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2019 DIGILAW 189 (KER)

Noushad. M. v. State of Kerala

2019-02-22

N.ANIL KUMAR, P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON

body2019
JUDGMENT : N. ANIL KUMAR, J. The petitioners have filed this writ petition praying for a direction to respondents 4 to 6 to provide effective police protection to the life and property of the petitioners and to ensure that there are no auto rickshaws parked in front of the building and from the illegal obstructions from respondents 9 to 12 and their men by resisting the free ingress and egress of the petitoners' shop rooms and houses with building Nos. T.P.IX/561, T.P.IX/563, T.P.IX/751 to 753, T.P.IX/566, T.P.IX/369 and 569, T.P.IX/568 and 570 and also to direct respondents 4 to 8 to take appropriate action upon Exts.P11 to P15 complaints filed by the petitioners. 2. Respondents 9 to 12 are the drivers/owners of auto rickshaws parking in front of the petitioners' shop rooms and buildings. It is alleged that the regular parking of auto rickshaws by respondent 9 to 12 are causing obstruction to the free ingress and egress to their shops and houses from the road. Hence the petitioners filed Ext.P10 complaint before respondents 3 to 8 for the removal of illegal parking of auto rickshaws by respondents 9 to 12 in front of petitioners' shop rooms and houses, virtually blocking free ingress and egress to the petitioners' shop rooms and houses. The first petitioner approached the 8th respondent and on a query made before the 8th respondent under the RTI Act, the 8th respondent- Secretary of Thevalakkara Panchayat issued Ext.P9 information stating that no authorised stand is permitted in front of the first petitioner's building. Feeling aggrieved by the unauthorised parking of auto rickshaws in front of the shops and houses of the petitioners virtually blocking their free ingress and egress, the petitioners submitted Ext.P12 complaint before the fifth respondent to render adequate police protection for not blocking their ingress and egress to the shops and houses of the petitioners. 3. The petitioners are owners of shop rooms and houses in Sy.Nos.342/8-1-4, 342/8-1-3, 342/8-2-1, 342/8-3 and 405/7, 405/8, 342/5-2,382/9-2 and 202/14,342/5 in Block No.15, Thevalakkara Village, Karunagappally Taluk and with building Nos.T.P.IX/561, T.P.IX/563, T.P.IX/751 to 753, T.P.IX/566, T.P.IX/369 and 569, T.P.IX/568 and 570 of the 8th respondent- Grama Panchayat. The petitioners' shoprooms and houses are situated on the southern side of Chavara-Sasthamcotta road at Padappanal Junction of Kollam District (Chavara-Adoor State Highway). 4. The petitioners' shoprooms and houses are situated on the southern side of Chavara-Sasthamcotta road at Padappanal Junction of Kollam District (Chavara-Adoor State Highway). 4. Respondent No.11 filed counter affidavit for and on behalf of respondents 9,10 and 12 contending that the petitioners 1 and 2 erected a shed in front of the shoproom by trespassing into the parking area as well as the public road. Pursuant to Ext.R11(a) complaint, the 8th respondent issued Ext.R11(b) notice to the first petitioner directing him to remove the encroachment and the constructions made strictly in violation of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011 and Section 220(b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act,1994. Similarly, petitioners 3, 4 and 5 had encroached upon the public road by erecting a shed in front of their shop rooms, converted into a strong room and closed the rooms by using iron nets and thereby causing traffic congestion in that area for which the 8th respondent initiated Ext.R11(b) notice to them. According to them, they have valid contract carriage permit issued by the 7th respondent to park their auto rickshaws at Padappanal Junction without causing any traffic obstruction. 5. The question arising for consideration in this case is as to whether the owners in possession of the shoprooms and houses adjoining the Chavara-Sasthamcotta Public Road have a right to go upon the road from any point from their shop rooms, houses, especially when there is a public road; and if that right is obstructed by anyone, the owners in possession of the shoprooms or houses are entitled to maintain an action for the injury, no matter whether the obstruction does or does not constitute a public offence. 6. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, Sri. P.P. Thajudeen, the learned Senior Government Pleader for respondents 1 to 7, Sri. A. Mohammed Savad, the learned counsel appearing for 8th respondent and Sri. B. Mohanlal, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 9 to 13. 7. Learned counsel for the party respondents contended that the particular road on which the parking complained of has been constructed as public road being Chavara-Sasthamcotta Road in Kollam District and no person has exclusive right to claim right over such a public road under any circumstance. B. Mohanlal, the learned counsel appearing for respondents 9 to 13. 7. Learned counsel for the party respondents contended that the particular road on which the parking complained of has been constructed as public road being Chavara-Sasthamcotta Road in Kollam District and no person has exclusive right to claim right over such a public road under any circumstance. According to them, the petitioners encroached upon the public road by erecting unauthorised shed in front of the shop rooms and thereby causing traffic obstructions to their customers and the people at large which could be evident from Ext.R11(a) complaint and consequent Ext.R11(b) notice issued by the local authority directing them to remove the alleged encroachments and constructions made strictly in violation of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules,2011 and Section 220(b) of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act,1994. It is further contended that the petitioners being trespassers have no right to object parking of auto rickshaws on the side of the public road as alleged by them. It is further contended that assuming for argument's sake that parking is a nuisance, still the remedy of the petitioners is to abate the nuisance in accordance with law and not by way of mandamus directing to issue necessary police protection to abate the nuisance. 8. As against this, the learned counsel for the petitioners contended that the road on which the parking has been challenged, is a public road and road frontage is of great importance and hence a person, who owns a shop room abutting the public road, can legally claim access to the public road at any point. Learned counsel for the petitioners further submits that in the case of a public road, the public are entitled to use the entire width of the public road as the highway and are not confined to the part which may be tarred or kept vacant in order for the convenient use of carriages and foot passengers. 9. The contention set forth above raises important questions of law and fact and it is necessary to examine various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in detail. 10. 9. The contention set forth above raises important questions of law and fact and it is necessary to examine various judgments of the Apex Court and this Court in detail. 10. In Municipal Committee v. Mohammad Ibrahim [AIR 1935 Lah 196], a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court held that there can be no question that for the owners of houses abutting on a public highway, the question of frontage means a great deal and if anything is done by those in whom the highway vests which interferes with the rights of the owners with regard to the Highway and which tends to diminish the comforts of the occupants of the house, the owners will undoubtedly have an actionable claim against them. 11. In Sheonarayan v. Dindayal [AIR 1931 Nag 189], a Single Bench of Nagpur High Court held that where a plaintiff complains of an invasion of his rights as owner of property, the beneficial enjoyment of which is adversely affected, he can sue for the removal of the obstruction of a public way without showing, special injury to himself beyond that suffered by any member of the public. 12. Similarly in Mandakinee Debee v. Basantakumaree Debee [AIR 1933 Cal.884] a Division Bench of Calcutta High Court held that any individual member of the public has the right to maintain a suit for removal of obstruction of a public highway if his right of passage through it is obstructed without proving special damage. 13. In Patna City Municipality v. Dwarka Prasad Singh and Others [AIR 1939 Pat 683], Harries,C.J. (as he then was) of the Patna High Court held that the owner of a land adjoining the highway is entitled to access to the highway at all points where the land adjoins the highway whether or not the soil of the highway being his. 14. In Damodara Naidu and Others v. Thirupurasundari Ammal and Others [AIR 1972 Madras 386], a Single Bench of the Madras High Court relied on Mackenzie's Law of Highways, 21st Edn (at Page 58), in which it is stated as follows:- “The owner of land adjoining a highway has a right of access to the highway from any part of his premises. This is so whether he or his predecessors originally dedicated the highway or part of it and whether he is entitled to the whole or some interest in the ground adjacent to the highway or not. The rights of the public to pass along the highway are subject to this right of access. Just as the right of access is subject to the right of the public and must be exercised subject to the general obligations as to nuisance and the like imposed upon a person using the highway....... The right of the owner of land adjoining a highway to access to or from the highway from or to any part of his land is a private right, distinct from the right to use the highway as one of the public, and the owner of the land whose access to the highway is obstructed may maintain an action for the injury whether the obstruction does or does not also constitute a public nuisance.” In the above reported decisions, while considering the right of the owner of the land adjoining the highway, it has been unequivocally held that when there is a public highway, the owners of land adjoining the highway have a right to go upon the highway from any point on their land; and if that right is obstructed by anyone, the owner of the land abutting the highway is entitled to maintain an action for the injury, whether the obstruction does or does not constitute a public nuisance. 15. In Tanoor Panchayat v. Kunhiamutty [ 1978 KLT 813 ], it was held by a Single Bench of this Court that the owner of land adjoining a high way is entitled to access to such highway at any point at which his land actually touches it. 16. Going by the above legal precedents, it is clear that permitting the private respondents to park autorickshaws unauthorisedly in front of the shop rooms and houses owned by the petitioners, obstructing their private right abutting the highway is not at all justified. No doubt, permitting the party respondents to park their auto rickshaws permanently in front of the petitioners' shop rooms on the side of the highway is an appropriation of his private right to have free access to the highway. No doubt, permitting the party respondents to park their auto rickshaws permanently in front of the petitioners' shop rooms on the side of the highway is an appropriation of his private right to have free access to the highway. Identical question of fact and law was considered by a Single Bench of this Court in the decision reported in Joseph v. District Magistrate [ 1996 (2) KLT 490 ]. It reads as follows:- “10. But more than that, the owner on the side of the national highway has a private right of access as well, subject to the public right of passage which is a higher right to be enjoyed by public including the person like the petitioner. In other words, a private right of access to the highway may co-exist with a public right of way though it does not necessarily merge with the public right. Public right of passage is subject to private right of landowners' right to access to the highway. Where a foot-path intervenes between a highway and adjoining premises, the owner of the premises is entitled to access across the foot-path to the highway for any kind of traffic, which is necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of his premises. The interest of the public in a highway consists solely in the right of passage. Such right would include stopping perhaps for refreshments, enjoying the view etc. But no highway user may use the highway for parking their vehicles permanently for their business so as to invade the private right of entry of a owner of adjoining land to the highway. For traffic regulation and for public purpose and for the safety of pedestrians, it is open to the authorities to plant barriers separating the foot path and the highway, which may invade the private right of a person owning land abutting the highway. It may also possible for a statutory authority to erect obstruction in the highway such as electric posts, telephone posts, but shelter etc., which may invade the private right of landowners abutting the highway. The same is for public interest. But allowing taxi cars to park on the side of the highway obstructing the private right of landowners abutting the highway is not for a public purpose, but for the private interest of taxi operators in exercise of their business. 11. The same is for public interest. But allowing taxi cars to park on the side of the highway obstructing the private right of landowners abutting the highway is not for a public purpose, but for the private interest of taxi operators in exercise of their business. 11. Allowing taxi operators who are engaged in their business to park their vehicles permanently in front of petitioner's workshop on the side of the national highway is an invasion of the private right of petitioner to have access to the national highway. It is not as if taxi cars are parked for sometime to board or alight passengers, but parked there for their business. Parking of taxi cars round the clock in front of the petitioner's shop as part of their business cannot be said to be legal.” The above legal principles have been virtually affirmed in the Division Bench decisions of this Court reported in Ummer Farookh v. Station House Officer and others [ 2014(1) KHC 317 ] (DB) and Jayaprasad v. State of Kerala [2018(2) KLT SN 47 (C. No.56) (DB). 17. One of the contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioners is that the statutory authorities have failed to discharge their duty by establishing authorised parking area without causing difficulty to the general public. In this connection, we deem fit and proper to consider the various provisions relating to rules for prescribing stands for taxis and other vehicles within the Panchayat area. 18. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions governing the context. As per Section 227 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the third respondent is the authority to prescribe public landing places, halting places and cart-stands and levy fees for their use. Section 227 of the Act reads as follows:- “227. 18. We will briefly refer to the statutory provisions governing the context. As per Section 227 of the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the third respondent is the authority to prescribe public landing places, halting places and cart-stands and levy fees for their use. Section 227 of the Act reads as follows:- “227. Public landing places and cart-stands etc.--Subject to such rules as may be prescribed, the Village Panchayat may - (a) provide public landing places, halting places and cart-stands (including stands for animals and vehicles of any description) and levy fees for their use; and (b) where any such place or stand has been provided, prohibit the use for the same purpose by any person, within such distance, thereof, any public place or the side of any public road as the panchayat may, subject to the control of the Regional Transport Authority, specify: Provided that the previous sanction of the Regional Transport Authority shall be obtained before any stand or halting place for motor vehicles is opened.” The Kerala Panchayat Raj (Landing Places, Halting Places, Cart Stands and other Vehicle Stands) Rules,1995 (for short 'the Rules') provides elaborate rules for prescribing stands for taxis and other vehicles as follows:- “3. Panchayat to invite objections before providing public landing places, halting places, cart stands or other vehicle stands.- (1) A Village Panchayat shall, if it intends to provide any public landing place, halting place, cart stand or other vehicle stand, publish a notice in the notice board of the Village Panchayat and in any prominent place in each of its constituencies requiring the public to raise objections regarding the same, if any, in writing within thirty days and publish the fact of such publication of notice in any two local daily newspapers in the regional language having wide circulation in that Village Panchayat. (2) The notice shall contain the survey number and the extent of the land in which it is intended to provide the landing place, halting place, cart stand, or other vehicle stand. 4. Village Panchayat to consider the objections.- The Village Panchayat shall, in cases where the approval of Regional Transport Authority is not required, consider the objections received from the public within the fixed day and dispose them within fifteen days. 5. 4. Village Panchayat to consider the objections.- The Village Panchayat shall, in cases where the approval of Regional Transport Authority is not required, consider the objections received from the public within the fixed day and dispose them within fifteen days. 5. Village Panchayat to obtain previous sanction of the Regional Transport Authority.- The Village Panchayat shall obtain previous sanction or the Regional Transport Authority before opening any public stand of halting place to motor vehicles.” 19. In this context, reference may also be made to Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. As per Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, the State Government or any authority authorised in this behalf by the State Government may, in consultation with the local authority having jurisdiction in the area concerned, determine places at which motor vehicle may stand either indefinitely or for a specified period of time and determine the places at which public service vehicles may stop for a longer time than is necessary for the taking up and setting down of passengers. Going by Section 117 of the Motor Vehicles Act and Rule 344 of the Kerala Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, it is within the realm of the 8th respondent to determine the location of a parking place for auto rickshaws/taxis in consultation with respondents 2 and 7. Section 72 (1) of the Kerala Police Act mandates Traffic Regulatory Committees in every Grama Panchayat, Municipality and Corporation for regulating matters in respect of traffic. Section 72 (2) of the Kerala Police Act provides that the concerned head of the Local Government Institution shall be the Chairman of the Traffic Regulatory Committee and the nominees of the District Magistrate, the District Police Chief, the Regional Transport Officer and the Executive Engineer of the Public Works Department shall be the members of the said committee. Section 72(3) provides that the Traffic Regulatory committee shall issue orders, not inconsistent with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and the Kerala Road Safety Act,2007 and the rules made there under, for preventing danger, obstruction and inconvenience caused to the general public in respect of traffic in the matters provided under sub-sections (3)(a) to (3)(g) of Section 72. Section 72(3) provides that the Traffic Regulatory committee shall issue orders, not inconsistent with the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act,1988 and the Kerala Road Safety Act,2007 and the rules made there under, for preventing danger, obstruction and inconvenience caused to the general public in respect of traffic in the matters provided under sub-sections (3)(a) to (3)(g) of Section 72. It is evident from Ext.P9 information issued by the Panchayat pursuant to the information sought invoking the provisions of the Right to Information Act that there exists no prescribed auto rickshaw stand in front of the petitioners' shop rooms and buildings. Thus, it is evident that no auto rickshaw stand has been approved by the 8th respondent- Panchayat or anybody else. 20. As noted above, the learned counsel for the party respondents contended that the petitioners are rank trespassers over the area earmarked for parking of the auto rickshaws and are causing obstruction in the National Highway as well as in the Panchayat area by encroaching the public property. Hence, it is contended that they are not entitled to get any relief from this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is true that rank trespasser over the Government land is not entitled to invoke discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. However, there is nothing on record to indicate that the petitioners are rank trespassers over the Government land as contended by the learned counsel for the party respondents. This is purely a disputed question of fact. It is for the statutory authority constituted under the Kerala Panchayat Raj Act to take appropriate steps to get the unauthorised construction, if any, made by the petitioners demolished in accordance with the procedure established by the law. In the case on hand, the petitioners produced Exts.P1 to P6(a) to prove their ownership over the shop rooms and houses adjoining the public road. Judged by the above standards, we are of the considered view that the petitioners are entitled to have access to Chavara-Sasthamcotta road in Kollam District abutting their shop rooms and houses free of any obstruction. In the case on hand, the petitioners produced Exts.P1 to P6(a) to prove their ownership over the shop rooms and houses adjoining the public road. Judged by the above standards, we are of the considered view that the petitioners are entitled to have access to Chavara-Sasthamcotta road in Kollam District abutting their shop rooms and houses free of any obstruction. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, the writ petition is liable to be disposed of as indicated herein below:- (1) There will be a direction to the sixth respondent to give adequate and effective police protection for carrying out business in the petitioners' shop rooms and the houses referred to above by stopping the illegal parking of the auto rickshaws and others in front of the petitioners' shop rooms and houses on the side of the highway. (2) Eighth respondent is directed to constitute a Traffic Regulatory Committee in accordance with Section 72 of the Keala Police Act within two weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (3) The eighth respondent is directed to determine the location of the parking place for auto rickshaws in consultation with the District Police Chief and the Regional Transport Authority within four months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. (4) Until a decision is taken by the competent authority, five auto rickshaws at a time shall be permitted to park in the existing parking place, for the time being, to assist the general public subject to any other decision taken by the Regional Transport Authority in consultation with the local authority. It is made clear that in the area where the auto rickshaws are parked, only five auto rickshaws can be parked. We also make it clear that this temporary arrangement of parking of five auto rickshaws at a time shall not give them any right to claim parking, as of right, in the said area. (5) We also make it clear that we have not adjudicated the disputed question of fact as to whether the petitioners have trespassed into the public road or not and the observations contained in this judgment shall not stand in the way of the competent authority for taking appropriate decision in this regard. The Writ Petition is disposed of as indicated hereinabove.