JUDGMENT : A.J. Shastri, J. The present First Appeal is filed by the appellants challenging the legality and validity of an order dated 22nd February, 2019 passed by the learned District Court, Valsad in Arbitration Application No.11 of 2019 and consequently also challenging the original action dated 19th February, 2019 of respondent No.2 and seeking relief to include the names of the appellants in the list of eligible candidates for ensuing election for the term 2019-2021 to their respective posts. 2. The background of facts is that for the post of President(Category of Industries), Executive Committee Member(Category of Industries) and Associate Executive Committee Member(Trading Category), the elections were scheduled as per the Constitution and rules and regulations of the respondent Association. The election for above three categories i.e. President, Executive Committee Member and Associate Executive Committee Member is to be held every two years as per the procedure and schedule in view of the rules governing the election of association. It is the case of the appellants that one post is available for the President, 12 posts for the post of Executive Committee Members and one for the post of Associate Executive Committee Member and so far a person from trader's category cannot participate in the election of a President. The appellants are claiming to be members of the respondent Association for number of years and are eligible to participate in the process of election. As per the procedure and schedule of election, the last date for receiving nomination was 16th February, 2019 and the last date for display of final list of candidates on notice board was 19th February, 2019 and on election being declared by the respondent, the appellants as per the rules have filled in their respective nomination forms for the post of President and simultaneously for the post of Member of Executive Committee. It is the ease of the appellants that, to their surprise, without waiting till 22nd February, 2019, the day fixed for withdrawal of nomination, the Scrutiny Committee misinterpreting the provisions of constitution of rules and regulations disqualified their nominations though they were qualified for the nomination for both the posts in question i.e. President as well as Executive Committee Member. It is the ease of the appellants that, to their surprise, without waiting till 22nd February, 2019, the day fixed for withdrawal of nomination, the Scrutiny Committee misinterpreting the provisions of constitution of rules and regulations disqualified their nominations though they were qualified for the nomination for both the posts in question i.e. President as well as Executive Committee Member. Upon personally inquiring whether Election Officer came to know that nominations are cancelled or disqualified, a letter was written by appellant Nos.1,3 and 4 and respondent No.4 before 6 p.m. on 19th February, 2019 requesting to withdraw their nomination with respect to post of President and continued the nomination for the post of Executive Committee Member and simultaneously appellant Nos.2 and 5 withdrew nomination for the post of Executive Committee Member and continued their nominations for the post of President. However, before the final list of candidates could be placed and before arrival of date of withdrawal of nominations dated 22nd February, 2019, it was indicated by way of foot note upon the letter of appellants that their nomination has already been disqualified by the Scrutiny Committee which led the appellants to request the Scrutiny Committee to immediately form the arbitration panel as per Rule 16 of the Constitution and convene a meeting on 19th February, 2019 itself. Despite such request being made and the urgency for the appellants, by way of email dated 20th February, 2019 at 14.41 hours, the Scrutiny Committee refused to constitute the Arbitral Tribunal on the ground that it is not within the domain of the Scrutiny Committee. Resultantly, the appellants approached the existing President of the Association and requested through email dated 20th February, 2019 to immediately form the Arbitral Tribunal and decide their grievance. 3. Even the President also failed to form such an Arbitral Tribunal, resultantly left with no other alternate, the appellants have approached the District Court, Valsad by way of application under section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 immediately on 21st February, 2019. The learned trial court issued urgent notice, heard the matter on 22nd February and at 6.30 p.m. on 22nd February, 2019, the District Court rejected the application. The learned trial court issued urgent notice, heard the matter on 22nd February and at 6.30 p.m. on 22nd February, 2019, the District Court rejected the application. The appellants could not obtain certified copy of the order passed by the District Court but since it was informed by the Court itself that application is rejected with an undertaking to produce the said order, the present First Appeal was moved before the Court and the Court upon hearing the learned advocate was pleased to issue urgent notice on 25th February, 2019 which was made returnable on 26th February, 2019. and it was ordered to be treated subject to the present proceedings. This order was passed in view of the fact that at an ex-parte stage, an attention was drawn about a decision delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Marutiben Dhudabhai Gamar Vs. State Election Commission reported in, 2018 AIJEL(HC) 239136 and upon receipt of the order of this Court, the learned advocates for the respondents have appeared and made their respective submissions. 4. Mr. Jal Soni Unwala, learned advocate appearing with Vs. Teal A. Vashi, learned advocate for the appellants has vehemently contended that the decision declaring the nomination as disqualified is absolutely unjust and arbitrary but tilted with mala-fides. It has been submitted that though there is no power of rejection of nomination (disqualified) before the date of withdrawal, the said decision is absolutely without the authority of law. It has further been submitted that the learned District Judge has not appreciated the real controversy which is involved in the present proceedings and has not granted the relief as prayed for in section 9 proceeding which is also a material error of exercising jurisdiction and looking to the urgency of the situation, this Court is requested to grant the interim respite. 5. To substantiate the contention, learned advocate, Mr. Unwala in brief has submitted that in view of the provisions contained under the by-laws/rules and regulations governing the election of association, starting point of right to contest the election would be after the display of final list of candidates and this issue could not have been mixed up with the validity of nomination. Mr. Unwala in brief has submitted that in view of the provisions contained under the by-laws/rules and regulations governing the election of association, starting point of right to contest the election would be after the display of final list of candidates and this issue could not have been mixed up with the validity of nomination. Mr. Unwala has submitted that since the decision of the Scrutiny Committee about validity of nomination papers shall be treated as final, the declaration about disqualifying the nomination is beyond the scope of the Scrutiny Committee. By relying upon sub-clause (iv) of clause (d) reflecting on page 37, Mr. Unwala has suggested that only three contingencies which are prescribed are the relevant consideration for declaring the nomination papers as invalid and no other contingency is prescribed whereof the nomination of appellants could be declared as invalid. There is no embargo according to the learned advocate to fill in nomination papers for multiple posts and in any case it is the appellants, who immediately on 19th February, 2019 at 16.15 hours, have withdrawn their respective nomination for relevant posts which are reflecting from page 55 onwards and as this withdrawal has taken place at the instance of appellants themselves, there was power available with the Scrutiny Committee to indicate that nomination to be declared as disqualified. This distinction has not been appreciated by the learned court below and as such the order deserves to be corrected by granting the relief as prayed for in the appeal. Mr. Unwala has further drawn the attention to the stages of process of election and has reiterated that so long as the date of withdrawal is 22nd February, 2019, it is not open to declare nomination as disqualified without giving a fair chance of withdrawal or to take decision for withdrawal before 22nd February. Mr. Unwala has further drawn the attention to the "prescription of nomination" as spelt out in clause(d) of the rules governing the election and has submitted that the decision could not have been taken much before. Mr. Unwala has further submitted that a right to contest is commencing from the date of declaration of final list and there was hardly any reason validly available to disqualify the nomination of the appellants. Mr. Unwala has further submitted that a right to contest is commencing from the date of declaration of final list and there was hardly any reason validly available to disqualify the nomination of the appellants. With a view to strengthen the submission, the learned advocate for the appellants has relied upon few decisions and has thereby contended that contest comes always after the date of withdrawal and it is relatable to the finalization of list. The said decisions are in the case of Shri Umed Vs. Raj Singh and Others reported in, (1975) 1 SCC 76 (para 18) in the case of K. Kamaraja Nadar Vs. Kunju Thevar and Others, (1958) AIR SC 687 (para 15) and decision of the Coordinate Bench dated 24.11.2015 delivered in Special Civil Application No.19046 of 2015 reported in 2015(0) AIJEL-HC 233432 and after referring to these decisions, the learned advocate has requested that this is a fit case in which equitable relief deserves to be granted. A further reliance is also placed on a recent decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Marutiben Dhudabhai Gamar (supra) and has requested that since there is a strong prima facie and balance of convenience is also in favour of the appellants, the relief of injunction deserves to be granted, otherwise, there is a likelihood of creation of irreversible situation which will mar the prospect of getting fair contest in election. It has been contended that in any case, the disqualification has already taken place prior to giving of an application on 19th by the appellants and for that, neither any opportunity of hearing is given nor even a representation is given and as such, the learned advocate has submitted that such decision unilaterally being taken is dehors the very basic proposition of law on granting of appropriate opportunity. To substantiate this submission, the learned advocate has further submitted that even the main Statute about election process i.e. Representation of Peoples Act has also envisaged the procedure of grant of opportunity to the candidate and by referring to section 36(5), the proviso whereof has suggested the concept of opportunity and having not done so here, the decision is in violation of principles of natural justice. The learned advocate has further submitted that here is a case in which the withdrawal from another post is already submitted to the authority well in time but the authority with mala fide intent appears to have taken the decision of nomination paper being declared as disqualified prior to it and as such, as a part of pre-meditated design against the appellants, a fair chance of contest is deprived of which is against the basic democratic principles, hence, in no case, the action is treated as valid. 6. The learned advocate has further submitted that it is absolutely in mala-fide exercise of power that a decision is taken and this aspect has not at all been considered by the court below by passing the order dated 22.2.2019 and hence, this material irregularity in exercising jurisdiction deserves to be corrected, by quashing and setting aside the same and consequently, the relief prayed for in an application under section 9 deserves to be granted. The learned advocate has submitted that in any case, since it is apparent violation of rule itself and the action apparently is tilted with mala fides, the relief prayed for be granted in the interest of justice. By harping upon the decision of the Division Bench of this Court, it has been reiterated that the relief prayed for may be granted in the interest of justice and alternatively, it has been requested that till the arbitral proceedings are being initiated, at least subject to the outcome, without creating any equity, the appellants' name be placed in the final list and they may be allowed to contest the election for their left out respective posts so that no irreversible situation be created and after making such request, the learned advocate has requested the Court to pass suitable order in the interest of justice. No other submissions have been made. 7. To counter the submissions made by the learned advocate for the appellants, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Shalin Mehta appearing with learned advocate, Mr. Ishan Mihir Patel for the contesting respondent Nos.1,2, and 3, has vehemently contended that from the beginning, nomination filled in for two posts since is not contemplated, the same was rightly rejected by the authority. 7. To counter the submissions made by the learned advocate for the appellants, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. Shalin Mehta appearing with learned advocate, Mr. Ishan Mihir Patel for the contesting respondent Nos.1,2, and 3, has vehemently contended that from the beginning, nomination filled in for two posts since is not contemplated, the same was rightly rejected by the authority. It has been submitted that rules governing election are absolutely making it clear that it is not open for a candidate to contest for the post of President as well as that of Executive Committee Member. By referring to Clause (d) dealing with nomination reflecting on page 36, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that a member can contest either for the post of President or for the post of Executive Committee Member but not for more than one post. Sub-clause (ii) contained in clause (d) reflecting on page 36 is making it absolutely clear that there is no error committed by the Scrutiny Committee to reject the nomination. It has been submitted that clause (vi) reflecting on page 37 is further making it clear that any candidate whose nomination has been declared as valid may withdraw his candidature. This is suggestive of the fact that only valid nominations are permitted to be withdrawn on the day which has been fixed. Whereas in the instant case, the claim which has been made by the appellants is based upon invalid nomination which is dehors the rules framed for conducting of election. It has further been contended that process of election has already been commenced and, therefore, in view of settled position of law propounded by series of decisions, only in rare case, the Court can exercise jurisdiction and according to learned Senior Advocate, this is not such a case in which once the process of election has started, any interception is permissible. He has further submitted that the decision of the Scrutiny Committee shall be treated to be final and the appellants are bound by the said decision. 8. Learned Senior Advocate has then invited the attention of this Court to rules 16 and 17 reflecting on page 33 of the petition compilation and has submitted that these rules and regulations are binding upon the association as well as members. 8. Learned Senior Advocate has then invited the attention of this Court to rules 16 and 17 reflecting on page 33 of the petition compilation and has submitted that these rules and regulations are binding upon the association as well as members. Hence, once these rules are to be observed by the appellants, the filing of petition itself is impermissible and that too, when the Scrutiny Committee's decision is to be treated as final. In any case, in view of the settled position of law, a specific statutory mechanism is available to ventilate the grievance in connection with the process of election, since a remedy of arbitration is provided under the rule itself and for that purpose, the learned Senior Advocate has invited the attention to rule 16 of the rules which is reflecting on page 33. It has further been contended that the overall reading of the clauses contained in the rules would lead to a situation where multiple nominations are not permissible and here, undisputedly, the appellants did file nominations for multiple posts. That being so, the action cannot be said to be unjust or arbitrary in any manner. Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that the order in question passed by the District Court is also not reflecting any perversity and hence, in the absence of any material irregularity or perversity, even if another view is possible, the same cannot be substituted in an appellate proceeding. It has further been contended that the reliance which has been placed on a decision delivered by the Division Bench of this Court, the facts are altogether different wherein the Court opined on the issue of fact of Rule 15. Hence, in no case, the stand taken by the appellants is permissible. Learned Senior Advocate has further submitted that even assuming without admitting that ratio laid down has some bearing but in view of the decision delivered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Narmada Bachao Andolan and Ors. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in, (2011) 7 SCC 639 one additional fact would make a world of difference in applying the principle of precedence. By relying upon para 59, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed and not entertainable at this stage of the proceedings. Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Ors. reported in, (2011) 7 SCC 639 one additional fact would make a world of difference in applying the principle of precedence. By relying upon para 59, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that the petition deserves to be dismissed and not entertainable at this stage of the proceedings. Lastly, learned Senior Advocate has submitted that concept of hearing is not to be applied in the election proceedings especially when the Election Statutes are to be strictly construed and unless and until an opportunity clause is provided, the appellants cannot expect such grant of opportunity. Whereas here in the instant case, the Scrutiny Committee's decision is to be treated as final and there is no room for giving opportunity as prescribed. As a result of this, even the submission of learned advocate for the appellants about violation of principles of natural justice is not available. Learned Senior Advocate has further contended that filing of nomination and contesting election are interlinked to each other and as such, when the contest is not permissible for more than one post, it presupposes that filing of nomination of more than one post is also not envisaged in the rule. Resultantly, it is not open for the appellants to submit that the decision is erroneous. In any case, since the order which has been questioned in the proceedings is a well reasoned order, based upon application of mind and after relying the decision delivered by the Court, there is hardly any scope made out by the appellants for exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Learned Senior Advocate after placing reliance upon the aforesaid decision of Narmada Bachao Andolan (supra) has requested the Court not to grant any relief to the appellants. 9. Having heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties and having gone through the materials produced on record, no doubt the Election Statutes are to be construed strictly and it is a general proposition of law laid down by decisions that normally once the process of election commenced, no interference is permissible. However, in a case of a peculiar nature, even a manifest error or malice is reflecting, the High Court's powers are not meant to ignore such act of the authority which is detrimental to the interest of the appellants. However, in a case of a peculiar nature, even a manifest error or malice is reflecting, the High Court's powers are not meant to ignore such act of the authority which is detrimental to the interest of the appellants. Here is the case in which it apparently reflects that there is no express provision prescribed not permitting filing of nomination for more than one post. The filing of nomination offering candidature is quite distinct from contesting the election. The entire reading of clauses pertaining to rules of election is not indicating anything about express bar of filing of nomination for multiple posts and as such, it appears that the authority has acted without application of mind. It further appears from the record that Schedule of Election is specifically prescribing the stages of process of election and one such significant date is the date of withdrawal of nomination. Since the Schedule of Election is very much relevant, the same is reproduced hereinafter: "Hypothetically, assuming that the first Wednesday of March, the day of election in the year of election falls on 5th, the schedule of election process shall be as under: Date of invitation of nomination ............21st January Last date of receiving nomination ............17th February Last date for displaying list of candidates ............19th February Last date for withdrawal of nomination ............22nd February Last date for displaying final list of candidates ............24th February Date of election .....................................5th March" 10. Two dates are very relevant from this schedule one, the last date of displaying list of candidates, which is 19th February and another stage is the last date of withdrawal of nomination, which is 22nd February. A perusal of the record indicates that possibly having realized or on an inclination, a specific letter is written on 19th February, 2019 at 16.15 hours which appears to have been acknowledged by the authority at 4.30 p.m. on that very day in which the appellants have withdrawn their nomination for the relevant one post. Now this has been undisputedly received by the authority on the day when displaying of list of candidates is scheduled. The affidavit-in-reply which has been filed has clearly asserted on oath that on the morning of 18th February, 2019, the names of the members have been displayed on the notice board i.e. before the day which has been scheduled, as per the election programme. 11. The affidavit-in-reply which has been filed has clearly asserted on oath that on the morning of 18th February, 2019, the names of the members have been displayed on the notice board i.e. before the day which has been scheduled, as per the election programme. 11. Further, when on 19th February, 2019, a request is made in writing to withdraw for one respective post for the appellants as mentioned in it, the said withdrawal request was well in time i.e. on or before 22nd February, 2019 and surprisingly, the authority has put a foot note that nomination is already rejected being disqualified. So, this decision apparently is preceding the date of withdrawal of nomination which in considered opinion of this Court is not permissible. The reason is that there is no express prohibition under the rules for filing of nomination for more than one post and hence, a right is conferred upon a candidate to exercise the option of withdrawal upto 22nd February, 2019 and undisputedly, prior to that date, for one post, the respective appellants have already withdrawn the nomination and as such, for another alternate post left out, the right to contest is very much available to the appellants. Additionally, it is also appearing that the appellants have never been given an opportunity before disqualifying the nomination and apart from this, even no reason is reflecting from the said decision which is reflecting at a foot note on communication dated 19th February, 2019 and as a result of this, the Scrutiny Committee in an arbitrary manner appears to have rejected the nomination. 12. The conjoint reading of the relevant clauses contained in the rules more particularly clause(d) is making it clear that a prohibition is mentioned to contest for more than one post at a time. Now the word 'contest' is quite different from filing of nomination. A conjoint reading of sub-clause(i) of clause (d) as well as sub-clauses (ii),(iii), (iv), (v) and (vi) makes it clear that a candidate can contest election either for the post of President or for the post of Executive Committee Member and not for more than one post at a time, but there is no embargo for filing up nomination for more than one post and in any case, the decision is taken before the actual date of withdrawal. This tantamounts to be an arbitrary and impermissible act and the Court would not like to endorse upon it simply on the ground of alternative remedy after the process of election is available. In the light of the aforesaid factual background which is prevailing on record, the judgments have been relied upon by the learned advocate for the appellants to indicate that contest starts after the last stage of process of election i.e. displaying of final list of candidates. The expression "contesting candidate" interpreted by the Hon'ble Apex Court is that a candidate whose name was included in the list of contesting candidates published by the Returning Officer. This publication must be interlinked with the final list of candidates. Certain observations contained in paragraph 16 of the decision of Hon'ble Apex Court which is reported in AIR 1958 Supreme Court page 687 since relevant are reproduced hereinafter: "16. It will be helpful in this context to survey the scheme of the Act in regard to the conduct of elections, contained in Part V of the Act. Under S. 30 as soon as the notification calling upon a constituency to elect a member or members is issued, the Election Commission is to appoint. (1) the last date for making nominations, (2) the date for the scrutiny of nominations, (3) the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures, (4) the date or dates on which a poll shall, if necessary, be taken, and (5) the date before which the election is to be completed. A candidate for election has to be validly nominated to start with and after such nominations are made the Returning Officer is to hold a scrutiny of nominations on the appointed day. Immediately after all the nomination papers have been scrutinized and decisions accepting or rejecting the same have been recorded by the Returning Officer, he is to prepare a list of validly nominated candidates and affix it to his notice board. Any of these candidates may, however, withdraw his candidature on or before the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures and the Returning Officer is enjoined on receiving a notice of withdrawal to cause the same to be affixed in some conspicuous place in his office. Any of these candidates may, however, withdraw his candidature on or before the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures and the Returning Officer is enjoined on receiving a notice of withdrawal to cause the same to be affixed in some conspicuous place in his office. Section 38 provides that immediately after the expiry of the period within which candidatures may be withdrawn as aforesaid the returning officer is to prepare and publish a list of contesting candidates, that is to say, candidates who were included in the list of validly nominated candidates and who have not withdrawn their candidatures within the said period. Section 52 provides for the consequences of death of a candidate before the poll and says that if a contesting candidate dies and a report of his death is received before the commencement of poll the returning officer upon being satisfied of the fact of the death is to countermand the poll and thereupon all proceedings with reference to the election are to commence a new in all respects as if for a new election. There are however two provisos to this section : (1) that no further nomination is necessary in the case of a person who was a contesting candidate at the time of the countermanding of the poll and (2) that no person who has given a notice of withdrawal of his candidature under S. 37 (1) or a notice of retirement from the contest under S. 55A (2) before the countermanding of the poll is ineligible for being nominated as a candidate for the election after such countermanding. Section 53 and 54 prescribe the procedure in contested and uncontested elections. If the number of contesting candidates is more than the number of seats to be filled a poll is to be taken; if the number of such candidates is equal to the number of seats to be filled, the returning officer is to forthwith declare all such candidates to be duly elected to fill these seats and if the number of such candidates is less than the number of seats to be filled, the returning officer is to forthwith declare all such candidates to be elected and the Election Commission is to call upon the constituency to elect a person or persons to fill the remaining seat or seats. Section 55A provides for retirement from contest at elections in Parliamentary and Assembly constituencies, and the consequences thereof. Under S. 55A (2) a contesting candidate may retire from the contest by a notice in the prescribed form delivered in the manner therein specified and the returning officer upon receiving such notice of retirement is to cause a copy thereof to be affixed to his notice board and also to be published in the manner prescribed. Sub-s. (5) enacts a legal fiction. It states that any person who has given a notice of retirement under sub-s. (2) shall thereafter be deemed not to be a contesting candidate for the purposes of S. 52. Sub-ss. (6) and (7) provide for the consequences of such retirement on the poll. Before such retirement the list of contesting candidates prepared by the returning officer under S. 38 is to determine whether there should be a poll or not. Sections 53 and 54 of the Act provide for all possibilities but if by reason of the number of contesting candidates being more than the number of seats to be filled a poll has to be taken and one or more of such contesting candidates retire before the commencement of the poll leaving in the field only such number of candidates as is equal to the number of seats to be filled, sub-ss. (6) of (7) provide that the returning officer is to forthwith declare all the remaining contesting candidates to be duly elected to fill those seats and countermand the poll." 13. Yet another decision which has been brought to the notice of this Court is a decision reported in (1975) 1 Supreme Court Cases page 76. The relevant observations contained in paras 18, 34 and 35 are reproduced hereinafter since the same have relevance: "18. The third question raised by Mr. Sibal on behalf of the appellant is that the provision of Section 123 (1) (A) (a) which speaks of "withdrawal from being a candidate" at the election is inapplicable to a situation where a candidate retires from the contest after the date fixed for the withdrawal of his candidature. In making this submission he admits that he is flying in the face of a recent decision of this court in Mohd. Yunus Saleem v. Shivkumar Sastri, (1974) AIR SC 1218 a decision to which one of us (Bhagwati, J.) was a party. In making this submission he admits that he is flying in the face of a recent decision of this court in Mohd. Yunus Saleem v. Shivkumar Sastri, (1974) AIR SC 1218 a decision to which one of us (Bhagwati, J.) was a party. The judgment of the court was delivered by Goswami, J. It was hold in that case that the expression "to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate" cannot be confined to the stage where the law permits a candidate to withdraw from the election. It was observed that the expression is of wide amplitude to include a subsequent withdrawal or non-withdrawal even at the last stage prior to the poll. It was held that the word ''withdraw'' is comprehensive enough to also connote "retire from contest". In that case an allegation had been made that one Surendra Kumar, the alleged financier of the B.K.D. Party, had offered to pay Rupees 30,000/- to Rs. 35,000/- to a candidate named Malan if the latter would withdraw from the contest and that one Shastri had similarly told Malan that if he withdrew from the contest he would recommend him for a seat in the Legislative Council. Thereupon Malan told them that he had no need of money and as regards the seat in the Council, that was for the future to decide, but as they were all asking him to withdraw, he would comply. It was alleged that the above offer or promise which had been made was at the instance of Shiv Kumar who had been elected to the Lok Sabha defeating the rival candidate Mohd. Yunus Saleem who was the election petitioner. Two questions arose for consideration- (i) whether there was any such offer or promise with a view to induce Malan to withdraw from the contest and (ii) whether even assuming that gratification was offered to Malan to induce him to withdraw from contesting the election, that would amount to a corrupt practice in view of the fact that this offer of gratification had been made after the date of withdrawal of the candidature. On facts, the court held that there was no such offer or promise of gratification, on which finding it was not really necessary to consider the second question. On facts, the court held that there was no such offer or promise of gratification, on which finding it was not really necessary to consider the second question. But it appears that since that point was also pressed the court came to the conclusion that it was unable to accept the submission that even if the facts alleged be established, there can be no corrupt practice within the meaning of Section 123 (1) (A) (a) of the Act when as a result of the gratification the candidate retired from the contest after the date of withdrawal of candidature. It appears to us that having regard to the history of legislation with regard to the expression "withdrawal of candidature" which was unfortunately not brought to the notice of the court, the law as laid down is not quite correct. One of us (Bhagwati, J.) has shown separately how that view is not really sustainable. We are quite aware of the fact that even as the point need not have been decided in the former judgment it need not he decided in this judgment, because on facts we have come to the conclusion that there was no payment to Chatru. But since the view taken in Mohd. Yunus's case is binding on the High Courts it has become necessary for us to review that decision." "34. That takes us to the second part of clause (a) which requires to be construed in the present case. The question which arises for consideration is what is the true scope and meaning of the words "to withdraw or not to withdraw from being a candidate" in this clause. It was common ground between the parties that these words cover a situation where a validly nominated candidate withdraws his candidature under Section 37 by giving a notice in writing on or before the last date fixed for the withdrawal of candidatures. But the controversy was as to whether they include something more. Do they apply to a situation where, after the last date for the withdrawal of candidatures under Section 37 is past, a contesting candidate announces that he does not wish to contest the election, or in other words, retires from the contest, or to use a more colloquial expression, sits down? The appellant contended that they do not, while the first respondent asserted the contrary. 35. The appellant contended that they do not, while the first respondent asserted the contrary. 35. In the first place, let us see what the words "to withdraw being a candidate" mean according to their plain natural sense. This Court in Mohd. Yunus Saleems case, (1974) AIR SC 1218 relied on the dictionary meaning of the word 'withdraw', namely, "to go away or retire from the field of battle or any contest". But it must be noted that the word 'withdraw' does not stand alone. It is part of a composite expression. The crucial words are "to withdraw - from being a candidate". They clearly indicate that what is contemplated is cesser or termination of the state of being a candidate. When a person withdraws from being a candidate, he ceases to be a candidate; he is no more a candidate. 'This meaning is considerably strengthened if we look at clause (b) (i), which uses the expression ''having withdrawn ....... his candidature'' and clause (B) (b), which uses the expression "to withdraw ....... his candidature" to denote the same idea. Now, the only mode in which a candidate can withdraw his candidature and cease to be a candidate is that set out in Section 37. Until the last date for withdrawal of candidatures, he has a locus paenitentiae and he can withdraw from being a candidate by giving a notice in writing to that effect under Section 37. But once that date is past, he becomes a "contesting candidate" and then he has no choice. He is irrevocably and irretrievably in the contest. No subsequent change of mind can help him to get out of the fight. It is then futile for him to announce that he does not wish to contest the election or he has retired from the contest. Whether he likes it or not, whether he energises himself or not, whether he actively campaigns or not, he remains a contesting candidate and the voters can cast their votes for him and even elect him, despite himself. He cannot, therefore, cease to be a contesting candidate and if that be so, it must follow a fortiori that he cannot withdraw his candidature or withdraw from being a candidate, once the last date for withdrawal of candidatures under Section 37 is gone." 14. He cannot, therefore, cease to be a contesting candidate and if that be so, it must follow a fortiori that he cannot withdraw his candidature or withdraw from being a candidate, once the last date for withdrawal of candidatures under Section 37 is gone." 14. The purpose of withdrawal is a mode in which a candidate can withdraw his candidature and ceases to be a candidate for a particular post and until the last date of withdrawal of candidature, he has a locus penitentiae and can withdraw from being a candidate by giving a notice in writing to that effect and as such, if above observations in the context of case on hand are to be seen, it would be quite clear that in writing for one post, the respective appellants have withdrawn their candidatures well within time i.e. prior to 22nd February. That being so, to construe the nomination as invalid much prior to the scheduled date of opportunity to withdraw is a decision not sustainable in the eye of law since there was a purpose behind prescribing the stage of withdrawal of nomination. 15. The aforesaid situation has led to a conclusion that action of disqualifying the nomination on a day previous to the scheduled date and that too in a manner which it has been conveyed is impermissible in law and an arbitrary act whether to be allowed to continue which may lead to irreversible situation for the appellants is a question before the Court. This is more to be considered by the Court from the fact that though immediate request was made to constitute an Arbitral Tribunal for examining the grievance of the appellants, the respondents have chosen not to respond to such repeated requests which ultimately led the appellants to invoke section 9 jurisdiction of the District Court. Unfortunately, it appears that the District Court under the general principle has ignored this crucial situation by misconstruing the clause contained in the rules of election. The finding which has been arrived at by the District Court is quite contrary to conjoint reading of rules. It is clearly out of place to read that filing of nomination for more than one post is prohibited under the rules. The finding which has been arrived at by the District Court is quite contrary to conjoint reading of rules. It is clearly out of place to read that filing of nomination for more than one post is prohibited under the rules. The candidate is prevented from contesting election for more than one post but if he has filled in nomination for more than one post, there is a specific stage prescribed for withdrawal of nomination i.e. 22nd February and as such, the conclusion which has been arrived at that rule is prohibiting from filling up nomination is a perverse finding, not in the spirit of rules which are apparently suggesting a different conclusion. The reasons which are assigned are not possible to be accepted and as such, in view of the appellate jurisdiction being wide enough to correct the serious mistake committed by the court below, this Court is of the opinion that the order dated 22nd February, 2019 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. In view of the aforesaid situation, the Court is confronted with a situation whether at this stage, any interference can be made or not and for that purpose, the Court has an assistance of a decision which is delivered by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Marutiben Dhudabhai Gamar Vs. State Election Commission reported in, 2018 AIJELHC 239136. Of course, the Court was dealing with the issue in writ jurisdiction but the fact that at a stage of nomination, on account of apparent discrepancy, the Court has held that interference can be made. In the said case also, there was a decision of scrutiny of form on 9th February, 2000 itself. Despite having alternative remedy, the Court appears to have corrected the mistake. In the instant case, having found a situation of a peculiar nature in which in a democratic set up, by an arbitrary decision, a fair contest is prohibited, the Court, instead of sitting as a mute spectator, is of the view that this is a fit case in which the interim relief as prayed for deserves to be granted. 17. The overall circumstance which is reflecting is leading to a situation where apparently the action of the respondent authority is found to be not only unjust and arbitrary but appears to be schemy. 17. The overall circumstance which is reflecting is leading to a situation where apparently the action of the respondent authority is found to be not only unjust and arbitrary but appears to be schemy. The manner of displaying of list on the previous day of the scheduled date of 19th, the manner of disqualifying nomination prior to the date of withdrawal of nomination and the manner in which the request for arbitration is shunted of are the circumstances which are not possible to be ignored by this Court. The very purpose of entrustment of power of a Court under section 9 of Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is to prevent immediate and apparent illegality and to see that no permanent damage can take place. Here is the case in which no doubt the remedy is provided to ventilate the grievance but after the entire process of election is over. This remedy is not possible to be construed to permit apparent illegality to be continued during the process. The learned District Court has not examined this aspect and appears to have completely misread the rules pertaining to election. The Court is of the opinion that exercise of jurisdiction by the District Court is perverse, based on misconstruction of the scheme of election and resultantly the order deserves to be quashed and set aside. The normal circumstance would definitely lead in favour of continuing the process of election but if that process of election is based upon a complete illegality, the process is not possible to be allowed to continue with this apparent illegality. Resultantly, the impugned order is required to be set aside. 18. The court below ought to have appreciated the object underlying the entrustment of power under section 9 in the Court. A party or a person is entitled to interim protection if the action of the other party is either in breach of the terms of agreement or 'militates' against equity, fair play or natural justice or otherwise and for extending protection, the pendency of arbitral proceedings is not a pre-condition in exercise of power by the Court. The Court may grant interim relief before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time thereafter. This literal meaning is clearly emerging from the language of section 9. The Court may grant interim relief before or during the arbitral proceedings or at any time thereafter. This literal meaning is clearly emerging from the language of section 9. Since the facts on hand are such and since the case is made out by the appellants, the Court is of the view that the learned trial judge ought to have exercised jurisdiction. Having failed to do so, this Court deemed it proper to entertain this appeal. 19. This is more so in view of the fact that there is a strong prima facie case reflecting on conjoint reading of rules of election on the issue made out and further if interim relief is not granted, the same tantamounts to be creating an irreversible situation for the appellants which may lead to multiplicity of proceedings. Since the aspects of balance of convenience and irreparable loss are also not having gone into by the District Court, the Court is inclined to consider the request of the appellants. Accordingly, the First Appeal is allowed in terms of prayer para 8(A). Resultantly, for effective implementation of the present order, the respondents are directed to take appropriate steps with immediate effect. There shall be no order as to costs. Consequently, Civil Application also stands disposed of.