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2019 DIGILAW 1902 (JHR)

Brahmeshwar Prasad Sahadeo, Son of Late Rameshwar Prasad Sahadeo v. Divisional Manager (Personnel) Growth Shop, Adityapur complex, TISCO Ltd, at Adityapur, P. O. & P. S. -Gamharia, Dist. -Seraikella-Kharswan, represented the TISCO Ltd.

2019-11-22

ANIL KUMAR CHOUDHARY

body2019
JUDGMENT : Heard learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant. 2. The plaintiff-appellant has filed this appeal under section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 19.02.2010 in Tittle Appeal No. 22 of 1998 passed by learned Additional District Judge (FTC-II), Seraikella by which the learned Additional District Judge (FTC-II), Seraikella dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court. 3. The brief fact of the case is that the plaintiff-appellant was appointed as permanent worker of TISCO Growth Shop, Adityapur. Tata Iron & Steel Company was the employer of the said plaintiff-appellant. During the course of the employment, the plaintiff-appellant was deputed to work relating to issuance of gate pass in respect of outgoing vehicles by which materials of the company was carried from the premise of the company. During the course of his employment, his employer allotted Quarter no. S-32/7 to the plaintiff-appellant. The said Quarter No. S-32/7 was given from the pool of the TISCO for occupation by the plaintiff being an employee. On 23.12.1975, two trucks of two different companies arrived at TISCO Growth shop for carrying materials from that company. The said two trucks belonged to two different companies namely M/s Mapco and M/s Muk Model Company respectively. The plaintiff-appellant was supposed to issue two different passes for the two trucks but the plaintiff-appellant issued one gate pass bearing entry no. 127 for both the trucks. For this misconduct on the part of the plaintiff-appellant, one enquiry was conducted and after the enquiry, the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed from the service of TISCO vide letter dated 20.11.1976. At the time of filing of the suit, the plaintiff was already dispossessed from quarter no. S-32/7. After his dismissal, the plaintiff-appellant submitted representations to various authorities and his efforts for amicable settlement, failed. The plaintiff-appellant served an advocate’s notice and filed the suit claiming that his dismissal order is illegal and void and against the principle of natural justice. 4. The case of the respondent-defendants on the other hand is that the suit is barred by limitation and hit by Section 92 of Bihar State Housing Board Act as well as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. Learned trial Court dismissing the suit interalia held that the suit is barred by limitation. 4. The case of the respondent-defendants on the other hand is that the suit is barred by limitation and hit by Section 92 of Bihar State Housing Board Act as well as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 5. Learned trial Court dismissing the suit interalia held that the suit is barred by limitation. It is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party and also hit by Section 34 of Specific Relief Act. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree of dismissal of the suit, the plaintiff-appellant filed the appeal before learned District Judge, Seraikella, which was registered as Tittle Appeal no. 22 of 1998 and the said appeal was ultimately heard and disposed of by the Additional District Judge (FTC-II), Seraikella. The learned First Appellate Court on the basis of the submissions made before it, formulated the following six points for determination: (1) Whether the suit was within the jurisdiction of the learned lower Court or not ? (2) Whether the suit is maintainable as per provision’s of law of limitation, as per Provision of Sect. 92 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act (in short B.S.H.B. Act), as well as, as per provision of Section 34 of Specific Relief Act? (3) Whether suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties or not? (4) Whether dismissal Order of the Plaintiff from service its illegal, arbitrary and against the Principle of natural justice? (5)Whether, plaintiff is entitled to get decree of declaration in respect to allotment of Quarter No. S-32/7 that its’ allotment in favour of defendants no. 3 is void and illegal? (6)Whether the impugned judgment and decree require any interference by this Court or not? 6. Learned First Appellate Court considered that the plaintiff admitted that he received the dismissal order on 20.11.1976 and the suit was filed on 26.11.1994, hence, the suit is barred by limitation. Learned First Appellate Court also considered that the suit is hit by Section 92 of Bihar State Housing Board Act, which requires a notice before filing a suit against the Board or any member or any officer or any employee of the Board or any person acting under the direction of the Board or Managing Director or any officer or any employee of the Board in respect of any act done or intended to be done under the Act. Learned First Appellate Court further considered that admittedly, Tata Iron & Steel Company, Jamshedpur being the employer of the plaintiff-appellant and the said company having not been made a party to the suit, the suit is bad for non-joinder of the necessary party. Learned First Appellate Court further considered that Bihar State Housing Board is also a necessary party because the said Quarter No. S-32/7 belongs to the said Board. Learned First Appellate Court next considered that the act of the plaintiff –appellant issuing two gate passes under a single entry amounts to a gross misconduct which caused great loss to his employer, hence, his dismissal from service cannot be said to be illegal, arbitrary and inoperative. Learned First Appellate Court also considered that after admitted dismissal of the plaintiff from TISCO Ltd., there is nothing wrong in the employer allotting quarter to the defendant no. 3 and dismissed the appeal and affirmed impugned judgment and decree passed by learned trial Court. 7. Mr. R.C.P. Sah, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant submits that learned Court below failed to appreciate the evidence in the record in its proper perspective and the dismissal of the plaintiff was in violation of the principle of natural justice as no show-cause notice was ever served upon the plaintiff before passing the order of the dismissal. 8. Having heard the submissions made at the Bar and after going through the record, it is found that it is the admitted case of the plaintiff that he received the order of dismissal on 20.11.1976 as is evident from the deposition of PW8 in paragraph-36. Learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant also fairly submits the same to be true that the suit was admittedly field before 26.11.1994. There is no explanation why there was inordinate delay in filing the suit nor there is any prayer for condonation of delay. It is also not disputed that the notice under Section 92 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act has not been delivered or left by the plaintiff at the Board’s office or the place of Board or any officer, servant or person of the said Board. It is also not disputed that the notice under Section 92 of the Bihar State Housing Board Act has not been delivered or left by the plaintiff at the Board’s office or the place of Board or any officer, servant or person of the said Board. It is also not disputed that Tata Iron & Steel Company is employer of the plaintiff and it is the company which issued the dismissal order and it is also not disputed that Tata Iron & Steel Company or Bihar State Housing Board has not been impleaded as party to the suit. Because of the aforesaid fact of the case, this Court is of considered view that there is no substantial question of law involved in this appeal. Learned Counsel for the appellant could not point out any specific instance of any particular evidence being not considered. The learned Counsel for the appellant also could not point out any illegality or error in the impugned judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court giving rise to any substantial question of law to be framed and decided by this Court in exercise of second appellate jurisdiction. 9. Thus there being no merit, this appeal is dismissed but in the circumstances without any costs. 10. Let the lower Court records be sent back to the Court below along with a copy of the judgment forthwith.