Research › Search › Judgment

Madras High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1838 (MAD)

G. Thirumurugan Gandhi v. State

2019-07-09

N.ANAND VENKATESH

body2019
JUDGMENT : N. Anand Venkatesh, J. All these Criminal Original Petitions have been filed seeking for the relief of quashing the FIRs registered against the petitioner by the respective respondent Police in each case. 2. For the sake of easy understanding, the FIRs registered against the petitioner, offences involved and the offending statements said to have been made by the petitioner, is extracted hereunder: TABLE AND EXTRACT OF OFFENDING STATEMENTS IN CASES INVOLVING G.THIRUMURUGAN GANDHI S. No. Crl.O.P. No. Crime No. Date of FIR Date of Alleged Offence Offence 1. Crl.O.P. No. 30026/2018 Crime No.1110/2018 11.07.2018 25.05.2018 Ss. 124A, 153, 505 (1) (b) 505 (1) (c) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 2. Crl.O.P.No.3002 9/2018 Crime No.2773/2017 12.12.2017 25.07.2018 Ss. 13(1) (b) of Unlawful Activities Prevention Act, 1967 & S.505 (1) (b) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 3. Crl.O.P. No. 30031/2018 Crime No.49/2018 18.01.2018 04.03.2017 Ss. 153, 505 (1) (b) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 4. Crl.O.P.No.30032/2018 Crime No.2540/2017 05.10.2017 25.02.2017 Ss. 153A (1) (a), 153 A (1) (b), 153B, 504 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 5. Crl.O.P.No. 30033/2018 Crime No.143/2018 13.02.2018 30.05.2016 (18) Ss. 153, 505 (1) (b) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 6 Crl.OP No. 30232/2018 Crime No.80/2018 24.04.2018 15.04.2018 Ss.153B(1) (a), 505 (2) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 7 Crl.OP No. 30226/2018 Crime No. 1803/2017 19.10.2017 01.05.2017 Ss.147, 148, 353, 143, 188, 124, 153 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 8 Crl.OP No. 30235/2018 Crime No. 274/2018 29.06.2018 25.06.2018 Ss.153, 505 (1) (b) 505 (1) (c) of Indian Penal Code, 1860 3. Mr. N.R. Elango, Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the petitioner is the Co-ordinator of May-2017 organisation, which strives to protect the welfare and interest of Tamil minorities, physically challenged and downtrodden section of the Society. The learned Senior Advocate further submitted that the Tamil Nadu Police is resorting to witch hunting the petitioner by registering false cases against the petitioner, whenever the petitioner raises public issues and questions the Government (Central and State) on their Policies, which goes against the interest of the State and the people of Tamil Nadu and thereby is throttling the freedom of speech and expression of the petitioner. He further submitted that even if the allegations made against the petitioner in each FIR is taken as it is, no offence is made out under Section 124, 153, 504, 505 and 353 IPC. He further submitted that even if the allegations made against the petitioner in each FIR is taken as it is, no offence is made out under Section 124, 153, 504, 505 and 353 IPC. In order to substantiate his arguments, the learned Senior Advocate relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bilal Ahmed Kaloo .Vs. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 and Balwant Singh And Another .Vs. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 . The learned Senior Advocate concluded his arguments by submitting that in each case, there is substantial delay in registering the FIR which according to him clearly establishes malafides and the registration of FIR in each case by itself is an abuse of process of law which requires interference of this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. 4. Per contra, Mr. A. Natrajan, learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the respondent Police, in each case, submitted that the petitioner involves himself in giving hate speeches which induces negative thoughts in the minds of the general public regarding the various Policies, Projects and Welfare Schemes that are attempted to be implemented by the State and Central Government. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the speeches given by the petitioner attempts to create disharmony between the State and Central Government and it is clearly intended to create enmity between people on the grounds of community and religion. The learned Public Prosecutor further submitted that the speeches made by the petitioner will not in any way help in the development of the State or will improve the growth of the downtrodden and it will only lead to ill-will and hatred among communities and will ultimately result in creating a law and order problem among the general public. It was also brought to the notice of the Court that there are nearly 20 cases pending against the petitioner at the stage of trial and six cases at the stage of investigation, apart from the present cases. 5. The respondent Police have filed counter affidavit in each case and explained the stage of investigation in each case and have sought for the dismissal of all the petitions. 6. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 7. 5. The respondent Police have filed counter affidavit in each case and explained the stage of investigation in each case and have sought for the dismissal of all the petitions. 6. This Court has carefully considered the submissions made on either side and the materials available on record. 7. The important provisions that have been invoked in all the FIRs against the petitioner is Section 153 and 153-A, 504 and Section 505 of IPC. It will therefore be relevant to take a look at the evolution of these provisions. (i) Section 153-A was inserted into the Code vide Section 5 of the Indian Penal Code Amendment Act (V of 1898). (ii) The original Section 153-A, as it stood prior to 1961, runs as under "Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise, promotes or attempts to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. Explanation.-It does not amount to an offence within the meaning of this section to point out, without malicious intention and with an honest view to their removal, matters which are producing or have a tendency to produce, feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of the citizens of India." (iii) In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 9 at page 664, the Supreme Court noticed the legislative intent behind the 1961 amendment of Section 153-A and observed 28. Interestingly, simultaneous with the introduction of the Bill to amend the Act, a Bill to amend Section 153-A of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) was moved by Shri Lal Bahadur Shastri. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the amendment notes that it was, inter alia, to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies whether based on grounds of religion, caste, language or community or any other ground. The Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing the amendment notes that it was, inter alia, to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies whether based on grounds of religion, caste, language or community or any other ground. The Statement of Objects and Reasons reads as follows: statement of objects and reasons In order effectively to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies whether based on grounds of religion, caste, language or community or any other ground, it is proposed to amend Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code so as to make it a specific offence for anyone to promote or attempt to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities. The Bill also seeks to make it an offence for anyone to do any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. Section 295-A of the Penal Code is being slightly widened and the punishment for the offence under that section and under Section 505 of the Code is being increased from two to three years. New Delhi Lal Bahadur Shastri 5-8~1961. (iv) The Law Commission of India, in its 42nd Report on the Indian Penal Code, observes as follows: The amendment of 1961made three changes in the original section. a. The term "classes" was replaced by religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities'. b. Secondly, the scope of the section was enlarged, by making it an offence also for anyone to do any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups, or castes or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. c. Thirdly, the Explanation was omitted. Bonafide writing or speech was no longer excepted from the purview of the section. (v) Post the 1961 amendment, the Section read as under "153-A. Whoever- (a) Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc. c. Thirdly, the Explanation was omitted. Bonafide writing or speech was no longer excepted from the purview of the section. (v) Post the 1961 amendment, the Section read as under "153-A. Whoever- (a) Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc. and doing acts prejudicial to maintenance of harmony-by words, either spoken or written, or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise, promotes, or attempts to promote, on grounds of religion, race, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever, feelings of enmity or hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities, or (b) commits any act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different religious, racial or language groups or castes or communities and which disturbs or is likely to disturb the public tranquillity, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both." (vi) In 1969,the section was expanded further, and the statement of reasons for the amendment is as follows: "Promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, language, etc., is made an offence under S. 153 of the IPC. It is proposed to include therein promoting enmity between different groups on grounds, such as, place of birth, or residence as well. It is also proposed to widen the scope of the provision so as to make promotion of disharmony or feelings of ill-will an offence punishable thereunder. Cl. (b) of the said section provides for the punishment for doing acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different groups. That provision is also proposed to be widened so as to include acts prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between different regional groups as well. It is also proposed to provide for enhanced punishment...for any such offence committed in a place of worship." (vii) Mens rea under Section 153-A Discussing the requirement of mens rea under Section 153-A the Law Commission, in its 42nd Report, points out "Three possible views can now be put forth as to the requirement of mens rea under Section 153-A. First, intention is still the gist of the offence, and has to be proved by the prosecution like any other fact, though it is open to the Court to infer it as is usually done in other cases. (Majority view before 1961).Secondly, intention is still the gist of the offence but there is a rebuttable presumption about it. By virtue of S. 81 of the Code, read with S. 106 of the Evidence Act, however, the accused can rebut the presumption (view expressed in Debates in Parliament in 1961).Thirdly, intention is not required and mere tendency to promote ill will, etc. is enough. (Allahabad view before 1961)." (viii) The Law Commission concluded as under "Hence we would support the first view, and recommend that the word "intentionally" should be inserted before the word "promotes" in Section 153-A to make it clear that mens rea is essential and has to be proved as in any other case." (ix) Discussing the ingredients of the Section a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in MaulanaAzizulHaqKausar Naqvi v. State,1980 SCCOnLineAll 77 : (1980) 17 ACC 152 : 1980 AWC 173 : AIR 1980 All 149 at page 162, opined as under "40.The essential ingredients of the aforesaid provision of law are: (1) That the accused promoted or attempted to promote feelings of enmity and hatred between different religious, racial or language groups or caste or communities or that the accused has done an act which is prejudicial to the maintenance of harmony between such groups or caste or communities and which is likely to disturb public tranquillity. (2) That he promoted or attempted to promote feelings of enmity or hatred by words or signs or visible representations or otherwise or had acted prejudicially to the maintenance of harmony which disturbs or is likely to disturb public tranquility." "54. It is thus firmly established, both in India and in England, that criminality for the offence of blasphemous libel, or criminality under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, does not attach to the things said or done but to the manner in which it is said or done. It is thus firmly established, both in India and in England, that criminality for the offence of blasphemous libel, or criminality under Section 153-A of the Indian Penal Code, does not attach to the things said or done but to the manner in which it is said or done. If the words spoken or written are couched in temperate, dignified, and mild language, and do not have the tendency to insult the feelings or the deepest religious convictions of any section of the people, penal consequences do not follow." (x) In Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 432 at page 219, the Supreme Court endorsed the approach of the Law Commission and held that mens rea is essential to constitute an offence under Section 153-A. The Court said "9. Insofar as the offence under Section 153-A IPC is concerned, it provides for punishment for promoting enmity between different groups on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community or any other ground whatsoever or brings about disharmony or feeling of hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, linguistic or regional groups or castes or communities. In our opinion only where the written or spoken words have the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order or affect public tranquillity, that the law needs to step in to prevent such an activity. The facts and circumstances of this case unmistakably show that there was no disturbance or semblance of disturbance of law and order or of public order or peace and tranquillity in the area from where the appellants were apprehended while raising slogans on account of the activities of the appellants. The intention to cause disorder or incite people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove the existence of mens rea in order to succeed. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their raising casually the three slogans a couple of times. In this case, the prosecution has not been able to establish any mens rea on the part of the appellants, as envisaged by the provisions of Section 153-A IPC, by their raising casually the three slogans a couple of times. The offence under Section 153-A IPC is, therefore, not made out." (xi) In Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of A.P., (1997) 7 SCC 431 ,the Supreme Court examined the commonality between Section 153-A and Section 505 of the IPC, and opined as under "15. The common feature in both sections being promotion of feeling of enmity, hatred or ill will "between different" religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or castes and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. Merely inciting the feeling of one community or group without any reference to any other community or group cannot attract either of the two sections." 16. The result of the said discussion is that the appellant who has not done anything as against any religious, racial or linguistic or regional group or community cannot be held guilty of either the offence under Section 153-A or under Section 505(2) of 1PC." (xii) In Manzar Sayeed Khan v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 5 SCC 1 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri) 417, the Supreme Court reiterated "The gist of the offence is the intention to promote feelings of enmity or hatred between different classes of people. The intention to cause disorder or incite the people to violence is the sine qua non of the offence under Section 153-A IPC and the prosecution has to prove prima facie the existence of mens rea on the part of the accused. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. The intention has to be judged primarily by the language of the book and the circumstances in which the book was written and published. The matter complained of within the ambit of Section 153-A must be read as a whole. One cannot rely on strongly worded and isolated passages for proving the charge nor indeed can one take a sentence here and a sentence there and connect them by a meticulous process of inferential reasoning." The Court also referred to its earlier decision in Ramesh v. Union of India, (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 266 : AIR 1988 SC 775 ] wherein it was held that a TV serial Tamas did not depict communal tension and violence and the provisions of Section 153-A IPC would not apply to it. The Court approved the felicitous observations of Vivian Bose, J. (as he then was) in BhagwatiCharan Shukla v. Provincial Govt., (1947) AIR Nagpur 1 wherein the learned judge has held "the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous men, and not those of weak and vacillating minds, nor of those who scent danger in every hostile point of view. ... It is the standard of ordinary reasonable man or as they say in English law 'the man on the top of a Clapham omnibus'." (xiii) In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 : (2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 1299 at page 612, the Supreme Court held 23. Similarly, Section 509 IPC criminalises a "word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of a woman" and in order to establish this offence it is necessary to show that the modesty of a particular woman or a readily identifiable group of women has been insulted by a spoken word, gesture or physical act. Clearly this offence cannot be made out when the complainants' grievance is with the publication of what the appellant had stated in a written form. Likewise, some of the complaints have mentioned offences such as those contemplated by Section 153-A IPC (promoting enmity between different groups, etc.) which have no application to the present case since the appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not directed against any particular group either. Likewise, some of the complaints have mentioned offences such as those contemplated by Section 153-A IPC (promoting enmity between different groups, etc.) which have no application to the present case since the appellant was not speaking on behalf of one group and the content of her statement was not directed against any particular group either. (xiv) Subal Kumar Dey v. State of Tripura,2007 SCCOnLineGau 104 : (2009) 1 Gau LR 265 : 2007 Cri LJ 1195 : (2008) 1 CCR 338 at page 265, the accused was being prosecuted under the following circumstances 1. The petitioner Subal Kumar Dey is the Editor and Publisher of the Bengali daily named "SyandamPatrika" printed, published and circulated from Agartala. One Yudhisthir Ray lodged a complaint on 8.5.1997 in Chebri police station under Khowai sub-division against Mr. Dey that his newspaper published a news item on 25.2.1997 that some explosives had been recovered from the house of a person named Ganga CharanDebbarma who was the relative of the then Chief Minister, which was false and fabricated. According to the informant the said news item was published with a view to malign the democratically elected Chief Minister and to incite disharmony between the tribal and the Bengali communities. The written complaint was registered as Kalyanpur P.S. Case No. 46 of 1997 under sections 501, 505(i)(b)(c), 153, 153(A) and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The investigation following the said FIR found prima facie evidence resulting to submission of a charge sheet against Mr. Dey, the petition herein. On the prayer of the petitioner the case was transferred from the court of Judicial Magistrate, Khowai to the court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Agartala. On 30.6.2000 Mr. Dey submitted a prayer for his discharge on the ground that the criminal proceeding against him was not maintainable in law as no personnel injury was attributed to the informant. The prayer for discharge was dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 7.8.2001. While rejecting the prayer the trial court observed that the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner under sections 153A, 505(b)(c) of the Indian Penal Code in support of which sufficient materials exist on record. The prayer for discharge was dealt with by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate in his order dated 7.8.2001. While rejecting the prayer the trial court observed that the charge sheet was filed against the accused petitioner under sections 153A, 505(b)(c) of the Indian Penal Code in support of which sufficient materials exist on record. It was further observed that both the provisions being analogous, the alleged offence had to be understood after ascertaining whether the news item was published and circulated to excite commotion and create communal disharmony and whether such news was false and fabricated. The learned court felt that at the stage of taking cognizance on the basis of the police report it was not possible to come to a definite finding whether the accused had published the news item without deliberate and malicious intention. At such a stage the court would just consider if there was ground for presuming that the accused had committed an offence. According to the learned trial court at the stage of cognizance there is no scope to record a conclusion that the materials on record are not likely to lead to conviction at the end of the trial. After taking a view that it will be premature to say that there is no sufficient materials against the accused, the petition for discharge came to be rejected. Aggrieved, the accused petitioner by means of this revision petition under sections 397 and 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code called in question the correctness and validity of the said order dated 17.8.2001 of the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate with a prayer for setting aside the said order and discharge the accused from the said proceeding. 8. The legal position set out above, when applied for scrutiny of the allegation made in the FIR and the charge sheet, it would unmistakably show that the allegation that the news item in question maligned the Chief Minister and prompted disharmony between tribals and Bengalies is not borne by any iota of evidence. There is no direct or indirect hint about two communities fighting each other and the statement that Ganga CharanDebbarma is related to the then Chief Minister Dasharath Deb (who is no more) is found correct from the statement of Ganga CharanDebbarma himself. There is no direct or indirect hint about two communities fighting each other and the statement that Ganga CharanDebbarma is related to the then Chief Minister Dasharath Deb (who is no more) is found correct from the statement of Ganga CharanDebbarma himself. Neither Dasharath Deb or any of his legal heirs nor Ganga CharanDebbarma made any allegation that they were maligned by the said news item or what was narrated had the ingredients of causing disharmony between the tribals and the Bengalies. No statement from any para military force who allegedly recovered carbine has been recorded to establish that no recovery of carbine from the house of Ganga CharanDebbarma was at all made. Even if the statement about the recovery of Carbine from the house of Ganga CharanDebbarma is found to be not correct, it cannot be said that such wrong statement caused or was likely to cause disharmony between two communities. Thus, before registering a case on the basis of the allegation made by Yudhistir Ray, the contents of the news item should have been carefully gone into by the investigating officer to satisfy himself whether ingredients constituting offences under sections 153A and 505 of the Indian Penal Code were prima facie present. Freedom of expression which includes freedom of press being one of the cardinal principles of a democratic polity would be the casualty if such unfounded allegation is quickly taken cognizance of without carefully examining the contents. In my considered view this is a fit case in which this court should step in to prevent the abuse of the process of court. It needs no emphasis to observe that the court below while making the impugned order failed to comprehend that the news item in question had nothing to incite or promote disharmony between two groups of people. (xv) In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 9 at page 676, the majority judgment in the Constitution Bench was of the view that Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 must be construed in the light of the amendments made in Section 153-A of the Code. (xv) In Abhiram Singh v. C.D. Commachen, (2017) 2 SCC 629 : 2017 SCC OnLine SC 9 at page 676, the majority judgment in the Constitution Bench was of the view that Section 123 (3) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 must be construed in the light of the amendments made in Section 153-A of the Code. This is because Section 123 of the RP Act, 1951 and Section 153-A of the IPC were, a "package deal" to Parliament making any appeal to communal, fissiparous and separatist tendencies, an electoral offence leading to voiding an election and a possible disqualification of the candidate from contesting an election or voting in an election for a period. An aggravated form of any such tendency could also invite action under the criminal law of the land. The Court then concluded 50.1.The provisions of clause (3) of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 are required to be read and appreciated in the context of simultaneous and contemporaneous amendments inserting clause (3-A) in Section 123 of the Act and inserting Section 153-A in the Penal Code, 1860. (xvi) The word "community" in the context of Section 123 (3) of the RP Act, 1951 (which deploys the same phraseology as Section 153-A IPC) came up for interpretation before a Division Bench of the High Court of Rajasthan in KhilumalTopandas v. ArjundasTulsidas,1959 SCCOnLineRaj 29 : AIR 1959 Raj 280 at page 283, and Court held as under "15. The Parliament went a step further by providing in Section 123(3) of the Act that a systematic appeal on grounds of caste, race, community or religion was a corrupt practice as a candidate elected on such basis must be deemed to be not a true representative of the people as a whole. In S. 123(3), the word "community" has been inserted which has not been used anywhere in the Constitution. The dictionary meaning of the word "community" is very wide. It may even mean the body of men having common interest. Such interest may be social, economic or political. 16. It is evident that the word "community" cannot be construed in its wider sense when it is used in S. 123(3). In India a community is often organised on the basis of caste or religion. We speak of the Khatri community or the Agarawal community on the basis of caste. Such interest may be social, economic or political. 16. It is evident that the word "community" cannot be construed in its wider sense when it is used in S. 123(3). In India a community is often organised on the basis of caste or religion. We speak of the Khatri community or the Agarawal community on the basis of caste. We speak of the Hindu community or the Muslim community on the basis of religion. Of course our history is so old that we have obliterated all kinds of racial prejudices, but a community may be organised on the basis of racial distinctions. When a community is organised on the basis of caste, race or religion, it is evident that such an organisation does come within S. 123(3). At the same time we have communities organised not on the basis of caste, race or religion but on social, economic or political basis. 17. Thus we may have an organisation of the mercantile community based on economical considerations aiming at the development of trade. We have also political bodies organised on different ideologies. The word "community" used in S. 123(3) has only to be confined to such an organisation which in effect divides the citizens of the country into groups sometimes opposed to one another. It is only when the organisation of the community is such as aims to divide the citizens of the country and releases forces antagonistic to the unity of the country that it comes within the purview of S. 123(3). Communities organised for the purpose of cementing the citizens for the purpose of social, economic and political pro-grass of the country, do not come under S. 123(3). 18. The words which are used immediately before and after the word community in that sub-section are 'caste, race and religion.' The word "community" must be construed by reference to the words 'caste, race and religion'. "It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them". Robertson v. Day,1879 5 AC 63 at p. 69. This is merely an application of the rule of noscitur a socits. "It is a legitimate rule of construction to construe words in an Act of Parliament with reference to words found in immediate connection with them". Robertson v. Day,1879 5 AC 63 at p. 69. This is merely an application of the rule of noscitur a socits. In Wharton's Law Lexicon n14th Edition at page 697 this rule is referred as follows: "Where there is a string of words in an Act of Parliament and the meaning of one of them is doubtful, that meaning is given to it which it shares with the other words". 8. A bare reading of Section 153 A of IPC postulates any act which promotes enmity between the groups on grounds of religion and race etc., or which are prejudicial to national integration, punishable. The purpose of enactment of such a provision was to check fissiparous, communal and separatist tendencies and secure fraternity so as to ensure the dignity of the individual and the unity of the nation. Similarly Section 505 of IPC is aimed at reports calculated to produce mutiny or to induce one Section of the population to commit offences against another and to prevent and remove communal and religious tensions. The common feature in Section 153 A and Section 505, being promotion of felling of enmity, hatred or ill will between different religious or racial or linguistic or regional groups or cause and communities, it is necessary that at least two such groups or communities should be involved. 9. A careful reading of the allegations made in the complaint and which has been extracted supra, shows that the petitioner has a clear tendency to get into a vitriolic diatribe whenever he picks up the microphone. It is true that free speech is the foundation of a democratic Society. A free exchange of ideas, dissemination of information, without restraints, dissemination of knowledge, airing of different view points, debating and forming one's own views and expressing them, are the basic ideas of a free Society. This freedom alone makes it possible for people to formulate their own views and opinions on a proper basis and to exercise their social, economic and political rights in a free society in an informed manner. Restraints on this right have been jealously watched by Courts. However, Constitution itself prescribes for restrictions of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2). Restraints on this right have been jealously watched by Courts. However, Constitution itself prescribes for restrictions of the freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(2). It enables the legislature to impose restrictions upon the freedom of speech and expression on eight grounds. Some of the important grounds are sovereignty and integrity of India, public order, decency and incitement to an offence. 10. Any leader or a speaker who takes to public platform or expresses through a social media, must bear it in mind that the Constitution of India does not permit hate speech in the name of freedom of speech and expression. Hate speeches create discord amongst the various ethnic and religious communities. Any speech which disrespects another citizen on grounds of religion, race, place of birth, residence, language, caste or community, is forbidden and becomes punishable under Indian Penal Code and various other laws. The responsibility attached to free speech should not be forgotten. 11. The speeches made by the petitioner and offending portions extracted herein above, is pregnant with hate spewed against a particular community which is attacked in a vituperative, opprobrious and slanderous manner. The petitioner is repeatedly attempting to portray as if Tamil Nadu does not belong to India and that every organ is attempting to destroy this State. He has also used the choicest of words against the High Court and Hon'ble Supreme Court. The claim made by the petitioner is that he is running an organisation to protect the welfare and interest of this State. The speeches made by the petitioner are no where near these avowed objects. 12. The speeches made by the petitioner and extracted supra will certainly promote a feeling of enmity, hatred and ill-will between different religious groups and communities. It also has the shades of fissiparous and separatist tendencies, which will seriously affect the unity of the nation and will have an impact on the growth and development of this State. The petitioner must understand that these hate speeches will in no way help or protect the welfare and interest of this State. Spewing venom against a particular community is not going to help the down trodden come up in the Society and become a part of the main stream. On the other hand, it will only sow the seeds of hatred among communities. Spewing venom against a particular community is not going to help the down trodden come up in the Society and become a part of the main stream. On the other hand, it will only sow the seeds of hatred among communities. People want to progress and come up in life and certainly the speeches made by the petitioner will not in any way contribute towards the same. 13. This Court is of the considered view that there are prima facie materials available against the petitioner and there are absolutely no grounds to interfere with the investigation conducted by the respondent Police at this stage. It is also important for the respondent Police to investigate thoroughly and see if there is a larger net and whether the petitioner is only the face of it. In the result, all the Criminal Original Petitions are dismissed. Consequently, all the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.