JUDGMENT : 1. Challenge in this petition, preferred under Section 104 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, is thrown to the Order dated 7th February 2019, passed by learned Principal District Judge, Kulgam (for brevity "court below"), on an Application under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) of the Code of Civil Procedure and for setting aside the same, on the grounds adumbrated therein. 2. The case set up by petitioner is that he promised to sell a vehicle Bus bearing Registration No. JK03-1349 to respondent for consideration amount of Rs. 5.00 Lacs and Rs. 5,000/- was paid in cash. Respondent is said to have issued two cheques in favour of petitioner: one was for Rs. 1.00 Lac; and another for Rs. 1.50 Lacs. Rest of the amount, according to petitioner, was agreed to be paid within a period of two months. Petitioner maintains that he presented both cheques before Bank, but both were dishonoured on 24th April 2015. Criminal proceedings, as stated by petitioner, are pending. He has also set in motion proceedings under Order XXXVII of the Code of Civil Procedure against respondent for recovery of an amount of Rs. 1.50 Lacs before learned court below. Respondent is said to have put in attendance. Respondent moved application under Order 37(3)(5), CPC, for leave to defend, to which objections were filed by petitioner, resisting respondent's application tooth and nail. Learned court below however, vide order dated 7th February 2019, has allowed respondent's application and granted leave unconditionally in favour respondent to defend the case. It is this order of which, petitioner is aggrieved and seeks setting aside thereof. 3. Heard and considered. 4. Learned counsel for petitioner, to cement the case set up by petitioner in petition on hand, has stated that learned court below has not followed the procedure as envisaged under Order XXXVII, CPC, inasmuch as there is complete procedural error in the proceedings as well as in impugned order. He also avers that amount claimed by plaintiff/petitioner has been admitted by respondent to be due from him and normally in such situation leave to defend the suit ought not to have been granted unless the amount so admitted to be due was deposited by defendant/respondent. Even learned court below is said to have not considered the objections filed by petitioner/plaintiff in opposition to application of respondent/defendant. 5. Even learned court below is said to have not considered the objections filed by petitioner/plaintiff in opposition to application of respondent/defendant. 5. A suit in terms of Order XXXVII, CPC, (Annexure II to petition) has been filed by petitioner before learned court below for recovery of Rs. 1.50 Lacs. Examination thereof discloses that plaintiff/petitioner was owner of a vehicle Bus, which was hypothecated with Neelam Finance Corporation, Kachi Chawni, Jammu and the whole hypothecated amount is claimed to have been liquidated in the year 2003. The plaint also reveals that petitioner agreed to sell the vehicle and delivered custody thereof to respondent against sale consideration of Rs. 5.00 Lacs. Respondent is shown to have paid Rs. 5000/-. Two Cheques for an amount of Rs. 2.50 Lacs are stated to have been issued by respondent to petitioner and rest amount of Rs. 2.45 Lacs was vowed to be paid by respondent to petitioner within two months. The cheques issued by respondents were dishonoured and respondents also did not pay outstanding amount of Rs. 2.45 lacs to petitioner. The plaint also divulges that a complaint under Section 420, 506 RPC, had been filed by petitioner before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Kulgam, against respondent, in which SHO concerned was directed to investigate. The police concerned is said to have submitted the report, which supported contents of complaint. 6. A petition under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure appears to have been filed by respondent before this Court vis-a-vis aforementioned criminal proceedings set in motion by petitioner. As is discernible from the plaint (Annexure II to petition) it is stated by petitioner therein that this Court without putting him to notice directed defendant/respondent to file the application for dropping of proceedings and finally the said complaint was dismissed precisely on the ground that the matter being a civil dispute. Petitioner maintains that he has challenged dismissal order before this Court in a petition, which is subjudice. 7. Annexure-III to petition is an Application that has been filed by respondent under Order XXXVII Rule 3(5), CPC, for leave to defend. It is important to have glance thereof as it raises various issues that need to be tried, adjudicated upon and squared off. Respondent claims that he purchased vehicle in question in the year 2015 against total sale consideration of Rs. It is important to have glance thereof as it raises various issues that need to be tried, adjudicated upon and squared off. Respondent claims that he purchased vehicle in question in the year 2015 against total sale consideration of Rs. 5.00 Lacs and in this regard an agreement was executed, in which plaintiff/petitioner has undertaken to pay the whole outstanding amount with respect to vehicle in question. It is also mentioned in the application of respondent that plaintiff/petitioner at the time of execution of agreement concealed the fact that the vehicle had outstanding amount of Rs. 4.50 Lacs as tax. Plaintiff/petitioner is said to have presented and encashed one cheque amounting to Rs. 1.00 Lac, but subsequently the Tax Department issued notice to defendant/respondent to liquidate the passenger tax of Rs. 4.50 Lacs, as such, respondent came to know about the passenger tax, which constrained him to stop payment of second cheque. The application also reveals that a complaint, filed by petitioner, was finally dismissed and vehicle released in favour of respondent. According to respondent, present petitioner has practised fraud upon him by concealing the fact that an amount of Rs. 4.50 lacs as passenger tax is outstanding against the vehicle. In his objections, petitioner has averred that vehicle in question was admittedly sold against consideration amount of Rs. 5.00 Lacs. Petitioner has also admitted that an agreement, as said by respondent in his application, was executed. However, according to petitioner, at the time of sale of vehicle, it was initially agreed that outstanding passenger tax would be paid by respondent but later on parties decided that both would bear the said tax jointly towards concerned department. 8. Application of respondent for leave to defend and objections filed by petitioner thereto, raise undoubtedly triable issues that need trial and adjudication, which cannot be done in summary trial cases. 9. In the present case learned court below, on meticulous examination of impugned order, has threadbare discussed all facets of the subject-matter as envisaged under Order XXXVII, CPC, for vouchsafing grant of leave to defend. Order XXXVII, CPC, has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure with the aim of allowing a person, who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a summary procedure instead of taking long route of a regular suit. Order XXXVII, CPC, has been included in the Code of Civil Procedure with the aim of allowing a person, who has a clear and undisputed claim in respect of any monetary dues, to recover the dues quickly by a summary procedure instead of taking long route of a regular suit. Order XXXVII Rule 3(5) guarantees right to defendant to apply for leave to defend the suit. First proviso to sub-rule (5) of Rule (3) of Order XXXVII, CPC, provides that leave to defend shall not be refused unless the Court is satisfied that the facts disclosed by the defendant do not indicate that he has a substantial defence to raise or that the defence intended to be put up by the defendant is frivolous or vexatious. Whether the leave is to be granted or not and whether there are triable issues arising out of the case or not can be decided only when the defendant is given an opportunity to duly apply for permission to defend the suit. Where the Court without providing an opportunity to defendant to apply for the purpose, refuses to grant permission, such act on part of the court is illegal and without jurisdiction. However, in the present case, court below has rightly granted leave in favour of respondent to defend as triable issues have come to fore which can be decided in regular suit and not in summary trial. 10. It may not be out of place to mention here that in Jacobs v. Booth's Distillery Co. [(1901) 85 LT 262] the House of Lords held that whenever a defence raises a triable issue leave must be given and also referred to two subsequent decisions where it was held that when such is the case leave must be given unconditionally. It is long since held that it is indeed not easy to say in many cases whether the defence is a genuine one or not and therefore it should be left to the discretion of the trial Judge who has experience of such matters both at the bar and the bench to form his own tentative conclusion about the quality or nature of the defence and determine the conditions upon which leave to defend may be granted. If the Judge is of opinion that the case raises a triable issue, then leave should ordinarily be granted unconditionally. If the Judge is of opinion that the case raises a triable issue, then leave should ordinarily be granted unconditionally. On the other hand, if he is of opinion that the defence raised is frivolous, or false, or sham, he should refuse leave to defend altogether. In that view of matter, the submissions in writ petition on hand, application of respondent for grant to leave and objections of petitioner in opposition thereto, raise triable issues, which cannot be adjudicated upon, determined and squared off in exercise of powers under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K State (pari materia to Article 227 of the Constitution of India). [See: IDBI Trusteeship Services Ltd. v. Hubtown Ltd., AIR 2016 SC 5321 ]. 11. It is not impertinent to mention that judicial pronouncements concerning object and scope of power of the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, which is pari materia to Section 104 of the J&K State Constitution, leaves little scope to interfere with the orders of subordinate courts as a matter of routine. This power cannot be taken as right of another appeal to aggrieved party nor this power can be invoked to point out an error of law or fact in the order or decision of a subordinate court. This power cannot be used to make out that the decision of subordinate court could have been or must have been other than what it was. Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When Subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction. Be it a writ of certiorari or exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the requirements that the error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and that a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby, are satisfied. 12. 12. It is well-settled that power of superintendence, so conferred on the High Court, is administrative as well as judicial and is capable of being invoked at the instance of any person aggrieved or may even be exercised suo motu. The paramount consideration behind vesting such wide power of superintendence in High Court is paving path of justice and removing any obstacles therein. Power under Article 227 is wider than the one conferred on the High Court by Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in the sense that the power of superintendence is not subject to those technicalities of procedure or traditional fetters which are to be found in certiorari jurisdiction. Else parameters invoking exercise of power are almost similar. 13. The Supreme Court in Dr. R. Venkatchalam and Ors. etc. v. Dy. Transport Commissioner and Ors. etc. ( AIR 1977 SC 842 ), has said that the Courts must avoid the danger of a priori determination of the meaning of a provision based on their own pre-conceived notions of the ideological structure or the scheme into which the provision to be interpreted is somewhat fitted. They are not entitled to usurp legislative function under disguise of interpretation. While interpreting a provision the Court only interprets law and cannot legislate it. If a provision of law is misused and subjected to abuse of process of law, it is for legislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemed necessary. 14. Article 227 can be invoked by the High Court suo motu as a custodian of justice. An improper and a frequent exercise of this power will be counterproductive and will divest this extraordinary power of its strength and vitality. The power is discretionary and has to be exercised very sparingly on equitable principle. This reserve and exceptional power of judicial intervention is not to be exercised just for grant of relief in individual cases but should be directed for promotion of public confidence in administration in larger public interest whereas Article 226 is meant for protection of individual grievances. Therefore, "the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but", as held by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case (supra), "its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline". Therefore, "the power under Article 227 may be unfettered but", as held by the Supreme Court in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case (supra), "its exercise is subject to high degree of judicial discipline". The object of superintendence under Article 227, both administrative and judicial, is to maintain the efficiency, smooth and orderly functioning of the entire machinery of the justice in such a way as it does not bring it into any disrepute. The power of interference under Article 227 is to be kept to the minimum to ensure that the wheel of the justice does not come to a halt and the fountain of justice remains pure and unpolluted in order to maintain public confidence in the functioning of the tribunals and courts subordinate to the High Court. The Supreme Court in Kokkanda B. Poondacha's case (supra), after recapitulating what has been observed in Shalini Shyam Shetty's case qua Article 227, held that "learned Single Judge of the High Court totally ignored the principles and parameters laid down" by the Supreme Court "for exercise of power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution qua an interlocutory order passed by the Subordinate Court and set aside the order of the trial Court without assigning any tangible reason." Jurisdiction under Article 227 must be sparingly exercised and may be exercised to correct the errors of the jurisdiction and the like, but not to upset the findings of the fact, which falls in the domain of an appellate court only. Same is true about the present case. The petition on hand is, from the above discussion, an appeal under the attire of petition under Section 104 of the Constitution of the Jammu and Kashmir. My above views are fortified by the fiats rendered in Nibaran v. Mahendra AIR 1963 SC 1895 ; D.N. Banerjee v. Mukherjee AIR 1953 SC 58 ; Nizzar Rawther v. Varghese Mathew AIR 1992 Ker 312 ; and Khimji Vidhu v. Premier High School AIR 2000 SC 3495 . 15. It is apt to mention here that the power under Article 227 is broader than that conferred on the High Court by Article 226. For example, through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do that and do something-it can issue further directions in the matter. For example, through its power to issue certiorari under Article 226, a High Court can annul the decision of a tribunal while under Article 227 it can do that and do something-it can issue further directions in the matter. But under Article 227, the High Court does not sit as a Court of appeal inasmuch as it is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior Court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision. The power of superintendent conferred by Article 227 is supervisory and not appellate jurisdiction. 16. From the foregoing discussion and settled legal position, it is deducible that instant petition does not call for any interference. The powers, vested in this Court under Section 104 of the Constitution of J&K, are neither substitution to revisional nor appellate power, inasmuch as order impugned is neither perverse nor has occasioned serious miscarriage of justice. Any interference by this Court would only prolong the trial inordinately. Even otherwise, impugned order does not warrant interference by exercise of extraordinary or supervisory jurisdiction of this Court, in that neither the decision-making process of learned court below suffers from any bias nor do impugned order cause any miscarriage of justice or otherwise suffer from any error of law. 17. In the background of preceding discourse, the petition on hand is devoid of any merit and as a corollary, the same is dismissed, with connected IA(s). 18. Copy of this order be sent down.