross-examination has also admitted that he did not receive any such letter of appointment from the petitioner-company. It is further submitted that during the enquiry proceeding, the respondent No.2 requested for examining one I.A. Khan, who was previously allotted the quarter in question for proving that he did not occupy the said quarter unauthorizedly. However, the enquiry officer did not allow the said opportunity to him. The said quarter was initially allotted to I.A. Khan and this fact has been admitted by Sri M. K. Sinha during his cross-examination which in fact, vitiates the case of the petitioner-company. However, the enquiry officer did not allow the said opportunity to him. The said quarter was initially allotted to I.A. Khan and this fact has been admitted by Sri M. K. Sinha during his cross-examination which in fact, vitiates the case of the petitioner-company. The respondent No.2 was staying in the said quarter with the permission of the Chief Security Officer and town administrator since 1979 which was in the knowledge of the management of the petitioner-company. In fact, the said quarter along with ten other quarters were to be demolished and the vacant space was to be given to a school namely ‘Little Flower’ run and managed by the Telco management for which a fabricated chargesheet was issued to the respondent No.2 on 02.04.1982. Subsequently, the said quarter was taken over, demolished and vacant possession of the same was handed over to the said school. The respondent No.2 was removed from the quarter in question and was also discharged from the service of the petitioner-company only because he was involved in trade union activities whereas, the occupants of ten other company quarters were provided alternative accommodation. The respondent No.2 is in fact, not guilty of unauthorized occupation of the company’s quarter, rather he has been victimized on the basis of the fabricated and vexatious chargesheet. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the respondent No.2 that the delay of about six and half years in raising the said industrial dispute occurred as the management of the petitioner-company kept on assuring the respondent No.2 that his case was under consideration and thus the petitioner-company cannot take advantage of the delay occurred in raising the industrial dispute. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the relevant materials available on record. One of the contentions of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner is that the domestic enquiry was held against the respondent No.2 after providing due opportunity of hearing to him and as such the learned Labour Court should not have sat as an appellate authority to substitute the decision of the petitioner-company by giving its own finding. In support of the said contention, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of East India Hotels Vs. Workmen & Ors. reported in (1974) 3 SCC 712 , the relevant paragraph of which is quoted hereunder: “5. In support of the said contention, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner puts reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of East India Hotels Vs. Workmen & Ors. reported in (1974) 3 SCC 712 , the relevant paragraph of which is quoted hereunder: “5. This appeal is by special leave against the award of the Tribunal. It is not denied that the Tribunal was in error in applying Section 11-A of the Act to this case, because the complaint, the enquiry, the report and the reference were all prior to the coming into operation of this Section on December 15, 1971. This Court held in Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre& Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Management that Section 11-A has no retrospective operation as it not only deals with procedural matters, but also has the effect of altering the law laid down by this Court in this respect by abridging the rights of the employer inasmuch as it gives power to the Tribunal for the first time to differ both on a finding of misconduct arrived at by an employer as well as with the punishment imposed by it. In the undoubted exercise of the right of the employer to take disciplinary action and to decide upon the quantum of punishment, both of which are part of the managerial functions, what has to be seen is whether the employer before imposing the punishment had conducted a proper enquiry in accordance with the provisions of the Standing Orders, if applicable, and principles of natural justice. When a proper enquiry has been held by an employer and the finding of misconduct has support from the evidence adduced at the said enquiry, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to sit in judgment over the decision of the employer as an appellate body. The interference with the decision of the employer will be justified when the enquiry is unfair or the findings arrived at in the enquiry are perverse or have no basis in evidence or the management is guilty of victimisation, unfair labour practice or mala fide or the punishment is harsh and oppressive. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, re-appraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. The Tribunal cannot, therefore, re-appraise the evidence and arrive at a conclusion different from that arrived at by the domestic Tribunal. Even if no enquiry has been held by an employer or if the enquiry held by him is found to be defective, the Tribunal in order to satisfy itself about the legality and validity of the order, has to give an opportunity to the employer and employee to adduce evidence before it. It is open to the employer to adduce evidence for the first time justifying his action; and it is open to the employee to adduce evidence contra. Once misconduct is proved, either in the enquiry conducted by the employer or by the evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time, the punishment imposed cannot be interfered with by the Tribunal except in cases where the punishment is harsh and oppressive. This is not a case where no enquiry has been held, nor is it a case where either side had not adduced evidence before the Tribunal. What the Tribunal had to see is whether the enquiry is vitiated by any of the grounds referred to by us. Admittedly, no such grounds exist in this case. Nothing was stated as to in what respects the enquiry was defective. On the other hand, the Tribunal proceeded on the basis that the enquiry was not vitiated, but it had power under Section 11-A to arrive at a different conclusion and award a different punishment. That apart, even the evidence justified the conclusion arrived at by the Enquiry Officer.” 7. To appreciate the said contention of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner, I have gone through the findings of the learned Labour Court. The stand of the respondent No.2 is that he was orally directed by the company’s management to occupy the said quarter after getting the same vacated by one I.A. Khan, who himself was in unauthorized occupation of the same after leaving the services of the company. According to the respondent No.2, he got the said quarter vacated after much efforts and came in possession of the same. Admittedly, the respondent No.2 was in the company’s services at the relevant point of time. M.W-1 (M.K. Sinha) deposed during the industrial adjudication that he came to know in the month of June, 1981 that the respondent No.2 had occupied the said quarter. Admittedly, the respondent No.2 was in the company’s services at the relevant point of time. M.W-1 (M.K. Sinha) deposed during the industrial adjudication that he came to know in the month of June, 1981 that the respondent No.2 had occupied the said quarter. Further, M.W-2 (B. B. Pandey) deposed that the respondent No.2 was occupying the said quarter since 20.07.1979. It would thus be evident that though the management of the petitioner-company had knowledge about the fact that the respondent No.2 was in unauthorized occupation of the company’s quarter, no prompt action was taken to get the said quarter vacated or to allot it in his favour as per the company’s rules. Under the said circumstance, I find force in the contention of learned counsel for the respondent No.2 that the quarter of the respondent No.2 as well as ten other quarters got vacated by the management for the purpose of allotting the same to ‘Little Flower’ school. The specific case of the respondent No.2 is that though the other workmen were allotted the alternative quarters, yet the management of the petitioner-company did not allot any alternative quarter to him and thus he was discriminated as against the similarly situated workmen of the company. The learned Labour Court, after thoroughly examining the facts, came to a finding that the direction of the petitioner-company to hand over the vacant possession of the said quarter without allotting any alternative quarter to the respondent No.2 is against the ethics and normal human behaviour. 8. It is a settled law that if the management is found indulged in victimization of the workman or the punishment inflicted upon the workmen appears to be harsh and oppressive, the interference by the industrial adjudicator is justified. As such, the contention of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner that the learned Labour Court has committed an error by interfering with the order of the disciplinary authority, is liable to be rejected. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. S. Viswanathan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 193 , has held as under: “12. counsel for the petitioner that the learned Labour Court has committed an error by interfering with the order of the disciplinary authority, is liable to be rejected. 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Management of Madurantakam Coop. Sugar Mills Ltd. Vs. S. Viswanathan, reported in (2005) 3 SCC 193 , has held as under: “12. Normally, the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal, as the case may be, is the final court of facts in these types of disputes, but if a finding of fact is perverse or if the same is not based on legal evidence the High Court exercising a power either under Article 226 or under Article 227 of the Constitution can go into the question of fact decided by the Labour Court or the Tribunal. But before going into such an exercise it is necessary that the writ court must record reasons why it intends reconsidering a finding of fact. In the absence of any such defect in the order of the Labour Court the writ court will not enter into the realm of factual disputes and finding given thereon. A consideration of the impugned order of the learned Single Judge shows that nowhere has he come to the conclusion that the finding of the Labour Court was either perverse or based on no evidence or based on evidence which is not legally acceptable. Learned Single Judge proceeded as if he was sitting in a court of appeal on facts and item after item of evidence recorded in the domestic enquiry as well as before the Labour Court was reconsidered and findings given by the Labour Court were reversed. We find no justification for such an approach by the learned Single Judge which only amounts to substitution of his subjective satisfaction in the place of such satisfaction of the Labour Court.” 10. It would thus be evident that the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal should not be interfered by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless it is found that the same is perverse and is not based on legal evidence. It would thus be evident that the finding of fact arrived at by the learned Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal should not be interfered by the High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, unless it is found that the same is perverse and is not based on legal evidence. It appears that the learned Labour Court, after taking into consideration all the evidences available on record, has given a finding of fact that the punishment inflicted upon the respondent No.2 is harsh and oppressive and the management of the petitioner-company is also guilty of unfair trade practice. 11. Now the question before this Court is as to whether the relief of reinstatement with full back wages, as has been granted by the learned Labour Court, needs any interference. So far as the challenge to the grant of back wages to the respondent No.2 is concerned, learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner-company has submitted that the respondent No.2 did not specifically state before the learned Labour Court that he was not gainfully employed during the period of discharge. To appreciate the said argument of learned Sr. counsel for the petitioner-company, it would be relevant to refer the following judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 12. In the case of Novartis India Ltd. Vs. State of W.B & Ors., reported in (2009) 3 SCC 124 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “37. Back wages in a situation of this nature had to be granted to the respondents by way of compensation. If the principle of grant of compensation in a case of this nature is to be applied, indisputably having regard to the fact situation obtaining herein, namely, that they were doing a specialised job and were to reach their age of superannuation within a few years, grant of back wages was the only relief which could have been granted. It was furthermore not expected that they would get an alternative employment as they were superannuated. Burden of proof was undoubtedly upon the workmen. The said burden, however, was a negative one. Once they discharged their burden by deposing before the Tribunal, it shifted to the employer to show that their contention that they had not been employed, was incorrect. No witness was examined on behalf of the employer. Even there was no pleading in that behalf.” 13. The said burden, however, was a negative one. Once they discharged their burden by deposing before the Tribunal, it shifted to the employer to show that their contention that they had not been employed, was incorrect. No witness was examined on behalf of the employer. Even there was no pleading in that behalf.” 13. Further, in the case of Prabhakar Vs. Joint Director, Sericulture Department & Anr., reported in (2015) 15 SCC 1 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “43. We may hasten to clarify that in those cases where the court finds that dispute still existed, though raised belatedly, it is always permissible for the court to take the aspect of delay into consideration and mould the relief. In such cases, it is still open for the court to either grant reinstatement without back wages or lesser back wages or grant compensation instead of reinstatement. We are of the opinion that the law on this issue has to be applied in the aforesaid perspective in such matters. 44. To summarise, although there is no limitation prescribed under the Act for making a reference under Section 10(1) of the ID Act, yet it is for the “appropriate Government” to consider whether it is expedient or not to make the reference. The words “at any time” used in Section 10(1) do not admit of any limitation in making an order of reference and laws of limitation are not applicable to proceedings under the ID Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed inasmuch as unless there is satisfactory explanation for delay as, apart from the obvious risk to industrial peace from the entertainment of claims after long lapse of time, it is necessary also to take into account the unsettling effect which it is likely to have on the employers' financial arrangement and to avoid dislocation of an industry.” 14. The learned counsel for the respondent No.2 puts reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase Vs. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein it has been held that in the cases of wrongful termination of services, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. Kranti Junior Adhyapak Mahavidyalaya (D.ED.) & Ors., reported in (2013) 10 SCC 324 wherein it has been held that in the cases of wrongful termination of services, reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages is the normal rule. It has been further held that the workman whose service has been terminated and who is desirous of getting back wages, is required either to plead or at least to make a statement before the adjudicating authority or the Court of first instance that he/she was not gainfully employed or was employed on lesser wages. If the employer wants to avoid payment of back wages, then it has to plead and lead cogent evidence to prove that the employee was gainfully employed and was getting wages equal to the wages he/she was getting prior to termination of service. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent No.2 further puts reliance on a judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court rendered in the case of Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Employees of M/S Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., reported in (1979) 2 SCC 80 wherein it has been held that the normal rule is that a workman whose service has been illegally terminated would be entitled to full back wages, except to the extent he was gainfully employed during the enforced idleness. Any other view would be a premium on the unwarranted litigative activity of the employer. If the employer terminates the service illegally and the termination is motivated to resist the workmen's demand for revision of wages, the termination may well amount to unfair labour practice. 16. In the present case, the respondent No.2 had admittedly attained the age of superannuation on 15.01.2001 which perhaps was not brought to the notice of the learned Labour Court while passing the impugned award dated 27.03.2006. However, considering the fact that the respondent No.2 had attained the age of superannuation before passing the impugned award, I am of the view that the order of reinstatement cannot be sustained in law. So far as the issue of payment of back wages to the respondent No.2 by the petitioner-company is concerned, it appears that he raised the said industrial dispute after more than six and half years and has not given sufficient explanation for the same and as such in my opinion, the respondent No.2 is not entitled to back wages for the said period. So far as the back wages for the remaining period is concerned, the learned Labour Court while granting the same to the respondent No.2 has not given any finding as to whether he was unemployed during the period of discharge. It has also not been mentioned in the impugned award dated 27.03.2006 as to whether the respondent No.2 had submitted before the learned Labour Court that he was not gainfully employed during the period of discharge. However, the respondent No.2 by way of I.A. No. 5707/2017 has submitted before this Court that during the period of discharge, he was unemployed and he survived during the said period on the income of his son. The said averment cannot be verified by the writ Court in absence of any such cogent material on record. However, considering the fact that the present matter is too old and the respondent No.2 has already attained the age of superannuation, to meet the ends of justice, I deem it appropriate that the respondent No.2 should be awarded a lump sum compensation keeping in view the clear finding of the learned Labour Court that he was not guilty of any misconduct. 17. In view of the discussions made hereinabove, the impugned award dated 27.03.2006 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition) passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jamshedpur in Reference Case No. 13 of 1995 is modified to the extent of directing the petitioner-company to pay a lump sum compensation of Rs.2,00,000/- (Rs. Two Lacs) to the respondent No.2 within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order. 18. The present writ petition is accordingly disposed of. 19. Consequently, I.A. No. 5707/2017 also stands disposed of.