Research › Search › Judgment

Allahabad High Court · body

2019 DIGILAW 1898 (ALL)

Pradeep Kumar @ Pradeep v. Meena Devi Sahu

2019-08-06

SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI

body2019
JUDGMENT : SURYA PRAKASH KESARWANI, J. 1. Interpretation of word "entertained" used in Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, and the waiver of period of six months notice and comparative hardship are the questions involved in the present petition. 1. Heard Sri V.P. Singh, learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioners and Sri Pankaj Saksena, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlady/respondent. 2. Briefly stated facts of the present case are that one Umashanker Bohare was original owner and landlord of House No.291 (new No.628, current No.186), Azadganj, Sipri Bazar, Jhansi. Ancestor of the defendant-tenant/petitioners was the tenant and the tenancy was succeeded by the petitioners. The aforesaid Umashanker Bohare sold the disputed house to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 by a registered sale deed dated 21.01.2010. According to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, the intimation of purchase of the aforesaid house was given by her to the defendant-tenant/petitioners on 21.01.2010 itself. However, rent was not paid by the defendant-tenant/petitioners. Therefore, the plaintiff-landlady issued a notice dated 03.08.2010 to the defendant-tenant/petitioners terminating the tenancy and demanded arrears of rent. Neither the house was vacated nor the rent was paid by the defendant-tenant/petitioners. Therefore, the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 filed the release application on 28.08.2010, under Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, on the ground of her bonafide need and default in payment of rent. 3. The defendant-tenant/petitioners filed a written statement on 29.11.2010 in which he specifically denied the ownership of plaintiff-landlady stating that the house was owned by one Shanker Lal and after his death it was inherited by his son Hira Singh and thereafter it was inherited by Tara Devi, wife of Hira Singh. The plaintiff-landlady has specifically denied it and stated on the basis of evidences on record that a Suit No.31 of 1965 in respect of the disputed house was filed and the aforesaid Hira Singh lost it. Thereafter, he filed First Appeal No.330 of 1977 which was dismissed by the High Court by judgment dated 16.10.1979. He filed the Second Appeal No.670 of 1980 before the Hon'ble Supreme Court which was dismissed by Hon'ble Supreme Court by judgment dated 27.04.1994. Thereafter, his wife Tara Devi filed Suit Nos.386 of 1999 and 44 of 2000, in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) which were jointly heard and dismissed by judgment dated 30.04.2011. Copies of all these judgments were filed alongwith an affidavit. Thereafter, his wife Tara Devi filed Suit Nos.386 of 1999 and 44 of 2000, in the Court of Civil Judge (S.D.) which were jointly heard and dismissed by judgment dated 30.04.2011. Copies of all these judgments were filed alongwith an affidavit. Thus, relevant judgments were brought on record that Umashanker Bohare was the owner and landlord of the disputed house who sold it to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1. 4. In paragraph 21 of the written statement the defendant-tenant/petitioners have raised an objection that the release application has been filed without exhausting three years period from the date of purchase of house and, therefore, the release application is barred by the proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 5. The release application being P.A. Case No.121 of 2010 (Smt. Meena Devi Sahu Vs. Pradeep Kumar and Another) was dismissed by judgment dated 16.4.2016, passed by the Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Jhansi, on the ground that the release application was filed before expiry of three years period from the date of purchase of house, and therefore, it was barred by the proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. However, the Prescribed Authority held that there is landlord - tenant relationship between the plaintiff-landlady/respondent No.1 and the defendant-tenant/petitioner. Aggrieved with this judgment, the plaintiff-landlady/respondent No.1 filed a Rent Control Appeal No.7 of 2016 and the defendant-tenant/petitioner filed a Rent Control Appeal No.8 of 2016. By the impugned judgment dated 15.03.2019 Rent Control Appeal No.7 of 2016, filed by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 was allowed and the P.A. Case was decreed. By judgment of even date i.e. 15.03.2019 the appellate court dismissed the Rent Control Appeal No.8 of 2015, filed by the defendant-tenant/petitioner. Aggrieved with these judgments the defendant-tenant/petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Submissions:- 6. Learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioner submits that the release application was filed by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 before expiry of three years period from the date of purchase of the disputed house. Therefore, the release application was barred by the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The defendant-tenant/petitioner has no house in the city of Jhansi, therefore, the comparative hardship was in his favour. Therefore, the release application was barred by the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. The defendant-tenant/petitioner has no house in the city of Jhansi, therefore, the comparative hardship was in his favour. He further submits that the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 has one house in the city of Jhansi and, therefore, comparative hardship can not be said to be in her favour. The release application was filed before expiry of six months from the date of notice dated 03.08.2010, therefore, it was not entertainable. 7. Sri Pankaj Saksena, learned counsel for the plaintiff-landlady/respondent supports the impugned judgment passed by the appellate court. Discussion & Findings:- 8. I have carefully considered the submissions of learned counsels for the parties. 9. From the submissions made by learned counsels for the parties, following three questions arise for consideration in the present petition:- QUESTIONS 10. (A) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the release application filed by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 before expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the house was barred by the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972? (b) Whether under the facts and circumstance of the case, the defendant-tenant/petitioner has waived the condition of six months notice required under the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972? (c) Whether under the facts and circumstance of the case the comparative hardship of the disputed house has been rightly held to be in favour of the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1? 11. Question No. (a) Whether under the facts and circumstances of the case the release application filed by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 before expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the house was barred by the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972? Admittedly the disputed house was purchased by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 by a registered sale deed dated 21.01.2010. According to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, the notice regarding purchase of house was given to the defendant-tenant/petitioner on 21.01.2010. A notice dated 03.08.2010 was issued by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent. Despite purchase of the house by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, the rent was not paid by the defendant-tenant/petitioner to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 although it was demanded and the fact of purchase was brought to his notice. A notice dated 03.08.2010 was issued by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, terminating the tenancy and demanding arrears of rent. Despite purchase of the house by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1, the rent was not paid by the defendant-tenant/petitioner to the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 although it was demanded and the fact of purchase was brought to his notice. The release application under Section 21(1)(a) on the ground of bonafide need and default in payment of rent by the defendant-tenant/petitioner, was filed by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 on 28.08.2010. It was registered as P.A. Case No.121 of 2010 and was decided by the Prescribed Authority/Judge Small Cause Court, Jhansi by judgment dated 16.4.2016. 12. The phrase that "no application shall be entertained on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a), unless a period of three years has elapsed since the date of such purchase" has been interpreted by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd. Vs. VIth Additional Distt. Judge & Ors., 1998 1 SCC 732 , and it has been held as under: "7. In view of the aforesaid rival contentions the following points arise for our consideration; 1. Whether the respondent-landlord's application under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act was not maintainable in view of the proviso to the said Section as it was filed before the expiry of three years from the date of purchase of the suit premises by the respondent. 2. Whether the said application was not maintainable on the additional ground that it was filed prior to the expiry of six months from the date on which notice was given by the respondent to the appellant as required by the very same proviso. 3. Whether the bona fide requirement of the respondent landlord did not survive in view of the subsequent event, namely, that respondent's wife had acquired an undivided interest in the adjoining part of the building in which the suit premises were situated and wherein the respondent-landlord was staying with his wife. 8. .......................A mere look at the aforesaid provision of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act shows that no application filed by a landlord is to be entertained by the prescribed authority on grounds mentioned in clause (a) unless a period of three years has expired since the date of purchase of the property by the landlord when the building which is purchased is having a sitting tenant. It is not in dispute between the parties that the appellant was a sitting tenant since 1966 in the said building when it was purchased by respondent Landlord on 30th June 1985, It is, of course, true that respondent landlord moved an application for possession, against the appellant both under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act and also under Section 21(1-a) of the Act. However, so far as the ground under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act is concerned the application was filed before the expiry of three years from the date of such purchase. It was in fact filed within seven months from the date of purchase of the premises. The moot question is whether the very filing of such application was barred by the provisions of the said proviso. It must be kept in view that the proviso nowhere lays down that no application on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) could be 'instituted' within a period of three years from the date of purchase. On the contrary, the proviso lays down that such application on the said grounds cannot be 'entertained' by the authority before the expiry of the period. Consequently it is not possible to agree with the extreme contention canvassed by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that such an application could not have been filed at all within the said period of three years. ...................................... The statutory scheme of Section 21(1) contra-indicates such a contention, sub-Section (1) of Section 21 lays down that 'the prescribed authority may, on an application of the landlord in that behalf, order the eviction of a tenant from the building under tenancy or any specified part thereof if it is satisfied that any of the following grounds exists.....' Section 21(1) deals with grounds mentioned not only in clause (a) but also in clause (b) The proviso to Section 21(1) bars entertainment of the application only on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) thereof, It is easy to visualise that an application for possession may be filed by the landlord not only invoking grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) but even other grounds mentioned in that sub-section. Therefore, the stage at which the court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in clause (a) are made out be the plaintiff or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. Therefore, the stage at which the court has to consider whether grounds mentioned in clause (a) are made out be the plaintiff or not will be reached when the Court takes up the application for consideration on merits. It has to be kept in view that applications for possession filed under Section 21(1) of the Act are not placed for admission before the prescribed authority. Once they are filed they are to be processed for being decided on merits after issuing notices to the parties concerned. Therefore, when the application reaches final hearing on merits the authority has to sift the grounds on which the application is based and if it finds that the application is based, amongst others, on the grounds mentioned in clause (a)) it has to ascertain whether three years' period has expired since the day of the purchase of the said property by the plaintiff- landlord and if the period of three years is found to have expired then the grounds mentioned in clause (a) would become alive for consideration of the authority. If not, said grounds would not be entertained for consideration. Thus the word 'entertain' mentioned in the first proviso to Section 21 (1) in connection with grounds mentioned in clause (a) would necessarily mean entertaining the ground for consideration for the purpose of adjudication on merits and not at any stage prior thereto as tried to be submitted by learned senior counsel, Shri Rao, for the appellant. Neither at the stage at which the application is filed in the office of the authority nor at the stage when summons is issued to the tenant the question of entertaining such application by the prescribed authority would arise for consideration. 9. Even that apart there is an internal indication in the first proviso to Section 21(1) that the legislature has made a clear distinction between 'entertaining of an application for possession under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act and 'filing' of such application. so far as the filling of such application is concerned it is clearly indicated by the Legislature that such application cannot be filled before expiry of six months form the date on which notice is given by the landlord to the tenant seeking eviction under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. so far as the filling of such application is concerned it is clearly indicated by the Legislature that such application cannot be filled before expiry of six months form the date on which notice is given by the landlord to the tenant seeking eviction under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. The words, 'the landlord has given a notice in that behalf to the tenant not less than six months before such application', would naturally mean that before filing of such application or moving of such application before the prescribed authority notice must have preceded by at least six months. similar terminology is not employed by the Legislature in the very same proviso so far as three years' period for entertaining such application by the prescribed authority is concerned. Therefore, it must necessarily mean that when the prescribed authority is required to entertain an application on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) a stage must be reached when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds for possession mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. Consequently on the very scheme of this Act it cannot be said that the word 'entertain' as employed by the Legislature in the firs proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act would mean 'Institution' of such proceedings before the prescribed or would at least mean taking cognizance of such an application by the prescribed authority by issuing summons for appearance to the tenant-defendant. It must be half that on the contrary the term 'entertain' would only show that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in clause (a)) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the prescribed authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years' period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord. 10. 10. In the present case, therefore, it must be held that when the Legislature has provided that no application under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act shall be entertained by the prescribed authority on grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act before expiry of three years from date of purchase of property by the landlord it must necessarily mean consideration by the prescribed authority of the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act of merits. On the facts of the present case, as we have seen earlier, that stage was reached after 1988 when the prescribed authority on the basis of the affidavit evidence led before it took up the plaintiff's case for consideration on merits of the grounds under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act and at that stage more than three years had expired. From the date on which the respondent-landlord had purchased the property. 13. Similar view has been taken by this Court in Rajendra Kumar Agarwal Vs. Krishna Gopal, 2013 4 AWC 3584 (All) (Paras 2, 3 & 4). In Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Union Bank of India, 2005 AIR(SC) 1891 Hon'ble Supreme Court laid down the law that if a suit is filed premature (in that case before the expiry of period of notice suit had been filed), however, it becomes mature during its pendency then the same will have to be decided on merit. The aforesaid judgment has been followed in M/s Pushpa Sahakari Avas Samiti Ltd. Vs. M/s. Gangotri Sahkari Avas S. Ltd. and others, 2012 3 JT 563 and in the matter of execution case it was held that if execution application had been filed before time but during pendency the execution application became mature then it has to be decided on merit. 14. M/s. Gangotri Sahkari Avas S. Ltd. and others, 2012 3 JT 563 and in the matter of execution case it was held that if execution application had been filed before time but during pendency the execution application became mature then it has to be decided on merit. 14. From the bare reading of 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 and principles of law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd.(supra) and Vithalbhai Pvt. Ltd.(supra), it can be safely concluded that the phrase "entertain" used in the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 would mean that the period of three years since the date of purchase by the landlord must have expired when the Prescribed Authority is required to entertain the release application on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. This would be a stage reached when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. The word "entertained" mentioned in the first proviso to Section 21(1) in connection with the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) would necessarily mean entertain the grounds for consideration for the purpose of adjudication of merits and not at any stage prior thereto i.e. neither at the stage at which the application is filed in the office of the Prescribed Authority nor at the stage when summons is issued to the tenant. The crux of the conclusion is that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the Prescribed Authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years' period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord/landlady. In the present set of facts, the disputed house was purchased by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 on 21.01.2010 and the case has been taken up for consideration on merit and was decided by the Prescribed Authority on 16.04.2016. Therefore, the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act stood complied with. Question No.(a) is answered accordingly. 15. In the present set of facts, the disputed house was purchased by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 on 21.01.2010 and the case has been taken up for consideration on merit and was decided by the Prescribed Authority on 16.04.2016. Therefore, the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act stood complied with. Question No.(a) is answered accordingly. 15. Question No.(b) Whether under the facts and circumstance of the case the defendant-tenant/petitioner has waived the condition of six months notice required under the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 ? Bare perusal of the written statement filed by the defendant-tenant/petitioner shows that the question of six months notice was not raised. The objection as to the filing of the release application before expiry of six months period from the date of notice, was not raised by the defendant-tenant/petitioner before the Prescribed Authority. He has also not filed any application under Order VII Rule 11 (d) of the Civil Procedure Code for rejection of the application on the ground that it is premature and barred by the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, on the ground that the application was filed before expiry of six months period of notice. Thus, the mandatory requirement of six months notice was waived by the defendant-tenant/petitioner. 16. A similar question was considered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Martin & Harris Ltd.(supra) and it has been held as under:- "11. so far as this point is concerned it must be held on the clear language of the first proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act that application for possession under Section 21(1) (a) had to be filed by the landlord concerned not earlier than expiry of six months from, the date of issuance of the notice by the landlord. On the facts of the present case it cannot be disputed that when the notice was issued on 20th September 1985 the application for possession could not have been filed by the respondent invoking the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act, at leas till 20th March 1986, while the application was filed in January 1986. To that extent it can be said that the application was premature. The provision in this connection has to be treated to be mandatory. 12. To that extent it can be said that the application was premature. The provision in this connection has to be treated to be mandatory. 12. However the further question survives for consideration, namely, whether the beneficial provision enacted by the Legislature in this Connection for the protection of the tenant could be and in fact was waived by the tenant. So far as this question is concerned on the facts of the present case the answer must be in the affirmative. As we have noted earlier after the suit was filed the appellant filed its written statement on 17th September 1986. In the said written statement the appellant, amongst others, did take up the contention that the application as filed by the respondent-landlord under Section 21(1) (a) was not maintainable and was premature as six months ' period had not expired since the service of notice dated 20th September 1985 when the suit was filed. But curiously enough thereafter the said contention raised by the appellant in written statement was given a go by for reasons best known to the appellant. It is easy to visualise that if at that stage the appellant had pressed for rejection of the application on the ground of Section 21(1) (a) as not showing completed clause of action due to non-expiry of six months from the date of Service of notice invoking Order VII Rule 11(a) and (d), CPC, alleging that the plaint did not disclose a cause of action or it appeared to be barred by law, respondent-plaintiff could have withdrawn the suit on the that ground under Order XXIII Rule, 1 Sub-rule (3), CPC as the suit based on grounds under Section 21 (1) (a) of the Act would have been shows to have suffered from a formal defect and he would have been entitled to claim liberty to file a fresh suit on the same cause of action after the expiry of six months' period from the date of service of notice. That opportunity was lost to the respondent-landlord as the appellant did not pursue this contention any further. On the contrary appellant joined issues on merits by seeking permission to cross-examine the plaintiff on merits of the case on grounds as pleaded under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. That opportunity was lost to the respondent-landlord as the appellant did not pursue this contention any further. On the contrary appellant joined issues on merits by seeking permission to cross-examine the plaintiff on merits of the case on grounds as pleaded under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act. When the decree was passed against the appellant, even while challenging the said decree in appeal no such ground was taken in the Memo of Appeal, nor was it argued before the First Appellate Court. Under these circumstances, the High Court rightly held that the contention, regarding the suit being premature as filed before expiry of six months from the date of the notice, must be treated to have been waived by the appellant. .............................................. The decision of the Privy Council referred to with approval by this Court in the aforesaid decision clearly indicates that if a proceeding before a Court is barred by a law, a plea to that effect being a pure question of law can be agitated any time. But if the prohibition imposed by the Statute is with a view to a fording projection to a party, such protection can be waived by the party. He may avail of it or he may not avail of it as he may choose. It is not the case of the appellant that the application for possession as filed by the respondent-plaintiff was barred by any provision of law. All that was contended was that it was prematurely filed as six months period had not expired from the date of issuance of the suit notice. That provision obviously was enacted for the benefit and protection of the tenant. It is for the tenant to insist on it or to waive it. On the facts of the present case there is no escape from the conclusion that the said benefit of protection, for reasons best known to the appellant, was waived by it though it was alive to the said contention as it was mentioned at the outset in the written, statement filed before the prescribed authority. Thereafter it was not pressed for consideration. Thereafter it was not pressed for consideration. Result was that the respondent landlord by the said conduct of the appellant irretrievably changed his position and would set prejudiced if such a contention is entertained at such a late stage as was tried to be done before the high Court after both the courts had concurrently held on facts that the respondent-plaintiff had proved his case on merits. 13. It is not possible to agree with the contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the provision containing the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act was for public benefit and could not be waived. It is, of course, true that it is enacted to cover a class tenants who are sitting tenants and whose premises are subsequently purchased by landlords who seek to evict the sitting tenants on the ground of bona fide requirement as envisaged by Section 21(1) (a) of the Act, still the protection available to such tenants as found in the proviso would give the tenants as found in the proviso would give the tenants concerned a locus penintentiae to avail of it or not. It is easy to visualise that proceedings under Section 21(1) (a) of the Act would be between the landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other. These proceedings are not of any public nature. Nor any public interest is involved therein. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed an called for adjudication by the prescribed authority. The ground raised by the Landlord under Section 21(1) (a) would be personal to him and similarly the defence taken by the tenant would also be personal to him. Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. .............................................. Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. 14. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. .............................................. Consequently it must be held that the provision for six months' notice before initiation of proceedings under Section 21(1) of the Act, though is mandatory and confers protection to the tenant concerned, it can be waived by him. 14. Apart from waiver the appellant was stopped from taking up such a contention as the respondent, on account of the aforesaid contention of the appellant, had irretrievably changed his position to his detriment and lost an opportunity of seeking leave of the Court to withdraw the suit with liberty to file a fresh suit, as seen earlier. The second point for consideration is, therefore, answered in the negative, in favour of the respondent-landlord and against the appellant." 17. From the discussion made above and the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court as aforequoted, it can be safely concluded that requirement of six months notice under the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, is mandatory but it can be waived by the tenant. These proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act are neither of public nature nor it involves any public interest. It would be between landlord and tenant. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed and called for adjudication by the Prescribed Authority. Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. In the present set of facts the defendant-tenant/petitioner neither raised any objection nor filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code for dismissal of the release application on the ground that it is premature or barred by the proviso to Section 21(a) of the Act. This clearly established that the defendant-tenant/petitioner has waived the protection of six months' notice as provided in the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioner deserves rejection and is hereby rejected. This clearly established that the defendant-tenant/petitioner has waived the protection of six months' notice as provided in the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioner deserves rejection and is hereby rejected. If an objection would have been raised before the Prescribed Authority in the very beginning then the plaintiff-landlady/respondent would have an opportunity to take leave of the Court to withdraw the release application and to file a fresh release application after expiry of six months period. 18. Question No.(c) Whether under the facts and circumstance of the case the comparative hardship of the disputed house has been rightly held to be in favour of the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1? The last submission of learned counsel for the defendant-tenant/petitioner also deserves rejection. Undisputedly, the defendant-tenant/petitioner has acquired the house in the city of Jhansi. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and evidences on record, both the courts below have recorded concurrent findings of fact with regard to the bonafide need of the plaintiff-landlady/respondent and comparative hardship to be in her favour. No perversity could be pointed out in these findings of fact. Therefore, these findings can not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. That apart, it would be relevant to mention that denial of title of the landlord by the tenant is in itself a valid ground of eviction of the tenant. 19. Considering the entire facts and circumstance and the evidences on record, concurrent findings of fact has been recorded by the courts below with regard to the bonafide need to be in favour of the plaintiff-landlady. No perversity could be pointed out in the aforesaid finding of fact, therefore, these findings of fact can not be interfered with in writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Conclusions 20. The legal position and conclusions stated above are briefly summarized as under:- (i) The phrase "entertained" used in the 1st proviso to Section 21(1)(a) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 would mean that the period of three years since the date of purchase by the landlord must have expired when the Prescribed Authority is required to entertain the release application on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) of U.P. Act 13 of 1972. This would be a stage reached when the Court applies its judicial mind and takes up the case for decision on merits concerning the grounds mentioned in clause (a) of Section 21(1) of the Act. The word "entertained" would necessarily mean entertain the grounds for consideration for the purpose of adjudication of merits and not at any stage prior thereto i.e. neither at the stage at which the application is filed in the office of the Prescribed Authority nor at the stage when summons is issued to the tenant. The crux of the conclusion is that by the time the application for possession on the grounds mentioned in Clause (a) of Section 21(1) is taken up by the Prescribed Authority for consideration on merits, at least minimum three years' period should have elapsed since the date of purchase of the premises by the landlord/landlady. In the present set of facts, the disputed house was purchased by the plaintiff-landlady/respondent no.1 on 21.01.2010 and the case has been taken up for consideration on merit and was decided by the Prescribed Authority on 16.04.2016. Therefore, the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act stood complied with. Question No.(a) is answered accordingly. (ii) requirement of six months notice under the 1st proviso to Section 21(1) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972, is mandatory but it can be waived by the tenant. These proceedings under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act are neither of public nature nor it involves any public interest. It would be between landlord and tenant. Only personal interest of landlord on the one hand and the tenant on the other hand get clashed and called for adjudication by the Prescribed Authority. Six months' breathing time is given to the tenant after service of notice to enable him to put his house in order and to get the matter settled amicably or to get alternative accommodation if the tenant realises that the landlord has a good case. This type of protection to the tenant would naturally be personal to him and could be waived. (iii) In the present set of facts the defendant-tenant/petitioner neither raised any objection nor filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code for dismissal of the release application on the ground that it is premature or barred by the proviso to Section 21(a) of the Act. (iii) In the present set of facts the defendant-tenant/petitioner neither raised any objection nor filed an application under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the Civil Procedure Code for dismissal of the release application on the ground that it is premature or barred by the proviso to Section 21(a) of the Act. This clearly established that the defendant-tenant/petitioner has waived the protection of six months' notice as provided in the proviso to Section 21(1) of the Act. 21. For all the reasons aforestated, the writ petition is dismissed.