JUDGMENT Dinesh Mehta, J. - The present appeal is directed against the order dated 22.05.2019, passed by the learned Additional District Judge, No.1, Jodhpur Metropolitan, Jodhpur (hereinafter referred to as 'the learned Trial Court'), vide which application for grant of temporary injunction filed by the appellant has been rejected. Succinctly stated the facts appertain to the present appeal are that: (1.1) The appellants-plaintiffs filed a suit in the representative capacity under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for and on behalf of general members of Purabia Sen Community. The plaintiffs' raised a grievance against the alleged irregularity in the election process of the Executive Committee of ¼Jh lsu dqy pkSjklh iqjfc;k I;km o cxsph laLFkk (hereinafter referred to as 'the Sanstha or the Society'), which is a body registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1958, with aims and objects of watching and guarding the interest of Sen Samaj and other objects enshrined in its Constitution. The plaintiffs asserted that as per the Constitution of the defendant Sen Sanstha, they being part of the Sen Community were entitled to become a member, but despite their persistent requests to the defendants, they were not inducted as members. It was contended that whenever the plaintiffs and other persons, contacted the defendants for membership, they adopted dilly-dellying tactics and said that the membership will be opened at the time of the election and intimation to this effect will be published in the newspaper. The defendants stated that once the notice is published, desirous persons can obtain form and become member after payment of requisite fee and recommendation of the Executive Committee. (1.2) The plaintiffs contended that the respondents got a notice dated 26.04.2019 published in the daily newspaper Dainik Navjyoti and requiring the members to pay an annual membership fee. (1.3) After going through such publication, the plaintiffs claim to be startled, as it contained a stipulation that the date for submitting application form and membership fee is extended till 02.05.2019, whereas no such notice inviting application for membership had ever been published. (1.4) It was asserted by the plaintiffs that on 30.04.2019, when other people including them contacted the defendants for becoming members, they got a response that the last date for furnishing the application form has since passed. (1.4) It was asserted by the plaintiffs that on 30.04.2019, when other people including them contacted the defendants for becoming members, they got a response that the last date for furnishing the application form has since passed. It was also pleaded by the plaintiffs that the defendants have intentionally not inducted the plaintiffs and hundreds of persons from the community who intend to become members and that the defendant society was in control of a handful of people. (1.5) With the above assertions, plaintiffs approached the Court by way of filing suit for declaration and permanent mandatory injunction for the following reliefs:- (1.6) Along with the suit so filed, the plaintiffs had also filed an application for grant of temporary injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of the Code and prayed as under:- (1.7) Reply to the temporary injunction application came to be filed by the defendants Nos.1 and 2 (President and Secretary of the defendant Sanstha) inter alia contending that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not bonafide and plaintiffs and their relatives had acted against the interest of the Society and that the suit filed under Order 1 Rule 8 of the Code was not maintainable, as the same was filed for personal vendetta and gains. It was also contended that detailed procedure has been provided in the Constitution of the Sanstha for induction of new members according to which certain members have been inducted and the last date of becoming member (02.05.2019) has already passed; electoral has been prepared; and the process of election has begun. The defendants denied all the allegations and averments made in the plaint in a mechanical manner. (1.8) The learned Trial Court, after hearing and considering the arguments of the concerned parties, rejected the application for temporary injunction, vide its detailed order dated 22.05.2019. The Trial Court, while deciding the first ingredient, i.e. prima facie case, noticed that the tenure of the Executive Committee of the Society, which was elected for three years, was going to expire on 31.05.2019 and the election program and notice dated 05.05.2019 has already been published in the daily newspaper dated 06.05.2019. Having noticed these facts, the Court below felt that no injunction can be granted, stalling the election process, in light of various judgments of the Supreme Court, referred in its order. Having noticed these facts, the Court below felt that no injunction can be granted, stalling the election process, in light of various judgments of the Supreme Court, referred in its order. (1.9) The learned Trial Court further observed that the relief sought in the suit and the application for temporary injunction is almost similar. The Court below thus held that the temporary injunction which amounts to final relief, cannot be granted while turning down the request for grant of temporary injunction. While discussing the pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial Court observed that both the parties have their own case(s) and the contentions raised by them can be determined only after recording the evidence and it was difficult to decipher at that stage of the suit, as to which parties' contentions are correct or more reliable. 2. Oppugning the order dated 22.05.2019 passed by the learned Trial court, Mr. Mehta learned counsel for the appellant- plaintiff contended that the learned Trial Court has seriously erred in rejecting the appellant's application for grant of temporary injunction, primarily being driven by the fact that the election process has been set in motion. He argued that the plaintiffs had approached the Court on 01.05.2019, with an assertion that regardless of the fact that the last date for becoming Member even as per the notice dated 26.04.2019, the defendants have refused to accept their forms to divert them of their right of induction as Members when they contacted them on 30.04.2019. He emphasized that there was enough material to substantiate the plaintiffs' apprehension that the defendants are going to proceed in high-handed manner in a bid to conduct elections, while blockading the way of desirous and eligible persons of the community from becoming members. He submitted that it was a fit case for grant of injunction, at least to the extent of directing the defendants to induct plaintiffs and other desirous members of the community as members and then hold elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Society. Mr. He submitted that it was a fit case for grant of injunction, at least to the extent of directing the defendants to induct plaintiffs and other desirous members of the community as members and then hold elections in accordance with the Constitution of the Society. Mr. Mehta contended that the learned Trial Court has relied upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court to conclude that the election process once commenced cannot be stalled; completely being oblivious of the fact that all the judgments cited by the defendants arose from the election disputes, which were either under Representation of Peoples Act or such as Parliamentary elections, Assembly elections, or under the other Constitutional provisions like Municipal elections and Panchayat elections, for which there is a constitutional embargo, to the effect that once the election process commences, the Courts cannot stay the process and the aggrieved person can question the irregularity/illegality during the election, only by way of election petitions. He argued that the elections in question are not governed by the provisions of the Constitution of India and hence there is/was no impediment in granting injunction as far as election of the defendant Society is concerned. He argued that the plaintiff has made out a clear and classic case of arbitrariness and irregularity by demonstrating that the defendants have practically closed the new membership for the common persons of the community. He argued that the defendants have not only denied the membership to the plaintiffs and other persons of the community, but have even refused to issue application form and accept requisite membership fee; they did not even publish a notice inviting application for the membership. 3. Mr. Mehta further argued that the Trial Court has erred in refusing to grant the application for temporary injunction, as according to it, the relief claimed in main suit and the application for temporary injunction were almost identical. He submitted that though there is a substantial difference in the prayers made in the main suit and the application for temporary injunction, yet in light of various authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court and this Court, there is no bar in the way of the Court to grant a relief in the form of mandatory injunction or relief while deciding application for temporary injunction, which may tantamount to final relief. He pointed out that the relief sought in the main suit was that the defendants be directed to issue notice to open the membership for all eligible persons of the Community and permit the plaintiff and other interested persons to become a member of the Sen Sanstha, before they proceed with the election and for the purpose of securing the final relief a request was made before the Trial Court to stay the forthcoming election of the Society, scheduled to be held on 26.05.2019. He submitted that when the application for temporary injunction was being argued before the Trial Court, the term of the existing Executive Committee had not expired and the Trial Court ought to have stayed the election for some time, till the desirous members of the Community became members of the Society. 4. With a view to bring the illegalities and irregularities committed by the defendants to fore, learned counsel read out the membership clause, viz., Clause 7 of the Constitution of the Society, and submitted that all major persons of Purabia Sen Community, on payment of membership fee of Rs.2/- or life membership-fee of Rs.101/-, are entitled to become ordinary or life member of the Society, of course, after acceptance of their request of membership by the Executive Committee. There is no other impediment in the way of a member belonging to Purabia Sen Community from becoming a member of the Society, except when the applicant is insane, insolvent, person of immoral character punished by the court or a person engaged in activities against the Community, as provided under Clause 8 of the Constitution. 5. According to the plaintiffs, hundreds of persons from the Community were eligible, interested and rather entitled to become members, but the defendants have not given them chance to avail such opportunity and in this way denied them the membership; indirectly. He argued that regardless of the fact that there are thousands of persons from this Community in Jodhpur itself, only a few hundred people are members of the defendant Sanstha, shows that the defendants have manipulatively managed and controlled the affairs of the defendant Society and restrained the eligible persons of the Community from becoming members. 6. He argued that regardless of the fact that there are thousands of persons from this Community in Jodhpur itself, only a few hundred people are members of the defendant Sanstha, shows that the defendants have manipulatively managed and controlled the affairs of the defendant Society and restrained the eligible persons of the Community from becoming members. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants, invited attention of the Court towards the notice dated 26.04.2019, published in the daily newspaper Dainik Navjyoti and contended that the said notice was deceptive, inasmuch as the main part of the notice required existing members to deposit their membership fee between 24.04.2019 to 02.05.2019, with a snag in the form of a hidden message to the effect that the last date for submitting application for membership and depositing the fee is extended till 02.05.2019. As against this, similar notice published in 2016, clearly contained a stipulation that the members of the Community can apply for membership along with requisite fee from 20.04.2016 to 05.05.2016. He submitted that it is a different matter altogether that even in 2016, the appellants and other members of the Community were not permitted to become members, at least a notice inviting application for membership was published, but this time, no notice inviting application for membership has been published and whatever has been published in the notice dated 26.04.2019, is a farce. 7. While inviting attention of the Court towards the size of the advertisement and that the fact that it was published in a newspaper, Dainik Navjyoti, which has lesser circulation in the city, Mr. Mehta pointed out that on other occasions, when the Executive Committee is formed, the defendants have published the advertisement/congratulation message of substantially bigger size in more popular newspaper like Rajasthan Patrika and Dainik Bhaskar. He showed concern by submitting that even obituary etc. have been published in the newspaper like Dainik Bhaskar and Rajasthan Patrika, while spending huge money of the society. He showed concern by submitting that even obituary etc. have been published in the newspaper like Dainik Bhaskar and Rajasthan Patrika, while spending huge money of the society. In a bid to drive home, his argument of arbitrariness and irregularity, he contended that if the defendants can spent such huge money for publicity and use services of newspapers like Rajasthan Patrika and Dainik Bhaskar, which are in more circulation, why have they chosen a newspaper like Dainik Navjyoti and that too by publishing a notice of such a small size is sufficient to show their intention to conduct the election in a clandestine manner. He argued that so called notice got published in the newspaper by the defendant was an eye-wash and was an empty formality, with an oblique motive of conducting the election of the society in a secret and high-handed manner. 8. Clarifying the appellants' stand, he urged that the appellants are not against the elections of the defendant Society but their concern is only to ensure that all eligible and desirous members of the Community are allowed to become members and take part in the ensuing elections and that the elections of the Society are conducted in accordance with the Constitution of the Society. 9. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents, Mr. J.K. Bhaiya, Mr. Ranjeet Joshi and Mr. Sunil Joshi, supporting the order of the Trial Court, contended that the plaintiffs have not given the details and essential facts as to when the plaintiffs have contacted the defendants for the purpose of becoming member; when they asked for membership forms; when they were refused membership etc. Mr. Bhaiya contended that the plaintiffs and their relatives have always acted against the interest of the defendant Society and the Samaj and their sole purpose is to scuttle the process of election, which had been set in motion by that time and now over. Learned counsel argued that the membership of the defendant Society is not automatic and the final decision to induct a person as member of the Society rests with the Executive Committee and that a person does not become a member simply by submitting an application form. He added that that the last date of becoming member has already passed and the relief as claimed by the plaintiffs cannot be granted. He added that that the last date of becoming member has already passed and the relief as claimed by the plaintiffs cannot be granted. Informing that the election of the Executive Committee has taken place on 26.05.2019, he submitted that not only the present appeal, even the suit filed by the plaintiffs has been rendered infructuous. 10. As a parting remark, Mr. Bhaiya argued that since the election of the Executive Committee has already taken place (on 21.05.2019), the members of the Executive Committee are going to elect President, Vice President, Secretary etc. from amongst them, hence any injunction or stay at this juncture would adversely affect the very existence of the Society, inasmuch as the term of the existing Executive Committee is going to expire on 31.05.2019 and if newly elected body is restrained from functioning, there will be nobody to maintain the affairs of the defendant Society. 11. Mr. Ranjeet Joshi and Mr. Sunil Joshi contended in coherence that it is settled proposition of law that election process once commenced cannot be stalled by the courts as has been held by the Supreme Court and this Court in various authoritative pronouncements. It was argued that the learned Trial Court has committed no error of law in rejecting the appellants' application for temporary injunction in light of such judgments of Supreme Court. They also maintained that there is practically no difference between prayers made in the suit and the prayers made in the application for temporary injunction, hence the court below has rightly rejected the plaintiffs' temporary injunction application. 12. Mr. Ranjeet Joshi and Mr. Sunil Joshi appearing for the respondents Nos.3 and 11 respectively submitted that the appellants have neither submitted application form nor have they deposited membership fee, hence they are not members of the Society. They have approached the Court, simply with an ill-will to disturb the harmony of the Society and interfere in its democratic setup. The Society is conducting its business strictly in accordance with the statutory provision and its Constitution, while also echoing the submissions already made by Mr. Bhaiya to convince the Court that the appellants are not entitled for any interim relief or stay, particularly when the elections have been held and the result has been declared. 13. The Society is conducting its business strictly in accordance with the statutory provision and its Constitution, while also echoing the submissions already made by Mr. Bhaiya to convince the Court that the appellants are not entitled for any interim relief or stay, particularly when the elections have been held and the result has been declared. 13. In response to the appellants' prayer that newly elected Executive Committee be restrained from taking charge, this Court showed a concern that if such prayer is granted, it would amount to a deadlock in the functioning of the Society, inasmuch as there will be nobody to manage the affairs of the Society and else it would result in extension of term of the existing Executive Committee for which there is no provision in its Constitution. In response to the above issue, Mr. Om Mehta submitted that though term of the Executive Committee has been designated for three years, but most of the times, the term of the Executive Committee has been extended and the election has not been held within three years, which shows that the Society's provision regarding three years' term is flexible. He, therefore, prayed that till the suit is decided, the present Executive Committee be permitted to continue. 14. Mr. Om Mehta, learned counsel for the appellants contended that the Court has vast power to injunct the incoming members and allow the existing members of the Committee to function. In support of his argument, he relied upon Clause 21 of the General Clauses Act and two judgments; (I) Kantilal Mansukhram Thakkar and Anr. Vs. J.M. Patel, Registrar, Co.Op. Societies and Ors. [decided on 29.03.1982 by the Gujarat High Court] and (II) Advocates' Association Vs. The District Registrar and Registrar of Societies and Ors. [decided on 17.04.2006 by the Karnataka High Court at Bangalore]. He relied upon para No.10 of the first judgment and para No.22 of the second judgment; relevant extract whereof is being reproduced hereunder:- "(I) (10) It may at this stage be mentioned that in the course of his submissions Mr. Vyas faintly staled that under Rule 4 the Director can fix the date of general election but once he has done so, the power is exhausted and there is no power given by any other rule to postpone the election to another date. Vyas faintly staled that under Rule 4 the Director can fix the date of general election but once he has done so, the power is exhausted and there is no power given by any other rule to postpone the election to another date. There is no merit in this submission because Section 21 of the Bombay General Clauses Act says that where, by any Bombay Act, or Gujarat Act, a power to issue notifications, orders, rules or by-laws is conferred, then that power includes a power, exercisable in the like manner and subject to the like sanction and conditions to add to amend vary or rescind any notifications, orders rules or by-laws, so issued. It is, therefore, obvious that under the said section the power to fix a date for election would include the power to postpone any date so fixed. This is also the view expressed by the Calcutta High Court in Bhuban Mohan Basak's case. (II) (22) ... ... ... It is trite to say that the authority who is supposed to hold an enquiry does not have the power to grant an interim order, even though it cannot be traced to any of the provisions of the Act would be a mockery of the situation. Apparently the Registrar in the case on hand prima facie was of the opinion that certain facts which are brought to his notice would require an enquiry and such an enquiry requires that any action which is likely to take place will have to be suspended. Consequently, I am of the view that the Registrar has got power to grant an interim order in aid of the final relief." 15. Mr. Sunil Joshi, learned counsel for the respondent No.11, vehemently opposed such suggestion by contending that the term of three years, given under Clause 7 of the Constitution, is mandatory and the same cannot be extended by this Court. In support of his contention, Mr. Joshi relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Regi Thomas & Ors. Vs. The State of Kerala & Ors., dated 19.04.2018, particularly para 11 thereof, which reads as under:- "Section 69 of the Act is the mechanism provided by the State Legislature as contemplated under Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India. Joshi relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Regi Thomas & Ors. Vs. The State of Kerala & Ors., dated 19.04.2018, particularly para 11 thereof, which reads as under:- "Section 69 of the Act is the mechanism provided by the State Legislature as contemplated under Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India. Once the mechanism provided under the Statute provides for a time schedule for preferring an election petition, in the absence of a provision in the Statute for enlarging the time under any given circumstances, no court, whether the High Court under Article 226 or this Court under Article 32, 136 or 142 of the Constitution can extend the period in election matters. In the matter of limitation in election cases, the Court has to adopt strict interpretation of the provisions. This Court in Smita Subhash Sawant Vs. Jagdeeshwari Jagdish Amin & Ors. , (2015) 12 SCC 169 , though in a different context, has held at paragraph 33 that 'In the absence of any provision made in the Act for condoning the delay in filing the election petition, the Chief Judge had no power to condone the delay in filing the election petition beyond the period of limitation prescribed in law'." Mr. Joshi further relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 2002 SC 1649 and read its relevant part contained in paras 10 and 11 of the judgment to contend that quashing of election and direction to hold fresh elections is contrary to democratic set-up of the Society. Paras 10 and 11 read thus:- "10. From the narration of facts and the contentions raised on behalf of the parties, it is clear that the dispute raised in the case has lost its relevance due to passage of time and subsequent events which have taken place during the pendency of the litigation. As noted earlier, the dipuste in the case relates to election of office-bearers of the South Eastern Railway Men's Union. The dispute arose at a point of time when both the appellant and the respondent No.1 were members of the said Union. Now both have ceased to be members of the Union. Further, successive elections have been held to elect office-bearers and the office-bearers so elected have been recognized by the management. In the circumstances, continuing this litigation will be like flogging the dead horse. Now both have ceased to be members of the Union. Further, successive elections have been held to elect office-bearers and the office-bearers so elected have been recognized by the management. In the circumstances, continuing this litigation will be like flogging the dead horse. Such litigation, irrespective of the result, will neither benefit the parties in the litigation nor will serve the interest of the Union. Accepting the contentions raised on behalf of respondent No.1 that the successive elections held in the meantime were invalid because he was not permitted to participate in it and to quash all such elections and direct holding of fresh elections under the supervision of the Court, will be contrary to democratic functioning of the employees' Union. Furthermore, Courts in the present situation of exploding dockets can illafford to stand time in such an exercise. 11. In the result, the appeal is allowed. The judgment/order dated 27th February, 2001 in C.O. No.2264 of 199 which is under challenge in the appeal is set aside. Miscellaneous Appeal No.179/1999 pending before the Additional District Judge, 3rd Court, Alipore, or any other Court to which it might have been sent on transfer, will be dismissed as infructuous. Title Suit No.105/1998 on the file of the 6th Civil Judge (Senior Division), Alipore, South Calcutta will be heard and disposed of expeditiously as far as possible within three months of receipt of intimation of this Order. The interim orders passed by the Courts below in the suit and the appeal are vacated. Parties to bear their respective costs." 16. M/S Joshi, in alternative, submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the case, instead of restraining the newly elected Executive Body from functioning, it would be appropriate and expedient to direct the Trial Court to decide the suit itself in a time bound program (say within three months) and till then the newly elected Executive Committee be allowed to take charge and perform its duties, because term of the existing Executive Committee is expiring on 31.05.2019. 17. I have considered the contentions raised by the rival counsels and perused the material on record. 18. The crux of the various judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in relation to the ingredients for grant of temporary injunction is; the order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. 17. I have considered the contentions raised by the rival counsels and perused the material on record. 18. The crux of the various judgments rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in relation to the ingredients for grant of temporary injunction is; the order refusing temporary injunction is of a discretionary character. Ordinarily the Appellate Court should neither interfere with the discretion exercised by the Trial Court nor should it substitute its own discretion. However, such rule is not absolute and in certain cases, interference with discretionary order may be warranted/justified in case the lower Court acts arbitrarily, perversely or in utter disregard to the settled legal principles and/or without considering the material available on record. 19. Keeping the above principles in mind, if the case at hand is considered, I find that the Trial Court has decided the issue of prima facie case, inappropriately and incorrectly. A perusal of the order of the Court below reveals that while considering the factor of prima facie case, it has relied upon various judgments to reach to a conclusion that no injunction can be granted in the matters of election disputes. It is a cardinal principle when it comes to injunction in election disputes, but it cannot be said to be an absolute law of universal application, more particularly when the election in question is not governed by the Constitutional provision or Statutory provision, providing remedy of election petition. In the cases like the one under consideration, when neither the Statute provides for a remedy of election petition nor does the Constitution of the Society provide for specific remedy, an aggrieved party has no other option but to knock at the doors of the Courts of Law. Such being the position, if the Court refuses to exercise its power being guided rather feeling bound by such principle, unscrupulous persons can well proceed arbitrarily and capriciously, so as to keep the power or management in their hands. In cases where the Constitution of the Society or the Statute does not provide any remedy, and when the plaintiff alleges that there are fundamental flaws or irregularities in conduct of election, and when it hits at the root of very existence of democracy, in my considered opinion, the Courts cannot and should not sit tight-lipped. 20. In cases where the Constitution of the Society or the Statute does not provide any remedy, and when the plaintiff alleges that there are fundamental flaws or irregularities in conduct of election, and when it hits at the root of very existence of democracy, in my considered opinion, the Courts cannot and should not sit tight-lipped. 20. If the plaintiff makes out a case of non-inclusion of certain member in the electoral rolls, or there is material to show that the persons eligible/entitled to become members have been intentionally inhibited from becoming a member, impairing the very democracy of the Society and if the Court finds that the elections in question are being conducted in arbitrary, vindicative or in an unruly manner, the Court should stretch its arms to the fullest, so as to reach the ends of justice. 21. Adverting to the facts appertain to the present case, this Court prima facie finds that all is not well in the functioning of the Society. There is enough material to record such prima facie finding; in the earlier elections of 2016, the Society had published notice inviting applications for membership before the election process was set in motion, whereas in the present election held in 2019, they have published a deceptive and misleading notice in the daily newspaper dated 26.04.2019. This time, the Society, instead of inviting membership has simply required the members to deposit their annual fee, with a delusive line stringed; "that the date of submitting application form and membership fee has been extended to 21.05.2019". Upon Court's query, Mr. Bhaiya, learned counsel for the respondent Society though pretentiously searched for it, but was unable to show from the record as to when the notice inviting/opening membership was published in the newspaper. He could only point out that a notice dated 15.01.2019 was affixed on the notice-board. A perusal of the notice, which is said to have been affixed on the notice-board of the Society, reveals that the membership was opened from 15.01.2019 to 15.04.2019, but when was it extended from 15.04.2019 to 24.04.2019; is beyond anybody's guess. He could only point out that a notice dated 15.01.2019 was affixed on the notice-board. A perusal of the notice, which is said to have been affixed on the notice-board of the Society, reveals that the membership was opened from 15.01.2019 to 15.04.2019, but when was it extended from 15.04.2019 to 24.04.2019; is beyond anybody's guess. That apart, the mere fact that the Society has published the notice inving applications for membership/election in such small size and that too in a newspaper having lesser circulation, speaks volumes about the so called fairness of the Society; particularly when other insignificant, but publicity oriented messages of extending congratulations, condolence messages etc. have been got published in substantially larger size, in other newspapers (more than one), having better circulation. This Court finds substance in the arguments of Mr. Om Mehta that if the Society's money can be spent for such unconstructive use, what prevented the Executives of the Society to give better publicity of the election program or a proper notice of opening of membership/election. 22. Concededly the last date for accepting membership form was 02.05.2019, whereas the appellants had approached the trial Court by way of the representative suit on 30.04.2019, with an assertion that despite their requests, defendants have refused to induct them as members. This being the assertion, the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs have not contacted the office of the Society for becoming members, does not inspire confidence, inasmuch as had the Society allowed them to apply for membership, they would hardly have rushed to the Court, at least before the expiry of the last date of filling up the form. The contention of learned counsel for the Society that the plaintiffs and their family members have acted against the interest of the Society, may be true, but then, in that case, it is for the Executive Committee to reject the election form(s) of such individual within the framework of the Society's Constitution. But the Society cannot deny an incumbent to apply for the membership, simply because the Executives of the Society do not like them or perceive them to be not worthy of becoming member. 23. But the Society cannot deny an incumbent to apply for the membership, simply because the Executives of the Society do not like them or perceive them to be not worthy of becoming member. 23. All interested and eligible persons of the community are entitled to a fair chance to apply for membership and contest election, of course, with a rider that their application forms need to be considered by the Executive Committee, which alone is competent to take a final decision regarding their membership. In the present factual backdrop, this Court prima facie finds that the rules of fair play have been kept in abeyance and the plaintiffs and other members of the community have been denied an opportunity to become member. 24. The finding of the Trial Court, as far as prima facie case is concerned, is based upon judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court and this Court, which are not applicable in the extant factual matrix. The learned Trial Court has decided the factor of prima facie case, being guided by the principle that no injunction can be granted if the election process has been set in motion. 25. Having reached to such conclusion, the Trial Court did not think it appropriate rather necessary to consider the merits of the case. Resultantly, the appellants' application for temporary injunction came to be rejected. The order under challenge, passed by the Trial Court is illegal. The refusal to exercise discretionary jurisdiction firmly entrenched in its inherent power under Section 151 of the Code, in the facts obtaining in the present case cannot be countenanced. The order under scrutiny, passed by the Trial Court on 22.05.2019, therefore, deserves to be and is, hereby quashed and set aside. 26. Having set aside the order of the Trial Court, this Court is left with two options: either to remand the matter to the Trial Court for deciding the temporary injunction application afresh on its merits; or to record its own finding and pass appropriate order on the plaintiffs' application for temporary injunction. 27. But, in the changed circumstances, none of these courses will meet the ends of justice because after passing of the order impugned (22.05.2019), the elections of the Executive Committee have been held; the Executive Committee elected by the members have elected the President, Secretary and other office bearers from amongst themselves; and the newly elected body has taken charge. 28. But, in the changed circumstances, none of these courses will meet the ends of justice because after passing of the order impugned (22.05.2019), the elections of the Executive Committee have been held; the Executive Committee elected by the members have elected the President, Secretary and other office bearers from amongst themselves; and the newly elected body has taken charge. 28. All these facts are required to be brought on record by the parties concerned, if they so desire or deem necessary. Grant of any injunction or passing any stay order at this stage, would tread not only the future but also the present of the Society to limbo. Any interference at this stage would stultify or choke the functioning of the Society. This Court is thus not inclined to pass any injunction, particularly when there is neither any allegation nor any material to show that the elections per se, after submitting the nomination forms, were conducted in arbitrari or unruly manner. 29. As a matter of fact, it is not a dispute arising out of election, rather it is dispute in relation to the membership of the Society, though it may ultimately have a bearing on the election, when the suit is ultimately decided. Be that as it may, considering the overall facts, I am not inclined to injunct the newly elected Executive Committee from functioning, during the pendency of the suit. 30. In light of what has been stated above and in view of the consent given by learned counsel for the defendants (instead of granting injunction, a direction be issued to the Trial Court to decide the suit expeditiously), I deem it expedient to dispose of the present appeal with the direction to the Trial Court to decide the suit in question with utmost promptitude, preferably within a period of six months; for which, all the parties have consented to cooperate the Trial Court. 31. The appeal stands disposed of in the above terms. 1