JUDGMENT : The appeal under section 100, Civil Procedure Code is at the instance of appellant-defendant preferred against the judgment and decree dated 2-9-2002 passed by III Additional District Judge, Gwalior in Civil Appeal No. 05/2001 whereby lower Appellate Court reversed the judgment and decree dated 4-12-2000 passed by the VIII Civil Judge, Class-I, Gwalior in Civil Suit No. 162-A/1998. The trial Court dismissed the suit preferred by the plaintiffs/ respondents and thereafter, the Appellate Court allowed the appeal preferred by the plaintiffs and suit was decreed therefore, appellant/defendant has preferred the instant appeal. 2. Precisely stated facts of the case for adjudication are that a suit for declaration and for redemption of mortgage was preferred by the plaintiff Keshar Bai w/o Mangal Singh as plaintiff No. 1 and Chandan Singh as plaintiff No. 2 against the defendant (present appellant) with the submission that husband of plaintiff No. 1 Mangal Singh has purchased the suit house with consideration of Rs.3,000/- at Medai Maholla Gwalior vide registered sale deed dated 5-8-1959. After the death of Mangal Singh-plaintiff No. 1 being wife and plaintiff No. 2 being son became joint owner of the property. Later on, they orally partitioned the property and part belonging to plaintiff No. 1 Keshar Bai is denoted in the map appended with the plaint with red mark and the part of the house came in possession of plaintiff No. 2 is denoted by green mark. 3. As alleged, father of defendant Kishan Chand Dubey entered into suit premise as tenant on 17-3-1969 and after him, present defendant was occupying the part of the house as tenant since 11-5-1976. Because of the bad habits of Chandan Singh being alcoholic, defendant used the opportunity in his favour and on 5-9-1979, it was agreed upon to mortgage the half portion of the house in favour of defendant. As per submissions, on 5-9-1979, defendant/ appellant gave Rs. 2500/- out of which, Rs.1630/- were given in cash and an agreement to sale has been executed in presence of notary Mr. C. L. Gupta. On 16-10-1979, plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh executed sale deed in favour of present appellant which according to the plaintiffs was not a sale deed but was a mortgage deed. 2500/- out of which, Rs.1630/- were given in cash and an agreement to sale has been executed in presence of notary Mr. C. L. Gupta. On 16-10-1979, plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh executed sale deed in favour of present appellant which according to the plaintiffs was not a sale deed but was a mortgage deed. A separate mortgage deed was also executed on same date i.e. 16-10-1979, in which it has been agreed upon that if plaintiff within five years from 16-10-1979 return back the mortgage amount then possession of the half portion of the house would be given back to the plaintiffs. It was the submission of plaintiff No. 1 Keshar Bai that she never put her thumb impression over the sale deed and the said mortgage deed. 4. It is further submitted at the instance of plaintiff that plaintiff No. 1 never received any consideration to the extent of half portion of the house and she has not given possession to the defendant regarding the same. The market price of the house is Rs. 18,000/- whereas defendant has purchased the suit house while paying Rs. 13,000/- only and the same is not permissible and it indicates the nature of transaction which according to the plaintiff was void and ineffective. 5. Plaint was submitted on 29-9-1980. Thereafter, on 30-10-1980 (almost after one month), plaintiff No. 1-Keshar Bai sold her part of the house to Mahesh Chand Gupta but from the amendment caused in the plaint, it appears that name of Mahesh Chand Gupta was inserted on 16-7-1987, till then Keshar Bai fought the case as plaintiff No. 1. Similarly, it appears that during pendency of the suit, plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh has died and in his place his legal representatives were brought on record vide order dated 9-2-2000 therefore, effectively the (later) incorporated plaintiff No. 1 Mahesh Chand Gupta fought the case on behalf of earlier plaintiffs and he was arrayed as plaintiff No. 1. 6. Earlier relief was sought regarding declaration of sale deed dated 16-10- 1979 as null and void and for restoration of possession to the plaintiffs but with the incorporation of present respondent No. 1 Mahesh Chand Gupta as plaintiff No. 1, relief of mesne profit and for restoration of possession was sought. 7. Defendant/present appellant contested the case by filing written statement. 7. Defendant/present appellant contested the case by filing written statement. In the written statement, defendant denied the allegations levelled by the plaintiffs. It is submitted that both the plaintiffs Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh executed sale deed in favour of defendant by taking consideration of Rs. 13,000/- from him on 16-10-1979. The said registered sale deed was executed in the presence of Sub Registrar and it was duly executed by both the plaintiffs Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh in which plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh signed the document whereas plaintiff No. 1 Keshar Bai put her thumb impression which was duly endorsed and possession was handed over to the defendant (present appellant) therefore, as per the relevant provisions, sale was complete. It was further submitted that prior to execution of the sale deed, both the plaintiff Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh executed an agreement to sale dated 14-6-1979 before notary C. L. Gupta (Ex.D-3) in which they entered into an agreement to sale with the present appellant and received Rs. 4000/- as advance. Later on, both the plaintiffs have taken money from time to time from the defendant and thereafter, executed the sale deed dated 16-10-1979. 8. It is further alleged that after executing the sale deed in favour of present defendant, mischief came in the minds of the plaintiffs and therefore, with the help of Mahesh Chand Gupta who purchased some different part of the house earlier, concocted a story and with the mala fide intention, executed the sale deed in favour of Mahesh Chand Gupta on 30-10-1980 vide Ex.P-4. Mahesh Chand Gupta earlier purchased the part of the house from the original plaintiffs No. 1 and 2 and wanted to purchase same part of the house which has been purchased by the defendant but quoted lower rates (Rs. 10,000/-) whereas defendant purchased the house by quoting higher rates (Rs. 13,000/-). In fact, part of the house was already sold by the husband of plaintiff No. 1 to one Dr. Rambabu Goyal for consideration of Rs. 4,000/- and one part to Mahesh Chand Gupta for consideration of Rs. 1,000/- therefore allegations of plaintiff was rebutted by the defendant on the ground that the market rate of the portion of the house purchased by the defendant was appropriate and looking to the earlier property sold, said rate was to the extent of Rs. 13,000/- only and not Rs. 18,000/-. 1,000/- therefore allegations of plaintiff was rebutted by the defendant on the ground that the market rate of the portion of the house purchased by the defendant was appropriate and looking to the earlier property sold, said rate was to the extent of Rs. 13,000/- only and not Rs. 18,000/-. By making special pleadings, defendant tried to submit that he is the beneficiary of registered sale deed by paying the requisite consideration and took the possession thereof, therefore, the suit of plaintiffs be dismissed with cost. 9. The trial Court framed as many as 17 issues in the matter and after considering the pleadings and submissions and evidence led by the parties, came to the conclusion that plaintiffs could not prove their case and therefore, dismissed the suit by upholding that plaintiffs duly executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant and mortgage deed was never executed by the parties so as to conclude that the sale deed was infact a mortgage by the conditional sale. 10. Newly added plaintiff No. 1 Mahesh Chand and newly added plaintiffs No. 2 to 6 (LRs. of original plaintiff Chandan Singh) preferred the appeal against the judgment and decree dated 4-12-2000 passed by the trial Court. The Appellate Court allowed the appeal and preliminary decree was issued in consequence thereof which is the subject-matter of challenge before this Court. 11. According to learned counsel appearing for the appellant, trial Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree holding the validity of the transaction whereby the sale deed has been executed in favour of the defendant by the original plaintiffs. There was no mortgage deed executed between the parties. In fact, the trial Court has categorically held that agreement dated 5-9-1979 was never executed because the said agreement was never produced on record before the trial Court to bring home the fact of execution of said agreement/ mortgage deed. In absence of document on record and in absence of the statement of Mahesh Chand Gupta (PW-1) made in this regard, it cannot be inferred that any mortgage deed was executed between the parties. PW-3 Jaswant who happened to be the son of plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh has nowhere referred the factum of execution of sale deed dated 5-9-1979. The said witness has referred the execution of sale deed dated 16-10-1979 (Ex.P-3) but not about the mortgage deed. PW-3 Jaswant who happened to be the son of plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh has nowhere referred the factum of execution of sale deed dated 5-9-1979. The said witness has referred the execution of sale deed dated 16-10-1979 (Ex.P-3) but not about the mortgage deed. Once the sale deed has been executed and possession has been taken then no interference could have been caused by the Appellate Court in the findings given by the trial Court because trial Court elaborately discussed the evidence and thereafter passed the impugned judgment and decree. Appellate Court appreciated the evidence in a very slip shod manner and tersely arrived to the conclusion in the appeal which is un-sustainable in the eyes of law. Through the various documents and evidence led by the parties, learned counsel appearing for the appellant contented that the suit of the plaintiffs suffered inherent lacuna. Appellate Court erred in ignoring such anomalies. Through various judgments referred by counsel for the appellant, it is submitted that appeal deserves to be allowed in light of the substantial questions of law framed by this Court and suit be dismissed accordingly. 12. Learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand supported the impugned judgment and decree and submits that the trial Court did not consider the aspect in correct perspective and therefore, Appellate Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and decree and corrected the error of the trial Court. It is submitted that when the sale deed and the deed of reconveyance were executed on the same date then they are mortgage by conditional sale. In support of his submission, he relied upon 2010 MP RN 70, Ramgopal vs. Devlal and another. According to him, from the contents of the Ex.D-1, it is clear that it was a conditional sale and was infact a mortgage deed and in support of his submission, he referred the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Gulab Chand (dead) by Lrs. vs. Babulal (dead) by Lrs., 1988 (1) JLJ 1 and Smt. Indira Kaur vs. Sheo Lal Kapoor, AIR 1988 SC 1074 . 13. It is further submitted that non-registration of reconveyance deed does not cause any impact over the case of the plaintiffs and he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manjabai Krishna Patil (dead) by LRs. vs. Raghunath Revaji Patil and anr. 13. It is further submitted that non-registration of reconveyance deed does not cause any impact over the case of the plaintiffs and he relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Manjabai Krishna Patil (dead) by LRs. vs. Raghunath Revaji Patil and anr. (2007) 9 SCC 521 to submit that registration of reconveyance deed is not required. Learned counsel for the respondents also referred the provisions contained in section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act (hereinafter referred as “TP Act”) to submit that mere execution of the sale deed does not pass any right, title and interest in favour of the vendee because it was infact a mortgage deed and like a surety. He relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ramlal and anr. vs. Phagua and others, (2006) 1 SCC 168 . He prayed for dismissal of appeal. 14. Heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 15. The instant appeal was admitted vide order dated 12-7-2016 on following substantial questions of law, which read as under :- “(i) Whether the transaction dated 16-10-1979 vide sale deed (Ex.D-2) was in fact an absolute sale or a mortgage with conditional sale in the light of section 91 and 92 of the Evidence Act ? (ii) Whether, in absence of mortgage deed dated 5-9-1979 on record, lower Appellate Court erred in treating the transaction dated 16-10-1979 as mortgage ? (iii) Whether, lower Appellate Court has mis-appreciated the evidence and erred in reversing the findings given by the trial Court ? 16. Since substantial questions No. 1 and 2 are interrelated and are in respect of sale deed dated 16-10-1979, therefore, they are considered analogously. Here the question for consideration is whether the sale deed dated 16-10-1979 was a sale deed or a mortgage deed or mortgage with conditional sale. 17. Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act deals in respect of Mortgages of Immovable Property and Charges. 18. Section 58 of the TP Act deals regarding mortgage by conditional sale. Here the question for consideration is whether the sale deed dated 16-10-1979 was a sale deed or a mortgage deed or mortgage with conditional sale. 17. Chapter IV of the Transfer of Property Act deals in respect of Mortgages of Immovable Property and Charges. 18. Section 58 of the TP Act deals regarding mortgage by conditional sale. For ready reference, it is reproduced as under :- “58- “Mortgage”, “Mortgagor”, “Mortgagee”, “Mortgage-money” and “Mortgage-deed”, defined :- (c) Mortgage by conditional sale :- Where, the mortgagor ostensibly sells the mortgaged property- On condition that on default of payment of the mortgage-money on a certain date the sale shall become absolute, or on condition that on such payment being made the sale shall become void, or property to the seller, the transaction is called mortgage by conditional sale and the mortgagee a mortgagee by conditional sale: Provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document which effects or purports to effect the sale.” 19. The basic and the most celebrated judgment on section 58(c) is pronouncement by the Apex Court in the case of Chunchun Jha vs. Ebadat Ali and another, AIR 1954 SC 345 , in which section 58(c) of the TP Act has been considered and explained as under :- “(8) Because of the welter or confusion caused by a multitude of conflicting decisions the legislature stepped in and amended section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act. Unfortunately that brought in its train a further conflict of authority. But this much is now clear. If the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents then the transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. But the converse does not hold good, that is to say the mere fact that there is only one document does not necessarily mean that it must be a mortgage and cannot be a sale. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. If the condition of repurchase is embodied in the document that effects or purports to effect the sale, then it is a matter for construction which was meant. The legislature has made a clear cut classification and excluded transaction embodied in more that one document from the category of mortgages, therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that person who, after the amendment, choose not to use two documents, do not intend the transaction to be a sale, unless they displace that presumption by clear and express words; and if the conditions of section 58(c) are fulfilled, then we are of opinion that the deed should be construed as a mortgage.” 20. It appears that the controversy has been clarified succinctly wherein their lordships have held that if the sale and agreement to repurchase are embodied in separate documents then transaction cannot be a mortgage whether the documents are contemporaneously executed or not. The mandate of the Apex Court maintained its effectiveness and vitality till date and meandering through various reiterations, the said legal position still holds the field. Illustratively, reference can be made of judgments rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Bishwanath Prasad Singh vs. Rajendra Prasad and anr., (2006) 4 SCC 432 and Gauri Shankar Prasad and ors. vs. Brahma Nand Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 28, therefore, it is to be seen that whether registered sale deed executed in favour of the defendant incorporated any clause of reconveyance or not and on factual scrutiny it appears that said clause of reconveyance was not at all incorporated. 21. Here in the present case, registered sale deed has been executed in favour of the defendant before the registering authority. The said fact has been taken care of by the trial Court while deciding the Issues No. 10 and 17 in categorical terms. The said issues were like this:- ^^10- D;k Áfroknh ds fgr esa lEikfnr foØ; i= fnukad 16-10-1979 ÁfrQy foghu gS vkSj bl ij iwoZ oknh Øekad 1 dk fu'kkuh vaxwBk vafdr gSA 17- D;k bdjkjukek fnukad 16-10-1979 ij oknh dslj ckbZ dk vaxwBk QthZ ,oa cukoVhA** 22. Other facets of the controversy is whether present plaintiff No. 1 has purchased the half of the share from earlier plaintiff No. 1 on dated 30-8-1980, has also been decided by the trial Court, that too in negative. Other facets of the controversy is whether present plaintiff No. 1 has purchased the half of the share from earlier plaintiff No. 1 on dated 30-8-1980, has also been decided by the trial Court, that too in negative. Similarly, the factum of mortgage by plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh to defendant has also been refuted by the trial Court by answering the issue in this regard. In short, the trial Court dealt with the said aspect in detail in the judgment dated 4-12-2000 and thereafter, came to the conclusion. The findings given by the trial Court if seen in the light of section 58(c) of the TP Act and the judgment referred by the Apex Court in the case of Chunchun Jha (supra), then logical inference comes out is that the sale deed dated 16-10-1979, executed by the plaintiffs in favour of the defendant was a sale transaction and it nowhere contemplated that the transaction is mortgage and after certain period, plaintiffs can redeem the mortgage. 23. Interestingly, agreement dated 5-9-1979 was never produced on record by the plaintiffs on which they rest their case and alleged that mortgage deed was executed on 5-9-1979 between plaintiff No. 2 Chandan Singh and defendant for consideration of Rs. 2500/-, out of which, Rs. 1630/- were paid. In absence of any such agreement placed on record and in absence of any evidence led by the plaintiffs Mahesh Chand (PW-1) and other plaintiffs’ witnesses in categorical terms, trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that no such agreement was executed between the parties and negatived the issues No. 3 and 4 in this regard. 24. Once the theory of mortgage has been shattered and plaintiffs could not prove the said theory which they ought to have, if they intended to succeed then in the set of evidence and pleadings available before the trial Court, judgment was rightly passed by the trial Court dismissing the suit. Plaintiffs could not prove their case regarding mortgage and therefore, sale deed dated 16-10-1979 was found to be a valid sale transaction. 25. The said sale deed dated 16-10-1979 Ex.P-2 was executed by the original plaintiffs Smt. Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh and while dealing with Issues No. 10 and 17, trial Court dealt with that aspect in detail. Defendant witness Rameshwar DW-1 and Chandrashekar DW-2 proved the agreement to sale as registered sale deed. 25. The said sale deed dated 16-10-1979 Ex.P-2 was executed by the original plaintiffs Smt. Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh and while dealing with Issues No. 10 and 17, trial Court dealt with that aspect in detail. Defendant witness Rameshwar DW-1 and Chandrashekar DW-2 proved the agreement to sale as registered sale deed. It is note worthy that agreement to sale dated 14-6- 1979 (Ex.D-3) was never challenged by the plaintiffs and plaintiffs could not prove that the agreement to sale dated 14-6-1979 (Ex.D-3) was a forged document. Therefore, cumulatively the trial Court rightly considered those aspects and passed the impugned judgment dismissing the suit. Thus, substantial questions of law No. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly. 26. Regarding the scope of first Appellate Court vis a vis judgment of the trial Court is concerned, (which is substantial question of law No. 3), this Court in the case of Rama Rao and others vs. Shantibai and others, 1979 JLJ 385 has dealt with the said issue and given guidance regarding the scope of interference of first Appellate Court and held as under :- “Where the Appellate Court sets aside the judgment passed by the trial Court, three things must appear from the judgment of the Appellate Court - (i) That it applied its mind to the reasons given by the trial Court; (ii) That it was present to its mind that the trial Court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses which the Appellate Court itself did not have ; and (iii) disagreeing with the trial Court. If this is not done, it must be said that the order of the Appellate Court is contrary to law. The Appellate Court has the undoubted jurisdiction to re-appreciate the oral evidence and reach a finding contrary to that arrived at by the trial Court but this it can do only if its order satisfies the above three conditions. AIR 1951 SC 120 , AIR 1960 SC 115 , AIR 1929 PC 15 , 1947 AC 484 and AIR 1949 PC 32 relied on. AIR 1972 SC 1716 , AIR 1941 Mad. 393 , AIR 1972 Orissa 28, AIR 1975 Patna 192 and 1960 JLJ 348 referred to.”. 27. AIR 1951 SC 120 , AIR 1960 SC 115 , AIR 1929 PC 15 , 1947 AC 484 and AIR 1949 PC 32 relied on. AIR 1972 SC 1716 , AIR 1941 Mad. 393 , AIR 1972 Orissa 28, AIR 1975 Patna 192 and 1960 JLJ 348 referred to.”. 27. Similarly, the Apex Court in the case of Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari, AIR 2001 SC 965 , has enlightened the Appellate Courts about the manner in which the first appeal is to be heard and decided. In view of the judgments referred above, trial Court always has the advantage of noticing the demeanours and evidence of the witnesses in person to come to a conclusion on objective basis which Appellate Court does not have. 28. Here the well reasoned findings given by the trial Court were un-settled by the Appellate Court in a very slip shod manner and ignored the vital aspects involved in the controversy specially section 58(c) of the TP Act and the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in the case of Chunchun Jha (supra). 29. If the relevant documents which according to the parties, are in existence but not placed before the Court by the party concerned then adverse inference has to be drawn against the said party. This view is supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Addagada Raghavamma and anr. vs. Addagada Chenchamma and anr., AIR 1964 SC 136 . 30. Here plaintiffs could not prove their case by adducing sufficient evidence to establish the fact regarding mortgage. Even otherwise, from the evidence it appears that original plaintiffs who alleged to have executed the mortgage deed (although denied by the defendant), have not appeared in the witness box. Only subsequent purchasers Mahesh Chand Gupta who arrayed as plaintiff No. 1 in 1987 (suit instituted in 1980) tried to establish the case of the original plaintiffs. In absence of original plaintiff being deposed before the trial Court, case of the plaintiffs lacked credence and authenticity from the very beginning. 31. In a case of redemption of mortgage specially when plaintiff asserts right of redemption vis-a-vis section 58(c) of the TP Act then burden is on him to come in the witness box or to produce documents sufficient enough in support of his allegations to bring home the theory of conditional sale. 31. In a case of redemption of mortgage specially when plaintiff asserts right of redemption vis-a-vis section 58(c) of the TP Act then burden is on him to come in the witness box or to produce documents sufficient enough in support of his allegations to bring home the theory of conditional sale. Here, original plaintiffs Keshar Bai and Chandan Singh did not choose to appear in the witness box and later on Mahesh Chand Gupta was incorporated as plaintiff No. 1 in 1987, that too after seven years of filing of the suit (suit filed in 1980) whereas he became registered owner allegedly in 1980 itself therefore, his incorporation at belated stage could not have established the fact regarding theory of conditional sale in which he was not privy to such transaction. If in the case of redemption of mortgage, plaintiff does not appear as witness or produce any document to assert and establish the factum of reconveyance then case of the plaintiff lacks credence. Those facts could have established only by the plaintiffs who were privy to the sale deed and alleged mortgage deed. Therefore, on this count also, case of the appellant gains ground and case of the plaintiffs deserve discredit. The trial Court grasped the said aspect and accordingly given the verdict whereas the Appellate Court ignored those aspects and committed mistake by reversing the judgment of the trial Court and passing preliminary decree. 32. In the considered opinion of this Court, sale deed dated 16-10-1979 was an absolute sale transaction which gave right, title, interest and possession to the defendant (present appellant) because the factum of possession is noted down in the said sale deed itself. The trial Court rightly passed the impugned judgment and Appellate Court erred in reversing it therefore, it is held that transaction dated 16-10-1979 was an absolute sale and not a mortgage with conditional sale. Since mortgage deed dated 5-9-1979 was not referred and could not be proved by the original or subsequent plaintiffs or by evidence led by them therefore, lower Appellate Court erred in treating the transaction dated 16-10-1979 as mortgage. Infact transaction dated 16-10-1979 was an absolute sale. Thus, substantial questions No. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly. 33. Since mortgage deed dated 5-9-1979 was not referred and could not be proved by the original or subsequent plaintiffs or by evidence led by them therefore, lower Appellate Court erred in treating the transaction dated 16-10-1979 as mortgage. Infact transaction dated 16-10-1979 was an absolute sale. Thus, substantial questions No. 1 and 2 are answered accordingly. 33. Regarding question No. 3, it has been discussed in the preceding paragraphs itself about the scope of interference by the Appellate Court vis a vis judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court has the liberty to observe the demenours of witnesses and other developments in the trial during the evidence to reach to the conclusion objectively about the testimonies of the witnesses and their credibility. This Court in the case of Rama Rao and others (supra) has dealt with said issue and taking cue from such guidance, it appears that Appellate Court erred in reversing the findings given by the trial Court while misappreciating the evidence. When the trial Court has given a specific finding regarding sale transaction and repelled the submission regarding mortgage then in absence of any perverse findings or cogent evidence, Appellate Court ought not to have reversed the findings of the trial Court therefore, Appellate Court erred in reversing it. Thus, substantial question No. 3 answered accordingly. 34. Therefore, cumulatively, in the considered opinion of this Court, appeal deserves to be succeeded and therefore, allowed and judgment passed by the Appellate Court dated 2-9-2002 passed in Civil Appeal No. 05/2001 deserves to be set aside and judgment and decree dated 4-12-2000 passed by VIII Civil Judge in Civil Suit No. 62-A/1998 is hereby revived. 35. Appeal stands allowed and disposed of. 36. Ordered accordingly. Appeal allowed.