JUDGMENT : S.N. PATHAK, J. 1. Heard counsel for the parties. 2. Petitioner has approached this Court with a prayer for quashing the letter issued under Memo No. 3692 (S/WE) dated 13.06.2016 as also for quashing entire departmental proceeding initiated against him. 3. The fact of the case as has been delineated in the writ petition is that petitioner was appointed on 24.12.1987 as Junior Engineer and he joined the service on 30.01.1988. During the course of service, he was transferred and posted at several places. Petitioner is presently working as a Junior Engineer in Road Construction Department, Road Division, Ranchi. It is alleged that pursuant to the direction of the Deputy Commissioner, Simdega, the Director, DRDA, Simdega submitted its report on 10.09.2005 alleging therein that Junior Engineers in-charge were allegedly not storing the food properly under the Sampurna Gramin Rojgar Yojna and National Food for Work Scheme and were involved in black marketing. It was further alleged that petitioner used his house to store the food grains and in this way accused persons including the petitioner committed criminal breach of trust of Rs. 68.50 Lac and thereby an FIR was lodged on 20.09.2005 for the offence under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 470, 477A and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and Section 71 of the E.C. Act against the accused persons. Thereafter, on 09.11.2006, petitioner was put under suspension. Chargesheet was issued against the petitioner on 15.07.2006. Thereafter, petitioner knocked door of this Court vide W.P. (S) No. 6903 of 2006 challenging the suspension order, which was allowed vide order dated 04.01.2007 and order of suspension was revoked vide order dated 28.02.2007. Thereafter, on 04.05.2007, the first enquiry officer was appointed to conduct inquiry against the petitioner. After alleged transfer of first enquiry officer, second enquiry officer was appointed on 20.06.2007, which was totally against the settled principles that enquiry officer cannot be changed on the ground of transfer. However, the second enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner from all the charges vide its report dated 17.05.2008. After alleged transfer of first enquiry officer, second enquiry officer was appointed on 20.06.2007, which was totally against the settled principles that enquiry officer cannot be changed on the ground of transfer. However, the second enquiry officer exonerated the petitioner from all the charges vide its report dated 17.05.2008. On 21.12.2012, pursuant to the order passed by Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate in G.R. No. 285 of 2005 [T.R. No. 03 of 2012] arising out of Kurdeg P.S. Case No. 32 of 2005, petitioner was convicted and sentenced to undergo R.I. for three years and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/-, which was however set aside vide order dated 05.06.2013, passed by Principal District and Sessions Judge, Simdega in Criminal Appeal No. 4 of 2013. After his exoneration from criminal trial, petitioner moved before the authorities for exoneration from departmental proceedings, but they sat tight over the matter and suddenly vide order dated 13.06.2016, decision has been taken to appoint another inquiry officer to conduct fresh enquiry against the petitioner, without assigning any reason for differing with the findings of the inquiry officer or without asking to show-cause to the petitioner on the point of differing with such findings and as such, petitioner has knocked door of this Court. 4. Mr. Rajiv Ranjan Mishra, learned counsel assisted by Kumari Rashmi, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner assails the impugned order of appointment of fresh enquiry officer. Learned counsel submits that on 17.05.2008 itself, after initiation of the departmental enquiry, the enquiry officer had fully exonerated the petitioner from the charges. The disciplinary authorities, without considering the facts and without differing with the charges, passed the order for appointment of fresh enquiry officer after lapse of eight years. The delay has not been explained as to what was the reason for appointing a fresh enquiry officer. Learned counsel further submits that only to get a favourable report, the order has been passed by the disciplinary authority for appointment of a fresh enquiry officer, that also after lapse of eight long years. It has been further argued that though petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case by the appellate authority, the same has not been considered by the disciplinary authority. Further persons having identical charges, faced criminal trial and subsequently acquitted and also exonerated by the enquiry officer. It has been further argued that though petitioner was acquitted in the criminal case by the appellate authority, the same has not been considered by the disciplinary authority. Further persons having identical charges, faced criminal trial and subsequently acquitted and also exonerated by the enquiry officer. In their cases, there is no order for fresh proceeding and the same was dropped, whereas petitioner has been discriminated and in order to harass, order has been passed for fresh enquiry. It has further been argued that there cannot be separate parameters for the persons having identical charges and as such impugned order is fit to be quashed and set aside. It has been also argued that action of the respondents is against their own State Litigation Policy. Learned counsel places heavy reliance on the Judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble Apex Court reported in (2008) 1 JLJR (SC) 37 on the point of appointing another inquiry officer for conducting fresh enquiry. Learned counsel further submits that similar issue has already been decided by this Court in W.P. (S) No. 5374 of 2012, W.P. (S) No. 1935 of 2013, W.P. (S) No. 2201 of 2013, W.P. (S) No. 1221 of 2013, W.P. (S) No. 1248 of 2013 and in many other cases. 5. Per contra, counter affidavit has been filed by the respondents. Mr. Ashutosh Gupta, AC to SC-V vehemently opposes contention of learned counsel for the petitioner and submits that there is no illegality or any infirmity in the impugned order. Justifying the impugned order, learned counsel submits that as some procedural illegalities were found in the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority had no other option but to change the enquiry officer and ask for fresh enquiry. Learned counsel however is silent on the point whether in case of other similarly situated persons enquiry has been dropped or not. 6. Be that as it may, having gone through rival contention of the parties, this Court is of the considered view that case of the petitioner needs consideration. Admittedly petitioner has been exonerated from the charges by the enquiry officer on 17.05.2008. The disciplinary authority was at liberty to differ with the report of the enquiry officer and ask for further enquiry. Admittedly petitioner has been exonerated from the charges by the enquiry officer on 17.05.2008. The disciplinary authority was at liberty to differ with the report of the enquiry officer and ask for further enquiry. But in the instant case, instead of passing orders for issuance of second show-cause notice or assigning reasons for differing with the enquiry report, the disciplinary authority sat tight over the matter for eight long years. No plausible explanations has been given for delay of eight years. It appears that the disciplinary authority just to get favourable report in his favour and against the petitioner, sat tight over the matter for eight long years and subsequently passed an order for appointment of fresh enquiry officer. From perusal of the documents brought on record and also Memo No. 3721, dated 30.08.2018, though not filed but produced today, which is taken on board, which shows that in cases of similarly situated persons who were also facing the identical charges and their names figures before the trial curt and who were subsequently acquitted along with the petitioner, their cases were reconsidered and proceedings against them were decided to be dropped whereas in case of the petitioner, an order of fresh enquiry was passed by the disciplinary authority which shows how the disciplinary authority was prejudiced in case of the petitioner and this amount to malice in law as well as mala-fide intention of the disciplinary authority. It is not in dispute that the disciplinary authority has the power to differ with the enquiry report after assigning cogent reasons for differing with the same but after eight long years without assigning any reasons, the power of the disciplinary authority ceases when an enquiry authority has already exonerated the petitioner from the charges, it was incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to pass final order. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan vs. Md. T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 , has clearly condemned such attitude on part of the respondents to harass the petitioner. Para-7 of the said Judgment is relevant to be quoted herein: “7. 7. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan vs. Md. T.N. Housing Board, (2005) 6 SCC 636 , has clearly condemned such attitude on part of the respondents to harass the petitioner. Para-7 of the said Judgment is relevant to be quoted herein: “7. The very same ground has been specifically raised in this appeal before this Court wherein it is stated that the delay of more than 10 years in initiating the disciplinary proceedings by issuance of charge memo would render the departmental proceedings vitiated and that in the absence of any explanation for the inordinate delay in initiating such proceedings of issuance of charge memo would justify the prayer for quashing the proceedings as made in the writ petition.” While quashing the charge memo issued against the appellant and allowing the appeal, the Hon’ble Court has concluded the order at Para-11 as under: “11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer.” 8. In view of facts and circumstances mentioned hereinabove, this writ petition is allowed. The impugned order issued under Memo No. 3692 (S/WE) dated 13.06.2016, is hereby quashed. The matter is remitted to the disciplinary authority for passing fresh order in accordance with law taking into consideration exoneration of the petitioner by the enquiry officer and also order of acquittal. 9. Pending Interlocutory Application also stands disposed of.