JUDGMENT Sanjay Kumar Dwivedi, J. - Heard Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Piyush Krishna Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 2. This Second Appeal has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 31.10.1990 and 15.11.1990 respectively passed by 2nd Additional District Judge, Deoghar in Title Appeal No. 103 of 1977, whereby, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree dated 11.08.1977 and 23.08.1977 respectively passed in Title Suit No. 127 of 1974/02 of 1977 was set aside and the judgment passed by the trial court was reversed by the appellate court. 3. The suit was instituted for declaration that defendant no.3 is not the adopted son of deceased Tentar Mandal and also for declaration that the adoption-deed no. 195 dated 27.07.1972 of Deoghar Sub-Registry Office is forged and fabricated and the same is illegal, inoperative and void deed. A prayer for permanently restraining defendant no.3 or any other person through him, who claim defendant no.3 to be adopted son of deceased Tentar Mandal was also made in the suit. 4. It was the case of the plaintiffs (respondents in the present Second Appeal) before the trial court that they are daughters and only heirs of the deceased Tentar Mandal in whose name Jamabandi no. 12 of Mouza Jamua, P.S. Mohanpur stands recorded. They claimed that their father Tentar Mandal leaving behind the plaintiffs/respondents as only heirs to inherit and succeed him, as their mother predeceased their father. The plaintiffs/respondents claimed that they were living with their father in their father''s house and were looking after him and maintained him so long he was alive. It was further case of the plaintiffs/respondents that Tentar Mandal entrusted the lands of the Jamabandi to plaintiff no.1 under Section 22 of the Santhal Pargana Tenancy Act, during his life time to avoid any difference from any corner and he gave information to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Deoghar to that effect which was noted as information vide Revision Miscellaneous Case No. 167 of 1963-64. The plaintiffs/respondents claimed to be in peaceful cultivating possession of their father''s land after the said entrustment and after the death of their father, they claimed to have succeeded the entire land and other movable and immovable properties of Tentar Mandal. The plaintiffs/respondents claimed to be in peaceful cultivating possession of their father''s land after the said entrustment and after the death of their father, they claimed to have succeeded the entire land and other movable and immovable properties of Tentar Mandal. According to the plaintiffs/respondents, when they were ploughing the Bihantar Khet for showing paddy seeds, defendant no.1 also wanted to plough the same land and when the plaintiffs objected, defendant no.1 stated that deceased Tentar Mandal (father of the plaintiffs) had adopted defendant no.3, namely, Pramod Kumar Mandal (appellant in the present Second Appeal), which surprised the plaintiffs and on enquiry, they know that defendant nos. 1 and 2 have adoption-deed, which is a forged and fabricated document. They alleged that Left Thumb Impression on the same adoption-deed is not of Tentar Mandal and the said deed was not attested as required under law. Their alternative case was that even if the said deed of adoption was executed by Tentar Mandal, that was under false representation, inducement and fraud played upon him and as such the deed is void and inoperative in law. The plaintiffs/respondents also claimed that they had been continuously living with their father since 1964 and they asserted that their father never executed any adoption-deed nor adopted Pramod Kumar Mandal, defendant no.3, nor there was any occasion for such adoption. The plaintiffs/respondents further asserted that Pramod Kumar Mandal never live with the plaintiffs'' father nor he was treated as son of the plaintiffs'' father. They also alleged that recital about legal formalities, Puja and actual giving and taking of Pramod Kumar Mandal in presence of agnates, friends and others, is false and there was no occasion of assembly of agnates, friends and others nor there was any Puja nor there was any actual giving and taking of defendant no.3 by defendant nos. 1 and 2 to the plaintiffs'' father. They also alleged that defendant no.3 was not the adopted son of the plaintiff''s father and defendant nos. 1 and 2 have forged and fabricated adoption-deed, which is a sham creating document and, therefore, defendant no.3 has no right. According to the plaintiffs/respondents, forged and fabricated adoption-deed has thrown cloud over the title and interest of the plaintiffs and, hence, the suit was instituted. 5. On notice, defendant nos. 1 and 2 have forged and fabricated adoption-deed, which is a sham creating document and, therefore, defendant no.3 has no right. According to the plaintiffs/respondents, forged and fabricated adoption-deed has thrown cloud over the title and interest of the plaintiffs and, hence, the suit was instituted. 5. On notice, defendant nos. 1 and 2 appeared in the suit and contested the suit and alleged that the suit is not maintainable as the same is barred by law of limitation, estoppel and acquiescence. A formal written statement on behalf of minor defendant no.3 was filed through his guardian. The defendants admitted that the plaintiffs are daughters of Tentar Mandal, but they denied the fact that the plaintiffs are only heirs of Tentar Mandal. They also denied that the plaintiffs are in possession over the properties left by Tentar Mandal, which according to them are in exclusive possession of defendant no.3, who is adopted son of Tentar Mandal. They also denied that the plaintiffs maintained Tentar Mandal and they stated that no entrustment was made by Tentar Mandal in favour of the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, the alleged entrustment must be either forged or fabricated which was created by the plaintiffs in mere paper, as there was no provision for such entrustment by filing petition in court vide any case, as alleged by the plaintiffs. They also stated that the plaintiffs never cultivated lands either on the basis of entrustment or on any other basis. The case of the defendants was that defendant no.3 is in exclusive possession of the land of Tentar Mandal with the help of defendant no.1, who helped him on humanitarian ground. They also denied any tussle over ploughing of the land as alleged by the plaintiffs. According to the defendants, Tentar Mandal, who had no son, requested the defendants to give their son Pramod Kumar Mandal (defendant no.3) in adoption which was agreed by defendant nos. 1 and 2. Thereafter, there was an adoption ceremony on 13.02.1972, which was a Shivratri day and on that occasion, defendant no. 3 was given in adoption by defendant no.1, with the consent of defendant no.2 and Tentar Mandal took defendant no.3 as his adopted son in presence of their friends and others after Puja and other rites as well as actual giving and taking ceremony. The defendants asserted that after the said adoption, defendant no. 3 was given in adoption by defendant no.1, with the consent of defendant no.2 and Tentar Mandal took defendant no.3 as his adopted son in presence of their friends and others after Puja and other rites as well as actual giving and taking ceremony. The defendants asserted that after the said adoption, defendant no. 3 live as son of Tentar Mandal and after the death of Tentar Mandal, defendant no.3 performed last rites and Sradh of Tentar Mandal and possessed all properties left by him as his adopted son. It was further case of the defendants in the suit that defendant nos. 1 and 2 and Tentar Mandal executed a registered deed of adoption in presence of several witnesses, which is genuine, lawful and unimpeachable. They also stated that there was no inducement or fraud. They also stated that after the adoption, the name of defendant no.3 was also changed from Pramod to Parmanand. They asserted that defendant no.3 is adopted son of Tentar Mandal and adoption was lawful, valid and unimpeachable. They alleged that the plaintiffs have no cause of action for the suit and on the said grounds they prayed that the suit may be dismissed. 6. On the basis of the above pleadings of the parties, the trial court entered into to decide the lis and framed 7 issues. With regard to adoption, issue nos. IV and V were framed and while deciding these issues, the trial court after considering the exhibits as well as the witnesses and relied upon certain judgments, came to the finding that defendant no. 3 was validly adopted by Tentar Mandal and the suit was dismissed on contest vide judgment dated 11.08.1977. Against the said judgment, the plaintiffs filed the appeal and after hearing the parties, the title appeal was allowed and the judgment of the trial court was set aside by the appellate court vide judgment dated 15.02.1986. Aggrieved with the judgment passed by the appellate court, the appellant herein has filed the second appeal being S.A. No. 235 of 1986 before the Patna High Court, which was allowed and disposed of vide order dated 09.03.1987. By the said order, the judgment dated 15.02.1986 passed by the appellate court was set aside and the case was remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law as discussed in the said order. By the said order, the judgment dated 15.02.1986 passed by the appellate court was set aside and the case was remitted back for fresh disposal in accordance with law as discussed in the said order. After remand of the matter, the same was again heard by the appellate court and the appellate court again set aside the judgment passed by the trial court and reversed the finding of the trial court, vide judgment dated 31.10.1990 in Title Appeal No. 103 of 1977. The decree was prepared on 15.11.1990. Aggrieved with this judgment, the present second appeal being S.A. No. 49 of 1991 has been filed before this Court by defendant no.3 in the suit. 7. After hearing the parties on 09.08.1991, this second appeal was admitted on following substantial questions of law: "(i) Whether the judgement of the appellate court is bad for the reason that it fails to take into consideration section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956. (ii) Whether the judgement of the appellate court could be sustained because the appellant has not consider the grounds given by the trial court in decree in that suit." 8. With regard to first substantial question of law, Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the trial court, after discussing every aspects of the matter and after considering documentary and oral evidences adduced on behalf of the parties, gave finding that the adoption-deed with regard to defendant no.3 is valid and there is no question of forgery with regard to adoption of defendant no.3. He further submits that rituals are also taken place as required under Sections 11 and 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act, 1956). He further submits that the appellate court, even after remanding of the matter by the High Court, has not considered the case in its right perspective. He also submits that so far as D.W.6 and D.W.7 are concerned, they have stated with regard to adoption of defendant no.3 and the evidence of D.W.6 and D.W.7 has not been considered by the appellate court while reversing the judgment of the trial court. By way of placing reliance upon Section 11(vi) of the Act, 1956, Mr. Srijit Choudhary submits that the ingredients of Section 11(vi) has been complied with at the time of adoption of defendant no.3. 9. By way of placing reliance upon Section 11(vi) of the Act, 1956, Mr. Srijit Choudhary submits that the ingredients of Section 11(vi) has been complied with at the time of adoption of defendant no.3. 9. For the sake of convenience, Section 11(vi) of the Act, 1956 is quoted herein below: "11(vi). the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up to the family of its adoption. Provided that the performance of datta homan, shall not be essential to the validity of an adoption." 10. By way of referring Section 16 of the Act, 1956, Mr. Srijit Choudhary submits that the said adoption-deed is a registered document and presumption is that whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. Mr. Srijit Choudhary relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon''ble Supreme Court in the case of Mst. Deu and others v. Laxmi Narayan and others, (1998) 8 SCC 701 . 11. Paragraph 3 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: "3. In view of Section 16 aforesaid whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said Act unless and until it is disproved. According to us, it was not open to the defendants of the said suit for partition to collaterally challenge the said registered deed of partition. In view of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act it was open to them to disprove such deed of adoption but for that they had to take independent proceeding. According to us, it was not open to the defendants of the said suit for partition to collaterally challenge the said registered deed of partition. In view of Section 16 of the aforesaid Act it was open to them to disprove such deed of adoption but for that they had to take independent proceeding. The High Court was fully justified in directing that the respondent be substituted in place of Smt Phulla on the basis of the registered deed of adoption produced before the court." By way of referring this judgment, Mr. Srijit Choudhary submits that in view of Section 16 of the Act, 1956, adoption-deed registered under law is produced before court purporting to record and the same is deemed to be in compliance of the provisions of the said Act. 12. Mr. Srijit Choudhary further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Baru (Since deceased) and another v. Tej Pal and others, (1998) AIR Allahabad 230 . 13. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: "10. The second point for determination is whether the requisite ceremonies for adoption were performed or not. On this ground adoption deed cannot be challenged. The adoption deed is a registered document. Its due execution and registration were proved from the evidence adduced by the defendants. At this juncture presumption available under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 can safely be drawn. Section 16 of the aforesaid Act reads as under: "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption:- Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any Court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved." It is thus clear from this section that once a registered adoption deed is produced before any Court recording the factum of adoption and it is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the Court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved. The presumption at the first place is conclusive, but it is rebuttable provided the deed of adoption is disproved. Once a registered deed of adoption was filed, the duty was not of propounder to establish the due execution and registration of the deed. In the adoption deed itself it is mentioned that ceremonies for adoption were performed. The adoption-deed bears signatures of Tej Pal and Yadram. Tej Pal is the father of Sadhu, the adopted child. Yadram was the person who took the child in adoption. It is clearly mentioned that 16 days before the execution of the deed of adoption requisite ceremonies including feasts etc. were performed. In such circumstances, heavy burden lay on the plaintiffs-appellants to disprove the deed of adoption and also disprove that ceremonies were not performed. Simply because Pandit was not examined presumption available and flowing from recitals the adoption deed cannot be negatived nor it can be disproved that no ceremonies were performed. Pandit could be examined by the plaintiffs on whose shoulder the burden lay to prove the factum of adoption, performance of the ceremonies of adoption and proof of due execution and registration of the adoption deed. 11. The defendants on the other hand examined the relevant witnesses. On the grounds of minor contradictions here and there in their testimonies they cannot be disbelieved. Minor contradictions are bound to occur due to the lapse of time and memory. The evidence of relevant witnesses examined by the defendants found corroboration from the adoption deed itself. As such the plaintiffs failed in disproving the execution and registration of the adoption deed. They further failed in establishing non performance of the ceremonies for adoption. The adoption deed, therefore, could not be challenged." By way of referring this judgment, Mr. Srijit Choudhary submits that the performance of adoption ceremony was taken place which is apparent from the evidence of D.W.6 and D.W.7 and, therefore, reversal judgment passed by the appellate court is not in accordance with law. 14. Mr. Srijit Choudhary further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar v. Smt. Vidya and Ors., (2007) AIR Allahabad 105 . 15. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: "10. 14. Mr. Srijit Choudhary further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Allahabad High Court in the case of Ashwani Kumar v. Smt. Vidya and Ors., (2007) AIR Allahabad 105 . 15. Paragraph 10 of the said judgment is quoted herein below: "10. Coming to the merits of the case, I find that the lower Appellate Court had rejected the application on the ground that the adoption deed executed in favour of the applicant was not validly executed under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. In my view, the lower Appellate Court had no jurisdiction to go into the validity and legality of the adoption deed which was executed and registered under the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, in view of the provision of Section 16 of the said Act which reads as under:- "16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption:- Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved."" 16. Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant further relied upon the judgment rendered by the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Ajay Kumar v. Rishalo Devi with Ajay Kumar v. Hawa Singh, (2019) 3 CivLJ 96 . 17. Paragraphs 30 and 31 of the said judgment are quoted herein below: "30. In the second appeal, the questions of law which was framed while admitting the appeal, have been extracted above. It is apparent from the reading of Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter to be referred as "the Act of 1956") that the registered Adoption Deed has a presumption that the adoption has been made in accordance with the provisions of the Act. Smt. Mankauri when filed the first suit, challenged the gift deeds, admitted the execution of the adoption deed and as also adoption of Ajay. Still further, natural mother and father of Ajay have appeared in evidence and they deposed about the valid adoption. Smt. Mankauri when filed the first suit, challenged the gift deeds, admitted the execution of the adoption deed and as also adoption of Ajay. Still further, natural mother and father of Ajay have appeared in evidence and they deposed about the valid adoption. DW2 Daya Nand, Deed Writer has also been examined who has deposed that the Adoption Deed was written by him on the instructions given by Late Smt. Mankauri. Other two witnesses have been examined who have also stated that the adoption had taken place. Hence, the reasons given by the learned Courts below discarding the valid adoption on the ground that the condition of Section 11 of the Act of 1956, have not been complied with or the ceremony of adoption has not been proved, are not valid. The First Appellate Court has wrongly held that since it is not proved that on the death of Smt. Mankauri, Ajay had performed her last rites, therefore, adoption is not proved, is also erroneous. 31. As per the Act of 1956, no particular form of adoption has been prescribed. The adoption can be done simply by putting a child in the lap of adopting parents by the natural parents. Learned First Appellate Court has not pointed out that which condition of Section 11 of the Act of 1956, is not fulfilled in the present case. Section 11 of the Act of 1956 reads as under:- "11. Other conditions for a valid adoption- In every adoption. Learned First Appellate Court has not pointed out that which condition of Section 11 of the Act of 1956, is not fulfilled in the present case. Section 11 of the Act of 1956 reads as under:- "11. Other conditions for a valid adoption- In every adoption. -- the following conditions must be complied with:- (i) if any adoption is of a son, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu son, son''s son or son''s son''s son (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption; (ii) if the adoption is of a daughter, the adoptive father or mother by whom the adoption is made must not have a Hindu daughter or son''s daughter (whether by legitimate blood relationship or by adoption) living at the time of adoption; (iii) if the adoption is by a male and the person to be adopted is a female, the adoptive father is at least twentyone years older than the person to be adopted; (iv) if the adoption is by a female and the person to be adopted is a male, the adoptive mother is at least twentyone years older than the person to be adopted; (v) the same child may not be adopted simultaneously by two or more persons; (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of its birth or in the case of an abandoned child or a child whose parentage is not known, from the place or family where it has been brought up to the family of its adoption. Provided that the performance of datta homan, shall not be essential to the validity of an adoption." By way of referring this judgment, Mr. Srijit Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellate court has not pointed out which condition of Section 11 of the Act, 1956 is not fulfilled in the case in hand. 18. By way of referring aforesaid judgments referred by Mr. Srijit Choudhary, he submits that the appellate court''s judgment is not in accordance with law and is in complete violation of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. By way of referring aforesaid judgments referred by Mr. Srijit Choudhary, he submits that the appellate court''s judgment is not in accordance with law and is in complete violation of Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He further submits that even after remand of the matter by the High Court, the appellate court has not taken care of deciding the appeal in view of the observations made by the High Court. 19. Per contra, Mr. Piyush Krishna Choudhary, learned counsel appearing for the respondents submits that the appellate court has decided the appeal in terms of the earlier remand order of the High Court. He further submits that there is no illegality in the appellate order. He further submits that there are no rituals of adoption of defendant no.3. He further submits that adoption-deed with regard to defendant no.3 is also not deemed to be a valid one and the appellate court has rightly come to that conclusion. 20. So far as first substantial question of law is concerned: With regard to first substantial question of law, this Court has perused the evidence of Biro Thakur (D.W.6), who is a barber and who supported the giving and taking over of defendant no.3 by Tentar Mandal. He has also stated that he has done every work with regard to adoption ceremony which was conducted by way of Puja. He has also stated that Sradh etc. were done by the adopted son (defendant no.3). Basudeo Mishra (D.W.7) is a Pandit, who performed adoption ceremony of defendant no.3. He has clearly stated that the boy was put on lap of Tentar Mandal and rest of the rituals were performed as per Hindu rites. Nothing adverse has come out in the cross-examination of both D.Ws. 6 and 7. Thus, as per the depositions of these two witnesses, rituals of defendant no.3 are confirmed. The appellate court below has failed to take into consideration the evidence of D.Ws. 6 and 7 in its right perspective. In that view of the matter, Section 11(vi) of the Act, 1956 is complied with. 6 and 7. Thus, as per the depositions of these two witnesses, rituals of defendant no.3 are confirmed. The appellate court below has failed to take into consideration the evidence of D.Ws. 6 and 7 in its right perspective. In that view of the matter, Section 11(vi) of the Act, 1956 is complied with. So far as adoption-deed is concerned, although the plaintiffs alleged the deed as forged and fabricated document, no evidence was produced on behalf of the plaintiffs to substantiate the allegation that the deed was forged and fabricated, which was marked as Ext.-C. No evidence has been adduced as to what false and misrepresented fraud was played by the defendants upon Tentar Mandal. Ext.-C is proved by D.W.18.- Purnanand Thakur, who is the scribe of the deed. D.W.8- Amin Mandal claimed to have identified the executors of the deed. Exts. A/4 to A/9 are the signatures of attesting witnesses, proved by formal witnesses D.Ws.9, 16, 17 and 19. Ext.-B is the endorsement of stamp vendor, proved by D.W.4- Paresh Nath Roy, which shows that stamp in the name of Tentar Mandal was sold. The endorsement of SubRegistrar on the deed of adoption clearly shows that the executors of the deed Tentar Mandal, Madho Prasad Mandal (defendant no.1) and Dashish Mandalian (defendant no.2) admitted the execution of the deed before the Sub-Registrar. In view of these evidences, the deed of adoption cannot be said to be forged one and thus, the judgment relied by Mr. Srijit Choudhary in this regard in the cases of Mst. Deu, Baru, Ashwani Kumar and Ajay Kumar (supra) are in favour of the appellant. This Court finds that the judgment of the appellate court is bad as it fails to take into consideration Section 16 of the Act, 1956. The first substantial question is, accordingly, answered. 21. So far as second substantial question of law is concerned: With regard to second substantial question of law, this Court finds that the appellate court has not considered the evidences of P.Ws. and D.Ws. in its right perspective particularly the evidence of D.W.6 and D.W.7, who established that ritual ceremony was taken place. The appellate court has also not decided the appeal afresh pursuant to earlier remand of the matter by the Patna High Court vide order dated 09.03.1987. and D.Ws. in its right perspective particularly the evidence of D.W.6 and D.W.7, who established that ritual ceremony was taken place. The appellate court has also not decided the appeal afresh pursuant to earlier remand of the matter by the Patna High Court vide order dated 09.03.1987. While remanding the matter to the appellate court, the Patna High Court observed in paragraph 2 as under: "2. Mr. Rama Kant Verma, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, contended that the defendant examined 19 witnesses, who were found reliable by the trial court, but the lower appellate court failed to consider the evidence, which has vitiated the finding of fact recorded by it. The ground appears to be well-founded. While discussing the cases of the parties, the lower appellate court has relied on several circumstances as established by the plaintiffs'' witnesses and specially in that event it was necessary for it to have considered the rebutting oral evidence, which has not been done. Further from paragraph 6 of the judgment of the learned Additional District Judge, it appears that an application for additional evidence was filed by the plaintiffs. The Court has relied upon the additional evidence offered without recording a clear finding as to whether the same was fit to be admitted or not. Further, if an additional evidence was admitted by the court at the instance of the plaintiffs, the defendant had a right to lead rebutting evidence. This aspect completely escaped the notice of the court. On both these grounds, the second appeal is allowed, the decision of the lower appellate court is set aside and the case is remitted to it for fresh disposal in accordance with law." On perusal of the appellate court''s judgment, it transpires that in spite of the observations made by the Patna High Court, the appellate court has not decided the appeal in its right perspective. Thus, the judgment passed by the appellate court is not in accordance with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This Court comes to a finding that the judgment of the appellate court can not sustain because the appellate court has not considered the grounds given by the trial court in decree and has not made out any reason in reversing the judgment of the trial court in its correct perspective. The second substantial question of law is, accordingly, answered. 22. The second substantial question of law is, accordingly, answered. 22. As both the law points formulated by this Court have been answered in affirmative, the judgment passed by the appellate court cannot sustain in the eyes of law. Accordingly, the judgment passed by the appellate court dated 31.10.1990 and decree dated 15.11.1990 in Title Appeal No. 103 of 1977 are set aside and the judgment passed by the trial court dated 11.08.1977 and decree dated 23.08.1977 in Title Suit No. 127 of 1974/02 of 1977 are restored. 23. Accordingly, this Second Appeal stands allowed and disposed of. 24. Office is directed to proceed accordingly. 25. Let the L.C.R. be sent back to the court below forthwith along with a copy of this judgment.