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2019 DIGILAW 1856 (JHR)

Subhra Banerjee v. Union of India, through Secretary

2019-11-13

DEEPAK ROSHAN, H.C.MISHRA

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JUDGMENT : Heard the appellant in person, learned A.S.G.I. Mr. Rajiv Sinha for the Union of India, and learned senior counsel Sri Anil Kumar Sinha for the respondent Nos. 2 & 3. 2. The appellant is aggrieved by the impugned Judgment dated 13.07.2017, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in W.P.(S) No. 4098 of 2016, whereby the writ application filed by the appellant, challenging the order dated 18.04.2016, imposing major penalty of removal from service as Director (Personnel), from Heavy Engineering Corporation Ltd., Ranchi, (herein after referred to as ‘HEC Ltd.’), was dismissed by the Hon’ble Single Judge. In the said writ application, by filing I.A. No. 6888 of 2016, the appellant had also challenged the order dated 29.09.2016 passed by the Appellate Authority, dismissing his appeal, during the pendency of the writ application. 3. The facts of this case, as disclosed in the impugned Judgment, is that the appellant had joined as Director (Personnel) in HEC Ltd., in the year 2012. In the month of July 2014, he was placed under suspension. He remained in suspension for a pretty long period, which compelled him to move this Court in W.P.(S) No. 424 of 2015, against continuous suspension without the issuance of charge-sheet. The said writ application was dismissed vide order dated 15thApril, 2015. The appellant preferred L.P.A. No. 271 of 215 against the said order, which was disposed of with certain observations. Ultimately, the Articles of Charges were served upon the appellant, as contained in Annexure-7 to the memo of appeal, and he was put to departmental proceeding. The Articles of Charges read as follows:- "Article-I. - That Sri Subhra Banerjee, while functioning as Director (Personnel) in HEC Ltd. has shown gross and willful indiscipline and insubordination and confrontational attitude towards the then Chairman & Managing Director (CMD), defiance of his directions, with a view to undermine CMD's authority, thereby trying to upset the established organizational norms in HEC Ltd. Thus, by aforesaid Acts, he committed misconduct under Rule 5(5), 5(6), 5(9) & 5(20) of the HEC Employees' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981. Article-II. - That the said Sri Subhra Banerjee has been abrasive, highhanded in his behavior and vindictive in his actions and had taken targeted action against individuals on grounds of personal vendetta. Article-II. - That the said Sri Subhra Banerjee has been abrasive, highhanded in his behavior and vindictive in his actions and had taken targeted action against individuals on grounds of personal vendetta. His conduct has been subversive of discipline and good behavior, amounting to misconduct under Rule 5(20) of the HEC Employees' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981. Article-III. - That the said Sri Subhra Banerjee has failed in discharge of his duties by failing to maintain harmonious industrial relations in the Corporation and his conduct has been prejudicial to the interest of the Company, amounting to misconduct under Rule 5(5) of the HEC Employees' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981. "Article-IV. - Sri Subhra Banerjee, Director (Personnel) HEC Limited scolded, abused, humiliated and threatened Sri R.P. Sinha, SDGM (vig.), HEC Limited on two occasions in the past. He also threatened and repeatedly scolded Sh. G.K. Yadav, SDGM I/c HTI & HRD and also pressurized him to impose penalty as disciplinary authority on Sh. Laldeo Singh, Vice President, Hatia Kamgar Union. He has been instrumental in interruption and slowing down the investigation being conducted by vigilance Department of HEC Ltd. by way of non-cooperation and using offensive language casting aspersions of Vigilance officials and questioning their authority/motive for queries sent for inquiry into investigation. Even while being on suspension he visited HEC premises and intimidated and threatened Sr. DGM (township) Shri Nagesh Jha for submitting a written affidavit to the CVO. Thus, by his aforesaid acts, Sh. S. Banerjee, Director (Personnel) committed gross misconduct under Rule 5(5), 5(9), 5(20) & 5(26) of the HEC Employees' Conduct Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981." 4. In the departmental proceeding, evidences from both sides were adduced, both oral and documentary, and upon the departmental enquiry, the first, third and fourth articles of charges were found to be fully proved, whereas the second article of charge was found to be partly proved. In the departmental proceeding, evidences from both sides were adduced, both oral and documentary, and upon the departmental enquiry, the first, third and fourth articles of charges were found to be fully proved, whereas the second article of charge was found to be partly proved. After following the due procedure, the Disciplinary Authority passed the order of major penalty of 'Removal from service which shall not be a disqualification for future employment under Government or the Corporation/Company owned or controlled by the Government', in terms of Rule 23(i) of H.E.C. Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981, by order dated 18.04.2016, as contained in Annxure-7 to the memo of appeal, and the appeal filed by the appellant against the said order, also stood dismissed by the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 29.09.2016, as contained in Annxure-9 to the Memo of Appeal. 5. Before proceeding to the rival contentions of the parties, it would be noteworthy to note Rule 32 of the HEC Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981, which provides that appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority specified in the Schedule, and shall be submitted to the authority, whose order is appealed against. The authority, whose order is appealed against, shall forward the appeal together with its comments and records of the case to the Appellate Authority, whereupon the Appellate Authority is to pass the order. The Schedule appended to the aforesaid Rules shows that for the Director of HEC Ltd., i.e., the rank which the appellant held in the Company, the Appointing Authority, the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority, as well as the Reviewing Authority, are all the President of India. In the present case, the Disciplinary Order was passed by order and in the name of President of India, whereas the Appellate Order is shown to have the approval of the Minister of Heavy Industry & Public Enterprises, Government of India. 6. In the present case, the Disciplinary Order was passed by order and in the name of President of India, whereas the Appellate Order is shown to have the approval of the Minister of Heavy Industry & Public Enterprises, Government of India. 6. In order dated 26.06.2019, this Court had opined that the punishment order and the appellate order have to be passed by separate authorities, though the orders may state that they are issued in the name of President of India, but we were unable to decipher from the punishment order as well as Appellate Authority's order as to who are the actual authorities who had passed the orders, as it was the case of the appellant that both these orders had been passed only by the Minister of Heavy Industry & Public Enterprises, Government of India. We directed learned A.S.G.I. to bring on record on affidavit as to which authority had passed the punishment order and the appellate order. A supplementary counter affidavit has been filed by the Union of India, bringing on record the counter-affidavit filed before the Writ Court, in which it is stated as follows:- "(ii) In the instant case, the Disciplinary Authority is the President of India and Hon’ble Minister (HI&PE) has acted on behalf of President of India, as per the delegation of Power. As a principle, Appeal does not lie against any order made by the President because Appellate Authority would be higher in rank than the Disciplinary Authority. However, in case when the President is the Disciplinary Authority as in the case of CMD/Directors in the Company, there cannot be two separate Authorities, i.e., there cannot be any Authority higher than the President to act an Appellate Authority. (iii) Since, there was ambiguity in the instant case as to whether Appeal would lie in case or not, the matter was referred to CVO, Department of Heavy Industry and he has opined that no Appeal lies against the order of the President. CVO, Department, further stated that since CDA rules of the HEC do not provide the clarity on the issue of Appeal against the order passed by the President as Disciplinary Authority, the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules may be followed. CVO, Department, further stated that since CDA rules of the HEC do not provide the clarity on the issue of Appeal against the order passed by the President as Disciplinary Authority, the provisions of the Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules may be followed. (iv) Since, in the Company matters, Central Civil Services (Classification Control and Appeal) Rules are not applicable, the matter was referred by the Department of Heavy Industry to Department of Legal Affairs for seeking their advice. However, Department of Legal Affairs had asked the Department to consult the Department of Personnel & Training for taking a decision in the matter. (v) On the advice of Department of Legal Affairs, the matter was referred to Department of Personnel & Training (DoP&T) for seeking their advice on the issue as to whether Appeal in the instant case lies or not because President is the Disciplinary Authority in the instant case. DoP&T had reiterated the views of Vigilance section of the Department i.e. no Appeal lies against any order made by the President. (vi)The issue was again examined extensively in the context of provisions of Appeal under HEC, CDA Rules, 1981. Rule 32 CDA Rules of HEC (Annexure-II) Provides that (vii) “An appeal shall be preferred within one month from the date of communication of the order appealed against. The appeal shall be addressed to the Appellate Authority specified in the Schedule and submitted authority whose order is appealed against. The authority whose order is appealed against, shall forwarded the appeal together with its comments and the records of the case to the Appellate Authority within 15 days. The Appellate Authority shall consider whether the findings are justify or whether the penalty is excessive or inadequate and pass appropriate orders (within three months of the date of appeal). The Appellate Authority may pass order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. (viii) ….. ….. ….. ….. The Appellate Authority may pass order confirming, enhancing, reducing or setting aside the penalty or remitting the case to the authority which imposed the penalty or to any other authority with such direction as it may deem fit in the circumstances of the case. (viii) ….. ….. ….. ….. (ix) In order to comply the provisions of the CDA Rules of HEC and also to have a natural justice in this case, it was decided by the Department to place the appeal of the petitioner before the Hon’ble Minister for Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises on behalf of President for consideration. Accordingly, the Appeal was considered by the Hon’ble Minister for Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises and the decision was communicated to the petitioner vide order dated 29.09.2016 (Annexure-IV). The Appeal of the petitioner was rejected/disposed off by the Appellate Authority on the ground “……… that the submissions/appeal are repetitive and no new facts or evidence has been adduced. The change of misconduct against him were therefore found to be proved after affording him full opportunity at all stages of the disciplinary proceedings. Therefore, the major penalty of removal of service stands and accordingly his appeal dated 02.05.2016 is rejected and disposed of.” " 7. In essence, the contention of the Union of India is that against the disciplinary order passed in the name of the President of India, there is no other remedy against the said order, and the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority is final, since there can be no authority higher than the President of India, to exercise the appellate authority. It is also stated that in view Rule 32 of the HEC Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981, and for compliance of the principles of natural justice, the Department placed the appeal of the appellant before the Minister for Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises, for consideration on behalf of the President of India, and that appeal was also rejected. 8. It may further be noted that while this matter was being heard on 7.8.2019, it was pointed out to us that the evidences of the defence witnesses examined by the appellant during the departmental proceeding, were discarded by the Enquiry Officer, just stating that the defence witnesses are the interested parties for the reason that they are in the direct chain of command of the appellant. This Court had asked the learned A.S.G.I. to address us on that point also. Learned A.S.G.I. has taken us through a detailed enquiry report, to show that it is not a case in which there is no evidence against the appellant, rather there is evidence against the appellant, and some witnesses have deposed against the appellant. 9. The impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court shows that the Hon’ble Single Judge has dismissed the writ application filed by the appellant, holding that the Disciplinary Authority, after thorough scrutiny of the enquiry report, and upon being satisfied that the charges against the delinquent have been proved, has passed the punishment order, and the law is well settled that the High Court has a limited scope for interference in exercise of the judicial review. The Hon’ble Single Judge has dismissed the writ application relying upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. Vs. Man Mohan Nath Sinha &Anr., reported in (2009) 8 SCC 310 , laying down the law as follows:- "15. The legal position is well settled that the power of judicial review is not directed against the decision but is confined to the decision-making process. The court does not sit in judgment on merits of the decision. It is not open to the High Court to reappreciate and reappraise the evidence led before the inquiry officer and examine the findings recorded by the inquiry officer as a court of appeal and reach its own conclusions. -------------." 10. The appellant in person, has challenged the impugned Judgment passed by the Writ Court, as also the punishment order passed against him, submitting that the Writ Court has failed to take into consideration the fact that there was gross violation of the principles of natural justice in passing the punishment order against him, and the Disciplinary Authority had passed the punishment order without any application of mind, in a routine manner, inasmuch as, only the charges were reproduced and the punishment order was passed. The appellant in person also submitted that there was complete non-application of the Judicial mind, ignoring the relevant facts by the Enquiry Officer and also by the Disciplinary Authority, who has accepted the enquiry report, in spite of the fact that the evidence of the defence witnesses examined by the appellant, was not even discussed by the Enquiry Officer, and the Enquiry Officer had placed reliance only upon the prosecution witnesses, who were prejudiced against the appellant. The appellant in person wanted us to go into the actual appraisal of the evidence on record, which in view of the settled principles of law we cannot do. He also drew our attention towards the fact that after his joining in the Company, the revenue of the township of the HEC Ltd. had been increased manifold, and the unit which was running into loss, came in profit. The appellant also wanted us to look into his annual appraisal report to show that his appraisal by the Company was always very good. He has also submitted that taking into consideration the working of the appellant, on two occasions he was sent to Bangladesh by the Company for finalizing the deals in favour of the company, which were successfully done by him. The appellant has also submitted that only those witnesses were examined in the departmental proceeding, who were favourable to the prosecution, and who were nursing grudge against the appellant for various departmental actions taken against them. 11. We however, cannot look into these matters though pointed out by the appellant in person, in view of the settled principle of law that we cannot enter into reappraisal of the evidence on record, which was within the exclusive domain of the Disciplinary Authority or the Appellate Authority. Nothing has been pointed out to show any procedural lapse in the departmental proceeding, or to suggest that there was any violation of the principles of natural justice. 12. Learned A.S.G.I., on the other hand, has submitted that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority to reappraise the evidence on record, and if there is some evidence on record against the appellant, this Court cannot interfere in the order of the Disciplinary Authority, reappraising the evidence, as is normally done in appeal. 12. Learned A.S.G.I., on the other hand, has submitted that this Court cannot sit in appeal over the findings of the Disciplinary Authority to reappraise the evidence on record, and if there is some evidence on record against the appellant, this Court cannot interfere in the order of the Disciplinary Authority, reappraising the evidence, as is normally done in appeal. In this connection learned A.S.G.I. has place reliance upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. Vs. S. Sree Rama Rao, reported in AIR 1963 SC 1723 , which has also been followed in Man Mohan Nath Sinha's case (supra), laying down the law as follows:- "7. There is no warrant for the view expressed by the High Court that in considering whether a public officer is guilty of the misconduct charged against him, the rule followed in criminal trials that an offence is not established unless proved by evidence beyond reasonable doubt to the satisfaction of the Court, must be applied, and if that rule be not applied, the High Court in a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is competent to declare the order of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry invalid. The High Court is not constituted in a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution a Court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: It is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence. The High Court may undoubtedly interfere where the departmental authorities have held the proceedings against the delinquent in manner in consistent with the rules of natural justice or in violation of the statutory rules prescribing the mode of enquiry or where the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair decision by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and the merits of the case or by allowing themselves to be influenced by irrelevant considerations or where the conclusion on the very face of it is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at that conclusion, or on similar grounds. But the departmental authorities are, if the enquiry is otherwise properly held, the sole judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, and the adequacy or reliability of that evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the High Court in a proceeding for a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution." (Emphasis supplied). 13. Learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent No. 2 & 3, has adopted the arguments of the learned A.S.G.I. 14. However, in course of arguments, the appellant in person has drawn our attention towards a letter dated 10.12.2014, which is written by the Chairman-cum-Managing Director of the HEC Ltd., addressed to the Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Ministry of Heavy Industry & Public Enterprises, with reference to the suspension of the appellant and his appeal for revocation of suspension. The said letter had been adduced in evidence by the appellant before the Enquiry Officer and has also been mentioned in the list of the documents filed by the appellant, in the enquiry repot. The appellant has further submitted that this letter had been written by the CMD of Company under whom the appellant had worked for two long years, and the said CMD had written in detail as to how the appellant was being targeted by the persons against whom he had taken actions, and had recommended for revocation of his suspension and allowing his appeal. The appellant has submitted that this letter has neither been considered by the Enquiry Officer, nor by the Disciplinary or the Appellate Authorities. 15. The appellant has submitted that this letter has neither been considered by the Enquiry Officer, nor by the Disciplinary or the Appellate Authorities. 15. Having heard the appellant in person, and learned counsels of the respondents, we find that under the HEC Employees' Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1981, the appellant had one more remedy, by way of filing review against the order of the Appellate Authority. The appellant has not availed this remedy provided to him in the Rules. The Court is conscious of the fact that in case of the appellant, the Appointing Authority, the Disciplinary Authority, the Appellate Authority as well as the Reviewing Authority, all are the President of India. However, in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India, at one hand it is stated that all the authorities being the President of India, there is actually no remedy available to the officers of the rank of the appellant, against the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, but at the other hand, in the same counter-affidavit it is stated that following the provisions relating to the appeal in aforesaid Rules, and for following the principles of natural justice, the appeal filed by the appellant was again placed before the Hon’ble Minister for Heavy Industries & Public Enterprises for consideration on behalf of the President of India, which was considered and his appeal was again dismissed. 16. In that view of the matter, without interfering with the impugned orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority, as well as the Appellate Authority, we give an opportunity to the appellant to file the review before the Reviewing Authority, in the same manner he had filed his appeal. We are giving this liberty to the appellant, for the reason that we are prima-facie, of the view that the said letter dated 10.12.2014, was written by none else than the CMD of the same Company, and it required some consideration by the authorities concerned, which appears to have not been done. If any such review petition is filed, the Reviewing Authority shall take into consideration the aforesaid letter dated 10.12.2014 also, and shall pass appropriate orders in accordance with law. It would be appropriate that before passing any final order on the review petition filed by the appellant, if any, the appellant be given a personal hearing in the matter, if the Rules so permit. 17. It would be appropriate that before passing any final order on the review petition filed by the appellant, if any, the appellant be given a personal hearing in the matter, if the Rules so permit. 17. Otherwise, we do not find any merit in this appeal, and the same is accordingly dismissed, subject to the liberty and observations, as aforesaid.