JUDGMENT : Vivek Singh Thakur, J. Present First Appeal has been preferred by the appellant-plaintiff (hereinafter referred to as 'the plaintiff') against dismissal of his suit for possession vide judgment, dated 1st January, 2005, passed by learned District Judge, Kinnaur Civil Division at Rampur Bushahr, H.P. in Civil Suit No. 19 of 2002. 2. As per plaint, the case put forth by plaintiff Dharam Prakash is that respondent No. 1 Kejang Butidh (hereinafter referred to as 'defendant No. 1') had filed a Civil Suit in the Court of Senior Sub Judge, Kinnaur at Reckong Peo for declaration, with consequential relief of permanent prohibitory injunction, restraining the father of plaintiff, i.e. Narpal Singh, as well as Panma Medup and Tanzin Giachho respondents No. 2 and 3 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘proforma defendants'), claiming her title on the suit property on the basis of verbal agreement to sell between father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, which was partly decreed vide judgment, dated 13th September, 2000 (Ex. PC), restraining the father of the plaintiff and proforma defendants from interfering in the possession of defendant No. 1 over the suit property in future, in any manner, till she was legally ejected from it in accordance with law, after holding that her possession on the suit property was legal and permissive, but dismissing the suit qua the relief of declaration of title of ownership on the suit property claimed by defendant No. 1. Further that the appeal preferred by defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh against the said judgment before the learned District Judge was dismissed in default, vide order dated 27th December, 2001 (Ex. PA), for non-appearance of defendant No. 1 (appellant therein). Before dismissal of the said appeal, Narpal Singh, father of plaintiff, had expired and Dharam Prakash (Plaintiff herein) was substituted as respondent therein as a legal heir of deceased Narpal Singh during the pendency of the appeal. 3. Now, plaintiff Dharam Prakash is claiming his title on the basis of the aforesaid judgment Ex. PC, which has attained finality between the parties, wherein claim of defendant No.1 Kejang Butidh for title as owner was dismissed. 4. 3. Now, plaintiff Dharam Prakash is claiming his title on the basis of the aforesaid judgment Ex. PC, which has attained finality between the parties, wherein claim of defendant No.1 Kejang Butidh for title as owner was dismissed. 4. Claim of plaintiff Dharam Prakash is that though defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh had claimed her ownership by way of adverse possession since 1982, but, as per plaint in earlier suit, she was put in possession by Narpal Singh, father of plaintiff, on account of oral agreement to sell promised with her. Therefore, it is claimed that for claim of defendant No.1 put forth in earlier suit, title of father of the plaintiff, now inherited by plaintiff being his son, is admitted, settled and undisputed and also that in the judgment in previous suit, defendant No. 1 was held in permissive possession with further rider that she can be ejected in accordance with law and thus, plaintiff Dharam Prakash is entitled to recover possession from defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh, who has no title over the suit property. It is case of the plaintiff that his father was owner in possession of the suit premises from 1968 to 1981, whereafter father of the plaintiff had permitted defendant No.1 and her family to live in the suit premises. 5. Case of defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh is that father of plaintiff had entered into an oral agreement with her to sell the property for a consideration of Rs.35,000/- and the said amount, being whole consideration amount, was received by him in installments and at the time of making the payment of last installment of Rs.5,000/- on 28th November, 1982, a writing to this effect was also executed by father of plaintiff and the possession of the suit property was delivered to defendant No. 1 on the spot. Further that proforma defendants No. 2 and 3, i.e. Panma Medup and Tanzin Gyachho, for that reason only, had never raised any objection with respect to the alleged sale. Also that the suit is hit by provision of Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred to as 'TP Act'). As per defendant No. 1, suit property was not recorded in the ownership of the father of plaintiff and for that reason, the sale deed could not be executed. It is also contended that in the judgment Ex. As per defendant No. 1, suit property was not recorded in the ownership of the father of plaintiff and for that reason, the sale deed could not be executed. It is also contended that in the judgment Ex. PC, father of the plaintiff was never held to be owner of the property and, therefore, finality of the said judgment is of no help to the plaintiff and also, there is no such finding in the earlier suit on the basis of which, the present suit can be maintained by the plaintiff. 6. It is undisputed that the proforma defendants, Panma Medup and Tanzin Giachho, have been recorded as owners of the suit property in revenue record. There is no entry either in favour of Narpal Singh (father of plaintiff) or plaintiff Dharam Prakash in revenue record. Panma Medup has been shown in possession of the suit property through defendant No. 1-Kejang Butidh on account of sale as per jamabandi for the year 1998-99 (Ex. PE) for the Village Gyaavug Khaas, District Kinnaur. 7. Referring revenue record, it is also contended on behalf of defendant No. 1 that plaintiff has no title in the suit property as the same has been recorded in ownership of Panma Medup and Tanzin Giachho, proforma defendants No. 2 and 3 and, thus, plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit and suit is not maintainable in the present form for it has been filed without seeking the relief of declaration of ownership of the father of plaintiff or of the plaintiff in the suit land or structure thereon. Suit has also been opposed on the ground that it is barred by limitation. 8. In replication, titled as rejoinder on behalf of plaintiff, reiterating the averments of the plaint, it has been stated that plaintiff-Dharam Prakash, being son of Narpal Singh, after the death of Narpal Singh on 20th April, 2001, was substituted as a legal heir in place of Narpal Singh during the pendency of the appeal before the learned District Judge filed by defendant No. 1 against the judgment Ex. PC passed in the previous suit and, therefore, he is competent to file and pursue the present suit. PC passed in the previous suit and, therefore, he is competent to file and pursue the present suit. Further that Panma Medup and Tanzin Giachho have been made proforma defendants as they were not available at the time of filing the suit and in view of the findings in the previous suit that defendant No. 1 is in permissive possession of the suit property, plea of adverse possession stands negatived. Agreement to sell, as claimed by defendant No. 1, has also been denied to have been entered upon between the father of plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and as defendant No. 1, in previous suit, has averred that suit property was sold to her through verbal agreement, the written agreement claimed in the written statement by defendant No. 1 is a forged and fabricated document and, therefore, there is no question of protection under Section 53A of TP Act, rather, submissions of defendant No. 1 are hit by principle of res judicata. It is also reiterated that the earlier suit was filed by defendant No. 1 against father of the plaintiff and other owners claiming adverse possession against them and, thus, title of the father of plaintiff stands admitted by defendant No. 1 and findings of the Court in that suit have attained finality and, therefore, defendant No. 1 is estopped from denying the ownership of plaintiff. 9. Defendants No. 2 and 3 had not contested the Civil Suit and were proceeded ex-parte. 10. After considering the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed by the trial Court for adjudication of the suit: “1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for possession of land and house as alleged? OPP 2. Whether the suit is barred by limitation as alleged? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit as alleged? OPD 4. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form as alleged in preliminary objection No. 3? OPD 5. Whether the suit is bad as mentioned in preliminary objection No. 4 as alleged? OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit due to his own act, conduct, omission and commission as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 9. OPD 6. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit due to his own act, conduct, omission and commission as alleged? OPD 7. Whether the suit is not properly valued for the purposes of court fee and jurisdiction as alleged? OPD 8. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? OPD 9. Whether the plaintiff has got no cause of action and the suit is frivolous as alleged? OPD 10. Whether the suit is hit by provisions of Section 53-A of Transfer of Property Act as allege? OPD 11. Relief.” 11. Plaintiff, in his evidence, lead in affirmative through Advocate, has only tendered copy of order, dated 27th December, 2011 Ex. PA, passed by the learned District Judge in the appeal arising out of the judgment Ex. PC passed in previous suit; copy of plaint, Ex. PB, in previous suit; copy of judgment, dated 13th September, 2002, Ex. PC, in the previous suit; copy of decree sheet, Ex. PD, therein; copy of misal haqiat Ex. PE; abstract of costs Mark-X and site plan Mark-Y and had closed his evidence in affirmative. One copy of family settlement Ex. P-1 has also been placed on record on 27.9.2003 through DW-5 Chander Singh, in his cross-examination. 12. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 had examined six witnesses in defence and had produced in evidence receipt, dated 24th February, 1981, Ex. DW-5/A; receipt, dated 18th May, 1981, Ex. DW-5/B; receipt, dated 6th December, 1981, Ex. DW-5/C and receipt, dated 28th November, 2002, Ex. DW-2/C; copy of agreement, dated 18th November, 2002, Ex. DW-2/B; copy of signature slip of father of plaintiff from Bank, Ex. DW- 6/A; copy of relevant page of registered maintained by State Bank of India having the signatures of father of the plaintiff, Ex. DW-6/B; copy of misal haqiat Bandobast Jadeed for Village Gyavug Khaas, Ex. DX. 13. Plaintiff, in rebuttal, has filed his affidavit in evidence Ex. PW-1/A and was examined as PW-1. 14. On conclusion of trial, the trial Court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff against which the present appeal has been preferred. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record and Memorandum of Appeal. 16. Plaintiff, in rebuttal, has filed his affidavit in evidence Ex. PW-1/A and was examined as PW-1. 14. On conclusion of trial, the trial Court has dismissed the suit of the plaintiff against which the present appeal has been preferred. 15. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have also gone through the record and Memorandum of Appeal. 16. Following point has arisen for consideration in this appeal: Whether impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned District Judge suffered from infirmity, illegality or perversity and, thus, is liable to be set aside? 17. In the plaint, Ex. PB, filed in the previous suit, defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh had claimed that father of plaintiff, i.e. Narpal Singh, had purchased the suit land in the year 1968 from defendant No. 2-Panma Medup and constructed one double storeyed building, consisting of eleven rooms, thereupon, but, the mutation was not attested in favour of father of plaintiff, however, he remained in possession of the suit land till 24th February, 1981 when he verbally agreed to sell the suit land to defendant No. 1 alongwith building thereon and pursuant thereto, delivered possession to defendant No. 1 on the same day. Thereafter, defendant No. 1 had claimed ripening of title in her favour on account of open, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession with clear denial of any kind of right, title and interest of the father of plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3 over the suit land and the building thereon. 18. It is now settled law that suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession is maintainable. 18. It is now settled law that suit for declaration of title on the basis of adverse possession is maintainable. In Ravinder Kaur Grewal & others v. Manjit Kaur & others, 2019 (10) SCALE 473 , the Apex Court has held that a person in possession cannot be ousted by another person except by due procedure of law and once 12 years’ period of adverse possession is over, even owner’s right to eject him is lost and the possessory owner acquires right, title and interest possessed by the outgoing person/owner, as the case may be, against whom he has prescribed and consequence is that once that right, title or interest is acquired it can be used as a sword by the plaintiff as well as a shield by the defendant within ken of Article 65 of the Act and any person who has perfected title by way of adverse possession, can file a suit for restoration of possession in case of dispossession. However, in present case, when defendant No. 1 is claiming her possession on the suit property delivered to her by father of plaintiff in pursuance to verbal agreement to sell, the same cannot be held to be hostile to the title of father of the plaintiff. Therefore, her plea of clear denial of title of plaintiff on account of continuous, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the suit property for the last more than 22 years is in contrast to her claim of acquiring possession of the suit property pursuant to sale agreement. Her said plea also stands already adjudicated upon in the previous suit and the findings in respect thereto have attained finality after dismissal of appeal preferred by defendant No. 1. Therefore, her such plea against father of plaintiff or plaintiff is misconceived and is not sustainable. However, it is not permissible to the plaintiff, but, permissible for the defendant to take alternative, contradictory pleas in the written statement, but it should not be mutually destructive. In present case, defendant No.1 is claiming her title and possession on the basis of agreement to sell as well as adverse possession. In both the pleas, she is claiming ownership in possession. Therefore, these pleas, despite being contradictory, are not destroying basic claim of ownership and possession of suit property. 19. In present case, defendant No.1 is claiming her title and possession on the basis of agreement to sell as well as adverse possession. In both the pleas, she is claiming ownership in possession. Therefore, these pleas, despite being contradictory, are not destroying basic claim of ownership and possession of suit property. 19. In previous suit, father of the plaintiff, defendants No. 2 and 3 (proforma defendants herein), who were defendants therein, were duly served, but, had not contested the claim of defendant No. 1 (plaintiff therein) and had not rebutted the facts stated in the plaint in that suit, wherein there was specific mention of the date 24th February, 1981 as the date of verbal agreement to sell and delivery of possession to defendant No.1 and on the basis of the said assertion, judgment and decree holding defendant No. 1 in permissive possession of the suit property was passed in her favour restraining father of the plaintiff and defendants No. 2 and 3 from interfering in possession of defendant No. 1 over the suit land in future, in any manner, till she is legally ejected from it in accordance with law. 20. Permissive possession of defendant No. 1 flows from the verbal agreement to sell entered upon on 24th February, 1981, which has been acknowledged on 28.11.1982 by father of plaintiff mentioned in Ex. DW-2/B. Fact stated in the previous suit that father of the plaintiff came in possession of the suit land in the year 1968, constructed building thereupon and remained in possession thereof till 1981 is also corroborated from the statement of plaintiff filed by way of affidavit Ex. PW-1/A in examination-in-chief in present suit, wherein it is stated that father of plaintiff had purchased suit property in the year 1968 from Panma Medup and Tanzin Giachho (proforma defendants) and thereafter, he had constructed a house consisting of eleven rooms and the said property remained in peaceful possession of father of the plaintiff till 1981. 21. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that in the previous suit, defendant No. 1 had pleaded possession of property on the basis of verbal agreement to sell whereas in present suit, in support of her claim, she has placed on record a written agreement Ex. 21. It is argued on behalf of the plaintiff that in the previous suit, defendant No. 1 had pleaded possession of property on the basis of verbal agreement to sell whereas in present suit, in support of her claim, she has placed on record a written agreement Ex. DW-2/B. It is also contended that in her cross-examination, she has admitted the said fact, however, has given an explanation that her documents were buried under the debris of her old damaged house, but, she had not disclosed the said fact in the Court but thereafter she, again, has stated that she had deposed in the Court to that effect and had also informed her Advocate at the time of drafting the plaint in the previous suit. 22. The possession of the suit property is claimed by defendant No. 1 to have been delivered to her on 24th February, 1981 on the basis of verbal agreement to sell, whereas agreement Ex. DW-2/B is dated 28th November, 1982. Sale consideration to the tune of Rs.35,000/- is claimed to have been paid in installments and first installment of Rs.10,000/- is claimed to have been paid on 24th February, 1981. In this regard, receipt Ex. DW-5/A issued for Rs.10,000/- is dated 24th February, 1981. In the previous suit, date of possession has also been claimed as 24th February, 1981 and it is also not only admitted, rather, deposed by plaintiff in his evidence that his father was in possession of the suit property till 1981 since 1968. Subsequent receipts are Ex. DW-5/B, dated 18th May, 1981 and Ex. DW-5/C, dated 6th December, 1981 worth Rs.10,000/- each. Last receipt Ex. DW-2/C for Rs. 5,000/- is dated 28th November, 1982 and the agreement Ex. DW-2/B is also dated 28th November, 1982. 23. It is evident from the aforesaid evidence on record that possession of suit property was delivered to defendant No. 1 in the year 1981 much prior to written agreement Ex. DW-2/B, from which date, defendant No. 1 had started making payment of installments of sale consideration and on receiving consideration in parts receipts have also been issued. 23. It is evident from the aforesaid evidence on record that possession of suit property was delivered to defendant No. 1 in the year 1981 much prior to written agreement Ex. DW-2/B, from which date, defendant No. 1 had started making payment of installments of sale consideration and on receiving consideration in parts receipts have also been issued. Therefore, possession was delivered to defendant No. 1 on the basis of verbal agreement entered upon on 24th February, 1981 and, thus, the statement to the effect in the previous plaint that possession of the suit property was delivered by father of plaintiff to defendant No. 1 on the basis of verbal agreement to sell is not in contradiction to the evidence on record and the stand taken in the written statement in present suit. 24. Statement of plaintiff in the previous suit is not on record. So far as informing the Advocate with respect to burial of documents under the debris of damaged house is concerned, that has been clarified by defendant No. 1 in her cross-examination. She has admitted that before putting thumb impression on the plaint, the Advocate had read over the plaint to her and he had not read over to her that documents have lost and have buried under the debris of damaged house. Therefore, her version appears to be true. She had informed the Advocate before drafting the plaint, but, her Advocate, to the best of his wisdom, had not mentioned the said fact in the plaint, however, fact remains that possession was delivered to her pursuant to the verbal agreement which was reduced into formal writing later on, only after receiving the last installment of the whole consideration on 28th November, 1982. Having a glance of condition of papers of agreement Ex. DW-2/B; receipts, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C also substantiates the plea of defendant No. 1 that these documents were buried in a box under the debris of damaged house. 25. To substantiate her claim, defendant No. 1 has relied upon agreement Ex. DW-2/B and receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B & Ex. DW-5/C signed and issued by father of the plaintiff. Agreement has been written on a stamp paper issued on 18th November, 2002, in favour of Narpal Singh, father of the plaintiff, for the purpose of agreement. 25. To substantiate her claim, defendant No. 1 has relied upon agreement Ex. DW-2/B and receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B & Ex. DW-5/C signed and issued by father of the plaintiff. Agreement has been written on a stamp paper issued on 18th November, 2002, in favour of Narpal Singh, father of the plaintiff, for the purpose of agreement. DW-7 Gian Bahadur, who was stamp vendor at Reckong Peo since 1979 to 1986, has been examined to prove the sale of stamp papers of Rs.4 denominations (in two sheets) to Narpal Singh, father of the plaintiff. He has identified his own signatures on the back side of the stamp papers in circle Ex. DW-7/A. He has further deposed that he had been knowing Narpal Singh personally and that his sister was married to Narpal Singh after 18th November, 1982. Though, in cross-examination, he has stated that he has not brought the register of 18th November, 1982, but, he has clarified that he does not know the fate of register at the time of his deposition as he had stopped working as stamp vendor in the year 1986. He has also stated that his register was not checked by Stamp Auditor at any time. The fact of marriage of his sister with Narpal Singh has not been questioned in cross-examination. Therefore, he is uncle (mama) in relation of the plaintiff Dharam Prakash. Though, it has been put to him, which stands denied, that he was deposing falsely in collusion with the defendants, but, there is no material on record to substantiate such suggestion. 26. The agreement Ex. DW-2/B is written by Durga Singh and witnessed by Hishe Nargu and Gyachho Ram. It has been signed by Narpal Singh, but, defendant No. 1 has neither signed it nor put her thumb impression on it. 27. It would be apt to notice that had this agreement been forged and fabricated, then, thumb impression of defendant No. 1 may also have been put on it for not taking any chance of rejection of the said document for not being signed by the second party as in case of fabrication of the document it would have been a natural instinct of defendant No. 1 to construct that document with her thumb impression, putting it to establish her presence and willingness to accept the said agreement. But, it is not so in the present case, which reflects genuineness of this document. 28. Defendant No. 1 has also examined attesting witnesses of the agreement, i.e. Gyachho Ram as DW-2 and Hishe Nargu as DW-3. In affidavits filed in examination-in-chief Ex. DW-2/A and Ex. DW-3/A, both of them have stated that the agreement was written on 28th November, 1982 between father of the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 by one Shri Durga Singh, r/o Ropa, who has expired. Further that the total sale consideration for the sale agreement was Rs.35,000/- and father of the plaintiff had admitted receipt of Rs.30,000/- prior to writing the agreement, receipts whereof were shown by defendant No. 1 to them, which were admitted by father of the plaintiff to be correct by stating that those receipts were written and signed by him. They have further stated that defendant No. 1 had paid Rs.5,000/- to the father of the plaintiff in their presence and father of the plaintiff had issued receipt to that effect. Both of them have identified the signatures of father of the plaintiff on the agreement in circle 'B' and their signatures thereon in the red circles 'A' and 'D', respectively. They have also stated that father of the plaintiff had informed that he had purchased said property from defendant No. 2. 29. DW-2 Giachho Ram as well as DW-3 Hishe Nargu were also examined as witnesses in the previous suit filed by defendant No. 1. In present suit, they have filed their affidavits in examination-in-chief stating therein that they have witnessed the execution of agreement Ex. DW-2/B. In cross-examination, DW-2 Giachho Ram has admitted that in the suit before Senior Sub Judge, Reckong Peo, he had deposed that suit property was sold orally. DW-3 Hishe Nargu, in his cross-examination, has stated that he had not volunteered to say in the Court at Reckong Peo that documents were prepared with regard to the sale of the house. He has further stated that he does not know that defendant No. 1 had filed a suit in the Court of Reckong Peo claiming oral sale of the house, however, he has further stated that he had asked the reason for not producing the documents from defendant No. 1 Kejang Butidh, but, she had replied that during dismantling of the old house, papers had misplaced. He has denied that Ex. DW-2/B and Ex. He has denied that Ex. DW-2/B and Ex. DW-2/C are not twenty years old documents, but, have been prepared at the time of filing of the suit. 30. As discussed supra, initial agreement, pursuant to which defendant No. 1 had paid installments against the sale consideration, was oral and the agreement Ex. DW-2/B was reduced into writing after transaction of entire consideration, in installments, was complete. Possession was also already with defendant No. 1 since 1981 in pursuance to the oral sale agreement. 31. Defendant No. 1 has also relied upon the receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C, written and signed by father of the plaintiff, however, despite the fact that receipt Ex. DW-2/C was prepared on the same day when the agreement Ex. DW-2/B was written, agreement Ex. DW- 2/B was not written by father of the plaintiff, Narpal Singh, but was got subscribed through one Durga Singh, who could not be examined as a witness for his death prior to that. But, subscribing the documents by him has been proved by examining witnesses DW-2 Giachho Ram and DW-3 Hishe Nargu. 32. DW-2 Giachho Ram, in his cross-examination, has stated that stamp papers, whereupon agreement Ex. DW-2/B has been written, were brought by Tek Singh, husband of defendant No. 1, whereas DW-3 Hishe Nargu has stated that those stamp papers were in the hand of father of the plaintiff, Narpal Singh, who had handed over the same to Durga Singh, who had subscribed agreement Ex. DW-2/B. 33. So far as purchase of the stamp papers by Narpal Singh is concerned, the same stands duly proved by DW-7 Gian Bahadur, who is also brother-in-law of Narpal Singh, father of the plaintiff. Stamps papers have been purchased on 18.11.1982 whereas document has been subscribed on 28.11.1982. Therefore, the only inference, considering the evidence on record, which can be drawn is that the stamp papers were purchased by father of the plaintiff, Narpal Singh, but the agreement was not reduced into writing immediately after purchase of stamp papers and thus Narpal Singh might have handed over the same to defendant No. 1 for an agreement. Even if Ex. DW-2/B is ignored, there is no reason to ignore or discard receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW- 5/B and Ex. DW-5/C. 34. It is claim of defendant No. 1 that the receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. Even if Ex. DW-2/B is ignored, there is no reason to ignore or discard receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW- 5/B and Ex. DW-5/C. 34. It is claim of defendant No. 1 that the receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C were written and signed by father of plaintiff and also in the written agreement Ex. DW-2/B, which was written by Durga Singh, father of plaintiff had put his signatures. To substantiate her claim that these documents were signed by father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, defendant No. 1, except requesting the Court to send those documents for comparison with the admitted documents available on record, has made all out effort to place and prove on record the signatures of father of plaintiff by summoning the record from the Bank as well as Education Department. 35. DW-6 Maan Singh, Cash Officer in State Bank of India, Gyavung Branch, District Kinnaur has proved on record copies of Account Opening Form and a page of Account Opening Register containing the signatures of father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, thereon as Ex. DW-6/A and Ex. DW-6/B, respectively, (original whereof were produced in the Court and after comparison with the photocopies were returned) by stating that account number of father of plaintiff was dated 11th December, 1995. In cross-examination, this witness has admitted that father of plaintiff had not signed in his presence nor he was having any other signature of Narpal Singh with him made later on, but, as on these documents, it is written Narpal Singh, therefore, he was saying that these signatures are of Narpal Singh. 36. DW-1 Shiv Ram Kashyap, Senior Assistant in Primary Education Block, Kalpa, has proved on record copy of page No. 1 of service book of father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, Ex. DW-1/A by producing original thereof in the Court whereupon the original signature of father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, are available. 37. Besides, DW-2 Giachho Ram and DW-3 Hishe Nargu, who have deposed that father of plaintiff had signed agreement Ex. DW-2/B and receipts Ex. DW-1/A by producing original thereof in the Court whereupon the original signature of father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, are available. 37. Besides, DW-2 Giachho Ram and DW-3 Hishe Nargu, who have deposed that father of plaintiff had signed agreement Ex. DW-2/B and receipts Ex. DW-2/C in their presence, defendant No. 1 has also examined DW-5 Chander Singh, resident of Village Gyavung, who has stated that Narpal Singh was resident of his village and since 1976, he (this witness) was posted as Headmaster in Middle School, Gyavung and Narpal Singh was Headmaster of Primary School, Gyavung during 1979-80 and both schools were in one complex and he is well conversant with the writing and signatures of Narpal Singh. He has identified the writing on receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, DW-5/B and DW-5/C as writing of Narpal Singh alongwith his signatures. He has also identified signatures of Narpal Singh in red circle 'B' on agreement Ex. DW-2/B. In cross-examination, a document Ex. P-1, having signatures of Narpal Singh at point 'B' was put to him, which was also having the signatures of this witness at point 'A'. He has admitted that this document was scribed by him on 13th July, 1969 with respect to partition between the parties and he has admitted that there is a difference between signatures on Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B & Ex. DW-5/C in comparison to Ex. P-1, however, he has clarified that both the signatures are of Narpal Singh. He has admitted that signatures on Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW- 5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C were not put by Narpal Singh in his presence, but, he has asserted that being conversant with his signatures, he can identify those signatures. 38. Plaintiff had not led evidence in affirmative, but, in rebuttal, he has filed affidavit Ex. PW-1/A in examination-in-chief and appeared as a witness in cross-examination. No evidence to rebut the claim of DWs-2, 5 and 6, whereby defendant No. 1 had led evidence to place on record the admitted signatures of Narpal Singh and to identify the signatures on documents Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B & Ex. DW-5/C as signatures of Narpal Singh, has been led by the plaintiff. The only document put to DW-5 Chander Singh is Ex. P-1, who, in his cross-examination, has categorically stated that in documents Ex. P-1 as well as Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B & Ex. DW-5/C as signatures of Narpal Singh, has been led by the plaintiff. The only document put to DW-5 Chander Singh is Ex. P-1, who, in his cross-examination, has categorically stated that in documents Ex. P-1 as well as Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C, there are signatures of Narpal Singh, with which he is well conversant being a co-villagers and colleague. 39. Had the signatures on documents Ex. DW-2/B, Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C been forged for fabricating false agreement/receipts, defendant No. 1 would not have taken risk of summoning the record of service book, Bank Opening Form etc. for placing the original signatures of father of plaintiff on record. Therefore, balance of probability of construction of these documents and signing thereof by and in presence of father of the plaintiff, Narpal Singh itself is in favour of defendant No.1. 40. Even if agreement Ex. DW-2/B is ignored, there are receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW- 5/C written, duly signed and issued by father of plaintiff, which also constitute a written agreement between the parties in pursuance to which defendant No. 1 is in possession of the suit property. Defendant No. 1 is not claiming possession on the basis of written agreement Ex. DW-2/B, but, prior to that, since when she had started paying the installments against the consideration of the suit property and Narpal Singh had been issuing the receipts after receiving the installments in pursuant to verbal sale. 41. Defendant No. 1 is claiming protection on the basis of Section 53A of the TP Act. Section 53A of the TP Act reads as under: “53A. Part performance. 41. Defendant No. 1 is claiming protection on the basis of Section 53A of the TP Act. Section 53A of the TP Act reads as under: “53A. Part performance. - Where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immovable property by writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues in possession in part performance of the contract and has done some act in furtherance of the contract, and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract, then, notwithstanding that where there is an instrument of transfer, that the transfer has not been completed in the manner prescribed therefor by the law for the time being in force, the transferor or any person claiming under him shall be debarred from enforcing against the transferee and persons claiming under him any right in respect of the property of which the transferee has taken or continued in possession, other than a right expressly provided by the terms of the contract: Provided that nothing in this section shall affect the rights or a transferee for consideration who has no notice of the contract or of the part performance thereof.” 42. Necessary conditions for making out the defence of part performance to any action in ejectment by owner were formulated by the apex Court in cases titled Nathulal versus Phool Chand, (1969) 3 SCC 120 ; Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi versus Pralhad Bhairoba Suryavanshi, (2002) 3 SCC 676 ; Rambhau Namdeo Gajre versus Narayan Bapuji Dhotra, (2004) 8 SCC 614 and Ram Kumar Agarwal versus Thawar Das, (1999) 7 SCC 303 . On the basis of aforesaid pronouncements, following postulates are sine qua non for basing a claim on Section 53A of the TP Act: (i) There must be a contract to transfer for consideration any immovable property. (ii) The contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf. (iii) The writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained. (iv) The transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof. (ii) The contract must be in writing, signed by the transferor, or by someone on his behalf. (iii) The writing must be in such words from which the terms necessary to construe the transfer can be ascertained. (iv) The transferee must in part performance of the contract take possession of the property, or of any part thereof. (v) The transferee must have done some act in furtherance of the contract. (vi) The transferee must have performed or be willing to perform his part of the contract. 43. In present case, plaintiff is claiming his ownership through his father. Defendant No.1 is also claiming transfer of land in her favour by father of plaintiff. In revenue papers, father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, is not recorded as an owner and defendants No.2 and 3 have been recorded as owner but none of the parties including them have considered them as owner. Plaintiff is claiming that his father Narpal Singh was owner on the basis of purchase of the suit property from defendants No.2 and 3. Therefore, title of Narpal Singh is not in dispute amongst the contesting parties in this suit. Plaintiff as well as defendant No.1 are claiming their title through title of Narpal, which has never been denied by defendants No.2 and 3, either in present suit or previous suit. By their conduct, they have acceded to the claim of father of plaintiff, acquiring ownership by way of sale. Defendant No.1 is claiming her right on the property on the basis of oral sale, acknowledged through written documents and receipts signed/issued by Narpal Singh in her favour and fact of putting her in possession by him. Her claim is also substantiated from the revenue entries, wherein she has been recorded in possession by way of/through sale. Therefore, possession of defendant No.1 upon suit property has protection of Section 53A of the TP Act. 44. It has come on record in evidence that there is contract to transfer for consideration an immovable property. The contract is in writing in document Ex. DW-2/B and even if the said document is discarded, there are receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. 44. It has come on record in evidence that there is contract to transfer for consideration an immovable property. The contract is in writing in document Ex. DW-2/B and even if the said document is discarded, there are receipts Ex. DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C duly signed by the transferor, which certainly form a written agreement between the parties, which has been duly signed by transferor as required under Section 53A of Transfer of Property Act as this Section envisages signing of the agreement by transferor only and for purpose of this Section agreement need not be signed by both parties, The writing not only of agreement Ex. DW- 2/B, but, the receipts DW-2/C, Ex. DW-5/A, Ex. DW-5/B and Ex. DW-5/C, in no uncertain terms, construe existence of the agreement for transfer of suit property against consideration by father of the plaintiff, Narpal Singh, to defendant No. 1. Possession was delivered to transferee and the transferee has taken over the possession of the entire suit property and has also completed her part of performance by paying the entire sale consideration to father of the plaintiff. Nothing remains on the part of the transferee except necessitating for execution of sale deed which could not be executed by father of the plaintiff for the reason the suit property had not been transferred in revenue record in his name till his death and even at the time of filing of the present suit, as per revenue record produced and proved by defendant No. 1 as well as plaintiff by placing on record misal haqiat bandobast jadeed Ex. DX and nakal jamabandi for the year 1998-99 Ex. PE in respect of the suit property, the suit property is still in the name of defendant No. 2 Panma Medup and defendant No. 3 Tanzin Ghiachho but with entry in column of possession in the name of Panma Medup through Kejang Butidh – defendant No. 1 on the basis of sale. 45. The fact that in the year 1968, father of plaintiff, Narpal Singh, had purchased the suit property from defendant No. 2 is also not disputed by defendants No. 2 and 3 and even evidence of plaintiff has also substantiated the said claim. In previous suit, father of the plaintiff as well as defendants No. 2 and 3 had not opted to contest the claim of defendant No. 1 on these facts. In previous suit, father of the plaintiff as well as defendants No. 2 and 3 had not opted to contest the claim of defendant No. 1 on these facts. Therefore, nothing remains to be performed by defendant No. 1 for performance of contract entered upon between her and father of the plaintiff and, thus, defendant No. 1 is fulfilling all conditions for protection of Section 53A of TP Act in her favour and thus is also entitled for such protection. 46. In view of the above discussion, impugned judgment and decree, passed by the learned District Judge, do not suffer from infirmity, illegality, irregularity or perversity. Learned District Judge has rightly dismissed the suit of the plaintiff, being devoid of merit and, accordingly, present appeal is also dismissed. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.