ORDER : Veerender Singh Siradhana, J. 1. Aggrieved of the order dated 23rd December, 2015, made by the Appellate Tribunal, Jaipur Development Authority, Jaipur (for short, "Tribunal"), in Appeal No. 73/2015: Dinesh Choudhary HUF Versus JDA; the petitioner - Jaipur Development Authority has approached this Court with a prayer to quash the impugned order. 2. Mr. Anil Mehta, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing on behalf of the petitioner - JDA, has assailed the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order dated 23rd December, 2015, made by the Tribunal on two grounds. Firstly, for the respondent was accorded permission for construction of the hotel under the Rajasthan Tourism Unit Policy - 2007 (for short, "Police of 2007"); and therefore, conversion charges are to be levied and were so determined according to the said Policy of 2007. Learned counsel contended that under Clause 3 of the Policy of 2007, there is no separate rate prescribed for hotels and other tourism units. Generally, hotels are considered to be in 'commercial category' and as such, it was proposed to assign as sub-category in the commercial category for hostels and tourism units in order to avoid any ambiguity for land conversion for commercial lands and hotels. According to the learned counsel, under Clause 7, Floor Area Ratio (FAR) for hotels already established was increased from 1.75 to 2.0, to allow construction of an additional floor. Therefore, according to the learned counsel, interference made by the Tribunal in the calculation of the betterment levy on the basis of residential reserve price of the area is bad in the eye of law. 3. Secondly, the impugned order dated 23rd December, 2015, has been made in ignorance of the fact that the respondent has not raised any grievance as to of the original order dated 14th November, 2013, wherein the respondent failed to deposit the amount of additional FAR levy with 75% to the tune of Rs. 96,57,360/- while depositing rest of the amount as per the document dated 14th November, 2013. According to the learned counsel, the amount of betterment levy, was rightly calculated by the petitioner - JDA vide calculation-sheet placed on record as Annexure-23. 4. 96,57,360/- while depositing rest of the amount as per the document dated 14th November, 2013. According to the learned counsel, the amount of betterment levy, was rightly calculated by the petitioner - JDA vide calculation-sheet placed on record as Annexure-23. 4. Referring to the Policy of 2007, learned counsel would contend that in the face of contemplation under Clause 3 and 7, there remains no ambiguity, and hence, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the matter while accepting the betterment levy calculated on the basis of the residential area. 5. Per contra; Mr. Bharat Vyas, learned counsel representing the respondent, resisting the claim of the petitioner - JDA for any interference with the impugned order made by the Tribunal, raised the preliminary objections as to the very maintainability of the writ application relying upon opinions of the Apex Court of the land. Learned counsel vehemently argued that this is second round of litigation between the parties for earlier writ application instituted by the petitioner - JDA, being S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11590/2015 (JDA Versus Dinesh Choudhary), was remanded back to the Tribunal vide order dated 15th September, 2015, observing thus: "The Tribunal is directed to address, aside of the legality of the impugned order dated 12.03.2015 on all counts also the issue of quantum of JDA's demand towards betterment charges payable by the respondent-appellant as a precondition for the release of the construction plans approved." 6. Referring to the impugned order made by the Tribunal, learned counsel contended that a glance of the impugned order made by the Tribunal would reflect that betterment levy chargeable in this case has been determined as Rs. 65,23,633/- (Rupees: Sixty Five Lac Twenty Three Thousand Six Hundred and Thirty Three), while the petitioner - JDA raised demand for payment on that count to the tune of Rs. 1,31,18,233/- (Rupees: One Crore Thirty One Lac Eighty Thousand Two Hundred and Thirty Three). It is further contended that the matter was referred to the State Government by the petitioner - JDA whereupon the petitioner was directed to levy the betterment charge as per the rates applicable to the tourism unit as would be evident from the order dated 5th August, 2014. It is further contended that the matter was referred to the State Government by the petitioner - JDA whereupon the petitioner was directed to levy the betterment charge as per the rates applicable to the tourism unit as would be evident from the order dated 5th August, 2014. However, the petitioner ignored the directions and in defiance of directions by the State Government so also contrary to the objection and intention as contemplated under the Policy of 2007, determined the amount of betterment levy. That apart, the petitioner - JDA was directed to charge betterment levy as per the charges prevalent i.e. in accordance with the Rajasthan Urban Areas (Permission for use of Agricultural Land for Non-Agricultural Purposes and Allotment) Rules, 2012 (for short, "Rules of 2012"), wherein expression "commercial purpose" has been defined under Rule 2(iii), which reads thus: "(iii) 'Commercial Purpose' means use of land or premises for the purpose of trade or commerce or business whether retail or wholesale, which shall include a shop, shopping complex, marriage hall, marriage garden, conference hall, bank, restaurant, hotel, depot, godown, printing press, auto service station, show-room, cinema, multiplex, explosive magazine, weight bridge, workshop, dhaba (whether pucca or temporary structure) petrol pump and such other purposes or any other activity, notified by the State Government, from time to time, as commercial purpose and shall also include the use thereof partly for residential and party for commercial purposes but shall not include tourism units." 7. According to the learned counsel, the definition of the phrase "commercial purpose", specifically excluded tourism unit from its ambit. Hence, the determination made by the Tribunal vide the order impugned before this Court needs no interference by this Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. 8. Referring to the additional affidavit filed on 22nd August, 2017, by the respondent, it is further urged that in somewhat identical factual matrix, betterment levy that was charged treating the 'tourism unit' as the unit for 'commercial purpose', was interfered by the State Government with a further direction to refund the amount. 9. 8. Referring to the additional affidavit filed on 22nd August, 2017, by the respondent, it is further urged that in somewhat identical factual matrix, betterment levy that was charged treating the 'tourism unit' as the unit for 'commercial purpose', was interfered by the State Government with a further direction to refund the amount. 9. Learned counsel would further contend that in compliance of the order made by this Court on 10th October, 2017, reserving rights of the parties while posting the matter for hearing to next date i.e. 7th November, 2017; the respondent has submitted his written submissions, which is a complete response to the twin grounds, which have been raised by the petitioner - JDA while assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the impugned order made by the Tribunal. In support of his contentions, learned counsel relied upon the following opinions: 1. Jasbir Singh v. State of Punjab, (2006) 8 SCC 294 2. State, through special cell, New Delhi v. Navjot Sandhu, (2003) 6 SCC 641 3. D.N. Banerjee v. P.R. Mukherjee, AIR 1953 SC 58 4. Sarpanch v. Ramgiri Gosavi, AIR 1968 SC 222 5. Ganpat v. Shashikant, AIR 1978 SC 955 6. Radhey Shyam & Anr. v. Chhabi Nath & Ors., (2015) 5 SCC 423 7. Gordhan Lal Agarwal v. Mali Ram Modi & Anr., 2013 (4) RLW 3377 (Raj.), and; 8. Abdul Rehman v. State, AIR 1978 SC 949 . 10. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance, perused the relevant materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the submissions at Bar. 11. Indisputably, permission for construction of the hotel was accorded to the respondent under the Policy of 2007, which contemplates conversion of agricultural land to urban areas. It is also not in dispute that the respondent raised construction of the hotel as per the terms and conditions of the Policy of 2007, as a 'tourism unit'. Further, FAR in the case involved herein is to be governed by Clause 7 of the Policy of 2007. The fact that the respondent was charged Rs. 100/- (Rupees: One Hundred), in addition to the price of residential area is also not in dispute. Further, FAR in the case involved herein is to be governed by Clause 7 of the Policy of 2007. The fact that the respondent was charged Rs. 100/- (Rupees: One Hundred), in addition to the price of residential area is also not in dispute. The Tourism Policy of 2007 has now been replaced by by the Rajasthan Tourism Unit Policy - 2015, which contemplates calculation of FAR on the basis of residential reserve price of the area. At this juncture, it will be profitable to take note of the contents of Clause - 5, which also incorporates the factum as to FAR of the Tourism Unit Policy - 2017, which reads thus: "5. Floor Area Ratio (FAR) Under the Tourism Unit Policy, 2007, double FAR was available for tourism units in newly developed and new township areas. At present, standard FAR is 1.33 without betterment levy, and maximum FAR is 2.25 with Betterment Levy is permissible. Tourism units covered under this Policy shall be allowed double FAR i.e. 4.50, out of which 2.25 shall be without betterment levy. Rate for betterment levy shall be calculated on the basis of residential reserve price of the area." 12. From a glance of definition clause of the Rules of 2012, prevalent at the relevant time, the State Government called upon the petitioner - JDA to deal with the matter in accordance with the prevalent rules. From a glance of Rules of 2012, it is more than evident that the 'tourism unit' of the respondent cannot be treated as a commercial unit for such a unit (tourism unit), has been excluded by the definition clause of the Rules of 2012, from the scope and ambit of the phrase "commercial purpose". 13. In the case of Jasbir Singh (supra), it has been held that according to Article 227(1), every High Court has the power of superintendence over all courts and tribunals within its territorial jurisdiction except those which are constituted by or under a law relating to the armed forces. This power of superintendence and control is both of administrative and judicial nature, and such power could be exercised suo-motu. However, the power of superintendence does not imply that the High Court can influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in any particular manner. 14. This power of superintendence and control is both of administrative and judicial nature, and such power could be exercised suo-motu. However, the power of superintendence does not imply that the High Court can influence the subordinate judiciary to pass any order or judgment in any particular manner. 14. In the case of State, through Special Cell, New Delhi (Supra), explaining the scope of exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution of India, it has been held thus: "The supervisory jurisdiction extends to keeping the subordinate Tribunals within the limits of their authority and to seeing that they obey the law. The powers under Article 227 are wide and can be used, to meet the ends of justice. They can be used to interfere even with an interlocutory order. However, the power under Article 227 is a discretionary power and it is difficult to attribute to an order of the High Court, such a source of power, when the High Court itself does not in terms purport to exercise any such discretionary power. It is settle law that this power of judicial superintendence, under Article 227 must be exercised sparingly and only to keep subordinate Courts and Tribunals within the bounds of their authority and not to correct mere errors. Further, where the statute bans the exercise of revisional powers, it would require very exceptional circumstances to warrant interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India since the power of superintendence was not meant to circumvent statutory law. It is settled law that the jurisdiction under Article 227 could not be exercised "as the cloak of an appeal in disguise". Where a statutory right to file an appeal has been provided for, it is not open to High Court to entertain a petition under article 227 of the Constitution. Even if a remedy by way of an appeal has not been provided for against the order and judgement of a district judge. The remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under section 115 CPC. Where remedy to filing a revision before the High Court under section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by state enactment, only in such case a petition under articles 227 of constitution would lie and not under articles 226." 15. The remedy available to the aggrieved person is to file a revision before the High Court under section 115 CPC. Where remedy to filing a revision before the High Court under section 115 CPC has been expressly barred by state enactment, only in such case a petition under articles 227 of constitution would lie and not under articles 226." 15. In the case of D.N. Banerji (supra), the Apex Court of the land, observed thus: "When a tribunal has acted within a jurisdiction high court does not enter fear unless there was any grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law. The court would interfere only when the exercise of discretion by a tribunal is capricious, perverse or ultra vires and not when it is exercised judicially. The court would not interfere merely because it might take a different view of the facts and exercise the discretion differently from what the tribunal has done." 16. In the case of Ramgiri Gosavi (supra), the Supreme Court in no uncertain terms held thus: "The high Court would not re-appreciate, review or reweigh the evidence after the tribunal has appreciated the same and decided questions of fact." 17. In the case of Ganpat (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed thus: "Normally the High Court does not enter the arena of facts under Article 227, but the High Court may interfere if a substantial portion of the evidence relied upon by the lower courts is found to be inadmissible, or of no evidentiary value, or a finding of fact is not supported by any evidence, or is based on manifest misreading of evidence, or if its conclusions are perverse. 18. In the case of Radhey Shyam & Anr. (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the ambit scope of Article 227 of the Constitution held thus: "Under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not issue a writ of certiorari. Article 227 of the Constitution vests the High Courts with a power of superintendence which is to be very sparingly exercised to keep tribunals and courts within the bounds of their authority. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. Under Article 227, orders of both civil and criminal courts can be examined only in very exceptional cases when manifest miscarriage of justice has been occasioned. Such power, however, is not to be exercised to correct a mistake of fact and of law. The essential distinctions in the exercise of power between Articles 226 and 227 are well known and pointed out in Surya Dev Rai and with that we have no disagreement. But we are unable to agree with the legal proposition laid down in Surya Dev Rai that judicial orders passed by a civil court can be examined and then corrected/reversed by the writ court Under Article 226 in exercise of its power under a writ of certiorari. 19. In the case of Gordhan Lal Agarwal (supra), a Coordinate Bench of this Court observed thus: "Exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of Constitution, was only available in order to maintain public confidence in administration of justice and for interference when the orders impugned generated issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction or were vitiated by misdirection in law or perversity on facts leading to manifest injustice to aggrieved party." 20. The Supreme Court in the case of Abdul Rehman and Ors., held thus: "High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution should be reluctant to interfere with or disturb the decision of specially constituted authorities or tribunals under the Act especially when the Legislature has entrusted the task of granting or renewing the stage carriage permits to the aforesaid authorities or tribunals which are expected to be fully conversant with the procedure and practice and the relevant matters which should engage their attention, While considering the scope of interference in a Writ of Certiorari the Supreme Court in this case held that High Court does not exercise the jurisdiction of an Appellate Court in the finding or conclusions on question of fact could hardly be re-examined or disturbed by it under writ jurisdiction as held by the Supreme Court in a case report in AIR 1965 SC 107 ." 21. For the reasons and discussions aforesaid so also in view of the reasonings recorded by the Tribunal vide impugned order dated 23rd December, 2015, in the singular factual matrix of the case at hand as well as in view of the settled legal position as to the scope of interference in the order made by the Tribunal; I am not inclined to entertain the writ application in exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 22. In the result, writ application fails and is hereby dismissed. The petitioner - JDA would do the needful to remove the seal affixed on the hotel. It is further made clear that minor abrasion wherever existing shall be removed by the respondent as may be directed by the competent authority, in accordance with law. 23. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.