JUDGMENT : Four persons, namely, Shankar Sao, Dhanwanti Devi, Birendra Sao and Kanchan Devi were made accused in Marafari P.S. Case no. 54 of 2007, which was registered on 15th May, 2007 at 9:30 p.m. on the basis of fardbeyan of Deo Lal Sao, father of Rita Devi, the deceased. They were sent up for trial to face the charge under section 302/34 of the Indian Penal Code, under section 304-B/34 of the Indian Penal Code and under section 3/ 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act. 2. Three persons, namely, Dhanwanti Devi-mother-in-law, Birendra Sao -brother-in-law and Kanchan Devi-sister-in-law of Rita Devi, the deceased, have been acquitted of the charges framed against them. 3. The appellant has been convicted and sentenced to R.I. for life under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code for dowry death of Rita Devi, his wife. 4. Mr. Sanjay Kumar Srivastava, the learned A.P.P. submits that the appellant has remained in custody for more than 12 years. 5. Mr. Hemant Kumar Shikarwar, the learned counsel for the appellant while challenging the legality of conviction of the appellant under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code submits that infliction of punishment of R.I. for life, which is the maximum punishment for the offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, on the appellant, was improper and in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case not sustainable in law. 6. The learned counsel for the appellant relies on the decision in “Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana” reported in (1994) 6 SCC 727 , to fortify his submission. 7. The appellant was married to Rita Devi on 19th June, 2002. The defence set up by the appellant is that in the intervening night of 14/15th May, 2007 she has committed suicide. Information about the death of Rita Devi was given by the appellant to her parents the next day and a First Information Report was lodged on the basis of fardbeyan of the father of Rita Devi, alleging that her family members have murdered her. 8. During the trial, the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses; the informant is P.W.9. 9. Admittedly, there is no eye-witness to the death of Rita Devi. The accused persons have examined five witnesses in their defence, three of them were initially made witness by the prosecution in the charge-sheet. 8. During the trial, the prosecution has examined 11 witnesses; the informant is P.W.9. 9. Admittedly, there is no eye-witness to the death of Rita Devi. The accused persons have examined five witnesses in their defence, three of them were initially made witness by the prosecution in the charge-sheet. Their evidence corroborates the evidence of Savita Kumari, P.W.5, who is the sister of the deceased and deposed in favour of the appellant. 10. Dr. H.K.Mishra, who has conducted the post-mortem examination, has said that the injuries found on Rita Devi were ante-mortem in nature and caused by hard and blunt object. According to the Doctor, the cause of death was violent asphyxia possibly caused due to throttling leading to cardio-respiratory failure. 11. In our opinion, the cause of death as stated by the doctor is not clear. No thumb mark was detected by the doctor over the neck of the deceased and violent asphyxia can occur during suicide particularly suicide by hanging. The doctor’s opinion becomes confusing also on account of his observation that the injuries on the deceased were caused by hard and blunt object. In the above scenario, in our opinion benefit should be extended to the accused. (refer, “Dhana Choudhary and others” Vs. State of Bihar, reported in (1985) 3 SCC 680 and “Vijay Singh and Another V. State of Madhya Pradesh” reported in (2014)12 SCC 293 ). 12. We find that in the discussion on the point of sentence the learned Judge has not taken note of the aforesaid circumstances which are leaning towards the appellant and he has imposed the maximum punishment of R.I. for life on the appellant. In “Hem Chand Vs. State of Haryana” reported in (1994) 6 SCC 727 , the Supreme Court has observed thus: “7. Now coming to the question of sentence, it can be seen that Section 304-B IPC lays down that: “Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life.” The point for consideration is whether the extreme punishment of imprisonment for life is warranted in the instant case. A reading of Section 304-B IPC would show that when a question arises whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman what all that is necessary is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death, which took place within seven years of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that such a person has caused the dowry death. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly responsible for the death of the deceased or not by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to have committed the dowry death if there were such cruelty or harassment and that if the unnatural death has occurred within seven years from the date of marriage. Likewise there is a presumption under Section 113-B of the Evidence Act as to the dowry death. It lays down that the court shall presume that the person who has subjected the deceased wife to cruelty before her death caused the dowry death if it is shown that before her death, such woman had been subjected, by the accused, to cruelty or harassment in connection with any demand for dowry. Practically this is the presumption that has been incorporated in Section 304-B IPC also. It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether the accused has any direct connection with the death or not, he shall be presumed to have committed the dowry death provided the other requirements mentioned above are satisfied. In the instant case no doubt the prosecution has proved that the deceased died an unnatural death namely due to strangulation, but there is no direct evidence connecting the accused. It is also important to note in this context that there is no charge under Section 302 IPC. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani PW-6 and Dr. Indu Lalit PW-7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr. The trial court also noted that there were two sets of medical evidence on the file in respect of the death of the deceased. Dr. Usha Rani PW-6 and Dr. Indu Lalit PW-7 gave one opinion. According to them no injury was found on the dead body and that the same was highly decomposed. On the other hand, Dr. Dalbir Singh PW-13 who also examined the dead body and gave his opinion, deposed that he noticed some injuries at the time of re-post-mortem examination. Therefore at the most it can be said that the prosecution proved that it was an unnatural death in which case also Section 304-B IPC would be attracted. But this aspect has certainly to be taken into consideration in balancing the sentence to be awarded to the accused. As a matter of fact, the trial court only found that the death was unnatural and the aspect of cruelty has been established and therefore the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 201 IPC have been established. The High Court in a very short judgment concluded that it was fully proved that the death of the deceased in her matrimonial home was a dowry death otherwise than in normal circumstances as a result of cruelty meted out to her and therefore an offence under Section 304-B IPC was made out. Coming to the sentence the High Court pointed out that the accused-appellant was a police employee and instead of checking the crime, he himself indulged therein and precipitated in it and that bride-killing cases are on the increase and therefore a serious view has to be taken. As mentioned above, Section 304-B IPC only raises presumption and lays down that minimum sentence should be seven years but it may extend to imprisonment for life. Therefore awarding extreme punishment of imprisonment for life should be in rare cases and not in every case.” 13. In “State of Punjab v. Manjit Singh and others” reported in AIR 2009 SC 2888 , the Supreme Court has observed thus: “12. With regard to the quantum of punishment to be awarded to persons found guilty of offences dealt with in the IPC, the Code confers a wide discretion on the court in the matter of awarding appropriate punishment by prescribing the maximum punishment and in some cases both the maximum as well the minimum punishment for the offence. With regard to the quantum of punishment to be awarded to persons found guilty of offences dealt with in the IPC, the Code confers a wide discretion on the court in the matter of awarding appropriate punishment by prescribing the maximum punishment and in some cases both the maximum as well the minimum punishment for the offence. Though no general guidelines are laid down in the Code for the purpose of awarding punishment, generally the judicial discretion of the court is guided by the principle that the punishment should be commensurate with the gravity of the offence having regarding to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances vis-a-vis an accused in each case.” 14. In the state of affairs; the appellant himself informing P.W.1 about death of Rita Devi, (ii) medical assistant to Rita Devi by the appellant, (iii) the unclear medical evidence, and (iv) charge-sheeted witnesses deposing in favour of the accused persons, we are of the opinion that there are overwhelming mitigating circumstances compared to the aggravating circumstances in favour of the appellant and, above all, the young age of the appellant (refer, Amit v. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 8 SCC 93 ) persuade us to hold that award of maximum punishment under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code to the appellant is not proper. 15. In our opinion, it would meet the ends of justice if the appellant is awarded punishment of R.I. for 10 years. 16. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code dated 27.01.2010 and the order of sentence of R.I. for life dated 30.01.2010 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court no.1, Bokaro against the appellant, namely, Shankar Sao in Sessions Trial Case no.308 of 2007 are set-aside. 17. The appellant is sentenced to undergo R.I. for 10 years under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code. 18. The appellant is in custody for more than 12 years and, accordingly, he shall be set free forthwith, if not wanted in connection with any other case. 19. In the result, Criminal Appeal (D.B.) no. 583 of 2010 is allowed. 20. Let lower court records be transmitted to the court concerned, forthwith.