JUDGMENT B.R. Sarangi, J. - The petitioner, who was appointed as a Sub-Staff (IVth grade employee) in the Life Insurance Corporation of India, Cuttack Division, has filed this writ petition to quash the order dated 25.03.2011 in Annexure-10 passed by opposite party no.1, the disciplinary authority, and also seeks for direction to the opposite parties to reinstate him in terms of judgment dated 23.11.2010 passed by this Court in OJC No.1872 of 2001 and grant him all the consequential benefits as due and admissible in accordance with law. 2. The factual matrix of the case, in hand, is that the petitioner, pursuant to the invitation of opposite party no. 1, submitted his application for the post of Sub-Staff (IVth grade employee). By following due procedure of selection, the petitioner was appointed, vide letter dated 25.02.1993, in pursuance of which, he joined on 01.03.1993 as Sub-Staff in the Cuttack Divisional Office of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (for short 'Corporation'). While he was continuing as such, on 24.09.1993, a set of charges were framed against him, that the transfer certificate produced by him in proof of his date of birth and educational qualification, along with the application, was a forged one and by production of such a forged document he wrongfully entered into service of the Corporation. By such acts, the petitioner failed to maintain absolute integrity and acted in a manner detrimental to the interest of the Corporation and prejudicial to good conduct and thereby committed breach of Regulation 21 read with Regulation 39(1) of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960. After receipt of the memorandum of charges, the petitioner submitted his reply denying all the allegations. Being dissatisfied with the explanation submitted, the Corporation initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner on the basis of the said charges. 3. In the inquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of the charges and on the basis of the inquiry report, the disciplinary authority on 29.01.1996 passed the order of removal from service. Against the said order dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal on 12.02.1996 before the Zonal Manager-opposite party no.2. The appellate authority, vide order dated 24.06.1996 which was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 28.06.1996, dismissed the appeal by confirming the order dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority. 4. Against the said order dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority, the petitioner preferred appeal on 12.02.1996 before the Zonal Manager-opposite party no.2. The appellate authority, vide order dated 24.06.1996 which was communicated to the petitioner by letter dated 28.06.1996, dismissed the appeal by confirming the order dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority. 4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order of the appellate authority passed on 24.06.1996, the petitioner preferred OJC No.6285 of 1996 on the ground that the order so passed by the appellate authority is a nonspeaking one and has been passed without application of mind. Considering the materials available on record, this Court, vide judgment dated 28.09.2000, quashed the order of the appellate authority by holding that it was nonspeaking one and that the appellate authority should have passed a reasoned order after taking into consideration all the materials available on record. By so holding, this Court remanded the matter back to the appellate authority to reconsider the appeal by referring to the evidence available on record and taking into consideration all the grounds mentioned in the memorandum of appeal preferred challenging the order passed by the disciplinary authority. But the appellate authority, vide order dated 17.01.2001, rejected the appeal of the petitioner. 5. The petitioner once again approached this court challenging the order of removal dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority and the confirmation order passed by the appellate authority on 17.01.2001, by filing OJC No. 1872 of 2001. After due adjudication, the Division Bench of this Court, vide judgment dated 23.11.2010, quashed the order of punishment dated 29.01.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority and the order of confirmation dated 17.01.2001 passed by appellate authority and remitted the matter back to the opposite parties for reconsideration of the punishment specially considering the punishment imposed on two employees, namely, Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalco. Since in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar vs. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others (O.J.C. No.8643 of 1994), this Court did not grant any back wages for the period he was out of service and directed that the petitioner therein would not be entitled to back wages for the period he remained out of service, after remand, the disciplinary authority passed the order dated 25.03.2011 with the following observations: "So far as penalties imposed upon Sri Ramanath Lakra and Stephen Khalko is concerned, the said penalties were imposed by the disciplinary authorities on the facts and merits of the cases With the above noted observation the undersigned do not find any merit of the case warranting modification of order dated 29.01.1996 passed by the Disciplinary Authority against Sri Lokanath Kuanr, Ex-Sub-Staff, SRNO. 346543, and the penalty of "Removal from Service" in terms of regulation 39(1 )(f) of LIC of India, (Staff) Regulation 1960 imposed by the Disciplinary Authority vide order dated 29.01.1996 and corrigendum to the order vide dated 15.02.1996 holds good." Being aggrieved by such order, instead of preferring appeal as required under the Regulations, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present application. 6. Mr. S. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner urged before this Court that this Court after due adjudication, having set aside the order dated 29.09.1996 passed by the disciplinary authority, as well as the order dated 17.01.2001 passed by the appellate authority, vide judgment dated 23.11.2010 passed in OJC No. 1872 of 2001 and remitted the matter to the disciplinary authority for reconsideration taking into account the cases of Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, who stands on similar footing with the petitioner, but the disciplinary authority rejected the case of the petitioner as he stood on a different footing than that of the Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, as their dates of birth mentioned in the fake certificate and genuine certificate was same, whereas the date of birth of the petitioner in fake certificate is different than that of the genuine certificate. 7. It is contended that reconsideration of the matter afresh by the disciplinary authority is not permissible, in view of the finding arrived at by the Division Bench in judgment dated 23.11.2010. 7. It is contended that reconsideration of the matter afresh by the disciplinary authority is not permissible, in view of the finding arrived at by the Division Bench in judgment dated 23.11.2010. It is further contended that if the Division Bench came to a definite conclusion that there was no difference between the case of the Deepak Kumar Bohidar (supra) and the present petitioner, the disciplinary authority, without applying his mind in proper perspective, should not have drawn a distinction between the petitioner and Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, which is not permissible and therefore, seeks for quashing the same. 8. Mr. S.P. Panda, learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties contended that since this Court had remanded the matter back to the disciplinary authority, vide judgment dated 23.11.2010, with the direction to pass a fresh order especially considering the punishment imposed on the two employees, namely, Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko who stood on same footing with the petitioner, the disciplinary authority reconsidered the matter and passed a reasoned order on 25.03.2011 in compliance of the judgment dated 23.11.2010 passed in OJC No. 1872 of 2001 stating that the cases of Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko are different from the case of the petitioner. Thereby, no irregularity or illegality has been committed in passing the order impugned in the present case. 9. This Court heard Mr. S. Das, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. P. Panda, learned counsel appearing for opposite parties. Pleadings having been exchanged between the parties and with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, this writ petition is being disposed of finally at the stage of admission. 10. The facts delineated above are not in dispute. The only question to be considered in this case is that on the basis of the judgment dated 23.11.2010 passed by this Court in OJC No. 1872 of 2001, whether it is open to the opposite parties to reassess the case of the petitioner afresh take a different view that the petitioner's case does not stand on the same footing with Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko. 11. For just and proper adjudication of the case, the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for respective parties in OJC No. 1872 of 2001, which has been mentioned in paragraph-3 of the said judgment dated 23.11.2010, are extracted hereunder: "3. 11. For just and proper adjudication of the case, the contentions raised by the learned counsel appearing for respective parties in OJC No. 1872 of 2001, which has been mentioned in paragraph-3 of the said judgment dated 23.11.2010, are extracted hereunder: "3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner in stead of making any submission on veracity of the charges framed against the petitioner, drew attention of the Court to a decision of this Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar vs. Divisional Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India and others vide O.J.C. No.8643 of 1994 disposed of on 13.8.2008. With reference to the aforesaid judgment, it was contended by the learned counsel that the petitioner stands exactly on the same footing as that of the petitioner in the aforesaid case and the order of termination in the aforesaid case having been set aside, the said decision be made applicable to the case of the present petitioner. Shri Samantray, learned counsel appearing for the Life Insurance Corporation of India relied on some decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and submitted that a person, who has entered into the service by producing a forged document, does not deserve any sympathy and, therefore, the order of removal from service can only be the order that could be passed under the circumstances. Shri Samantray, learned counsel also relied on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Regional Manager, Central Bank of India vs. Madhulika Guruprasad Dahirand others reported in (2008) 13 Supreme Court Cases 170 . In the same case, appointment had been made on the basis of a false Caste Certificate and the employee was terminated from service. The Hon'ble Supreme Court held that where an employee obtains an appointment on production of false Caste Certificate, equity, sympathy and generosity have no place in such a situation. The decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is more or less same as the face of the present case. The petitioner-Deepak Kumar Bohidar in the aforesaid case was initially engaged as a Badli worker under Life Insurance Corporation of India. A decision was taken by the National Industrial Tribunal that those who were working as Badli workers would be regularized. The petitioner-Deepak Kumar Bohidar in the aforesaid case was initially engaged as a Badli worker under Life Insurance Corporation of India. A decision was taken by the National Industrial Tribunal that those who were working as Badli workers would be regularized. The petitioner-Deepak Kumar Bohidar accordingly applied for regularization and after facing an examination, he was selected and was appointed as a Sub-Staff in Class-IV under Life Insurance Corporation of India. While working as such, it was found that he had given a certificate showing him to have passed Class-X from CSB Zilla School, Sambalpur and his death of birth as 15.7.1961 and the said certificate having been found to be forged one, he was removed from service. In the said writ application, the petitioner-Deepak Kumar Bohidar admitted to have produced a forged certificate indicating his death of birth and the educational qualification but submitted that under similar circumstances in respect of some other employees namely, Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko. a lenient view had been taken by the Life Insurance Corporation Authorities and they were not removed from service. One of them namely. Ramanath Lakra was punished with reduction of oav bv one stage permanently and other employee namely. Stephen Khalko was punished with reduction of his p_ay bv two stages. This Court relying on a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhilesh Kumar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & others, reported in, (2007) 8 SC 713 came to hold that the employees standing on the same footing and charged on the same allegations should be dealt with similarly and, accordingly, this Court set aside the punishment of removal from service imposed on the said petitioner-Deepak Kumar Bohidar and directed the opposite parties to reconsider the question of punishment." (Emphasis supplied) Basing on such contention advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties in the aforesaid writ application, the Division Bench of this Court in paragraph-4 of the judgment observed as follows: "4. Here is a case where the petitioner did not admit to have produced a forged certificate but upon inquiry it was found that the certificate produced by the petitioner was forged one. Except this difference there is no other difference in the facts of the present case and in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar. Here is a case where the petitioner did not admit to have produced a forged certificate but upon inquiry it was found that the certificate produced by the petitioner was forged one. Except this difference there is no other difference in the facts of the present case and in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar. In this connection, learned counsel Shri Samantray referred to a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Man Singh vs. State of Harayana and others reported in, AIR 2008 Supreme Court 2481 . On perusal of the facts involved in the said case, we find that it is completely different and distinguishable from the present case. There is no denial of the fact that Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, who were also appointed as Sub-Staff under the Life Insurance Corporation of India, were found to have produced forged certificates for obtaining appointment, but they were not visited with an order of removal from service whereas the petitioner in the present case and Deepak Kumar Bohidar, the petitioner in O.J.C.No.8643 of 1994 on the very same allegation were removed from service. Therefore the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Akhilesh Kumar Singh vs. State of Jharkhand & others was relied upon by this Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar and the order of removal was set aside and the opposite parties were directed to reconsider the question of punishment Having not found differences in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar and in the present case, we have no hesitation to rely on the said judgment." (Emphasis supplied) After so observing, the Division Bench of this Court came to a definite finding, which reads thus:- "There is no denial of the fact that Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, who were also appointed as Sub-Staff under the Life Insurance Corporation of India, were found to have produced forged certificates for obtaining appointment, but they were not visited with an order of removal from service whereas the petitioner in the present case and Deepak Kumar Bohidar, the petitioner in O.J.C.No.8643 of 1994 on the very same allegation were removed from service." 12. Ultimately, the Division Bench of this Court, having not found any difference between the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar (supra) and the case of the petitioner, held that there is no hesitation to rely on the said judgment. Accordingly, quashed the order of punishment as well as the confirming order of the appellate authority, and remitted the matter back to the opposite parties for reconsideration of the punishment specially considering the punishment imposed on the aforesaid two employees, namely, Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko and also clarified that since in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar (supra), the Division Bench did not grant any back wages for the period he was out of service, the petitioner would not be entitled to back wages for the period he remained out of service. In view of such position, this Court comes to a definite finding that the petitioner's case should be treated at par with Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko. 13. The disciplinary authority cannot go beyond such finding and reassess the matter once again in a different manner and held that the cases of Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko stand on a different footing than that of the petitioner. This reassessment done by the disciplinary authority is contrary to the finding arrived at by this Court, which is absolutely misconceived and cannot sustain in the eye of law. In view of the Division Bench judgment of this Court, what the disciplinary authority was expected to do is that to grant the benefit of reinstatement in service to the petitioner at par with the similarly situated persons, namely, Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, by quashing the punishment of removal from service. This Court has already clarified that the petitioner is not entitled to any back wages, in view of the law laid down in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar (supra). 14. In view of such position, this Court is of the considered view that the disciplinary authority has exceeded its jurisdiction in coming to a conclusion that the petitioner stands on a different footing from Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko, when the Division Bench of this Court had already held and taken a view that the petitioner stands on same footing with Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko. Thereby, the order dated 25.03.2011 passed by the disciplinary authority, taking a view contrary to the judgment dated 23.11.2010 rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in OJC No. 1872 of 2001, cannot sustain in the eye of law. The same is liable to be quashed and is accordingly hereby quashed. 15. The matter is remitted back to the very same disciplinary authority to reconsider the case of the petitioner in the light of the case of Ramnath Lakra and Stephen Khalko and take a decision on the basis of the finding arrived at in those two cases. So far as back wages are concerned, it has already been clarified that the petitioner is not entitled to get such benefit in view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Bohidar (supra). The writ petition is thus disposed of. No order as to costs.