1. These batch of writ petitions have been listed together since common questions are involved and as such all the matters have been heard together and are being disposed of by this common order. 2. In all these writ petitions, the relief prayed for is as follows: (i) For issuance of appropriate writ, order or direction for quashing/setting aside the conditions regarding shop allotment, as contained in Memo No.1170(ii) dated 13.7.2016 issued by the Respondent No.4 (Annexure-4) to the extent rent of the shops allotted to fire affected people has been fixed at a monthly rent of Rs.20/- per square feet, specially because the said fixation of monthly rent of the shops is wholly arbitrary, confiscatory in nature and discriminatory, being violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India; (ii) For issuance of further appropriate writ, order or direction, including writ of mandamus, directing the respondents, particularly, Respondent No.4 to take uniform decision and fix rent in respect of shops allotted in favour of fire affected persons commensurate with rent realized by the Respondent No.4 from the neighbouring shops constructed by the Respondent No.4 at Market Complex, Simdega; (iii) For issuance of further appropriate writ, order or direction, including writ of declaration, declaring that the respondent authorities cannot discriminate in the matter of fixation of rent and cannot fix rent in respect of shops allotted by it to fire affected person in an arbitrary and whimsical manner; (iv) For issuance of further appropriate writ, order or direction, directing the respondents to fix reasonable rent in respect of the shop allotted in favour of the petitioner, being fire affected person, keeping in view of the fact that the shop has been allotted in favour of the petitioner as a measure of rehabilitation and resettlement being a beneficial exercise undertaken by the Respondent-State of Jharkhand. 3. The brief facts as per the pleading made in the writ petitions are that in the district of Simdega shops were built at Daily Market, Sabji Mandi, Simdega which were temporary in nature settled in favour of the jobless persons by way of Sariat Settlement by the then Simdega Municipality. The rent @ Rs.2/ per square feet per month was being realized from the shop owners in whose favour the shops were allotted under the Sariat Settlement. The rent @ Rs.2/ per square feet per month was being realized from the shop owners in whose favour the shops were allotted under the Sariat Settlement. In the month of March, 2010 due to fire at Daily Market, Simdega approximately around 80 shops situated at Daily Market, Simdega burnt, including the stock left in the said shop. The petitioners along with other victims who have sustained loss due to fire, have approached before the State Government seeking compensation as well as resettlement of shops in their favour by constructing new shops. Upon this an enquiry was conducted by the Sub Divisional Officer, Simdega and in pursuance thereto report was submitted before the Commissioner, South Chhotanagpur, Ranchi, in pursuance thereto altogether 69 shops owners have suffered loss due to the incidence of fire and the total loss was assessed at Rs.1,13,63,000/- . The Deputy Commissioner has also moved proposal before the State of Jharkhand for construction of shops of the affected persons by demanding a sum of Rs.92,59,000/- as a cost of construction of shops, and finally the shops have been constructed and decided to be allotted also in favour of the petitioners who are victim to the said incidence of fire, in pursuance to an agreement being agreement executed on 08.09.2016 and on different dates on the basis of certain terms and conditions as also the eligibility for consideration of candidature for allotment as has been mentioned in the Memo No.1170(ii) dated 13.07.2016. The validity of the agreement has been for a period of five years and after completion of the period of five years, within three months from the date of completion of the agreement from the date of expiry the renewal of the agreement can be resorted to. The specific condition has been provided for fixation of rate which provides that in the newly constructed building situated near the Bus Stand, the rate of rent for the shop situated in the ground floor would be Rs.30/ per square feet and Rs.25/ per square feet in the first floor while other shops the rate would be Rs.20/- per square feet with further condition that as per the requirement the terms and conditions can be changed and the settlement is to be made on the basis of lottery amongst the fire victim shopkeepers. The condition has also been inserted that within the period of 30 days from the date of lottery an agreement has to be enriched with the Executive Officer, Municipal Commissioner, Simdega and it is only thereafter the shops would be transferred. The rate of rent would be for a period of three years and after expiry of the period of three years it would be enhanced @ Rs.10/ per square feet. The petitioners after complying with the conditions stipulated therein as also by entering into the agreement on different dates as per the condition stipulated for allotment of shops they started running their business. The petitioners after accepting the terms and conditions of the agreement have questioned one of the terms and conditions about the rate of rent which according to them is exorbitant since it has been enhanced from 2 rupees per square feet to Rs.20 per square feet. 4. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel for the petitioners has agitated the following grounds: (I) The enhancement of rate of rent from Rs.2/ to Rs.20/ is exorbitant and without appreciating the fact that the shops have been settled by way of rehabilitation/resettlement by the State Government after suffering loss caused due to fire. (II) There is no basis of enhancement of rent. (III) The Government cannot enhance the rate of rent for profit making purpose rather a balance is to be maintained in enhancement of rate of rent and enhancing rent from Rs.2/ per square feet to Rs.20/ per square feet cannot be balance amount keeping into consideration that the shops is situated in the district of Simdega which according to the petitioner is a poor affected area. He has relied upon the judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of M/s Dwarkadas Marfatia and Sons vs. Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay reported in (1989) 3 SCC 293 , Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, port of Mumbai and Anr. reported in (2004) 3 SCC 214 , Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 and N.D. Jayal and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 362 . reported in (2004) 3 SCC 214 , Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. reported in (2011) 13 SCC 446 and N.D. Jayal and Anr. vs. Union of India and Ors. reported in (2004) 9 SCC 362 . One another point has also been agitated in rebuttal of the stand taken in the counter affidavit to the effect that once the agreement has been enriched it is not available for the signatory to turn around and challenge the condition, Mr. Gadodia, learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the law has been settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Basheshar Nath vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Anr. reported in AIR 1959 SC 149 , Central Inland Water Transport Corporation Limited and Anr. vs. Brojo Nath Ganguly and Anr. reported in (1986) 3 SCC 156 , Olga Tellis and Ors. vs. Bombay Municipal Corporation and Ors. reported in (1985) 3 SCC 545 and one unreported order passed by this Court in W.P.(C) No.170 of 2012 confirmed in L.P.A. No.132 of 2013 and one another unreported judgment passed in W.P.(C) No.707 of 2018 with analogous cases. 5. Per contra, Mr. Rahul Kumar Gupta, learned Sr. S.C-I and Mr. Prashant Pallav, learned G.A-IV representing the State of Jharkhand in the writ petitions have jointly submitted that the enhancement of rent from Rs.2/ per square feet to Rs.20/ per square feet cannot be said to be excessive and exorbitant since the Simdega Municipality is taking rent only on account of providing the premises on rent but the same is inclusive of maintenance cost and also day today affairs of cleaning and other routine works. The construction work of buildings have been coasted to Rs. 97 lakhs and odd and as such it is a burden upon the State exchequer which can only be borne by the allottees although the same cannot be compensated but taken into consideration the part of the day today maintenance and other maintenance work to keep the building in order if the rate of rent has been enhanced from Rs.2/ per square feet to Rs.20/- per square feet, it cannot be said to be exorbitant. The petitioners are claiming on the basis of the rent fixed by way of Sariat Settlement but without disclosing the date of settlement arrived at by the competent authority with the petitioners, however, the stand has been taken sometime in the year 2015, the concept of Sariat has gone and the entire affairs which is public in nature, have been handed over to the municipality for considering the fact of earning revenue after 74th Amendment made in the Constitution whereby and whereunder the local bodies have been conferred with the independent status also to generate its source of income and since the State Government is not allocating any funds, therefore, it can only be managed by the rental which is to be charged. After coming into end of the Sariat, the Government was generous enough to construct the new building being a welfare State to be allotted in favour of the petitioners so that they may not suffer unnecessary difficulty and it is for this reason the huge construction has been made for construction of the building and on the basis of terms and conditions for allotment the lottery has been conducted in which the petitioners have consciously by knowing through their naked eyes have participated in the allotment and it is only thereafter the shops have been allotted. In one of the terms and conditions the rate shown is Rs.20/ per square feet and once the petitioners have participated knowing the rate of Rs.20/ per square feet they cannot turn around after entering into an agreement by assailing the said order and therefore, the argument which has been advanced on behalf of the petitioners that even after acceptance of the conditions of the agreement it can be challenged and to demonstrate his argument certain judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court has been relied upon in rebuttal to the same, the said principle is not applicable in the instant case as because rent is not a fundamental right and the question of waiver or acquiescence or estoppel, if there is any conferment of fundamental right or any legal vested right, rent cannot be said to be a fundamental right and it is not the case of the petitioners that they are not being allowed to do the business or trade, and therefore, the judgment relied upon in this regard on this issue are not applicable. 6. 6. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and on appreciation of the rival submissions, deem it fit and proper first to state the undisputed facts which is available on record. The shops in question have been settled in favour of the petitioners under the Sariat Settlement @ Rs.2/ per square feet, in the month of March, 2010 the fire broke out in the premises resulted into burning of entire shops including the materials kept therein. The petitioners have approached before the State authority, in pursuance thereto enquiry was conducted by the Enquiry Officer for assessment of the damages and the cost which will incur in construction of the shops. The report was submitted before the Deputy Commissioner, Simdega, who has made proposal before the authority of the State Government for sanction of fund for construction of shopping complex, the Government has acted to such proposal and sanctioned 97 lakhs and odd, shops have been constructed as Block-A, Block-B, Block-C, Block-D and Block-E and Block-F. Block C, D, E and F are in the ground floors while Block-A and B in the first floor. The local authorities have taken decision to allot the shops by virtue of lottery after fulfilment of certain conditions. The terms and conditions are of eligibility as also the rate of rent for the ground floor as Rs.30/ per square feet and for first floor Rs.25/ per square feet while in the new market complex Rs.20/ per square feet has been fixed. The condition has been stipulated that if a candidate is willing to fulfil the conditions, they can be considered for allotment of shops. Further it is admitted that the allotment of shops in Block-E has been kept reserved for the fire victims. The petitioners after going across the terms and conditions incorporated in the decision taken by the authority, have participated in the lottery by virtue of it the shops have been allotted as per the lottery. Subsequently the agreement has been enriched by making specific stipulation made therein that they will comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement as also will pay fixed rent and in case of failure, the allotment of the shop can be cancelled as would appear from Annexure-6 annexed to the W.P.(C) No.6644 of 2017. Subsequently the agreement has been enriched by making specific stipulation made therein that they will comply with the terms and conditions of the agreement as also will pay fixed rent and in case of failure, the allotment of the shop can be cancelled as would appear from Annexure-6 annexed to the W.P.(C) No.6644 of 2017. The petitioners after allotment of the aforesaid shops have invoked the jurisdiction of this Court by filing these writ petitions under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the rate of rent of Rs.20/ per square feet on the ground as referred hereinabove. The State respondents have seriously objected to the prayer as also the ground of making such prayer as referred hereinabove. In the State of Jharkhand the tenancy law is applicable, earlier in the name of Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 and subsequent thereby on bifurcation of the State Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2000 come into effect and subsequently on repealment of the Act, 2000 new act effecting from dated 15.04.2015 called as Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011. The provision of the said Act is not applicable with respect to the building belonging to the Government. 7. This Court in order to appreciate the argument and before dealing with the judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners, deem it fit and proper to refer the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in this regard in the case of Patel Gordhandas Hargovindas and Ors. vs. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad and Anr., reported in AIR 1963 SC 1742 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the criteria for demanding ratable value of the building is the annual rent which the owner might reasonably accept to get from a hypothetical tenant less certain deduction by laying down the proposal that ratable value of a building where tenant or his occupy is limited by measure of standard rent arrived at by the building the principle of the rent Act, and cannot exceed the figure of the standard rent so arrived at by the assigned authority. Further while fixing the ratable value the assigned authority would have to take into consideration the rent which the owner of similar premises constructed earlier was situated in it or in an adjoining locality might reasonably accept to receive from a hypothetical tenant so that there is no wide disparity between rate of rents, complying the principle of comparative matter in case of two premises, the disparity should not be despairingly large. Further it has been held therein that while fixing reasonable rent, the municipal authorities had not enjoyed unfettered discretion what they like. They are bound to take into account standard pay in respect of similar or nearly similar terms in the locality. In the case of another judgment Dr. Balbir Singh & Ors. vs. M/s Municipal Corporation of Delhi & Ors., reported in (1985) 1 SCC 167 , the Hon’ble Apex Court has elaborately discussed and laid down principles for the determination of ratable value. When the Municipal Act requires determination of the annual value the same has to be on the basis of parameter fixed for fixing fair rent as per the Rent Control Act and ratable value cannot be more than the fair and standard rent, determination of annual rental value has to be according to the terms of the Municipal Act. The fixing of ratable value has to be governed by procedures of fixing of standard rent by the Rent Control Authorities and not on the basis of actual income derived by the landlord. 8. Under the applicable tenancy law, standard rent has been defined under Section 2(J) which means “standard rent in relation to the building means the rent calculated under Section 9. Section 9 deals with standard rent which reads as under: “9. Standard Rent:-(1) Standard Rent, in relation to any building, means the rent calculated on the basis of five per cent per annum of the aggregate amount of the cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the building in the year of construction. Provided that due allowance shall be made on the cost of construction and price of land based on the cost index as per provisions of Section 45 of Income Tax Act, 1981. Provide however, that the rent shall always be fixed on monthly basis. Provided that due allowance shall be made on the cost of construction and price of land based on the cost index as per provisions of Section 45 of Income Tax Act, 1981. Provide however, that the rent shall always be fixed on monthly basis. (2) For the purpose of this Section: (a) the cost of construction shall be the actual amount spent on construction, and in case such amount cannot be ascertained, such cost shall be determined as per the standard scheduled rates of the Road Construction Department and Buildings Construction Department of the State Government with reference to cost of similar construction for the year in which the building was constructed. (b) the market price of the land shall be the price for which the land was bought as gathered from the registered sale deed or the market value of the land notified by the Registration Department of the Government for the year in which construction was made, whichever is high. (c) the land shall be the total land comprising the building and such of safe vacant land up to fifty percent of the plinth area as is appurtenant thereto. (d) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (a), (b) and (c), the cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the building purchased from or allotted by the Housing Board or any Public Sector Undertaking of the Government or a municipality or municipal corporation shall be the aggregate amount paid or payable to such Housing Board or any Public Sector Undertaking of the Government or a municipality or municipal corporation, as the case may be.” The Sub section 1 to Section 9 provides about fixing of the standard rent to be calculated on the basis of 5% per annum of the aggregate amount of the cost of construction and the market price of the land comprised in the building in the year of construction subject to condition as has been inserted under sub section 2 (a), (b), (c) and (d). Sub section 2 (a) states about the cost of construction which shall be the actual amount spend on construction and in case such amount cannot be ascertained, such cost shall be determined as per the standard scheduled rates by the Road Construction Department and Building Construction Department of the Government with reference to cost of similar construction for the year in which the building was constructed, while Sub section (b) stipulates that the market price of the land shall be the price for which the land was bought as gathered from the registered sale deed or the market value of the land notified by the registered department of the Government for the year in which the construction was made, whichever is high. Sub section 2 (c) provides that the land shall be the total land comprising the building and stage of safe vacant land up to 50% of the plinth area as to appurtenant, however the market price has not been defined in the Act, however, it is synonyms of the market value. 9. The judgment upon which the learned counsel for the petitioners has relied, as would appear from the judgment rendered in the case of Jamshed Hormusji Wadia vs. Board of Trustees, port of Mumbai and Anr., the law has been laid down that the Government is not to act unreasonably in fixing the rent of the public property by not acting as profit making motive so as to unduly enhance the rents and further it has been laid down that a balance has to be struck between the two extremes. Similar view has been expressed in the case of Banatwala and Company vs. Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr. and the other judgments relied upon in this regard. The position of law as has been settled in the judgment is not in dispute and the Government cannot be allowed to earn the profit and a balance is to be maintained. It is equally settled that each and every judgment is to be tested on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved in each and every case independently. The position of law as has been settled in the judgment is not in dispute and the Government cannot be allowed to earn the profit and a balance is to be maintained. It is equally settled that each and every judgment is to be tested on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved in each and every case independently. So far as facts of these cases are concerned, the petitioners before this Court is against the rent of Rs.20/ per square feet, although the petitioners are claiming for enhancement of rent from Rs.2/ to Rs.20/ per square feet but this Court after going across the material available on record and considering the admitted fact herein that the Sariat has come to an end in the year 2015 and further the petitioners have entered into an agreement which will be said to be in super session to the Sariat Settlement, if any, and as such it cannot be said about enhancement of rate of rent from Rs.2/ to Rs.20/ per square feet. The question which is to be seen by this Court, as to whether the fixation/determination of Rs.20/ per square feet is excessive or excessive/exorbitant or not? It also needs to refer herein that the petitioners are claiming on the basis of Sariat Settlement as would appear from the definition of Sariat which means the miscellaneous collections of incorporeal rights of Jalkar, Falkar and Bunkar etc. Admittedly herein, the fact does not pertains either of Jalkar, Falkar or Bunkar, rather it is settlement of shops which now are being claimed by way of Sariat Settlement. It is also not in dispute that the settlement of shops perhaps have been made by the authority after confirming the nature of the jobs (Jalkar) have been settled in favour of the petitioners. It has nowhere reflected in the pleading that when the Sariat Settlement has been arrived by fixing rent to the tune of Rs.2/ per square feet, as would appear from the stand taken by the State in the counter affidavit which has not been rebutted by the petitioners since no rejoinder affidavit has been filed. It has nowhere reflected in the pleading that when the Sariat Settlement has been arrived by fixing rent to the tune of Rs.2/ per square feet, as would appear from the stand taken by the State in the counter affidavit which has not been rebutted by the petitioners since no rejoinder affidavit has been filed. After the damage caused due to fire of temporary shops, the Government has taken a generous view for construction of shops over the area pertaining to the new shops which is just adjacent to the market complex beside the Bus Stand by making allocation of Rs.97 lakhs and odd. The conditions have been inserted by way of policy decision for allotment of shops after completion of construction and each and every conditions have been notified for people in general and in pursuance thereof the petitioners have made their application for allotment of the shops which have been earmarked for the fire victim shopkeepers. The petitioners are claiming that the steps have been taken in the rehabilitation scheme but no such scheme has been annexed and the stand taken by the petitioners in this regard has been disputed by the State respondents that no such resettlement or rehabilitation package have been decided to be taken rather it is only by way of taking generous and lenient view as such construction has been made. It is admitted fact that the petitioners were knowing about the rent to the tune of Rs.20/ per square feet and it is only thereafter they have participated in the lottery in which the allotment of shops have been made and thereafter they have entered into an agreement by accepting the terms and conditions and one of the terms and condition is Rs.20/ per square feet to be paid by way of rent. Learned counsel for the State has taken the ground that once the terms and conditions of the agreement has been accepted, the petitioners cannot turn around by challenging it while the same has been seriously disputed by emphatically arguing that if the terms and conditions are arbitrary and in the teeth of Article 14 of the Constitution of India, it can onwards be challenged by way of juridical review. 10. Mr. 10. Mr. Sumeet Gadodia, learned counsel for the petitioners in order to strengthen his argument has relied upon the judgment rendered in the case of Basheshar Nath vs. Commissioner of Income Tax Delhi & Rajasthan and Anr. 11. This Court in order to appreciate his argument, deem it fit and proper to first deal with the scope of judicial review in the matter of contract as also jurisdiction to interfere with the policy decision. It has been admitted by the Hon’ble Apex Court that the High Court sitting under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, cannot rewrite the terms and conditions of the contract as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Union Territory of Pondicherry and Ors. Vs. P.V. Suresh and Ors., reported in (1994) 2 SCC 70 wherein at paragraph 11 & 12 it has been held that the Court has no jurisdiction to alter the terms or re-write the contract between the parties. In the case of Polymat India (P) Ltd. and Anr. Vs. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and Ors., reported in (2005) 9 SCC 174 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court by taking aid of the judgment rendered in the case of United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. M.K.J. Corp., reported in (1996) 6 SCC 428 has been pleased to observe that “after the completion of the contract, no material alteration can be made in its terms except by mutual consent”. Admittedly, herein the petitioners have entered into an agreement and after accepting each and every terms and conditions they have got the possession and thereafter the present writ petition has been filed assailing the fixation of rent. If any interference would be shown by this Court, it will amount to re-write the terms and contract which is not permissible under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as has been referred herein above. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Basheshar Nath (supra) the fact involved herein is the principle of acquiescence, waiver and estoppel is applicable in a case of the fundamental rights. The judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners in the case of Basheshar Nath (supra) the fact involved herein is the principle of acquiescence, waiver and estoppel is applicable in a case of the fundamental rights. This Court is in no way differ with the said proposition that if any decision has been taken which if is in the teeth of the fundamental right, the same will be interfered by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India holding it infringement of the fundamental right but it is equally settled that each and every judgment is to be tested on the facts involved in that case. Herein, the facts do not pertains to violation of any fundamental right rather it is the question wherein enhancement of rate of rent has been agitated that too based upon the terms and conditions of the agreement which cannot be said to be infringement of fundamental right of the petitioners. Since the question of acquiescence, waiver and estoppel is applicable only in case of infringement of fundamental right but the enhancement in the rent being not a fundamental right, therefore, the question which is to be seen by this Court in this regard, as to whether the petitioners after accepting the terms and conditions of the bilateral contract can be allowed to assail the same. It is the settled position of law that in a process of selection, once the candidate participates, ceases the right to challenge, as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the judgment rendered in the case of Dr. G. Sarana vs. University of Lucknow and Ors. reported in (1976) 3 SCC 585 , wherein at para 15 it reads as under: “15.We do not, however, consider it necessary in the present case to go into the question of the reasonableness of bias or real likelihood of bias as despite the fact that the appellant knew all the relevant facts, he did not before appearing for the interview or at the time of the interview raise even his little finger against the constitution of the Selection Committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the committee. He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the committee. This view gains strength from a decision of this Court in Manak Lal’s case where in more or less similar circumstances, it was held that the failure of the appellant to take the identical plea at the earlier stage of the proceedings created an effective bar of waiver against him. The following observations made therein are worth quoting: It seems clear that the appellant wanted to take a chance to secure a favourable report from the tribunal which was constituted and when he found that he was confronted with an unfavourable report, he adopted the device of raising the present technical point.” The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Vijendra Kumar Verma vs. Public Service Commission, Uttarakhand and Ors. reported in (2011) 1 SCC 150 wherein at paragraph 24, 25 and 26 it has been held as under: “24. When the list of successful candidates in the written examination was published in such notification itself, it was also made clear that the knowledge of the candidates with regard to basic knowledge of computer operation would be tested at the time of interview for which knowledge of Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation would be essential. In the call letter also which was sent to the appellant at the time of calling him for interview, the aforesaid criteria was reiterated and spelt out. Therefore, no minimum benchmark or a new procedure was ever introduced during the midstream of the selection process. All the candidates knew the requirements of the selection process and were also fully aware that they must possess the basic knowledge of computer operation meaning thereby Microsoft Operating System and Microsoft Office operation. Knowing the said criteria, the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced the questions from the expert of computer application and has taken a chance and opportunity therein without any protest at any stage and now cannot turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was wrong and without jurisdiction. 25. Knowing the said criteria, the appellant also appeared in the interview, faced the questions from the expert of computer application and has taken a chance and opportunity therein without any protest at any stage and now cannot turn back to state that the aforesaid procedure adopted was wrong and without jurisdiction. 25. In this connection, we may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in G. Sarana (Dr.) v. University of Lucknow wherein also a similar stand was taken by a candidate and in that context the Supreme Court had declared that the candidate who participated in the selection process cannot challenge the validity of the said selection process after appearing in the said selection process and taking opportunity of being selected. Para 15 inter alia reads thus: (SCC p. 591) “15. … He seems to have voluntarily appeared before the committee and taken a chance of having a favourable recommendation from it. Having done so, it is not now open to him to turn round and question the constitution of the committee.” 26. In P.S. Gopinathan v. State of Kerala this Court relying on the above principle held thus: (SCC p. 84, para 44) “44. … Apart from the fact that the appellant accepted his posting orders without any demur in that capacity, his subsequent order of appointment dated 15-7-1992 issued by the Governor had not been challenged by the appellant. Once he chose to join the mainstream on the basis of option given to him, he cannot turn back and challenge the conditions. He could have opted not to join at all but he did not do so. Now it does not lie in his mouth to clamour regarding the cut-off date or for that matter any other condition. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, rightly held that the appellant is estopped and precluded from questioning the said order dated 14-1-1992. He could have opted not to join at all but he did not do so. Now it does not lie in his mouth to clamour regarding the cut-off date or for that matter any other condition. The High Court, therefore, in our opinion, rightly held that the appellant is estopped and precluded from questioning the said order dated 14-1-1992. The application of principles of estoppel, waiver and acquiescence has been considered by us in many cases, one of them being G. Sarana (Dr.) v. University of Lucknow….” It is evident from the para laid down in the aforesaid cases that once the candidate participates in the process of selection, ceases its right to question it, applying the aforesaid position of law and considering the aforesaid factual aspect herein, under which the petitioners have accepted the terms and conditions of the contract and now questioning the same, hence the same is not applicable to the petitioners. The further fact as has been asserted in the counter affidavit that the rate of rent is inclusive of the maintenance of the building and day today maintenance i.e. cleaning and all affairs to maintain the building on daily basis. It also requires to refer herein the object of the 74th Amendment of Constitution of India enacted in the year 1992 and also known as Nagarpalika Act, came into force on June, 1993 which was end at supplementing the inadequate constitutional provision for local Government by giving financial autonomy and there should be ways of revenue generation to be make them self-sufficient. In that view of the matter also the municipality in order to generate revenue, if fixed the rent Rs.20/ per square feet inclusive of all the maintenance charge day today, it cannot be said that any illegality has been committed. 12. This Court after considering the aforesaid aspects of the matter, having not been rebutted by the petitioners since no rejoinder has been filed, is of the view that the rate of rent of Rs.20/ per square feet, cannot be said to be excess and exorbitant so far as fixation of the standard rate and it is to be done in pursuance to the fixation as per the provision made under Section 9 of the Act, 2011. This Court has also considered the rate of rent on this angle and found the table stipulated containing the rate of rent under Annexure-4, wherein in the first floor the rate is either Rs.75/ per square feet or Rs.50/ per square feet or Rs.30/ per square feet or Rs.25/ per square feet and Rs.20/ per square feet is the lowest one, keeping the fact into consideration that the earlier shop which according to the petitioners have been settled by way of newly constructed pucca building in a site just adjacent to the Bus Stand which is at the midst of the market and therefore, this Court is of the view that the basis of fixation of the standard rate is based upon the parameter fixed in Section 9 of the Jharkhand Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 2011, however, the Tenancy Act, 2011 is not applicable but as has been held by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Patel Gowardhan Das vs. Municipal Commissioner, Ahmedabad (supra) and Dr. Balbir Singh vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, that while fixing the rent of the Government building the parameters of fixation under the tenancy law is to be kept in mind. 13. This Court after discussing the facts in detailed hereinabove as also putting reliance by the petitioners upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court has also considered the scope of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for making interference in decision making process since it has been the position of law that the High Court can interfere with the decision making process if there is error in the decision taken. This Court has found from the materials available on record that the decision of fixation of enhancement of rent does not suffer from any error in decision making process and therefore, is not inclined to exercise the extraordinary jurisdiction conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 14. In the result, all the writ petitions failed and are accordingly, dismissed. 15. Consequently, I.A. No.5319 of 2018 (W.P.(C) No.6644/2017), I.A. No.5323 of 2018 (W.P.(C) No.6603/2017), I.A. No.5321 of 2018 (W.P.(C) No.6620/2017), I.A. No.5322 of 2018 (W.P.(C) No.6642/2017) and I.A. No.5318 of 2018 (W.P.(C) No.6651/2017) also stand disposed of.