JUDGMENT 1. Appellants had faced trial in FIR No. 151/2010 registered at Police Station Raipur, District Jhalawar for the offence punishable under Sections 302/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as 'IPC') and Section 4/25 of Arms Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'). 2. Trial court vide judgment dated 18.05.2012 ordered the conviction of the appellants under Sections 302/34 IPC. Appellant No.1 Yashwant Singh was also convicted qua offence punishable under Section 4/25 of the Act. 3. Vide order of an even date, appellants were sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life qua offence punishable under Section 302/34 IPC and fine of Rupees one thousand each. It was ordered that in default of payment, appellants would further undergo rigorous imprisonment of six months. Appellant No.1 Yashwant Singh was sentencecd to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year qua offence punishable under Section 4/25 of the Act and fine of Rupees five hundered. It was further ordered that in case of default of payment of fine, he was to further undergo rigorous imperisonment for three months. 4. Prosecution story, in brief, is that on 03.09.2010 at about 7.00 p.m., complainant Ram Singh was sitting infront of his house. In the meantime, he heard the voice of his brother Gaind Singh. Complainant ran towards the spot and saw that Yashwant Singh, Madan Singh and Shodan Singh were inflicting injuries to his brother with farsi wali sticks. Two other persons were also standing there. On seeing them, all the assailants fled away from the spot. On the basis of the statement of the complainant, formal FIR was registered. 5. After completion of investigation and necessary formalities, challan was presented against the appellants. 6. Charges were framed against the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC and Section 4/25 of the Act. 7. Appellants did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 8. In order to prove its case, prosecution examined thirteen witnesses. Appellants when examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 prayed that they were innocent and had been falsely involved in this case with a view to usurp their land. Appellants did not examine any witness in their defence. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that eyewitnesses had been falsely introduced in this case. Eye-witnesses could not have witnessed the occurrence from the spot where they were sitting.
Appellants did not examine any witness in their defence. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that eyewitnesses had been falsely introduced in this case. Eye-witnesses could not have witnessed the occurrence from the spot where they were sitting. In this regard, learned counsel has placed reliance on the site plan Exhibit-P-5. Eye-witnesses had made material improvements in their statements while appearing before the trial court. All the eye-witnesses were interested witnesses and had not suffered any injury. No blood stains were found on the clothes of the eye-witnesses. There was no evidence on record to suggest that the appellants had shared common intention to commit the murder of Gaind Singh. If the statements of the eye-witnesses were to be believed, even then, it could be said to be a case falling under Section 325 IPC. The appellants did not share any common intention and it could be said to be a case of sudden fight. Deceased had died on account of excessive bleeding. In support of his arguments, learned counsel has placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ramashish Yadav and Others Vs. State of Bihar, (1999) 8 SCC 555 , wherein, it was held as under:- "Coming to the question of applicability of section 34 for the murder of Tapeshwar, we find from the evidence of the three eye witnesses that while Ram Pravesh Yadav and Ramanand Yadav caught hold of Tapeshwar, accused Samundar Yadav and Sheo Layak Yadav came with gandasa and gave blows on the head of Tapeshwar, as a result of which Tapeshwar died, section 34 lays down a principle of joint liability in the doing of a criminal act. The essence of that liability is to be found in the existence of common intention animating the accused leading to the doing of a criminal act in furtherance of such intention. The distinct feature of section 34 is the element of participation in action. The common intention implies acting in concert, existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. It requires a prearranged plan and it presupposes prior concert. Therefore, there must be prior meeting of minds.
The distinct feature of section 34 is the element of participation in action. The common intention implies acting in concert, existence of a pre-arranged plan which is to be proved either from conduct or from circumstances or from any incriminating facts. It requires a prearranged plan and it presupposes prior concert. Therefore, there must be prior meeting of minds. The prior concert or meeting of minds may be determined from the conduct of the offenders unfolding itself during the course of action and the declaration made by them just before mounting the attack. It can also be developed at the spur of the movement but there must be pre-arrangement or premeditated concert." 10. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Vijay Singh And Another Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2014) 12 SCC 293 , wherein, it was held as under:- "Nonetheless from the evidence of the prosecution witnesses what is proved beyond doubt is that appellant Vijay Singh caused injury on the face of the deceased by ballam and appellant Hari Singh on neck by farsa. In this backdrop, we proceed to consider the nature of offence. It is relevant here to mention that no charge under Section 34 IPC has been framed against the appellants. Even if we assume in favour of the State, as contended by Mr. Singh, that it is possible to hold the appellants guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC in the absence of charge, in our opinion, for that the prosecution will have to prove that the injuries attributable to the appellants or any of them were the cause of death. As observed earlier, the appellants had caused one injury each, whereas the deceased had sustained five injuries. According to the doctor, death had occurred on account of shock and excessive bleeding due to the injuries caused on the person of the deceased. Therefore, the death had not taken place as a result of the injuries caused by the appellants or any one of them. Hence, they cannot be held guilty under Section 302 IPC simplicitor or with the aid of Section 34 IPC." 11. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balu @ Bala Subramaniam and Anr. Vs.
Hence, they cannot be held guilty under Section 302 IPC simplicitor or with the aid of Section 34 IPC." 11. Learned counsel has next placed reliance on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Balu @ Bala Subramaniam and Anr. Vs. State (U.T. of Pondicherry), (2015) CrLR 1184 (SC) , wherein, it was held as under:- "Common intention is seldom capable of direct proof, it is almost invariably to be inferred from proved circumstances relating to the entire conduct of all the persons and not only from the individual act actually performed. The inference to be drawn from the manner of the origin of the occurrence, the manner in which the accused arrived at the scene and the concert with which attack was made and from the injuries caused by one or some of them. The criminal act actually committed would certainly be one of the important factor to be taken into consideration but should not be taken to be the sole factor. "Under Section 34 IPC, a pre-concert in the sense of a distinct previous plan is not necessary to be proved. The common intention to bring about a particular result may well develop on the spot as between a number of persons, with reference to the facts of the case and circumstances of the situation. The question whether there was any common intention or not depends upon the inference to be drawn from the proving facts and circumstances of each case. The totality of the circumstances must be taken into consideration in arriving at the conclusion whether the accused had a common intention to commit an offence with which they could be convicted." 12. Learned State counsel who is assisted by the counsel for the complainant has opposed the appeal and has submitted that the eye-witnesses had rushed to the spot on hearing the cries of Gaind Singh. Eye-witnesses had witnessed the occurrence. Cause of death of the deceased is cumulative effect of all the injuries inflicted on his person. Hence, trial court had righlty ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC. 13. Present case relates to murder of Gaind Singh. Case restes of eye-witness account. Parties are closely related to each other. 14. Complainant while appearing in the witness box as PW-9 has duly supported the prosecution case.
Hence, trial court had righlty ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC. 13. Present case relates to murder of Gaind Singh. Case restes of eye-witness account. Parties are closely related to each other. 14. Complainant while appearing in the witness box as PW-9 has duly supported the prosecution case. Statement of the complainant is duly corroborated by other eye-witnesses PW-3 Lakhan Singh (son of the deceased), PW-4 Smt. Maan Kanwar Bai (wife of the deceased), PW-5 Nathu Singh (brother of the deceased) and PW-7 Umrav Singh (brother of the deceased). As per the said eye-witnesses, they were all present together near their house and on hearing the cries of Gaind Singh, they had rushed to the spot. When they reached the spot, where the occurrence has taken place, they saw that the appellants were armed with farsi wali sticks and were inflicted injuries to Gaind Singh. On seeing the eye-witnesses, appellants fled away from the spot. Injured was removed to the hospital for treatment but he succumbed to his injuries. 15. Exhibit-P-11 is the post-mortem examination report of the deceased. A perusal of the same reveals that deceased had suffered six injuries. The said injuries have been described as antemortem in nature and fresh before death. Cause of death of the deceased has been described due to hemorrhagic shock as a result of multiple injuries over the body. 16. From the initial stage itself, it was the case of the prosecution that the appellants were armed with farsi wali sticks and to the similar effect is the deposition of the eye-witnesses in the Court. Deceased had suffered lacerated as well as incised wounds. 17. Thus, from a combined reading of the statements of the eyewitnesses as well as the post-mortem examination report, it is evident that all the appellants had inflicted injuries to the deceased which ultimately resulted in his death. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, it can be inferred/concluded that all the appellants had shared common intention while inflicting injuries to the deceased. Hence, in the present case, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that section 34 IPC was not applicable, is without any force. 18. From the prosecution evidence, it cannot be said that it was a case of sudden fight.
Hence, in the present case, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that section 34 IPC was not applicable, is without any force. 18. From the prosecution evidence, it cannot be said that it was a case of sudden fight. Eye-witnesses were duly cross-examined by the defence counsel, but their testimony with regard to the manner of occurrence could not be shaken. Statements of the eye-witnesses being natural inspire confidence. Statements of the eye-witnesses are not liable to be disbelived merely because they are related to the deceased. In-fact, appellants are also close relatives of the deceased. A perusal of the testimonies of the eyewitnesses leads to the inference that all the appellants with their common intention had inflicted injuries to the deceased which resulted in his death. Hence, it cannot be said to be a case falling under Section 325 IPC. 19. There is also no force in the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the eye-witnesses had not witnessed the occurrence. Learned counsel has drawn attention of this Court towards, Exhibit-P-5, site plan. Occurrence had occurred at spot-A shown in the site plan and the eye-witnesses were sitting at spot-7 shown in the site plan. Learned counsel has argued that from spot-7, occurrence which has taken place at spot-A could not have been witnessed. This argument of the learned counsel for the appellants is without any basis because it is not the case of the witnesses that they had witnessed the occurrence from spot-7. Rather, it is the case of the eye-witnesses that on hearing the cries of Gaind Singh, they had rushed to the spot and had witnessed the occurrence. A perusal of the site plan also does not lead to the inference that the cries of Gaind Singh from spot-A could not have been heard by the eye-witnesses who were present at spot-7. There is not much distance between spotA and spot-7. Hence, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the witnesses had been introduced at a later stage and had not witnessed the occurrence, is without any force. 20. We have gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants.
There is not much distance between spotA and spot-7. Hence, the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellants that the witnesses had been introduced at a later stage and had not witnessed the occurrence, is without any force. 20. We have gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellants. There is no quarrel with regard to the propostion of law settled by the said judgments but the same fail to advance the case of the appellants as they are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 21. Thus, in the present case, prosecution had been successful in proving its case. Ocular version is duly corroborated by medical evidence. Parties are closely related to each other. There is no reason for the eye-witnesses to have falsely involved the appellants in this case and shield the real culprits. Hence, the learned trial court had righlty ordered the conviction and sentence of the appellants with regard to the commission of murder of Gaind Singh. No ground for interference is made out. 22. Dismissed.