ORDER : 1. Learned counsel for the petitioner prays for and is permitted to make necessary correction in paragraph no.5 of the writ petition regarding the petitioner’s date of joining in service. 2. The present writ petition has been filed for quashing the part of the order dated 12th November, 2003 as contained in memo no.10-53/02-2733 passed by the District Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad- respondent no.3, whereby the petitioner’s four annual increments have been withheld with cumulative effect and he has been transferred and posted in Government Middle School, Maniadih Circle, Tundi-1. Further prayer has been made for issuance of direction upon the respondents to allow the petitioner to discharge his duty as Headmaster In-charge in Government Middle School, Kotaladda, Topchanchi-2. 3. The factual matrix of the case, as stated in the writ petition, is that the petitioner joined his service on 17th November, 1973 as Science Teacher. He assumed the charge of headmaster with effect from 30th September, 1997 in pursuance of the direction of the respondent no.3 after superannuation of the earlier headmaster of Government Middle School, Kotaladda, Topchanchi-2, District Dhanbad. During the said period one peon, namely, Ashutosh Modak was also serving in the said school and discharging his official duty. The petitioner used to send absentee statement of teachers as well as non-teaching staff including that of Ashutosh Modak. According to the petitioner, since the service book of Ashutosh Modak was not available with him, he could not know the exact date of superannuation and as such he used to send the absentee statement even after his date of superannuation under the impression that the actual date of retirement of Ashutosh Modak was 60 years. An explanation was called from the petitioner and other persons in respect of disbursement of salary to Ashutosh Modak despite having attained the age of superannuation. The petitioner was also put under suspension vide memo no.1133 dated 16th July, 2002. Thereafter, he was served with memo of charge on 16th April, 2003 alleging that excess salary was paid to Ashutosh Modak even after attaining the age of superannuation i.e. 58 years due to his fault. The Area Education Officer, Dhanbad was appointed as enquiry officer and the Block Education Extension Officer, Dhanbad was appointed as departmental officer and the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation within 15 days in the departmental proceeding. The Area Education Officer, Dhanbad was appointed as enquiry officer and the Block Education Extension Officer, Dhanbad was appointed as departmental officer and the petitioner was directed to submit his explanation within 15 days in the departmental proceeding. The petitioner, accordingly, submitted his reply to the memo of charge on 20th May, 2003, denying all the allegations, however, the Enquiry Officer concluded the enquiry ex. parte. Thereafter, the order of punishment dated 12th November, 2003 was passed by the District Sukperintendent of Education, Dhanbad against the petitioner withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect and he was also transferred to Government Middle School, Maniadih Circle, Tundi-1. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner denied the allegations levelled in the memo of charge contending that the service book of the concerned peon- Ashutosh Modak was neither available in the office nor was produced on being demanded by him. It is further stated that the enquiry was concluded without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. However, after passing of the impugned order dated 12th November, 2003, the petitioner made a detailed representation before the respondent no.2, requesting inter alia to recall the said order, but no action was taken on the same. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that the impugned order is liable to be set aside on the ground that no opportunity of hearing was provided to the petitioner before passing the order of punishment and as such, the same is violative of principles of natural justice. Since the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing in the enquiry, true facts could not be brought on record, such as non-availability of the service book of Ashutosh Modak, which was certified by the then Principal-cum-Drawing & Disbursing Officer of the school, etc. The enquiry report was not served upon the petitioner causing great prejudice to him. It is further submitted that even as per the impugned order, the disciplinary authority came to the conclusion that apart from the petitioner, the Drawing and Disbursing Officer and the Area Education Officer, Dhanbad were also responsible, but they were not punished. The petitioner has, in fact, been made scapegoat in the matter and he was inflicted major punishment of withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect and was also transferred by way of punishment to another school. The petitioner has, in fact, been made scapegoat in the matter and he was inflicted major punishment of withholding of four annual increments with cumulative effect and was also transferred by way of punishment to another school. It is also submitted that the excess amount paid to Asutosh Modak has already been recovered from his retiral dues. The issue regarding superannuation of Ashutosh Modak was raised in the meeting convened by the Principal-cum-Drawing & Disbursing Officer and the then Area Education Officer, but they did not initiate any action in relation to the superannuation of the said peon. Sri Rajendra Prasad, the then Principal-cum-Drawing & Disbursing Officer, had also certified the service book of the said peon on the date of his superannuation as on 31st May, 2001 and had also entered the name of the said peon in the last pay certificate. Thereafter, the successor of said Sri Rajendra Prasad, namely, Sri Mukteshwar Mishra, Principal-cum-Drawing & Disbursing Officer had also not raised any objection in that regard. In fact, Ashutosh Modak intentionally misled the school administration and continued in service beyond the actual date of his superannuation. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents submits that Ashutosh Modak was a peon, who continued in service till 31st January, 2002, though his actual date of superannuation was 31st January, 2000 as per his date of birth registered as 2nd January, 1942, since during the said period the age of superannuation was 58 years. The petitioner was found responsible in allowing Ashutosh Modak to continue in service for extra two years due to which he got salary for the said period also. The higher authorities of the department could know about this fact only when the pension paper of Asutosh Modak was submitted for sanction. It is further submitted that during enquiry, the Drawing and Disbursing Officer and the Area Education Officer submitted their respective explanations, however, the petitioner did not do. So it was found in the enquiry that the petitioner was directly involved in the said matter. The petitioner’s contention that he was not involved in the said matter is incorrect, as on perusal of the pension papers submitted by the petitioner under his seal and signature, it was found that he, in fact, allowed Ashutosh Modak to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation. The petitioner’s contention that he was not involved in the said matter is incorrect, as on perusal of the pension papers submitted by the petitioner under his seal and signature, it was found that he, in fact, allowed Ashutosh Modak to continue in service beyond the age of superannuation. It is further submitted that if the service book was not available with the petitioner, how did he forward the pension papers of Ashutosh Modak to the higher authorities. The action taken against the petitioner is just and proper. It may be possible that at the time of taking over the charge of the school, the petitioner might not have received the service book of Ashutosh Modak, but thereafter he would have definitely received his service book. The particulars of the teachers and other staff used to be sent to the higher authorities on regular basis. The petitioner was supposed to have all information of the teachers and non-teaching staff working under him. Accordingly, the petitioner as well as the Drawing & Disbursing Officer was awarded minor punishment. The Drawing and Disbursing Officer was punished with stoppage of two annual increments and was transferred on administrative ground to Tundi Block. So far as the Area Education Officer is concerned, he retired from service on 31st May, 2002 and as such a recommendation was made to the Director, Primary Education, Government of Jharkhand to initiate suitable proceeding against him. So far as the transfer of the petitioner from the said school is concerned, the respondents have ample power to do so on administrative reason. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the materials available on record. Learned counsel for the petitioner has given much emphasis to the argument that the petitioner has been inflicted a major penalty/punishment in utter violation of the principle of natural justice, as the enquiry report as well as the second show cause notice was not given to him before passing the impugned order of punishment. On the contrary, the stand of the respondents is that the petitioner has been awarded minor punishment after affording due opportunity of hearing to him. Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider the relevant law on the present issue. 7. In the case of Punjab SEB Vs. Raj Kumar Goel, reported in (2014)15 SCC 748 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. Therefore, it would be appropriate to consider the relevant law on the present issue. 7. In the case of Punjab SEB Vs. Raj Kumar Goel, reported in (2014)15 SCC 748 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “9. At the very outset, we may clearly state that there is no discord or dispute over the exposition of facts. The controversy has arisen with regard to implementation of the order of punishment imposed by the authority on the delinquent employee. The courts below have opined that though it is mentioned in the order of punishment that there is stoppage of five increments without cumulative effect which is a minor punishment yet the manner of implementation converts it to a major punishment. There can be no cavil over the proposition that when a punishment of stoppage of an increment with cumulative effect is imposed, it is a major punishment. In this regard, we may refer with profit to the decision in Kulwant Singh Gill v. State of Punjab wherein it has been held that withholding of increments of pay simpliciter without any hedge over it certainly would be a minor punishment but withholding of increments with cumulative effect, the consequences being quite hazardous to the employee, it would come in the compartment of major punishment. Proceeding further the two-Judge Bench stated thus: (SCC pp. 507-08, para 4) “4. … But when penalty was imposed withholding two increments i.e. for two years with cumulative effect, it would indisputably mean that the two increments earned by the employee was cut off as a measure of penalty forever in his upward march of earning higher scale of pay. In other words the clock is put back to a lower stage in the time scale of pay and on expiry of two years the clock starts working from that stage afresh. The insidious effect of the impugned order, by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his time scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The insidious effect of the impugned order, by necessary implication, is that the appellant employee is reduced in his time scale by two places and it is in perpetuity during the rest of the tenure of his service with a direction that two years’ increments would not be counted in his time scale of pay as a measure of penalty. The words are the skin to the language which if peeled off its true colour or its resultant effects would become apparent.” After so observing, the Court treated the said punishment to be a major penalty. In said case while interpreting clause (v) of Rule 5 of the same Regulations, the Court did not accept the reasoning of the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab.” 8. It would thus clear that withholding of increment with cumulative effect is certainly a major punishment and the contention of the learned counsel for the respondents that the punishment awarded to the petitioner is a minor one is liable to be rejected. 9. So far as the issue regarding violation of the principle of natural justice is concerned, it appears that the petitioner after service of memo of charge had submitted his reply denying all the allegations. However, on completion of enquiry, neither the enquiry report nor the second show cause notice was issued to the petitioner so as to afford him an opportunity to respond to the same. In the case of ECIL & Ors. Vs. B. Karunakar & Ors., reported in (1993)4 SCC 727 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “26. The reason why the right to receive the report of the enquiry officer is considered an essential part of the reasonable opportunity at the first stage and also a principle of natural justice is that the findings recorded by the enquiry officer form an important material before the disciplinary authority which along with the evidence is taken into consideration by it to come to its conclusions. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. It is difficult to say in advance, to what extent the said findings including the punishment, if any, recommended in the report would influence the disciplinary authority while drawing its conclusions. The findings further might have been recorded without considering the relevant evidence on record, or by misconstruing it or unsupported by it. If such a finding is to be one of the documents to be considered by the disciplinary authority, the principles of natural justice require that the employee should have a fair opportunity to meet, explain and controvert it before he is condemned. It is negation of the tenets of justice and a denial of fair opportunity to the employee to consider the findings recorded by a third party like the enquiry officer without giving the employee an opportunity to reply to it. Although it is true that the disciplinary authority is supposed to arrive at its own findings on the basis of the evidence recorded in the inquiry, it is also equally true that the disciplinary authority takes into consideration the findings recorded by the enquiry officer along with the evidence on record. In the circumstances, the findings of the enquiry officer do constitute an important material before the disciplinary authority which is likely to influence its conclusions. If the enquiry officer were only to record the evidence and forward the same to the disciplinary authority, that would not constitute any additional material before the disciplinary authority of which the delinquent employee has no knowledge. However, when the enquiry officer goes further and records his findings, as stated above, which may or may not be based on the evidence on record or are contrary to the same or in ignorance of it, such findings are an additional material unknown to the employee but are taken into consideration by the disciplinary authority while arriving at its conclusions. Both the dictates of the reasonable opportunity as well as the principles of natural justice, therefore, require that before the disciplinary authority comes to its own conclusions, the delinquent employee should have an opportunity to reply to the enquiry officer’s findings. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.” 10. The disciplinary authority is then required to consider the evidence, the report of the enquiry officer and the representation of the employee against it.” 10. In the present case, the respondent no.3 did not apply his independent mind while passing the impugned order dated 12th November, 2003, rather he merely relying upon the enquiry report straightway passed the order of punishment. Thus the said order cannot be said to be a reasoned one. It was incumbent upon the respondents to serve a copy of the enquiry report to the petitioner so as to respond to the finding of the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner has specifically asserted that due to non-supply of enquiry report, he was seriously prejudiced, as he could not explain several relevant facts in relation to the situation under which Ashutosh Modak continued to serve beyond his age of superannuation. 11. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits at bar that the petitioner has already superannuated from service and as such, it would not be appropriate to remand the matter before the disciplinary authority for its consideration afresh. I find substance in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 12. In the case of Punjab National Bank & Ors. Vs. Kunj Behari Misra, reported in (1998)7 SCC 84 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- “21. Both the respondents superannuated on 31-12-1983. During the pendency of these appeals, Misra died on 6-1-1995 and his legal representatives were brought on record. More than 14 years have elapsed since the delinquent officers had superannuated. It will, therefore, not be in the interest of justice that at this stage the cases should be remanded to the disciplinary authority for the start of another innings. We, therefore, do not issue any such directions and while dismissing these appeals, we affirm the decisions of the High Court which had set aside the orders imposing penalty and had directed the appellants to release the retirement benefits to the respondents. There will, however, be no order as to costs.” 13. In view of the aforesaid judgments and keeping in view that the petitioner has already superannuated from service, I am of the view that remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority at this stage would not serve any useful purpose. There will, however, be no order as to costs.” 13. In view of the aforesaid judgments and keeping in view that the petitioner has already superannuated from service, I am of the view that remanding the matter to the disciplinary authority at this stage would not serve any useful purpose. Since it has already been observed that the petitioner has been inflicted major penalty/punishment in violation of the principle of natural justice, the part of the impugned order dated 12th November, 2003 contained in memo no.10-53/02-2733 passed by the District Superintendent of Education, Dhanbad- respondent no.3 to the said extent cannot be sustained in the eye of law and the same is hereby quashed. 14. The writ petition is, accordingly, allowed.